Simone Ashley Bilato

The court assessed damages for the applicant, Vineet Khanna, arising from the respondents' breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.

The court rejected claims for rescission and damages in lieu of specific performance, finding the property was not unique and that the applicant failed to prove fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court awarded damages based on the difference between the purchase price and the market value at the date of breach, as well as for extension fees, temporary accommodation, and moving/storage expenses, but denied "equitable interest" and limited some claims due to insufficient evidence.

The applicant, Vineet Khanna, brought a motion to stay the defence of the respondents on the basis that the respondents failed to disclose a Mary-Carter type agreement.

The court reviewed the facts and relevant case law, ultimately finding that the Minutes of Settlement in question were not a Mary-Carter type agreement that changed the adversarial position of the parties.

The court held that immediate disclosure was not required and that the applicant was not prejudiced by any delay in disclosure.

The motion was dismissed.

The parties reached a settlement in Stage 3 of the Condominium Authority Tribunal's online dispute resolution system.

The Tribunal issued a consent order requiring the tenant to comply with the Condominium Act and the corporation's rules regarding nuisance, parking, and storage, subject to specific exemptions for the tenant's business operations.

The tenant was also ordered to pay $13,000 in costs to the corporation.

The applicants sought declarations that their removal as directors of the Niagara Regional Native Centre (NRNC) and the subsequent election of the individual respondents to the board in February 2023 were invalid due to governance irregularities and violations of the Not-for-Profit Corporations Act and NRNC By-Laws.

The court found the February 2023 election and the applicants' removal and membership termination invalid due to lack of proper notice, voting irregularities, and failure to comply with statutory and by-law requirements.

While acknowledging the invalidity, the court declined to reinstate the applicants or invalidate all acts of the subsequent board, instead ordering the current October 2023 board to continue until a properly conducted election, with specific protocols for membership and voting.

The applicants, a horse owner and trainer, sought judicial review of a Horse Racing Appeal Panel (HRAP) decision upholding penalties for their horse testing above the permitted threshold for total carbon dioxide (TCO2).

They argued they were denied procedural fairness regarding disclosure of testing laboratory records, that the HRAP decision was unreasonable, and that the rule establishing the TCO2 threshold was ultra vires.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness given the HRAP's efforts to mitigate late disclosure, concluding the HRAP's reliance on the testing evidence was reasonable, and holding that the rule was within the Registrar's statutory mandate to uphold the integrity of horse racing.

The plaintiff brought an action against the City for injuries sustained after slipping and falling on a snow-covered tree root on private property adjacent to a City sidewalk.

The plaintiff had stepped off the plowed sidewalk to avoid people waiting at a bus stop.

The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the fall occurred on private property, the claim was barred by the 10-day notice requirement under the Municipal Act, and there was no gross negligence.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable excuse for the late notice and that the City had met its duty of care by plowing the sidewalk.

This decision addresses a summary judgment motion by Security National Insurance Company (SN) seeking to dismiss claims for unidentified automobile and family protection coverage.

The central issue was whether the deceased, Lawrence Hamel, and the named insured, Yvonne Moelker, qualified as "spouses" under the Insurance Act and OPCF 44R endorsement, given they maintained separate residences due to Hamel's mental health.

SN argued for a strict co-residence requirement, while the plaintiffs and the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund advocated for a broader interpretation aligned with family law's dependency context.

The court dismissed SN's motion, adopting the expansive, holistic definition of "spouse" from the Family Law Act, which does not mandate shared dwelling, finding that Yvonne and Larry were indeed spouses.

This appeal concerned a dispute between cousins over their aunt's will, specifically regarding the Testatrix's testamentary capacity when she executed a 2007 will.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in finding capacity without sufficient evidence and challenged the costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the assessment of evidence regarding testamentary capacity.

The court affirmed the application judge's discretion to discount expert evidence based on a biased factual summary and found ample evidence to support the Testatrix's capacity.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed, as the appellant failed to demonstrate an error in principle or that the award was plainly wrong, noting that the absence of dockets is not an automatic bar to cost recovery.

The plaintiff sued the defendant municipality after slipping and falling on ice.

The initial notices of claim provided to the municipality inaccurately described the location of the fall.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred due to the deficient notice.

The court found that while the issue of prejudice to the municipality was a genuine issue for trial, the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable excuse for the deficient notice, as he did not provide evidence from family members who were present at the time of the fall.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision which found her injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The applicant argued the adjudicator erred in law by requiring a diagnosis of chronic pain to remove her from the MIG, and erred in fact by failing to consider evidence of functional impairment.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding the adjudicator correctly applied the law regarding chronic pain and functional impairment, and adequately considered the evidence.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought medical and rehabilitation benefits beyond the $3,500 Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) cap, arguing that she suffered from chronic pain and chronic pain syndrome.

The respondent denied the treatment plans on the basis that the injuries were predominantly minor.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to establish a diagnosis of chronic pain or any functional impairment that caused an adverse effect on her well-being, noting she returned to work shortly after the accident and continued her regular duties.

The Tribunal concluded the applicant's injuries fell within the MIG and dismissed the application for additional benefits.