The Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. CR, 2017 ONSC 5667
CITATION: The Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. CR, 2017 ONSC 5667
COURT FILE NO.: 467/15 (St. Catharines)
DATE: 20171002
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – FAMILY COURT
BETWEEN:
The Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region
Applicant
- and -
CR and AH
Respondents
COUNSEL: Christopher Etherden and Sukhpaul Tut, for the Applicant Edward F. Kravcik, for the Respondents
HEARD: July 24, 25, 26, 28 & August 2, 2017 in St. Catharines and written submissions dated August 14 to 23, 2017
BEFORE: R. A. Lococo, J.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1] The Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region has brought a child protection application relating to the child, AEH. The child is two years old. The Society apprehended him at the hospital following his birth. He has been in foster care since that time.
[2] CR is the child’s mother. AH is his father. The parents have access visits with the child, supervised by the Society. With the parents’ consent, there was a final order dated December 4, 2015 finding the child to be in need of protection pursuant to section 37(2)(l) of the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11.
[3] Following a five-day disposition hearing and written closing submissions, the Society seeks a final order making the child a Crown ward without access. The Society previously brought a summary judgment motion for the same disposition, which was dismissed by MacPherson J. for written reasons dated October 27, 2016.
[4] The child has been in the care of the same foster mother since shortly after his birth. He suffers from some delays and therefore has special needs. He has suffered from a clubfoot, treatment of which requires him to wear special corrective footwear for a period each day. He has gross and fine motor skill delays and speech delays. He has ongoing appointments with medical professionals to address these issues. He is on a wait list for pediatric development assessment and is also waiting to undergo genetic testing.
[5] The child’s mother and father have been in a committed relationship for four years. Except on a temporary basis due to the father’s health (as indicated further below), the parents do not reside together, nor do they intend to do so going forward.
[6] The mother is in her late thirties. She is cognitively and intellectually delayed. She suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and controlled epilepsy. Her financial decisions are made by a trustee provided through Ontario Works, since she is unable to manage her financial affairs. She has five other children with two previous partners. The youngest of those children was born 15 years before the child, AEH. All her previous children were made Crown wards without access.
[7] The father is in his early seventies. He has significant health issues. He has suffered two previous heart attacks. In December 2016, he was diagnosed with cancer (non-Hodgkin lymphoma, stage 4). He was hospitalized and underwent chemotherapy. Upon his release, he was cared for by the mother, with whom he resided on a temporary basis, continuing to the time of trial. No updated medical evidence was provided as to his prognosis going forward.
[8] The father also has a child protection history. He had two children with his late partner, who was their children’s principal caregiver. The children remained with his partner after their separation. One of the children was apprehended and placed in foster care. The child was returned to her mother when the child was 16 years old. The father was also the subject of allegations of sexual interference with a teen-aged girl, but no criminal charges were laid against him.
[9] The Society has serious concerns about the parents’ ability to care for the child. The areas of concern identified by the Society may be summarized as follows:
Parenting capacity – The parents lack the capacity to adequately parent and care for the child, taking into account: (a) the child’s special needs; (b) the parents’ previous parenting history; (c) the mother’s serious mental and physical limitations; and (d) the father’s serious health issues.
Parenting skills/accessing programs and services – The parents failed to demonstrate the parenting skills necessary to parent and care for the child. They failed to access parenting programs and services suggested to them and showed insufficient benefit from the programs they did access.
[10] In light of these concerns as well as the length of time the child has been in the Society’s care, the Society’s position is that there are only two disposition alternatives open to the court: (i) the child is made a Crown ward; or (ii) the child is placed in the care of one or both of his parents subject to a supervision order.
[11] The Society argued that it would be in the child’s best interests to be made a Crown ward without access in order to facilitate his adoption by third parties. In the Society’s submission, based on the concerns outlined above, the parents lack the parenting capacity and skills to care for the child on a full-time basis, especially given the child’s special needs. According to the Society, the risk of harm to the child posed by the parents’ inability to address protection concerns cannot be mitigated by the terms of a supervision order.
