WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notices be attached to the file:

This is a case under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and is subject to subsections 110(1) and 111(1) and section 129 of the Act. These provisions read as follows:

110. IDENTITY OF OFFENDER NOT TO BE PUBLISHED —(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act.

111. IDENTITY OF VICTIM OR WITNESS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED —(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.

112. NO SUBSEQUENT DISCLOSURE — No person who is given access to a record or to whom information is disclosed under this Act shall disclose that information to any person unless the disclosure is authorized under this Act.

Subsection 138(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which deals with the conse­quences of failure to comply with these provisions, states as follows:

138. OFFENCES — Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published) . . . or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) . . .

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. M.C., 2026 ONCJ 266

DATE: 2026 05 07

COURT FILE No.: Toronto Region 4810 998 24 Y4810831-00

B E T W E E N :

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

M.C., a young person

Before Justice M. Speyer

Heard on March 30, 2026

Reasons for Judgment released on May 7, 2026

Martin Sabat, Mohsin Yousuf…………………………………….counsel for the Crown

Maija Martin, Stephanie Brown .................................... counsel for the accused M.C.

Speyer J.:

The offence:

[1] M.C. pleaded guilty to 2nd degree murder in the death of Eugene Erlichman. He admitted that on April 29, 2024, between 12:19 p.m. and 1:31 p.m., he fatally stabbed Eugene Erlichman intending to cause his death, or to cause him such bodily harm that he knew would likely cause Mr. Erlichman’s death and was reckless whether death ensued or not.

[2] Following a Gardiner hearing, I made additional findings of fact that are relevant to M.C.’s sentence as a young person under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

[3] The evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that this was a planned attack on Mr. Erlichman, carried out by M.C. and Sebastian Persaud. M.C. was acquainted with Eugene Erlichman through his girlfriend A.R. who was a close friend of Brooke Dawe. Ms. Dawe had been in an intimate relationship with Mr. Erlichman for about one and one-half years. In the week prior to the murder, M.C. and A.R. stayed at Ms. Dawe’s apartment where she lived with her mother and her mother’s boyfriend Adam Ruttan. During this time, M.C. also met Sebastian Persaud, who was in a sexual relationship with Brooke Dawe.

[4] Between April 28 and April 29, 2024, M.C., AR and Brook Dawe stayed overnight with Eugene Erlichman at his apartment at 640 Roselawn Ave. On April 29, 2024, shortly before the murder, M.C. contacted Mr. Persaud and left the apartment to meet him. He returned to the apartment wearing a medical mask and gloves and armed with a knife. M.C., with the assistance of Mr. Persaud, ambushed Mr. Erlichman at the entrance of the apartment and stabbed him multiple times, to 6 areas of his body. They also tried to restrain him with duct tape. There were no defensive wounds on the victim. The fatal wounds were to the posterior base of his neck and to his upper left chest, with puncture wounds to his heart and lung. Shortly after the murder, M.C. and Mr Persaud left the apartment with the victim’s phone, disposing of it in the area of Forest Hill Public Library. The murder weapon or weapons were not found by police, and I infer that M.C. and Mr. Persaud disposed of them.

[5] In the days following the murder, M.C., A.R. and Brooke Dawe returned to Ms. Dawe’s apartment. M.C. telephoned his parents to tell them what he had done, saying he would not “rat out” anyone and would take the blame. On May 2, 2024, Adam Ruttan went to Mr. Erlichman’s apartment and saw Mr. Erlichman dead in the living room area. Mr. Ruttan reported this to paramedics who happened to be in the lobby of the building, but then quickly left without providing any further statement.

[6] Following the discovery of Mr. Erlichman’s body, M.C. dyed his hair and fled to Bellville with the assistance of Adam Ruttan. M.C.’s father found him there on May 3, 2024, and brought him back to Toronto, where he turned him over to Toronto police.

[7] There is evidence that M.C.’s motive for this murder was his belief that Eugene Erlichman was abusive to Brooke Dawe, however this fact has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I place no weight on M.C.’s statement to Dr. Julia Vinik, the author of the s. 34 report, that he was coerced into this murder by an unnamed man who was in a relationship with Ms. Dawe.

