Sean Robichaud

The accused, Roger Jaggernauth, was charged with attempted murder and counselling to commit murder.

The charges stemmed from a crossbow attack on Marlene Pimenta, his former partner, following a contentious separation and family law dispute over her financial investment in his home.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including Jaggernauth's strong motive, his solicitation of a "hitman" from a former biker club member (Paul Eakin), threatening utterances to his work supervisor (David Allan), and "heat conscious" after-the-fact conduct prior to being officially contacted by police.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, concluding that the circumstantial evidence, viewed holistically, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jaggernauth orchestrated the attack with intent to kill and deliberately counselled murder.

The case involved charges of importing and possessing heroin for trafficking against two accused.

The central issue was the accused's knowledge of the parcel's contents.

The court applied the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule and found one accused guilty, while the other was acquitted due to lingering doubt regarding their knowledge.

This ruling addresses a voir dire during a judge-alone trial to determine the admissibility of electronic documents (Kijiji messages and email attachments) proffered by the defendant Sebastian Zamora.

Zamora, charged with importing and possessing heroin, sought to admit these documents as circumstantial evidence of his state of mind, arguing they provided context to cellular phone extractions relied upon by the Crown.

The Crown objected, arguing the documents were inadmissible hearsay and akin to prior consistent exculpatory statements.

The court found that the electronic documents met the authenticity and best evidence rules under the Canada Evidence Act, having been verified by a police officer.

The court ruled that the documents were admissible as circumstantial evidence, noting that their weight would be determined at the conclusion of all evidence, and that trial fairness required their admission to provide context to the Crown's evidence.

This criminal trial concerned a single count of sexual assault against B.B., based on his daughter T.B.'s recovered memory of an incident from her childhood.

T.B. experienced a "flashback" in 2018, recalling her father touching her nipples when she was around 11 years old.

The court meticulously assessed the reliability of T.B.'s recovered memory, noting the absence of independent corroborating evidence and the potential for confabulation, despite T.B.'s sincere belief in its truth.

The judge also considered B.B.'s exculpatory statements and the complex family communications surrounding the allegation.

Ultimately, the court found that the Crown did not prove B.B.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The accused was charged with three counts of sexual offences against his two stepdaughters.

The allegations spanned several years and involved both touching and intercourse.

The accused testified and emphatically denied the allegations, providing a detailed and credible account of events.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court accepted the accused's exculpatory evidence under the first prong, finding him entirely credible.

The court also found that even if the accused's evidence was not fully accepted, it raised a reasonable doubt under the second prong, and the frailties in the Crown's evidence raised a reasonable doubt under the third prong.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter at a house party where both parties consumed significant amounts of alcohol.

The complainant had almost no memory of the events and awoke the next day suspecting she had been sexually assaulted.

The accused testified that the sexual encounter was consensual.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework to assess credibility and considered whether the complainant had the capacity to consent and whether she subjectively consented.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent or that she did not consent, as there were reasonable inferences available other than guilt.

The accused was found not guilty.

Following a jury's guilty verdict for gang sexual assault and administering a stupefying drug, the court delivered reasons for sentencing Gavin MacMillan and Enzo DeJesus Carrasco.

Each offender received a total sentence of nine years imprisonment (seven years for gang sexual assault and two years consecutive for administering a stupefying substance), with credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court found that the victim never consented to the sexual activity, and the offenders had no mistaken belief of consent, rejecting their characterization of events as consensual BDSM.

Ancillary orders included DNA, lifetime prohibition, 20-year SOIRA, and non-communication.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder and robbery, sought a bail review under s. 522 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court agreed that the pandemic was a material change, granting jurisdiction to review the detention order.

However, the court found that the applicant's detention remained necessary on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

Despite a strict proposed release plan involving house arrest and electronic monitoring, the court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the applicant would commit further offences and that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the alleged offences.

The Crown brought an application during a trial for gang sexual assault to admit the expert testimony of an emergency room physician and a sexual assault nurse-examiner.

The proposed evidence concerned the effects of alcohol and drugs on the complainant's consciousness and capacity to consent, as well as the interpretation of her physical injuries.

The accused opposed the physician's evidence, arguing she lacked toxicological expertise and was biased due to her advocacy for sexual assault survivors.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant, necessary, and reliable, and held that the physician's social media posts did not demonstrate an inability to provide impartial evidence.

The accused, charged with gang sexual assault and other offences, brought applications under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual comments, gestures, and interest in a sex club to support their defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The court dismissed the application regarding the prior sexual comments and gestures, finding the evidence irrelevant and based on prohibited twin-myth reasoning.

