8 total
Bail granted pending extradition despite serious online child exploitation allegations.
The applicant sought bail pending an extradition hearing arising from allegations of online sexual communications with minors, extortion, and recorded sexual acts.
The court held that although the Crown's case was strong and the allegations were grave, strict release terms, house arrest, sureties, reporting, internet prohibitions, and prior compliance with similar bail conditions sufficiently addressed the secondary ground.
Applying the tertiary ground framework, the court found public confidence in the administration of justice would not be undermined by release, particularly given the applicant's earlier compliance on bail in related domestic proceedings.
Bail was granted on stringent conditions.
Appeal allowed and acquittal entered after breath samples excluded due to s. 10(b) language rights breach.
The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.
He argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated because police did not inform him he could consult duty counsel in his native language, Vietnamese, despite objective signs of his limited English comprehension.
The Superior Court of Justice found that 'special circumstances' existed, triggering an obligation for police to inform the appellant of his right to access counsel in his language of choice.
The failure to do so constituted a s. 10(b) breach.
Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2), allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.
The court granted a stay of proceedings for a below-ceiling delay of over 17 months in a transitional drinking and driving case.
The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay.
The charge involved driving a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.
The application was heard following the Supreme Court of Canada's landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which established presumptive ceilings for trial delay.
The court found that while the net delay of 17 months and 21 days fell below the 18-month ceiling for provincial courts, the delay was unreasonable in the circumstances.
The defence demonstrated meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings, the case was straightforward to somewhat more than straightforward, and the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to address delay.
The court granted the stay of proceedings.
Nurse suspended for 12 months for stealing patients' credit cards and failing to report criminal convictions.
The Member, a Registered Practical Nurse, faced allegations of professional misconduct after being found guilty of criminal offences including fraud, identity theft, and possession of stolen credit cards belonging to vulnerable patients at two facilities.
The Member also failed to report these criminal charges and findings of guilt to the College.
The Member admitted to the allegations via an Agreed Statement of Facts.
The Discipline Committee found the Member committed professional misconduct and accepted a joint submission on penalty, ordering a 12-month suspension, a reprimand, and various conditions on the Member's certificate of registration.
The accused was acquitted of sexual offences and granted alternative Charter stays due to Crown misconduct and legal aid failures.
The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual touching of a person under 16 years contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code, alleged to have occurred in January 2013.
The trial proceeded over multiple court appearances spanning 17 months.
The accused was found not guilty on both counts.
The court further found that the accused's rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated due to abuse of process resulting from the Crown's breach of undertakings given at the judicial pre-trial and the failures of Legal Aid Ontario.
The court also found a violation of section 11(b) Charter rights due to unreasonable delay caused by the actions of the prosecuting Crown and Legal Aid Ontario.
An 18-minute duty counsel consultation satisfied the right to counsel for an impaired driving arrest.
The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a RIDE check-stop.
The sole issue was whether there was a breach of the defendant's right to consult counsel and, if so, whether breath test results should be excluded.
The defendant consulted with duty counsel for 18 minutes before providing breath samples.
The defendant claimed the consultation was interrupted by the arresting officer, while the officer testified he merely peeked through the window and did not rush her.
The court found that while the officer's interjection may have led to the defendant ending the call somewhat earlier than she might otherwise have done, the 18-minute consultation provided a reasonable opportunity to receive necessary legal advice.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that a detainee has an unlimited right to consult counsel and held that the right is limited to a reasonable opportunity to obtain immediate and preliminary legal advice regarding the core issues in a drinking and driving investigation.
Appeal from convictions for cocaine trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime dismissed.
The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime.
The Crown alleged the appellant was the supplier to a co-conspirator who dealt directly with an undercover officer.
The trial judge found the appellant and the co-conspirator were engaged in a conspiracy to traffic cocaine.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and concluding that the conviction for possession of proceeds of crime flowed directly from the trafficking conviction.
Youth charged with murder released on bail under s. 31 of the YCJA after tertiary ground detention overturned.
The 16-year-old applicant was charged with second degree murder and attempted murder.
He was initially ordered detained solely on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.
The applicant sought a review of the detention order.
The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by failing to consider releasing the youth to a responsible person under s. 31 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.
Additionally, fresh evidence from the preliminary inquiry showed the Crown's case was less compelling than originally presented.
The Court granted the application and ordered the youth released into the care of his grandparents under strict conditions, including house arrest.