Victim impact:

[8] Eugene Erlichman was 23 years old when he was murdered. He was the adopted son of Sarah Kronik Erlichman and Henry Erlichman and sister to Gabriella Erlichman. Family members describe Eugene as a loving, kind, generous, trusting and adventurous young man who was fiercely loyal to his family. Although he faced challenges of mental illness and substance abuse, he was strongly supported by his family, particularly his mother Sarah. Tragically, the apartment where he briefly lived and was murdered, was his first attempt at living independently from his parents.

[9] It is evident from the victim impact statements of Eugene’s parents, sisters, uncles, cousins, and co-workers that he was a beloved member of a tight knit family and community. His death has had a devastating impact on all of them, particularly because of the horrific manner in which he died. Sarah Kronik Erlichman spoke of the joy Eugene brought to their lives and the deep pain she feels everyday since his death. Mrs. Erlichman described how she is a broken woman, whose life has been shattered by grief. She mourns deeply the loss of her son and the future that was taken from him.

[10] Like her parents, Gabriella Erlichman is struggling with depression and anxiety as a result of her brother’s murder. Gabriella and her parents described the guilt they feel in not being able to protect him. They are also angry and fearful that others who were involved in Eugene’s murder have not faced justice. There is no hope of closure for them until everyone involved in this terrible crime has been brought to justice. M.C.’s silence on this issue, while his constitutional right to exercise, only deepens the family’s pain and suffering.

The offender:

[11] M.C. was 17 years old at the time of this murder. He is the third child of A.C. and M.P. The presentence report and the s. 34 report describe him as having a highly chaotic upbringing, marked by chronic exposure to domestic violence, inconsistent parenting, harsh discipline, bullying by peers, and frequent moves. He exhibited early behavioural problems including emotional dysregulation, self-harm, impulsivity, aggression and heavy substance use. M.C. was often suspended from school for fighting and was frequently truant. At the time of his arrest, he had only completed a few grade 9 credits. While he has no other youth record, there is evidence in the presentence report and the s. 34 report that he was frequently involved in criminal activity, including gang involvement.

[12] Growing up, M.C. received counselling and support through various organizations, including the Children’s Aid Society, with little effect. While he has a positive relationship with his mother, his relationship with his father is more challenging and inconsistent.

[13] In the year leading up to the murder, M.C. was in a relationship with another youth, A.R., with whom he has an infant daughter. During this time, he moved out of his mother’s home and lived with A.R., but their housing was transient and insecure. He and A.R. moved frequently, with no adult supervision or structure, or means of support. M.C. stopped going to school and became increasingly involved in criminal activity. His substance abuse escalated. His relationship with A.R. was also problematic, marked by frequent conflict and cycles of separation and reconciliation.

[14] Approximately three weeks before the murder, after another conflict with A.R., M.C. moved back to his mother’s home who tried to impose supervision and structure to keep him from trouble. This arrangement was short-lived. Following another incident, his mother took M.C. to live with his father in Guelph. In the week prior to the murder, M.C. left his father’s home and travelled to Toronto to reunite with A.R., where they stayed at Brooke Dawe’s apartment.

[15] Dr. Vinik reported that M.C. was diagnosed at an early age with Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder, a diagnosis which she confirmed as continuing to this day. She also diagnosed him with having a borderline personality disorder. Dr. Vinik noted that M.C.’s longstanding difficulties with severe emotional dysregulation, impulsivity, interpersonal relationships, and repeated anti-social behaviour such as violence, aggression, and participation in illegal activities are enduring and pervasive, impacting various aspects of his life. These traits are commonly seen in personality disorders and underscore the need for ongoing long term therapeutic support.

[16] Dr. Vinik reported that M.C. also suffers from polysubstance use disorders, which began in early adolescence, and is closely linked to his criminal behaviour. M.C. told Dr. Vinik that at the time of the murder, he was under the influence of cannabis and quite drunk. M.C.’s drug use continued while in custody, and he admitted that he continued to use cannabis and MDMA whenever he could get it, until he was caught with it on May 2, 2025. He told Dr. Vinik that he has since stopped using substances, but also that he intends to continue using cannabis and alcohol when he is released. Dr. Vinik stressed that substance relapse prevention will be critical when M.C. is released from the controlled environment of custody.