[12] The parents’ position has evolved during the course of these proceedings. In his opening statement after the Society completed its evidence, the parents’ counsel indicated that the parents would be requesting that the child be returned to their care in accordance with section 57(3) of the Children and Family Services Act. According to the parents’ counsel, the Society did not adequately investigate the allegations relating to the parents or arrange to have their parenting capability assessed, and did not actively work with them to deal with any protection-related concerns. In these circumstances, the Society had not demonstrated that the parents cannot adequately care for the child or that the parents have no reasonable prospect of gaining the required skills. Therefore, the Society had not met the burden of proof required by the legislation, according to the parents’ counsel.
[13] In the alternative, the parents’ counsel argued in his opening statement that the child should be placed in the mother’s care with a six-month supervision order, subject to terms that would include the following: (i) the parents will work cooperatively with the Society; (ii) the parents will ensure that the child attends all medical and other appointments and will follow the recommendations of professionals working with the child; (iii) the parents will permit the Society full access to the child and their residence; (iv) the parents will complete any parenting programs that the Society requests; (v) the parents will not leave the child with any caregiver not pre-approved by the Society; (vi) the mother will ensure the home is clean, tidy and free from hazards; and (vii) the mother and/or the father will apply for housing with Bethlehem Place or a similar housing organization.
[14] In his closing submissions following the testimony of the mother and the father, the parents’ counsel noted that the mother, as the child’s proposed caregiver, clearly has limitations, and that those limitations have not been assessed. He also noted that the father’s medical situation is somewhat uncertain. Given these circumstances, the parents’ counsel revised his initial position and no longer takes the position that the child should be returned to the parents without further Society involvement. As initially argued in the alternative, the parents’ position is that there should be a six-month supervision order, placing the child in the mother’s care substantially as proposed in their counsel’s opening statement, with enhanced terms that would direct the Society to take an active role in assisting and supervising the parents with respect to care of the child. Among other things, the Society would be required to assist the parents in accessing programs and services, arranging and paying for parenting capacity assessments for both parents, assisting and supporting the mother in applying for Bethlehem Place or other suitable assisted housing, checking on the child at least three times a week, and providing transportation for medical, professional, parenting or other appointments.
[15] For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that it would be in the child’s best interests to be made a Crown ward without access, in order to facilitate his adoption by suitable third parties. In my view, his best interests would not be served by placing him in his parents’ care subject to a supervision order.
[16] In the balance of these reasons, I will consider in more detail each of the areas of concern the Society identified to justify the granting of the order it requests and explain why I have reached the above conclusions on disposition of the Society’s application.
II. Parenting capacity
[17] The Society argued that the parents lack the capacity to adequately parent and care for the child, taking into account: (a) the child’s special needs; (b) the parents’ previous parenting history; (c) the mother’s serious mental and physical limitations; and (d) the father’s serious health issues. In this regard, it is useful to consider the evidence relating to these factors in more detail.
(a) The child’s special needs
[18] The child has been in the care of same foster mother since shortly after his birth. The foster mother has shown admirable devotion to the child’s well-being, but is unable to offer him a permanent home.
[19] According to the testimony of the foster mother and that of the Society’s child service worker, the child is an energetic child, but requires a lot of stimulation and encouragement to engage the child in activities to promote his development. He suffers from some delays and therefore has special needs. He has suffered from a clubfoot, gross and fine motor skill delays and speech delays.
[20] In order to treat his clubfoot, the child needs the assistance of a boots and bar apparatus that he is required to wear for a period of time each day. His foster mother described the procedure for assembling the apparatus, which takes some time, and needs to be done correctly in order for the apparatus to be effective.
[21] In order to address the child’s special needs, the child also has appointments with various medical professionals, including a pediatrician, a speech therapist, a physiotherapist and an occupational therapist. Some of these professionals provide exercises and activities that require implementation at home between appointments. The child is also on a wait list for pediatric development assessment and is also waiting to undergo genetic testing.
[22] The foster mother has been responsible for taking the child for his appointments, which are in various locations. The parents (neither of whom drives) have not been involved in these appointments, nor have they indicated an interest in being involved.
(b) The parents’ previous parenting history
[23] As previously indicated, both parents have a child protection history that the Society relies on to justify its concerns relating to the parents’ capacity to care for the child.