The court permitted limited evidence regarding discussions about attending a sex club solely to provide context for a text message sent by one of the accused, with strict instructions against using it to infer consent.

Evidence of conversations immediately prior to the sexual encounters was ruled admissible.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion arguing that recent amendments to the Criminal Code eliminating peremptory challenges in jury selection should not apply retrospectively to their trial.

The court applied the rule of coordinate jurisdiction, noting that two other Ontario Superior Court judges had already ruled the amendments were procedural and applied retrospectively.

Finding no cogent reason to depart from those decisions, the court dismissed the application and ordered jury selection to proceed under the amended procedure.

The Crown sought to admit a post-arrest statement made by the accused, who was charged with multiple sexual offences.

The accused challenged the voluntariness of the statement, arguing that his English comprehension was insufficient and that the police caution regarding his right to silence was inadequate.

The court found that the accused's English skills were reasonably sophisticated and that the police officer went to great lengths to ensure the accused understood his right to silence.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, applied to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity and the #MeToo movement, specifically the #IBelieveHer hashtag.

The court permitted modified questions regarding pre-trial publicity but dismissed the request to ask questions about the #MeToo movement and the hashtag.

The court held there was an insufficient evidentiary basis to take judicial notice of widespread bias or that jurors would be incapable of setting aside such bias despite trial safeguards.

Jason William Heffernan pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death after an incident in a shopping plaza parking lot where the victim, Corby Stott, was struck and killed.

Stott was attempting to direct traffic when a confrontation ensued, leading to Heffernan driving his vehicle with Stott on the hood, accelerating to a speed that caused Stott to fall and sustain fatal head trauma.

The court considered the principles of denunciation, general deterrence, and rehabilitation.

Aggravating factors included the verbal confrontation, aggressive driving, driving with the victim on the hood, failure to stop immediately, and the significant impact on the victim's family.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, expressed remorse, calling 911, remaining at the scene, the offence being out of character, and strong family support.

The court emphasized the high moral blameworthiness despite the absence of intent to kill.

Two brothers were jointly charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal to trial based on surveillance evidence showing hand-to-hand transactions over two days and the subsequent discovery of drugs and cash at a residence where both accused were found.

The court applied the test for committal in circumstantial cases, examining whether a reasonable jury could draw inferences of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused to trial on all three counts.

The accused, charged with second degree murder following a vehicular confrontation with a pedestrian, applied for release on bail pending trial.

The Crown conceded that the accused met his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court granted the application and ordered the accused's release on a $200,000 recognizance with strict conditions, including house arrest and supervision by named sureties, to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of importing heroin and conspiracy to import heroin.

The sentencing judge determined that the offender was a joint principal and organizer of a sophisticated international drug smuggling operation involving multiple importations from Africa to Canada and the United States.

The court rejected the argument that the offender's tragic personal history as a survivor of the Rwandan genocide warranted a departure from the usual sentencing range, as there was no link between her history and the offences.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 15 years in custody, less pre-sentence credit, along with mandatory weapons prohibition and DNA orders.

In a first degree murder trial arising from a fatal shooting outside an apartment elevator, the Crown sought to admit ante-mortem statements of the deceased and multiple prior statements of a key eyewitness who fled to the United States before trial.

Applying the principled hearsay framework, the court found necessity established for both categories because the deceased had died and the eyewitness had deliberately removed herself from the court's reach despite diligent efforts to secure her attendance.

The deceased's statements were admitted because their temporal proximity, surrounding circumstances, partial corroboration, and available cross-examination of the reporting witnesses provided threshold reliability.

The eyewitness's statements were excluded because she had repeatedly lied under oath and to police, had a possible motive to deflect blame, and her prior preliminary inquiry testimony offered no meaningful substitute for contemporaneous cross-examination.

On a pre-trial evidentiary motion in a murder prosecution, the court dismissed the defence application to exclude police statements for alleged breach of the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The court held the accused was repeatedly informed of his rights, understood the jeopardy he faced, and clearly waived immediate access to counsel in order to hear what the investigator had to say.

The court further held that the accused's denials and lies to police had some probative value as post-offence conduct relevant to rebutting a self-defence claim.

The statements were admissible, with the caveat that the jury would require limiting instructions as to the permissible use of that evidence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on observations by police officers, field sobriety tests, a drug evaluation officer's assessment, and toxicology evidence showing the presence of marijuana and prescription drugs in the accused's urine.

The defence challenged the admissibility of evidence and argued the Crown had not proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that while the drug evaluation officer's opinion was admissible as non-expert opinion evidence under R. v. Graat, it did not rise to the level of expert evidence and therefore did not carry special weight.

Considering all evidence, including the absence of impaired driving, the court found the Crown had not proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed the charge.