[17] According to the s. 34 report, M.C. has made significant progress while in custody, especially while at Arrell Youth Centre. He is described by staff as respectful, compliant and cooperative with staff and generally tries to avoid conflict. This is a noticeable improvement from when he was first placed in custody at the Roy McMurtry Youth Centre where he was involved in a number of physical altercations. He was then moved to Sprucedale Youth Centre where he was again involved in conflicts and physical altercations. These incidents led to his transfer to Arrell Youth Centre in September of 2024 where his behaviour has improved. M.C.’s conflicts with peers and staff have decreased over time, and he has now developed more positive relationships. Indeed, he has been described by staff at Arrell Youth Centre as a prosocial influence on his unit and a mentor to the younger youth.

[18] M.C. has also meaningfully re-engaged with education while in custody, earning nearly all his required high school credits with good grades. His academic success is attributed to his compliance with his medication, reduced substance use, and the structured environment of custody. His future goals are to complete his education and become trained in a skilled trade.

[19] While in custody, M.C. has been compliant with prescribed medication, which has improved his behaviour, and he has meaningfully participated in counselling. He has displayed insight into his difficulties and has expressed remorse for the offence. He continues to enjoy the strong support of his family, especially his mother. His plan on release is to live with A.C., continue treatment and counselling, learn a trade and be a good parent to his daughter.

[20] Dr. Vinik has assessed M.C.’s risk for violent reoffending to be at the high end of the low range while he is in custody, but at a higher risk when he is in the community. She notes that in custody, M.C. has demonstrated significant behavioural improvement, emotional growth, and increased maturity. He has benefited from the highly structured custodial setting with clear expectations and support. However, she also identified some ongoing concerns, particularly related to anger regulation, impulsivity, antisocial attitudes, and substance relapse risk. She believes that with appropriate structure, therapy and support, M.C.’s risk of reoffending can be managed. He will require intensive, structured therapeutic intervention and close supervision to preserve the gains he has made and manage risk following his transition from custody.

[21] Dr. Vinik recommended that M.C. engage in intensive individual therapy specifically targeted to his mental health needs and criminogenic risk factors. She recommends that I consider placing M.C. on an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision Order (IRCS), pursuant to s. 42(2)(r)(iii) and 42(7) of the YCJA. Such an order would provide enhanced rehabilitative programming throughout the custodial and community portions of his sentence.

[22] As outlined in the IRCS suitability assessment report, this is a comprehensive program with dedicated funding that will address the issues identified in Dr. Vinik’s report, with the aim of reducing M.C.’s risk of recidivism. A treatment plan has been developed to address M.C.’s needs while in custody and in the community. M.C. has been assessed as responding positively to treatment and has agreed to participate in the proposed plan. The Provincial Director recommend that I make an IRCS sentence. M.C.’s counsel and the Crown also recommend that I make an IRCS order.

Position of the parties:

[23] The Crown’s position is that the appropriate sentence is one of 7 years, apportioned as 4 years in intensive rehabilitative custody followed by 3 years under conditional supervision in the community, pursuant to s. 42(r)(iii)(A) and (B) of the YCJA. Crown counsel argues that this sentence should be in addition to the time M.C. has spent in pretrial custody since his arrest on May 3, 2024. They argue that a 7-year IRCS sentence from the date of committal is necessary to reflect the nature, gravity, and moral culpability of the young person and to hold him accountable for his crime. They submit that 4 additional years in intensive rehabilitative custody is necessary to rehabilitate M.C. so he can be safely reintegrated into the community. The Crown also seeks an order for M.C.’s DNA, a weapons prohibition order for life, and a no contact order with members of the Erlichman family and others who were with him in the days prior to and after the murder.

[24] Defence counsel agrees that an IRCS sentence of 7 years is warranted but submits that I should deduct two years from the custodial portion of the sentence to reflect the time M.C. has spent in custody since his arrest on May 3, 2024. This would leave a balance of two years in intensive rehabilitative custody and three years under conditional supervision in the community. This position is based on M.C.’s mental health, his substantial progress while in custody, his strong support in the community and the availability of the enhanced rehabilitative programs available through the IRCS order.

[25] M.C. does not oppose the ancillary orders requested but submits that a 10-year weapons prohibition order is reasonable. He also agrees to the no-contact order but requests an exception so he can communicate with A.R. regarding their child.