[24] The mother has five other children. She had her first child when she was 15 years old. The biological father was 17 years old. They had four children together over a period of less than five years. The Society became involved because of concerns about the parents’ ability to care for the children. These children were ultimately made Crown wards without access.
[25] Two years after the birth of the youngest of the mother’s four children, she gave birth to another child, who had a different biological father, her then partner. That child was apprehended at birth due to the Society’s concern about the parents’ ability to care for the child. That child was also made a Crown ward without access.
[26] As part of the evidence that the Society relied on, the Society’s counsel noted the 1997 decision of Scott J. with respect to one of the mother’s children with her first partner. The primary focus of that decision related to the capacity of the mother’s partner to parent the child, since he was being put forward as the primary caregiver, with the mother providing secondary support. In her decision making the child a Crown ward without access, Scott J. commented adversely on the prospect of the mother’s providing even secondary parenting support, making reference to her difficulties caring for the child and noting evidence of “her own limitations that prevented her from learning.” Earlier in the decision, Scott J. noted that the mother’s “mental capabilities are limited”, but that “no specific assessment has been presented.”
[27] As previously noted, the child’s father also has a child protection history. He had two children with his late partner, who was their children’s principal caregiver. The children remained with his partner after their separation. The children were never in the father’s primary care. One of the children, who had physical disabilities, died when she was a teenager. The other child was apprehended and placed in foster care. That child was returned to her mother when the child was 16 years old. The father was also the subject of allegations of sexual interference with a teen-aged girl, but no criminal charges were laid against him.
[28] The parents’ counsel argued that it was dangerous and inappropriate to rely on the child protection history of either parent to justify the Society’s position in the current application. According to the parents’ counsel, the relevance of the father’s previous child protection history was limited because he was not being put forward as the primary caregiver. As well, as noted by MacPherson J. in her decision on the summary judgment motion, the allegation of previous sexual interference against the father should not be relied on since it was not substantiated by admissible evidence.
[29] With respect to the mother, the parents’ counsel noted that the focus of Scott J.’s previous decision was the parenting ability of the biological father, not the mother. As well, the mother was then under 20 years old, did not testify, and was not represented by counsel. Her capabilities had not been specifically assessed.
[30] Taking into account the above submissions of the parents’ counsel, I agree that caution is warranted with respect to reliance on the parents’ child protection history when considering the disposition of the current application. In the case of the allegation of sexual impropriety against the father, I agree with the parents’ counsel (and MacPherson J.) that the allegation should not be considered in this case. However, particularly as it relates to the mother, the previous child protection history clearly provides a factual backdrop for the concerns that led to the Society’s intervention upon the child’s birth. As well, as noted further below, I consider it appropriate to rely on the mother’s child protection history together with other evidence that the Society cited to justify the conclusion I have reached with respect to disposition in this case.
(c) The mother’s mental and physical limitations
[31] The evidence at trial establishes that the mother has serious mental and physical limitations. This conclusion was clear from the evidence provided by the Society as well as from the testimony of the parents at the hearing. As noted in a letter dated December 16, 2016 from the mother’s family physician, Dr. Barker:
[The mother] has controlled epilepsy, cognitive impairment and COPD. She is on ODSP and is vulnerable to emotional and physical abuse. She is unlikely able to take care of herself properly and does need a caregiver with her best interests at heart.
[32] In 2014, Dr. Barker referred the mother to a psychologist, Dr. Ramsay, in order to assess the mother’s cognitive capacity. Dr. Ramsay’s report following that consultation was set out in a letter dated July 9, 2014 (with the heading “Psychological Consultation Note”). The consultation included a four hour psychometric examination to assess the mother’s cognitive functions. In summary, Dr. Ramsay concluded that the mother’s performance on measures of intelligence and academic achievement was “significantly lower than average.” He estimated that her Intelligence Quotient (IQ) was 52, significantly lower than the mean of 100, and that her academic performance was at the Grade 2 level, significantly lower than her actual educational achievement at school. Dr. Ramsay indicated that he was unable to formally diagnose her with intellectual delay and assess its degree, because he was not able to administer one of the required psychometric measures. However, he went on to state that “it is fair to say that she has significant intellectual and academic challenges and that her performance is well below the average range for her age.”
