Craig Loman Coughlan

The Ontario Court of Justice found Omar Ashraf Elkhodary guilty of assaulting Vicky Moscoe by pushing her during a confrontation over posters depicting child hostages.

The court carefully analyzed video evidence and witness testimony, rejecting Elkhodary's claim of self-defence.

The court applied the modern self-defence framework under Section 34 of the Criminal Code, emphasizing the accused's purpose and reasonable belief of threat.

It concluded Elkhodary's actions were motivated by a desire to remove the posters rather than to defend himself, and that no reasonable grounds existed to believe force was being used or threatened by the complainant.

The accused, Cindy Ali, was charged with first-degree murder in the death of her daughter.

Following a successful appeal of a prior conviction, she proceeded to a new trial without a jury.

The Crown alleged she smothered her daughter, either as a planned act (mercy killing), an impulsive act (second-degree murder), or through criminal negligence by failing to provide necessaries of life (manslaughter) during a staged home invasion.

The defence maintained her innocence, asserting a genuine home invasion by intruders or an accidental death due to seizure/aspiration.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the accused's culpability, noting that both the defence's home invasion account and the Crown's staging theory were equally consistent with the evidence.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

This is a ruling on a Corbett application to determine the admissibility of the accused's criminal record for cross-examination on credibility during a trial for second-degree murder.

The court balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record, considering the nature, similarity, and remoteness of previous convictions, and the need to prevent an unbalanced picture for the jury.

The judge decided to admit an edited version of the record, excluding drug offences, mischief over $5000, crimes indicating antipathy to the justice system (assault peace officer, escape lawful custody), sexual assaults, and possession of a firearm, while allowing crimes of dishonesty (theft, possession of stolen property) and some assaults and breaches of court orders, with aggravated assault reduced to assault.

Simeon Harty was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder and discharging a firearm with intent.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, the offender's criminal record, and being on judicial interim release in violation of conditions.

Mitigating factors included his youth, pro-social behavior, community contributions, positive conduct in detention, and rehabilitation prospects.

The jury recommended 10 years parole ineligibility.

The court, comparing the case to R. v. Grant, imposed a life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility for murder and a concurrent 10-year sentence (7 years 7 months after pre-sentence custody credit) for discharging a firearm with intent.

Ancillary orders for DNA, weapons prohibition, and no-contact were also made.

The Crown applied for an order to permit two police officers to give non-expert opinion evidence identifying the accused from surveillance video in a first-degree murder and attempted murder trial.

The defence resisted the application.

The court found that both officers met the threshold for giving such evidence, having prior acquaintance with the accused and being in a better position than the jury to make the identification due to changes in the accused's appearance and their close interactions.

The court acknowledged potential issues regarding the weight of the evidence and prejudice from prior police contact but ruled the evidence admissible, inviting counsel to minimize the prejudicial risk.

The accused was charged with sexual assault against the complainant.

The Crown called only the complainant as a witness, and the accused called no evidence.

The trial began as a preliminary inquiry but was converted to a trial by judge alone after the complainant's evidence in chief.

The sole issue was whether the complainant's testimony proved the alleged offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge found the complainant's credibility and reliability to be seriously compromised by inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her police statement, particularly regarding alleged threats from the accused, her history of dishonesty in dealings with the criminal justice system, and concerns about the reliability of her memory given her drug use at the time of the alleged incident.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused brought a motion to stay a charge of Over 80 based on unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was arrested on April 2, 2016, with trial scheduled for November 16, 2017, representing 19.5 months of delay.

The Crown argued that defence delay should be deducted, resulting in a net delay of 16 months, below the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The defence contended the net delay was 18.5 months.

The court found the net delay was 18.5 months and that the Crown failed to establish an exceptional circumstance to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The charge was stayed.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with five offences relating to human trafficking and prostitution involving a single adult victim.

The Crown alleged the accused recruited and transported the victim from Ontario to Calgary for the purpose of exploitation, received material benefits from prostitution, exercised control over the victim's movements, and procured her as a prostitute.

The accused was discharged on the threat charge due to lack of evidence.

The court found insufficient evidence of an exploitative purpose under the Criminal Code definition to commit on the human trafficking and material benefit charges.

The accused was committed to trial on the remaining two charges (exercising control and procuring).

The court determined that the trial should proceed in Thunder Bay rather than Toronto, as the substantive offences occurred primarily in Alberta with only incidental conduct in Ontario.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mg/100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused sought to exclude breathalyzer test results on the basis that his Charter rights under s. 8 (right to privacy) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) were breached.

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) as the accused failed to clearly invoke his right to counsel of choice and was not sufficiently diligent in exercising that right.

Although the court found a breach of s. 8 by videotaping the accused while using a urinal without informing him of a private washroom alternative, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol content over the legal limit.

The accused was stopped as part of a mobile RIDE program, failed an approved screening device test, and was arrested.

The accused was transported to a police station where breath samples were provided approximately one hour and ten minutes after the initial stop.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the stop, the grounds for the approved screening device demand, and whether the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The accused abandoned Charter arguments at the close of the Crown's case.

The court found that the stop was lawful, the grounds for the approved screening device demand were established, and the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found guilty.