Applicable sentencing principles:

[26] Section 3(a) of the YCJA sets out general principles that govern the youth criminal justice system, some of which apply to sentencing. Specifically, it holds that the youth criminal justice system is intended to protect the public by:

(i) holding young persons accountable through measures that are proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person,

(ii) promoting the rehabilitation and reintegration of young persons who have committed offences, and

(iii) supporting the prevention of crime by referring young persons to programs or agencies in the community to address the circumstances underlying their offending behaviour.

[27] Section 3(b) of the Act directs that the criminal justice system for young persons be separate from that of adults, must be based on the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability, and must emphasize, amongst other things, rehabilitation and reintegration, and fair and proportionate accountability that is consistent with the greater dependency of young persons and their reduced level of maturity.

[28] Sentencing principles are also contained in section 38 of the Act which states that the purpose of youth sentences is to hold a young person accountable for an offence through the imposition of just sanctions that have meaningful consequences for the young person and that promote his or her rehabilitation and reintegration into society, thereby contributing to the long-term protection of the public.

[29] Additional sentencing principles are found in s. 38(2) of the YCJA which includes the principle of parity, restraint, and proportionality, meaning that the sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person. The objective of the sentence may include denunciation and specific deterrence.

[30] Section 38(3) sets out factors that the court must consider in determining the appropriate sentence, including the degree of participation by the young person in the commission of the offence; the harm done to victims, the time spent in detention by the young person as a result of the offence, any previous findings of guilt of the young person; and any other aggravating and mitigating circumstances related to the young person or the offence that are relevant to the purpose and principles set out in this section.

[31] Pursuant to s. 42(7) of the YCJA, an IRCS order can be made if, (a) the young person has committed a serious violent offence; (b) is suffering from a mental illness or disorder, a psychological disorder or an emotional disturbance; (c) a plan of treatment and intensive supervision has been developed for the young person, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the plan might reduce the risk of the young person repeating the offence or committing a serious violent offence; and (d) the provincial director has determined that an intensive rehabilitative custody and supervision program is available and that the young person’s participation in the program is appropriate.

[32] The length of an IRCS order is governed by s. 42(2)(r) which, in cases of second degree murder must not exceed seven years from the date of committal, comprising of a committal to intensive rehabilitative custody for a maximum of 4 years, followed by a placement under conditional supervision served in the community (see 42(2)(r)(iii)(A) and (B)). The proportion of custody to conditional supervision is within the court’s discretion. The legislated requirement of 2/3 custody and 1/3 community supervision that applies to ordinary custody and supervision orders made under s. 42(2)(n) does not apply to IRCS orders and reflects the fact that intensive custody and supervision is to be an individually tailored sentence - see R. v. A.A.Z., 2013 MBCA 33, para. 68.

[33] The concept of accountability was discussed in the case of R. v. W.(M.), 2017 ONCA 22. At para. 100, Justice Epstein held that section 38(1) of the YCJA emphasizes that the purpose of any youth sentence is to hold the young person accountable for his or her offence. This is to be achieved by imposing sanctions that have meaningful consequences for the young person, and that promote his or her rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

[34] At para. 101 Justice Epstein held that the accountability analysis necessarily involves a consideration of proportionality and rehabilitation, with rehabilitation being "subject to" the proportionality principle. Under s. 38(1), consideration must be given to the sentence that has the greatest chance to rehabilitate the young person. Section 39(3) requires consideration of the youth's attitude toward rehabilitation, his or her history with rehabilitative programs and the availability of such programs.

[35] A central concept of the YCJA is that young persons have a lesser maturity than adults. Thus, the analysis of what is a proportionate sentence that holds the young person accountable for their actions must be founded on the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability.

[36] In R. v. O.(A.), 2007 ONCA 144 at para. 46, the Ontario Court of Appeal identified accountability in the YCJA context as the equivalent to the adult sentencing principle of retribution, and further, recognized the close correlation between moral culpability and retribution. The court applied the concept of retribution as articulated by then Chief Justice Lamer in R. v. M.(C.A.), 1996 CanLll 230 (SCC) at para. 80 as follows:

Retribution in a criminal context, by contrast, represents an objective, reasoned and measured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly reflects the moral culpability of the offender, having regard to the intentional risk-taking of the offender, the consequential harm caused by the offender, and the normative character of the offender's conduct. Furthermore, unlike vengeance, retribution incorporates a principle of restraint; retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, and nothing more.