[33] Taking into account the psychometric testing as well as his interview with the mother and a review of her chart, Dr. Ramsay also concluded that the mother is “impaired in her ability to meet the demands of daily living”, and that she is “having difficulty with maintaining a healthy weight and requires assistance in order to live adequately.” He also described the mother as “very vulnerable emotionally, cognitive[ly] and psychologically.”
[34] In his consultation note, Dr. Ramsay made a number of recommendations, including continued medical care relating to the mother’s weight, assessment of her level of adaptive skills to facilitate a formal diagnosis of her degree of intellectual delay, continued counselling and a vocational assessment. In her testimony, the mother indicated that after Dr. Ramsay’s report, she had no further consultations with him and that there was no follow up on the recommendations in his report, other than regular visits with her family physician.
[35] The Society relied on Dr. Ramsay’s report to support the conclusion that the mother does not have the capacity to adequately parent and care for the child. The parents’ counsel vigorously challenged that conclusion in his closing submissions. While conceding that the mother had obvious limitations and delays, the parents’ counsel argued that the Society had not established that those limitations impacted her ability to care for the child. According to the parents’ counsel, it was incumbent on the Society to determine the extent of the mother’s limitations to see if they could be addressed in order to allow the child to remain with the parents. Referring to Dr. Ramsay’s report (which was dated more than a year before the child’s birth), counsel argued that even given Dr. Ramsay’s conclusion that the mother’s testing was incomplete, the Society did nothing to assess either parent or assist them in acquiring the skills they required to parent the child. Counsel also relied on the summary judgment motion decision, in which MacPherson J. found a genuine issue requiring a trial, based in part on the fact that there had been no parenting capacity or other assessment of either parent as well as the lack of evidence as to the Society’s efforts to provide resources to the parents to allow them to acquire the necessary parenting skills.
[36] While I initially found the submissions of parents’ counsel on this point persuasive, I ultimately concluded that in the context of all the evidence, including the mother’s testimony at trial, her prior child protection history, and the evidence of the child protection workers about their interactions with the parents and the child, I was entitled to rely on Dr. Ramsay’s report to support the conclusion that the mother does not have the capacity to adequately care for herself, let alone parent and care for the child. As noted further below, I have concluded that the mother’s limitations are so pervasive that it would not be in the child’s best interests to be left in the mother’s care, even with the strict supervision terms that the parents’ counsel suggested.
[37] With respect the parents’ counsel’s reliance on the summary judgment decision, I wish to make it clear that I have no reason to dispute the decision that summary judgment in favour of Crown wardship was not justified in this case, based on the motion judge’s assessment of the evidence before her. However, in reaching the conclusions I have on disposition, I had the benefit of additional evidence, including the oral testimony of both parents and the Society workers. The evidence at trial also covered developments since the summary judgment decision, including the father’s cancer diagnosis, as noted further below.
(d) The father’s serious health issues
[38] As previously noted, the father has significant health issues. He has suffered two previous heart attacks. In December 2016, he was diagnosed with cancer (non-Hodgkin lymphoma, stage 4). He was hospitalized and underwent chemotherapy. In response to a letter from the Society dated February 7, 2017, his oncologist indicated that the father’s medical prognosis was poor. Upon his release from hospital in April 2017, he was cared for by the mother, with whom he resided on a temporary basis, continuing to the time of trial. As of April 2017, his oncologist indicated to the Society (in response to their inquiry) that the father’s medical prognosis was fair. The father continued to undergo chemotherapy on an out-patient basis after his release from hospital. When the father testified at trial, he indicated that he was awaiting word from his oncologist as to whether further treatment would be required. However, no medical evidence has been provided with respect to the father’s prognosis going forward.
[39] As previously noted, the parents’ counsel acknowledged the uncertain nature of the father’s health, and argued that the child should be placed in the mother’s care with the Society’s continued active involvement by way of a supervision order. On the evidence, it is clear that it would not be appropriate in this case to rely on the father as providing even secondary parenting support to the mother going forward, given the father’s serious health issues and uncertain prognosis.
