JulieAnn Barrett

The offender pleaded guilty to 13 counts involving the sexual abuse of five child victims, including his niece from age 2 to 7, the creation of child pornography, and possession of child pornography.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence or, alternatively, a long-term offender designation.

The defence opposed both designations, arguing for a determinate sentence of 8-10 years.

The court found the offender met the criteria for dangerous offender status under sections 753(1)(a)(i) and 753(1)(b) of the Criminal Code based on a pattern of repetitive sexual behaviour and failure to control sexual impulses, with a likelihood of future harm.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of 13 years 6 months less pre-sentence custody, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order, rejecting an indeterminate sentence but finding the offender's risk manageable in the community with appropriate conditions and treatment.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.