[37] The concept of denunciation was also discussed by Justice Lamer in R. v. M.(C.A.), supra, at para 81:

Retribution requires that a judicial sentence properly reflect the moral blameworthiness of that particular offender. The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society's condemnation of that particular offender's conduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender's conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law.

Analysis:

[38] In the case before me, the parties are in agreement that an IRCS order should be made. On the basis of the s. 34 report and the IRCS suitability report, I am satisfied that

M.C. meets the criteria set out in s. 42(7) of the Act. The parties also agree that the maximum sentence allowed under s. 42(2)(r) is appropriate. Where the parties differ is the amount of time I should deduct from the custodial portion of the sentence. Before dealing with presentence detention, I will address why I agree that the maximum sentence is required.

[39] M.C. committed one of the most serious crimes in our society: the intentional killing of another person. Eugene Erlichman was a young man with a future ahead of him with a loving supportive family. That future was cut short in a brutally violent manner. The victim was stabbed to death in his own home, a place he should have felt safe from harm. M.C. used his relationship with A.R. and Brooke Dawe to get access to the victim’s home and ambushed him there with the assistance of Sebastian Persaud. Eugene had no hope of surviving such a brutal attack.

[40] This was a planned, premeditated attack on the victim, orchestrated by M.C. and Persaud, and perhaps others. Afterwards, M.C. disposed of evidence and attempted to evade police by changing his appearance and fleeing to Bellville. In the days after the murder, M.C. spoke to his parents and told them what he had done, but never expressed to them his remorse for killing another human being. His only comment on the repercussions of what he had done was to say that he would take the blame, that he would not implicate anyone else in this crime, and that he would have to go away for a while. His preoccupation was with how the murder would impact his life, not the pain and suffering he had caused, or the senseless taking of a life.

[41] The harm M.C. has caused to the Erlichman family is significant and enduring. In their victim impact statements, family members describe the tremendous pain they’ve experienced and continue to suffer. No sentence I impose on M.C. will reduce their pain.

[42] Given M.C.’s high moral culpability, the seriousness of the offence committed, his degree of participation, and the grave consequential harm caused by him, I am satisfied that only a sentence of 7 years will suffice to hold M.C. properly accountable for his crime and serve to denounce his conduct.

[43] I will next address whether any time should be deducted from this period for pretrial custody. M.C. has been in custody on this charge since May 3, 2024, or just over 2 years. Section 38(3)(d) of the YCJA requires the court to take into account time spent in presentence detention but does not mandate a mechanical calculation in the reduction of the custodial portion of the sentence. A youth court justice has discretion to not give any credit for pretrial custody, especially in the context of a Crown application to sentence the youth as an adult, or where to do so would result in a sentence that is inadequate to meet the objectives of the YCJA - see R. v. M.B., 2016 ONCA 760, para 10.

[44] As observed by Justice Pardu in R. v. M.B., supra, para 11:

The reasons why a sentencing judge might choose to exercise discretion in this manner are apparent, when considering the sentencing objectives under the YCJA. Youth sentencing judges are mandated under the YCJA to impose the least restrictive sentence capable of achieving the purposes expressed in the YCJA, and to impose the sentence most likely to rehabilitate the young person and reintegrate him or her into society (YCJA, s. 38(1), 38(2)(e)). Requiring youth court judges to give credit for pre-sentence custody could reduce their ability to meet these objectives because, in some instances, deducting pre-sentence custody could lead to a conclusion that the youth sentence would be of insufficient length to hold the youth accountable.

[45] The Manitoba Court of Appeal in R. v. A.Z.Z., supra at para 150 posed a number of questions that are useful in determining whether any time should be deducted for presentence custody in the context of a youth sentence:

• Will the young person be able to achieve the desired rehabilitation objectives if presentence detention is credited?

• Do the circumstances and consequences of the offence require the maximum sentence be imposed without giving credit for presentence detention?

• Will the youth sentence sufficiently hold the young person accountable (or be a “fit one”) if credit for presentence detention is granted?

• Can the presentence detention be taken into account by adjusting the type or severity of the sentence?

• How long has the youth spent in pretrial detention, what was the reason for the delay and was the young person able to access programs and services while in presentence detention?

• Was there a joint submission and/or extensive negotiations concerning the rehabilitative needs of the young person?