III. Parenting skills/accessing programs and services
[40] The Society argued that the parents failed to demonstrate the parenting skills necessary to parent and care for the child. According to the Society, they failed to access parenting programs and services suggested to them and showed insufficient benefit from the programs they did access.
[41] In support of this position, the Society relied on the evidence of its child protection workers who were involved with the family. According to their evidence, the Society became involved with the mother prior to the child’s birth after Public Health Ontario alerted the Society that the mother was pregnant with her sixth child, and expressed concern about her capacity to parent her child safely given her extensive child protection history and developmental disability. The Society attempted to work with the mother on pregnancy planning, but she refused the Society’s involvement.
[42] After the child’s apprehension following his birth, the Society worker who had carriage of the file (Ms. Moscato) met with the parents along with the father’s adult daughter for a case planning meeting, in which Ms. Moscato reviewed the service goals relating to access, the parents’ involvement in parenting programs and implementing skills learned, and cooperation with the Society. Thereafter, Ms. Moscato (and her successors who were assigned to work with the parents) met with the parents on a number of occasions to discuss the Society’s concerns and the parents’ progress in addressing those concerns. As well, Ms. Moscato suggested that the parents take various programs, including those set out in her letter to the parents dated February 4, 2016. The mother declined to take suggested programs intended to help cope with trauma, including past traumatic experiences and the stress of having her child in foster care, on the basis that she did not need that assistance. The father declined to take anger management programs, on the basis that he had no issues controlling his emotions. Both of them declined to take suggested programs in Niagara Falls or elsewhere outside of St. Catharines, even if the Society provided transportation.
[43] Notwithstanding these objections, both parents have taken certain parenting courses that the Society suggested. In particular, the father has completed the Caring Dads Program offered by the Family Counselling Centre Niagara. The mother attended infant group meetings with other mothers and their infants at the Society offices. Nevertheless, the child protection workers continued to express concern as to whether the parents made any progress in acquiring the skills necessary to effectively care for the child, especially one with special needs. As noted further below, the observations of Society workers that supervised the parents’ access visits with the child did not provide the Society with any confidence that such was the case.
[44] The parents began regular access visits with the child, commencing a few weeks after the child’s birth. Generally speaking access visits have been at the Society’s offices, except when the child accompanied the mother to a parenting program, and one access visit at the hospital when the father was receiving cancer treatment. The regular access visits were initially one hour per week at the Society’s offices, expanding over time to three hours per week. The father was unable to attend access visits once he was hospitalized. The mother’s visits once again became one hour per week when she was assisting in the father’s care, and she missed some access visits during that time. Access visits for both parents have more recently resumed, one hour per week at the Society’s offices.
[45] According to the evidence of the Society worker who supervised the access visits, the mother was actively involved with the child during the visits, playing with him and reading to him, but there was minimal stimulation that would be beneficial for the child’s development, using sensory toys, tummy time or floor play time. The Society worker also indicated that the father generally stay seated and was less engaged with the child, even before the father’s illness. As well, the worker indicated that the child would not go willingly to his parents at the start of visits, and there was generally no show of emotion on either side when the visits ended.
[46] Although access visits have not occurred in the residences of either of the parents, Society workers attended the residences of both the mother and the father at various times to assess their suitability for child care purposes. In general terms, the workers expressed concern about the general clutter and the strong smell of cigarette smoke and animal odours as well as the lack of furniture, equipment or supplies suitable for a child.
[47] As alluded to previously, the parents’ counsel argued that in light of the parents’ previous child protection history, the Society did not take appropriate steps to assess the parents’ parenting capabilities, or actively work with them to address any limitations the parents may have that gave rise to child protection concerns. According to the parents’ counsel, the Society has not demonstrated that the parents cannot adequately care for the child or that the parents have no reasonable prospect of gaining the required skills. In counsel’s submission, the appropriate disposition would be a six month supervision order, placing the child in the mother’s care, with enhanced terms that would direct the Society to take an active role in assisting and supervising the parents with respect to care of the child. Among other things, the Society would be required to assist the parents in accessing programs and services, arranging and paying for parenting capacity assessments for both parents, assisting and supporting the mother in applying for Bethlehem Place or other suitable assisted housing, checking on the child at least three times a week, and providing transportation for medical, professional, parenting or other appointments.
