ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Cooney & Hamber, 2026 ONSC 3929

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-0074-0000

DATE: 2026 07 03

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

BRANDY COONEY AND BECKY HAMBER

Counsel:

Ms. M. MacKenzie and Ms. K. Frew, for the Crown

Ms. K. Edward, for Ms. Cooney

Mr. M. MacGregor and Mr. N. Sheiban, for Ms. Hamber

HEARD: July 3, 2026

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Conlan J.

I. Overview

1Brandy Cooney and Becky Hamber are before the Court to be sentenced after being found guilty after trial of four criminal offences:

(i) unlawful confinement of their view-to-adopt son, J., contrary to section 279(2) of the Criminal Code;

(ii) assault of J. with a weapon, contrary to section 267(a) of the Criminal Code;

(iii) failure to provide to J. the necessaries of life, contrary to section 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code; and

(iv) first degree murder of their view-to-adopt child, L., contrary to section 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

2By virtue of sections 235(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code, it is known that both offenders will be sentenced to life imprisonment as a minimum penalty for the murder of L.

3It is also known, by virtue of section 745(a) of the Criminal Code, that neither offender will be eligible for parole until she has served twenty-five years of the sentence.

4The facts underlying the four criminal offences are outlined in this Court’s reasons for judgment reported at R. v. Cooney & Hamber, 2026 ONSC 2646, and they need not be repeated here.

5Even in a first degree murder case, however, reasons for sentence serve a purpose. More than one purpose, actually.

6They give a chance for the victims to have their sentiments recorded. They are intended to be a resource for Correctional Service Canada and for the Parole Board of Canada. And, in this particular case, they are a reminder that these offenders are being sentenced for more than the murder of L.; in other words, the reasons for sentence are important because they explain what the appropriate punishment is for the abuse of J.

7It must be kept in mind that the offences committed by these offenders against J. are serious crimes. Unlawful confinement and assault with a weapon are each punishable by imprisonment for up to ten years, while failure to provide the necessaries of life is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years.

II. The Positions of the Crown and the Defence

8For obvious reasons, no submissions were made by any counsel with regard to the sentence to be imposed on the first degree murder conviction.

9Concerning the unlawful confinement conviction, the Crown requests a sentence of 3 years in custody; Ms. Edward suggests 3 years in custody; and Mr. MacGregor made no submissions.

10With regard to the assault with a weapon conviction, the Crown requests a sentence of 2 years in custody; Ms. Edward suggests 1 year in custody; and Mr. MacGregor made no submissions.

11Regarding the failure to provide the necessaries of life conviction, the Crown requests the maximum penalty of 5 years in custody; Ms. Edward suggests 3-4 years in custody; and Mr. MacGregor made no submissions.

12It is agreed by all counsel that the sentences imposed on counts 1 through 3 all be made consecutive to one another but concurrent with the sentence imposed on count 4, the first degree murder.

13I wish to thank all counsel for their thoughtful and succinct submissions delivered today.

III. Victim Input

14A sacred Indigenous ceremony, known as smudging, took place in the courtroom earlier this morning.

15In a sense, that ceremony was a form of victim input on behalf of the Indigenous community at large.

16The Court received today several very eloquent and moving victim impact statements on behalf of: the Indigenous community; the neighbourhood where the offenders and the children formerly lived in Burlington; Saint Paul School, where the children used to attend; the Burlington Fire Department, whose members responded to the emergency call and tried to save L.’s life; the children’s former foster mother and father and family in Ottawa; the children’s grandmother; and J. himself.

17This Court is indebted to all of those who took the time to make these sentiments known. Victim input and community input are so very important to the sentencing process. In fact, public confidence in the criminal justice system depends on the intricate involvement of victims and the community at large.

18These are not just words uttered by those who wrote or contributed to these statements. These are vivid illustrations of the immense pain, suffering, grief, sorrow, regret, loss, and guilt that has been experienced by so many as a result of the criminal actions of Ms. Cooney and Ms. Hamber.

19What we do know from these statements is that L. will never be forgotten. And, if J. were a bird, his wings would be buoyed by the winds of support provided by all of those who have made their sentiments known here today.

20This case transcends its particulars. Its impact has been both immense and profound.

IV. The Sentence of the Court

21Perhaps more than any other single consideration, it is the degree of moral blameworthiness of the offender that drives sentencing in Canadian criminal law.

22The fundamental purpose of sentencing is that the sentence imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender – section 718.1 of the Criminal Code.

23For all intents and purposes, the degree of responsibility of the offender and the degree of moral blameworthiness of the offender are the same thing.

