Dr. Ramsay

The worker, a paramedic, appealed a decision denying entitlement to benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic mental stress, and chronic mental stress.

The worker alleged that their PTSD was caused by traumatic events experienced during their employment.

The Appeals Resolution Officer found that the contemporary medical evidence and the worker's prior reporting indicated that the worker's mental stress injury was primarily caused by interpersonal conflicts and the employer's decisions or actions that are part of the employment function, such as promotions and leaves of absence.

As these factors are excluded from entitlement under the relevant operational policies, the presumption of work-relatedness for PTSD was rebutted, and the appeal was denied.

The appellant appealed her conviction for aggravated assault against a 13-month-old child, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing conflicting expert medical evidence on the causation of the child's head injury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly preferred the Crown's expert opinion in isolation before considering the totality of the evidence, thereby misapplying the R. v. W.(D.) framework.

This led to a flawed assessment of the defence's alternative theories and a failure to properly consider whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following a home invasion where an 82-year-old woman was beaten to death.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder, arguing the jury should only be left with second-degree murder or manslaughter.

The Crown argued first-degree murder could be established through planning and deliberation or constructive murder based on forcible confinement.

The court granted the directed verdict application, finding no evidence to support planning and deliberation, nor evidence of a discrete act of forcible confinement separate from the killing itself.

The jury was directed to return a verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder and subsequently convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

The Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application seeking to make a two-year-old child with special needs a Crown ward without access.

The child had been in foster care since birth.

The mother had significant cognitive and physical limitations, and her five previous children had been made Crown wards.

The father had serious health issues, including stage 4 cancer.

The parents sought a supervision order placing the child in the mother's care.

The court found that the parents lacked the capacity and skills to care for the child and that a supervision order would not mitigate the risks.

The court ordered that the child be made a Crown ward without access to facilitate adoption.

In a second‑degree murder prosecution involving the death of an infant following severe brain and retinal injuries, the court conducted a voir dire on the admissibility of opinion evidence from treating clinicians.

The defence argued that only forensic pathologists should be permitted to testify regarding the mechanism of injury and that clinicians lacked forensic expertise.

Applying the principles governing expert evidence, including the Mohan framework and considerations from the Goudge Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology, the court held that the treating neurosurgeon and paediatric ophthalmologist could provide opinion evidence within the limits of their specialized expertise.

The court concluded that their opinions regarding the likely causes of the brain injury and retinal haemorrhages were reliable, highly probative, and did not risk undue prejudice or confusion for the jury.

The clinicians were therefore permitted to testify regarding the likely mechanisms of the observed injuries.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter based on criminal negligence in relation to the death of his infant child.

The Crown and defence jointly proposed a six‑year penitentiary sentence but disputed the appropriate credit for pre‑sentence custody under ss. 719(3) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted the joint submission, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the abuse of a vulnerable infant and breach of parental trust.

Enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody was granted due to segregation, safety concerns arising from the nature of the offence, and communication restrictions with the offender’s spouse.

The court applied mixed credit rates for different custody periods and imposed ancillary orders including a lifetime firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused was charged with assault and manslaughter in relation to the death of his infant son, who suffered catastrophic brain injuries consistent with violent shaking or acceleration-deceleration trauma.

The Crown’s case was circumstantial and relied on medical evidence, witness testimony, admissions made to acquaintances, and evidence of post-offence conduct.

Expert evidence established that the injuries were non-accidental and occurred within a narrow time window during which the accused was caring for the infant.

Additional circumstantial evidence included prior rough handling of the infant, incriminating statements to a former partner, and flight from the jurisdiction after the incident.

Considering the cumulative effect of the evidence, the court concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused inflicted the injuries causing death.

The defendant pleaded guilty to eight counts of giving contradictory evidence in relation to his testimony at various court proceedings in a second-degree murder case involving the death of a two-and-a-half-year-old child.

The defendant's testimony evolved significantly across multiple hearings, from denying knowledge of the child's injuries to eventually admitting responsibility.

The court imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment, emphasizing the serious nature of misleading evidence in homicide proceedings and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.

The Crown appealed an order quashing a committal for second degree murder and substituting a committal for manslaughter in the death of a 34-month-old child.

The reviewing judge had found insufficient evidence of the subjective intent required for murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the reviewing judge erred by looking at the medical evidence in isolation and failing to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence, which could support an inference of the requisite intent.

The committal for second degree murder was restored.