K. Frew

The offender pleaded guilty to two historical sexual assault convictions: one committed in 1987 against a woman in her home using a knife as a weapon, and another committed in 1993 against a young woman in a public area.

The offences were discovered through DNA evidence linking the 1987 assault to the 1993 assault in 2003, with the offender finally identified through genealogical investigation in 2023, approximately 30 years after the second assault.

The court imposed an 8-year penitentiary sentence (5 years for the first assault, 3 years consecutive for the second), along with ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA order, firearms prohibition, DNA order, and section 743.21 order.

The court rejected the defence position for a conditional sentence, finding that the gravity of the offences and the offender's degree of responsibility required a significant custodial sentence despite mitigating factors including guilty pleas, remorse, and 30+ years without further criminal conduct.

The Crown applied to have the offender, Vezio Cardullo, declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention following his guilty pleas to sexual assault causing bodily harm, overcoming resistance by choking, and uttering threats.

The defence conceded the dangerous offender designation but opposed an indeterminate sentence, proposing a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court found the offender to be a dangerous offender under all three pathways of the Criminal Code, citing his extensive criminal history, including prior sexual assaults, and the brutal nature of the predicate offences.

However, based on expert evidence indicating the offender's treatability and motivation for change, the court determined that a determinate sentence of 17 years' imprisonment (9.5 years net from judgment date) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public, rather than an indeterminate sentence.

J.R., charged with sexual assault, brought a disclosure motion seeking various communications between the Crown and the complainant/counsel, the Victim Witness Assistant Program (VWAP), and details regarding the storage and destruction of J.R.'s DNA sample from a previous, unrelated case.

The defence argued these materials were relevant to the admissibility of extrinsic sexual activity, the similar fact witness's knowledge, and potential Crown misconduct.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the requested communications irrelevant to the evidence and the DNA sample issue unrelated to the current case.

The court also determined that the defence's claim of Crown misconduct was speculative and not supported by evidence of an abuse of process, thus not warranting the broad disclosure sought.

The offender, D.M., was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault.

This decision concerns his sentencing.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the severe impact on the victim, the nature of the assault (multiple acts, physical violence, presence of another male, victim was 16), and the offender's lack of insight.

Mitigating factors included his youth (18 at the time of offence), lack of prior criminal record, good employment history, and family support.

The Crown sought 4 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the seriousness of the offence and the need for denunciation and general deterrence, but imposed a sentence below the typical range for forced penetration sexual assaults due to the offender's youth and first-offender status.

The Crown applied for an order permitting the adult complainant in a sexual assault trial to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) and with a support person.

The complainant suffered from an anxiety and panic disorder that she believed worsened after testifying at the preliminary inquiry.

The court granted the application, finding that testifying via CCTV would facilitate the complainant giving a full and candid account of the alleged acts.

A 25-year-old offender with a history of addiction and post-traumatic stress disorder from childhood sexual abuse pleaded guilty to multiple charges including breaches of probation, assault on a police officer, and sexual assault.

The sentencing judge imposed 30 days jail time (time served) without additional probation, rejecting the Crown's request for a two-year probation order.

The decision critically examines the criminalization of probation breaches for vulnerable individuals and the concept of "system-generated offences," drawing on the Supreme Court's recent decision in R. v. Zora regarding disproportionate impacts on marginalized populations.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual touching of a person under 16 years contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code, alleged to have occurred in January 2013.

The trial proceeded over multiple court appearances spanning 17 months.

The accused was found not guilty on both counts.

The court further found that the accused's rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated due to abuse of process resulting from the Crown's breach of undertakings given at the judicial pre-trial and the failures of Legal Aid Ontario.

The court also found a violation of section 11(b) Charter rights due to unreasonable delay caused by the actions of the prosecuting Crown and Legal Aid Ontario.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act: operating a motor vehicle without insurance and knowingly using a false insurance card.

The trial proceeded in the defendant's absence.

The Crown proved that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on Highway 403 in Oakville on November 7, 2011, and that she was the registered owner of the vehicle.

The defendant's insurance policy had been cancelled on October 8, 2011, due to non-payment of premiums.

The defendant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the vehicle was insured at the time of the offence.

The defendant also failed to establish the defence of reasonable care.

The Crown stayed the second count, and the defendant was convicted on the first count.

The accused was charged with accessing child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought Charter applications challenging the validity of the search warrant under section 8 and alleging breaches of the right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that the Information to Obtain the search warrant contained significant embellishments and generalizations about offender behaviour that were devoid of meaningful factual support.

The court determined that the ITO provided only suspicion and speculation rather than reasonable and probable grounds that evidence would be found at the residence 13 months after the alleged offence.

The court also found multiple breaches of the accused's section 10(b) rights during questioning by police before he was informed of his right to counsel.

Both the physical evidence and the accused's statements were excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual interference with a young person under 16 years contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The alleged offences occurred on June 6, 2011, in Milton, Ontario.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused pleaded not guilty.

The trial involved testimony from the complainant, her sister, the accused's girlfriend at the time, and the accused himself.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and consistent, while rejecting the testimony of the defence witnesses as unreliable and self-serving.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts and registered a stay on one count pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision on December 14, 2012.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused brought Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the arrest, the admissibility of statements, and the right to counsel.

The court found no violation of s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) regarding the arrest, as the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on civilian witness information and observations.

The court found no s. 7 violation regarding compelled statements, as the accused's statements to the officer were not compelled by a statutory duty to report.

However, the court found a s. 10(b) violation due to inadequate police note-taking regarding the accused's request to speak to counsel, resulting in exclusion of all statements made at the scene and en route to the detachment.

Under s. 24(2), the breath test results were admitted as the breach was minor and the public interest in highway safety favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty of impaired driving based on circumstantial evidence establishing he was the driver and that the driving occurred within the two-hour window required by statute.

The accused, a taxi driver, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference with a minor.

The Crown presented evidence from two complainants and an undercover police officer, all of whom described similar patterns of sexually inappropriate conduct during taxi rides.

The accused denied all allegations, claiming intoxication on the part of the complainants and accidental contact.

The court found the complainants and undercover officer credible and rejected the accused's testimony as inconsistent and evasive.

The court convicted on two counts: sexual interference with a minor and sexual assault.

A stay was entered on the third count (sexual assault of the minor) pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The offender was convicted by a jury of sexual assault and assault arising from an incident involving forced intercourse and physical violence in the complainant’s home, and later pleaded guilty to failing to comply with an undertaking prohibiting contact with the complainant.

The court considered the seriousness of non-consensual intercourse, the physical injuries inflicted, the impact on the complainant, and the intimate relationship between the parties as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of criminal record, some expressions of remorse, and otherwise stable personal circumstances.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in intimate partner sexual violence, the court imposed a custodial sentence within the range reflected in comparable authorities.

Concurrent and consecutive sentences were structured to reflect that the breach offence occurred weeks later.

Following a jury conviction for sexual assault and assault, the defence argued the verdict was ambiguous because the jury may have relied on different factual bases ranging from touching to intercourse.

The court held that the Crown’s closing submissions created the possibility that jurors reached a unanimous verdict based on different evidentiary foundations.

In such circumstances, sentencing requires the trial judge to independently determine the relevant facts using the criminal standard of proof.

After reviewing the trial evidence, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed both digital penetration and sexual intercourse without consent as part of a continuous sexual assault.

These findings were adopted as the factual basis for sentencing.