24As Chief Justice Lamer wrote for the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (S.C.C.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at paragraphs 37 and 40, a fit sentence is one that properly reflects the gravity of the offence committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender; ultimately, “punishment must be proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender”, citing R. v. Martineau, 1990 CanLII 80 (S.C.C.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at page 645.

25Under section 718 of the Criminal Code, the most important sentencing objectives in this case are (i) denunciation and (ii) deterrence (both general and specific).

26Section 718.01 of the Criminal Code is very clear in this regard – as these offences committed by Ms. Cooney and Ms. Hamber involved the abuse of persons under the age of 18 years, L. and J., this Court shall give primary consideration to the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

27This is further reinforced by section 718.04 of the Criminal Code. Because Ms. Cooney and Ms. Hamber committed offences that involved the abuse of persons who were vulnerable because of their personal circumstances, L. and J., this Court shall give primary consideration to the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

28There is no question that L. and J. were vulnerable persons. They were foster children who had been apprehended by the state and were being placed for potential adoption. In addition, they were children who self-identified as being Indigenous, and section 718.04 specifically refers to the personal circumstance of being “Aboriginal and female” as an example of vulnerability.

29Neither L. nor J. comes within the expression “Aboriginal and female”, however, the point is that the victims’ Indigeneity is one factor that adds to them being considered as vulnerable persons.

30There are other provisions in the Criminal Code that demonstrate the many statutorily aggravating factors that are present in this sentencing of Ms. Cooney and Ms. Hamber.

31It is aggravating that the offenders abused members of their family, L. and J.: section 718.2(a)(ii).

32It is aggravating that the offenders abused minor children, L. and J.: section 718.2(a)(ii.1).

33It is aggravating that the offenders abused their positions of trust and authority in relation to L. and J.: section 718.2(a)(iii).

34It is aggravating that the offences committed by Ms. Cooney and Ms. Hamber had a significant impact on the health of L. and J.: section 718.2(a)(iii.1).

35It is aggravating that the abuse perpetrated by Ms. Cooney and Ms. Hamber had the effect of impeding L. and J. from obtaining health services, most notably Danielle’s Place for L. and medical treatment for the cuts on J.’s feet: section 718.2(a)(vii).

36In summary, this is a highly aggravating case in which both the gravity of the offences and the degree of moral blameworthiness of the offenders are as high as could possibly be imagined.

37Cases involving the abuse of children generally, not just sexual abuse, call for exemplary sentences. I agree with the Crown that R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 has been widely accepted as supporting that principle.

38Ms. Cooney and Ms. Hamber betrayed the faith entrusted to them as foster parents who were about to adopt two young, vulnerable children of Indigenous heritage. Their betrayal of that trust was exemplified in their lengthy abuse of both children, culminating in their killing of L.

39The life of one young child has been snuffed out at the hands of these offenders, and the life of J., the younger brother left behind, has been altered forever.

40For these crimes, Brandy Cooney and Becky Hamber are each sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole until having served at least twenty-five years of the sentence.

41The sentences imposed on counts 1 through 3, the offences involving J., are all made consecutive to one another but concurrent to the sentence imposed on count 4, the first degree murder of L.

42In terms of counts 1 through 3, I have considered the two court decisions filed by the Crown, R. v. S.D., 2017 ONSC 591 and R. v. Zaman, 2025 ONSC 5786, however, respectfully, they are of limited utility. In comparison to the sheer extent of the abuse of J., including its duration, neither of those two cases was nearly as serious as ours.

43On count 1, the unlawful confinement of J., each offender is sentenced to 3 years in custody, as requested by the Crown.

44On count 2, the assault of J. with a weapon, each offender is sentenced to 2 years in custody, as requested by the Crown.

45On count 3, the failure to provide to J. the necessaries of life, each offender is sentenced to 5 years in custody, the maximum penalty prescribed by law, as requested by the Crown.

46For each offender, the victim fine surcharges are waived. There is a lifetime firearms and weapons prohibition order made under section 109 of the Criminal Code. There is a primary designated DNA order made. There is a section 743.21 non-communication order made with regard to all persons named by the Crown in submissions.

47I wish to say three further things. I believe J. I do not believe any of the allegations of maltreatment that were levelled against the former foster family in Ottawa. And these boys, L. and J., have always been Indigenous.

48That is the end of this case but not the end of the memory of L. and only the beginning of the rest of J.’s life.

Conlan J.

Released: July 3, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Cooney & Hamber, 2026 ONSC 3929