[48] Having considered the submissions of the parents’ counsel, I do not agree that it would be in the child’s best interests to leave the child in the mother’s care, even subject to the strict supervision terms he has suggested. I am satisfied that the evidence at trial, taken as a whole, supports the conclusion that it would be in the child’s best interests to be made a Crown ward without access for the purposes of adoption.
[49] In reaching the conclusion that a supervision order with strict terms was not a viable alternative, I took into account the evidence of the Society workers as to their unsuccessful efforts to persuade the parents to take advantage of some of the programs and services suggested in the past. As well, given the age of the child and the time that he has already spent in care, I do not consider it appropriate to extend the time that the child’s care is subject to the Society’s supervision based on the remote prospect of the mother acquiring the required skills at some time in the future. The evidence before the court does not provide any reasonable basis for concluding that she will be successful in acquiring those skills. As well, for the reasons already indicated, it would not be appropriate to rely on the father to provide secondary parenting support going forward.
IV. Analysis and conclusion
[50] When a child is found to be in need of protection pursuant to section 37(2) of the Child and Family Services Act, the court has the authority to make an order as to the child’s placement, as provided for in section 57. As indicated in section 57(1), any such order must be in the child’s best interests. In order to determine whether an order is in a child’s best interests, the court is directed to take into account the considerations set out in section 37(3).
[51] In this case, two plans of care have been placed before the court for consideration. The Society requests Crown wardship without access to facilitate the child’s adoption by third parties. The parents ask that the child be placed in the mother’s care and custody subject to the Society’s supervision.
[52] In considering the evidence before me, I have no doubt of the parents’ affection for the child and of their desire to have him in the mother’s care with the father’s ongoing involvement, subject to the Society’s supervision. However, as noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. C.M., 1994 CanLII 83 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 165 at 204, “furtherance and protection of the child’s best interests must take priority over the desires and interests of the parent.”[^1]
[53] In this case, for the reasons outlined above, I am satisfied that it is in the child’s best interests to be made a Crown ward and placed in the care of the Society without access. On the evidence before me, I do not consider it to be in the child’s best interests to place him in the care and custody of the parents subject to the Society’s supervision.
[54] In reaching the conclusion that this order should be made without access to the parents, I considered section 59(2.1) of the Child and Family Services Act. That section provides that in order to make or vary an order for access to a Crown ward, the court must be satisfied of two criteria: the relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child (section 59(2.1)(a)); and the access will not impair the child’s future opportunity for adoption (section 59(2.1)(b)). The onus is on the parents to establish that both these criteria are satisfied for access to be granted.
[55] Dealing with section 59(2.1)(b) first, if the child is made a Crown ward without access, the Society intends to offer the child for adoption by appropriate adoptive parents. In this regard, the evidence provided by the Society indicated that there is no apparent impediment to a successful adoption in this case notwithstanding the child’s health and developmental issues, which should be manageable for most prospective adoptive parents. The Society’s intention to offer the child for adoption is consistent with the statutory scheme of the Child and Family Services Act, which indicates a preference for the permanent and stable placement of Crown wards. An order for Crown wardship without access in this case is clearly consistent with that preference. In that regard, there is no evidence to support the conclusion an access order will not impair the child’s future opportunity for adoption, the onus being on the parents to provide such evidence. Therefore, based section 59(2.1)(b), no access order should be made.
[56] Regardless of my conclusion relating to section 59(2.1)(b), I am also satisfied that no access order should be made based on section 59(2.1)(a). As already noted, the onus is on the parents seeking access to a Crown ward to establish that the relationship between the parents and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child. The evidence in this case did not establish that such was the case, especially in light of the parents’ limitations and the child’s special needs.
[57] Accordingly, a final order will issue making the child AEH a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.
The Honourable Mr. Justice R.A. Lococo
Released: October 2, 2017
Niagara Region v. CR, 2017 ONSC 5667
COURT FILE NO.: 467/15 (St. Catharines)
DATE: 20171002
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
FAMILY COURT
BETWEEN:
The Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region
Applicant
- and -
CR and AH
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
R. A. Lococo, J.
Released: October 2, 2017
[^1]: Quoting Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 at para. 60.