Emily Beaton

The defendant, Nimal Ranatunga, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, M.F., testified that she consented to sexual intercourse only on the condition that a condom be used.

The defendant initially complied but then removed the condom during intercourse without M.F.'s knowledge or consent.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Kirkpatrick regarding non-consensual condom removal.

The central issue was the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the defendant, and whether the defendant had an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court found M.F. to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the defendant's claim that he informed M.F. or that her subsequent actions implied consent.

The court concluded that the defendant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent for unprotected sex, finding him guilty of sexual assault.

Nimal Ranatunga was found guilty of sexually assaulting MF by removing a condom during consensual intercourse without her permission ("stealthing").

The victim suffered severe trauma, depression, and anxiety.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and the evolving legal landscape regarding non-consensual condom removal as sexual assault (referencing Kirkpatrick and Hutchinson).

While the Crown sought a 3-year penitentiary sentence, and the defence sought a 2-year conditional sentence, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, with the first 10 months under house arrest, followed by 8 months of curfew, and 6 months of statutory terms.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition (life for prohibited firearms), and a 20-year SOIRA order.

The court found the conditional sentence appropriate given the specific circumstances of the offence and the offender, noting the qualitative difference from sexual assaults involving physical restraint, and the offender's good rehabilitative prospects and remorse.

This criminal trial concerned eight counts against the accused, H.H., involving his former spouse and their daughter across three incidents.

The charges included sexual assault, assault, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats, mischief, and assault by strangulation.

The court assessed the credibility of the witnesses, finding the complainant and her brother credible, while disbelieving the accused.

Based on the evidence, the accused was found guilty on seven counts, including sexual assault, multiple assaults, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats, mischief, and assault by strangulation.

He was acquitted on one count of assault against his daughter due to reasonable doubt regarding intent.

This is a criminal trial under the Youth Criminal Justice Act where a young person, S.B.S., faced three allegations of sexual assault involving his younger cousin.

The court assessed the credibility of both the complainant and the young person, finding both to be largely credible.

Despite the compelling testimony of the complainant, the court found that inconsistencies in her account, combined with the young person's credible denials and other defence evidence, raised a reasonable doubt regarding the allegations.

Consequently, S.B.S. was acquitted of all counts.

Darcy Martin pleaded guilty to one count of Sexual Interference, contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code, involving a 15-year-old victim.

The court considered aggravating factors including a prior sexual assault record, the victim's age and vulnerability, a significant age difference, and the profound impact on the victim and her mother.

Mitigating factors included a guilty plea (though late), genuine remorse, proactive efforts to address sex addiction through counselling and 12-step programs, supportive family, positive employment history, and compliance with bail conditions.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives for child sexual offences, guided by R. v. Friesen.

The final sentence was three years imprisonment, along with mandatory ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, a 20-year SOIRA registration, a victim fine surcharge, and a 10-year prohibition from positions of trust with minors.

The court also invited further submissions on internet accountability and no-contact orders.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his co-worker over a period from July 2016 to June 2017 at their workplace.

The complainant testified that the accused touched her breast and crotch area on more than 30 occasions without consent.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming the complainant fabricated them to obtain a layoff or money through the Human Rights Tribunal.

The central issue was credibility and reliability of the parties.

The court found the complainant's evidence consistent and credible despite vigorous cross-examination, and rejected the accused's denials and alternative explanations.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

A police officer arrested the accused for impaired driving but failed to immediately advise him of his right to counsel, instead choosing to search for identification and seize an item from the vehicle.

The Crown conceded this constituted a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the breach sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion of the breath test results, particularly given systemic failures by the Peel Regional Police to comply with the immediacy requirement.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving based on observations of erratic driving and physical indicia of impairment, but the charge of exceeding the legal limit was dismissed due to the exclusion of the breath test evidence.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the defendant drove into a commercial plaza parking lot in Brampton where he was stopped at a fixed-point sobriety check stop.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the detention, the grounds for the approved screening device demand, and the voluntariness of statements made in the breath room.

The court found the detention was authorized under the Highway Traffic Act and common law, the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on bloodshot eyes and odour of alcohol on the breath, and the defendant's statements were voluntary given the multiple cautions provided and the fair manner in which the breath technician conducted the proceedings.

Expert toxicological evidence established the defendant's blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a violation of section 11(b) of the Charter (right to be tried within a reasonable time) and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The trial commenced on September 22, 2014, but was adjourned to February 26, 2015 due to underestimation of trial time.

The defendant's section 11(b) application was heard on February 26, 2015, and the court reserved judgment.

The application was dismissed on July 8, 2015.

The court found that the total delay of approximately 25 months should be apportioned as follows: delay subject to waiver (6 months), inherent time requirements (8 months and 1 week), actions of the defence (4 months), and institutional delay (7 months).

The institutional delay fell below established guidelines, and the defendant failed to establish actual prejudice resulting from the delay.

The Crown brought an application to recall Constable Bell to provide additional evidence regarding the location and circumstances of a vehicle stop.

The defence raised a Charter argument regarding arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, arguing the stop occurred on private property without legal authority.

The Crown sought to recall the witness to elicit evidence relevant to this Charter issue, which had not been specifically particularized in the defence's notice of application.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that while the defence was not at fault for failing to provide specific notice due to inadequate disclosure, it had an ongoing obligation to alert the Crown once the issue became apparent.

The court balanced procedural fairness to both parties and permitted the Crown to recall the witness to address the Charter claim.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

Media organizations sought permission to use electronic devices to transmit information from inside the courtroom and to make audio recordings during a criminal jury trial.

The court considered s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act and an applicable practice direction permitting unobtrusive audio recording by journalists solely to supplement handwritten notes.

The court authorized such audio recordings and permitted journalists to transmit information from inside the courtroom, provided proceedings were not disrupted.

The court also established a procedure governing media access to large volumes of documentary exhibits, requiring undertakings preventing publication until a judicial determination confirmed sufficient evidence to place the document before the jury.

A publication restriction was ordered for specified personal identifying information contained in documentary materials.