[46] I would add to the above list, whether the Crown has applied to have the youth sentenced as an adult. Appellate courts have consistently held that the youth sentencing judge has broad discretion to take pre-trial custody into account as a consideration in deciding whether the youth should serve a youth or an adult sentence - see R. v. D.W., 2008 ONCA 268, paras 2-3; R. v. M.B., supra, paras 7, 11.

[47] In applying these principles to M.C., I find that an appropriate length of sentence from date of committal is one of 7 years. The sentence will be apportioned as 3 years in secure intensive rehabilitative custody and 4 years under conditional supervision. In coming to this conclusion, I have considered the following:

[48] I recognize that M.C. has made significant gains while in custody, especially in the area of education, emotional growth, reduced aggression, abstinence and improved compliance with authority. However, I am satisfied that additional time in secure custody is needed to ensure he continues on this important path. As observed by Dr. Vinik, M.C.’s risk of offending violently was likely very high when he committed these offences. This risk has been reduced to the low-moderate level. Dr. Vinik attributes this progress largely to the highly structured environment of the youth detention facilities where M.C. has been living, his recent abstinence from substances and his compliance with medications. M.C.’s willingness to participate in rehabilitative programs is also a positive factor.

[49] Notwithstanding these gains, I find that 3 more years in intensive rehabilitative custody is necessary to reduce M.C.’s risk of reoffending and to hold him accountable for his actions. As pointed out by Dr. Vinik, M.C.’s improved behaviour has occurred within a highly structured, closely supervised environment. M.C.’s diagnosis of ADHD, polysubstance use disorder, and significant emotion dysregulation associated with borderline personality disorder, will require him to continue receiving intensive and specialized treatment while in custody and continue when released. I agree with Dr. Vinik’s assessment that sustained treatment and gradual, well‑supported transition to the community are essential to maintain his recent gains and promote long‑term rehabilitation.

[50] M.C. pleaded guilty and expressed his remorse for his actions. During the s. 34 assessment, he acknowledged the seriousness of the crime, accepted responsibility for his actions, and stated that “no one deserves to be killed.” He recognizes the profound harm he caused the victim’s family. M.C. has also articulated how the offence has fundamentally changed him, noting its devastating impact on his own life, his family, and especially his relationship with his daughter.

[51] At the same time, I have some concerns regarding the depth of M.C.’s remorse. He has framed his actions through a lens of coercion, fear, and perceived necessity, suggesting ongoing difficulty in fully accepting responsibility without qualification. He continues to hold anti-social attitudes, especially towards the use of violence and a tendency to justify or minimize harm when actions are linked to “protecting” others. As noted by Dr. Vinik continued, intensive therapeutic work is necessary for him to have a deeper understanding of his behaviour and reduce the risk that fear‑based rationalizations could re‑emerge in the future.

[52] Lastly, I have considered the seriousness of the offence, M.C.’s moral culpability and the harm he has inflicted on the victim and his family. He planned and carried out a brutal attack on a defenceless young man in his own home. A sentence of 7 years is required to properly reflect M.C.’s moral blameworthiness, and to hold him accountable for his behaviour. A sentence of this length is also required to allow as much time as possible for M.C. to continue on his road to rehabilitation. In light of the gains, he has made while in custody, I am satisfied that the secure custody portion of the sentence can be reduced by one year. However, given M.C.’s ongoing need for intensive rehabilitative supports, especially in the community, I conclude that a 4-year conditional supervision order is required achieve the goal of rehabilitation and reintegration.

[53] Dealing next with ancillary orders: For DNA purposes, second degree murder is a primary designated offence, and I order M.C. to provide a sample of his DNA to the National DNA databank. In light of M.C.’s diagnosis and his continued risk or reoffending, I am satisfied that he should be prohibited from possessing firearms and related items for life, pursuant to s. 51 of the YCJA. Lastly, there will be an order prohibiting him from communicating with Sebastian Persaud, Adam Ruttan, Brooke Dawe and A.R., except he may communicate with A.R. through counsel or a mutually agreed upon third party for the purpose of making access arrangements to his daughter, or as permitted by a family court order made after today’s date. He is also prohibited from contacting specific members of the Erlichman family. Crown to provide me with a list of those names.

Released: May 7, 2026

Signed: Justice M. Speyer