Jordan Lee Gold

The offender was convicted of sexually assaulting an incapacitated victim who was his friend and tenant.

The assault resulted in an unwanted pregnancy which the victim subsequently terminated.

The court denied a request to anonymize the trial decision, as the victim did not support it.

Weighing the significant harm to the victim and the breach of trust against the offender's lack of a criminal record and positive background, the court imposed a sentence of 42 months' imprisonment along with ancillary orders.

In a sexual assault prosecution, the court ruled on competing pre-trial evidentiary applications concerning prior sexual activity evidence and the complainant's attitudes toward sexual activity with the accused.

The defence sought to adduce evidence of prior sexual trauma to explain the complainant's reaction, her asserted belief in non-consent, and her later recovered memory; the Crown sought to lead evidence that the complainant had no romantic or sexual interest in the accused.

Applying the s. 276 framework, the court held that the defence could adduce only the fact of prior recovered memories, without identifying the sexual nature of the earlier trauma, and rejected broader use of the prior trauma evidence.

The court also excluded the Crown's proposed evidence as impermissible propensity reasoning on consent.

The court acquitted A.B. of all charges of sexual assault and sexual touching against Y.Z., finding that the complainant's evidence was not sufficiently reliable or credible to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The decision turned on significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, implausibility in the mechanics of the alleged assaults, and contradictions with other evidence, including the timing and circumstances of the alleged events.

The court also found the accused's evidence to be generally credible and reliable.

The accused, Mark Andre Davis, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a 13-year-old complainant, his tennis student, relating to an incident in his car after a tennis practice.

The complainant and the accused gave conflicting accounts of the incident.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant’s evidence and was left in reasonable doubt by the accused’s version.

Mr. Davis was acquitted of all charges.

The court considered whether a complainant can consent to bodily harm in the context of BDSM sexual activity.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault with a weapon.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable and concluded that the Crown failed to prove lack of consent, vitiation of consent by abuse of authority, or intentional infliction of bodily harm beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The decision also discusses the social value of BDSM and questions whether the law should be re-examined to reflect contemporary social norms.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code to admit the complainant's videotaped statement in a sexual assault and sexual interference trial.

The respondent opposed, arguing the statement, recorded two years and two months after the last alleged incident, was not made within a "reasonable time." The court, applying a holistic interpretation of "reasonable time" considered the complainant's age at the time of delay, the relationship with the accused, and the common reasons for delayed disclosure in sexual abuse cases.

The court found the delay reasonable and allowed the application, concluding that admitting the video recording would not interfere with the proper administration of justice.

The applicant, Marcus Pearson, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

He was charged with sexual assault offences, and the total delay from information sworn to trial completion was 26 months and 2 days, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The applicant argued that the Crown's decision to prefer a direct indictment a year after the preliminary hearing was set caused unreasonable delay.

The court found that while the defence took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, the applicant failed to demonstrate that the case took "markedly longer than it reasonably should have" particularly given that prosecutorial discretion in preferring an indictment is only reviewable for abuse of process, which was not alleged.

The application was dismissed.

The court delivered oral reasons for sentence after Roger Jaggernauth was found guilty of attempted murder and counselling to commit murder.

The Crown and defence jointly proposed a total sentence of 16.5 years custody, with credit for pre-sentencing custody.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the devastating impact on the victim, the domestic context of the offences, the victim's vulnerability, the fact the attack occurred at her home, and the extensive planning involved in the contract hit.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, pro-social history, and time spent on house arrest.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it proportionate and consistent with sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The accused, Roger Jaggernauth, was charged with attempted murder and counselling to commit murder.

The charges stemmed from a crossbow attack on Marlene Pimenta, his former partner, following a contentious separation and family law dispute over her financial investment in his home.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including Jaggernauth's strong motive, his solicitation of a "hitman" from a former biker club member (Paul Eakin), threatening utterances to his work supervisor (David Allan), and "heat conscious" after-the-fact conduct prior to being officially contacted by police.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, concluding that the circumstantial evidence, viewed holistically, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jaggernauth orchestrated the attack with intent to kill and deliberately counselled murder.

Darcy Martin pleaded guilty to one count of Sexual Interference, contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code, involving a 15-year-old victim.

The court considered aggravating factors including a prior sexual assault record, the victim's age and vulnerability, a significant age difference, and the profound impact on the victim and her mother.

Mitigating factors included a guilty plea (though late), genuine remorse, proactive efforts to address sex addiction through counselling and 12-step programs, supportive family, positive employment history, and compliance with bail conditions.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives for child sexual offences, guided by R. v. Friesen.

The final sentence was three years imprisonment, along with mandatory ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, a 20-year SOIRA registration, a victim fine surcharge, and a 10-year prohibition from positions of trust with minors.

The court also invited further submissions on internet accountability and no-contact orders.

The applicant pled guilty to drug trafficking offences but sought a stay of two counts of cocaine trafficking, alleging entrapment.

He argued police lacked reasonable suspicion that he was trafficking cocaine before providing him the opportunity to sell it to an undercover officer.

The court dismissed the application, finding that police had formed the requisite reasonable suspicion based on reliable confidential informant tips, extensive surveillance, and the applicant's own statements to the undercover officer prior to the drug transaction.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault following trial.

The Crown sought imprisonment for nine months followed by probation for two years, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, SOIRA registration for 10 years, weapons prohibition, and a section 743.21 order.

The defence sought a conditional discharge with strict probation conditions including house arrest.

The court imposed imprisonment for four months followed by probation for three years, with conditions including no contact with the victim, a 20-metre distance requirement, mandatory counselling and sexual offender relapse prevention programming, restrictions on employment in positions of trust involving physical therapy, and ancillary orders for DNA collection, SOIRA registration for 10 years, and weapons prohibition.

The accused, a therapy assistant at a home care agency, was charged with sexually assaulting an elderly male client.

The Crown alleged that the accused touched the complainant's penis without consent during a physiotherapy session.

The accused claimed he was conducting a medical examination to assess for signs of infection or inflammation.

The court found that the accused intentionally applied force to the complainant's penis without communicated consent, that the touching occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature violating the complainant's sexual integrity, and that the accused's explanation for the touching was not credible.

The court rejected the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown sought to prove lack of consent by arguing the complainant lacked capacity due to voluntary alcohol ingestion.

The court found that the complainant's lack of memory was not solely indicative of incapacity, and considering the totality of evidence, including the accused's detailed account and post-incident communications, a reasonable doubt existed regarding the complainant's capacity to consent and actual consent.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for an 'over 80' offence.

The trial judge had excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding two breaches of s. 10(b) because the police did not allow the respondent to call a police officer friend to get a lawyer's name, and because the police told him he could call his own lawyer, duty counsel, or no lawyer.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found the trial judge erred in law.

The police had no obligation to facilitate a call to a third party when the detainee did not explain the reason, and the information provided about the right to counsel was not misleading.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The accused was convicted at trial of five offences arising from his attempt to purchase sexual services from two 14-year-old girls.

Following conviction, the accused applied to reopen the case, arguing that late disclosure and failure to disclose certain documents deprived him of the ability to make full answer and defence.

Specifically, the defence contended that disclosure related to a second production order was not adequately provided, which may have prevented a Charter challenge to the admissibility of evidence obtained from that order.

The Crown argued that disclosure was provided in a timely manner and that the defence had notice of the availability of further disclosure.

The court dismissed the application to reopen, finding that the rigorous test for reopening after verdict had not been met.