Milan Rupic

The offender, an on-duty police officer, was convicted of sexual assault after using his position to engineer private meetings with a vulnerable complainant, leading to digital penetration and forced fellatio.

The Crown sought a sentence of five to six years, while the defence sought three years.

The court weighed the grave breach of trust and profound impact on the complainant against the offender's lack of criminal record, exemplary career, and the collateral consequences of his conviction.

The offender was sentenced to four years in custody, along with DNA, SOIRA, weapons prohibition, and non-communication orders.

A Toronto Police Service officer, Constable Quinn, was charged with one count of sexual assault of E.W. while on duty.

The Crown alleged the sexual activity was non-consensual, and that Quinn manipulated the situation by faking a phone call to his partner and creating opportunities to be alone with the complainant.

Quinn testified the activity was consensual and instigated by the complainant.

The court found Quinn's testimony not credible, particularly regarding the fake phone call and his efforts to engage with the complainant outside of police duties.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence that she did not consent and found her credible and reliable.

The court also determined that, even if there had been apparent consent, it would have been vitiated by Quinn's abuse of his position of trust, power, or authority as an on-duty police officer.

Constable Quinn was found guilty of sexual assault.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent, Jake Grant, on an assault charge.

The trial judge had stayed proceedings due to alleged abuse of process, citing the complainant's monetary motivation, police misconduct in not referring the investigation out, and Crown's disclosure issues (not disclosing *R. v. Tout* and not calling the complainant).

The appellate court found that the trial judge made reversible errors in law and fact, particularly in misapprehending the evidence (especially surveillance videos), misapplying the *Babos* test for abuse of process, and incorrectly stating the Crown's duty to call witnesses or the accused's right to confront an accuser.

The appellate court found the police investigation was comprehensive and the disclosure process was adequately managed through pre-trial conferences.

The court concluded that the case was not one of the "rarest of cases" warranting a stay and that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute if the charges did not go to trial, given the egregious conduct depicted in the surveillance videos.

The appeal was allowed, the stay quashed, and the matter remitted for trial before a different judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder on the grounds of Crown non-disclosure.

The Crown failed to disclose medical records relating to the appellant's mother's health until partway through the appellant's cross-examination.

These records were relevant to the appellant's defence that his mother, rather than the appellant, killed the victim.

The trial judge initially dismissed the mistrial application, expecting that expert evidence would neutralize any prejudice.

However, the expert changed his evidence at trial.

The Court of Appeal found a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the overall fairness of the trial process and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed a certiorari decision quashing a committal for trial on a charge of breach of trust contrary to section 122 of the Criminal Code.

The respondent, an on-duty police officer, refused to assist a member of the public who reported a potential suicide in progress in High Park, Toronto.

The victim subsequently died by suicide.

The application judge found no evidence capable of supporting the necessary mens rea for breach of trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that while the respondent's conduct was egregious, the Crown failed to establish an improper purpose materially different from the mere failure to perform his duty.

The court distinguished between misfeasance in public office (which requires an improper purpose) and neglect of official duty (which does not), and held that a desire to avoid an unpleasant duty does not constitute the requisite improper purpose.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing an application for judicial review of a Crown decision to stay a private prosecution.

The appellant alleged that the Crown's decision to stay the prosecution constituted an abuse of process, arguing that the decision was not evidence-based and that failing to prosecute what the appellant characterized as indisputable perjury harmed the integrity of the administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that abuse of process is not a tool for assessing the quality or reasonableness of prosecutorial decisions, but rather addresses egregious Crown conduct that seriously undermines the fairness of proceedings or the integrity of the administration of justice.

The court found no foundation for an abuse of process finding.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his wife, Adrienne Roberts, who was found murdered in the basement of their home.

He appealed on three grounds: (1) that the application judge erred in dismissing his O'Connor application for production of criminal investigation files relating to two other similar crimes; (2) that the trial judge erred in dismissing his alternate suspect defence application; and (3) that the first degree murder verdict was unreasonable and should be substituted with second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the application judge's O'Connor ruling, no air of reality to the alternate suspect defence, and that the jury's verdict of first degree murder was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The applicant, a police officer, was convicted of attempted murder after shooting a person on a streetcar.

He brought a constitutional challenge against the five-year mandatory minimum sentence for attempted murder with a restricted firearm under s. 239(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate given the high moral blameworthiness of the applicant's conduct, nor was it overbroad in its application to police officers.

This case concerns the sentencing of Police Constable James Forcillo for attempted murder.

The court first addressed a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum punishment of five years for attempted murder under s.239(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, finding it did not infringe ss.12 or 7 of the Charter.

The sentencing judge then determined the appropriate sentence, rejecting the defence's submission that Forcillo's moral blameworthiness was low due to a misperception.

The court found that Forcillo acted contrary to his training by shooting a potential threat and failing to use de-escalation, constituting a high level of moral blameworthiness and an egregious breach of trust.

Despite mitigating factors such as positive personal characteristics and the impact of protective custody, the aggravating factors, including the abuse of authority and the serious actual harm caused, substantially outweighed them.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence.

A sentence of six years in the penitentiary was imposed.

The Crown applied for certiorari seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry judge’s decision discharging a police officer from charges of second-degree murder and manslaughter arising from the fatal shooting of a suspect during the execution of a search warrant.

The Crown conceded the murder charge but argued the officer should have been committed to trial for manslaughter based on careless use of a firearm, advancing two theories: that the officer released the firearm onto a sling while grappling with the deceased, or that he had his finger on the trigger and unintentionally fired.

The Superior Court held the preliminary inquiry judge applied the correct committal test and did not commit jurisdictional error.

The evidence showed the officer’s conduct complied with training and police policy, and the proposed inferences of careless firearm use were unsupported and speculative.

Certiorari was therefore unavailable.