Milan Rupic

The offender, an on-duty police officer, was convicted of sexual assault after using his position to engineer private meetings with a vulnerable complainant, leading to digital penetration and forced fellatio.

The Crown sought a sentence of five to six years, while the defence sought three years.

The court weighed the grave breach of trust and profound impact on the complainant against the offender's lack of criminal record, exemplary career, and the collateral consequences of his conviction.

The offender was sentenced to four years in custody, along with DNA, SOIRA, weapons prohibition, and non-communication orders.

A Toronto Police Service officer, Constable Quinn, was charged with one count of sexual assault of E.W. while on duty.

The Crown alleged the sexual activity was non-consensual, and that Quinn manipulated the situation by faking a phone call to his partner and creating opportunities to be alone with the complainant.

Quinn testified the activity was consensual and instigated by the complainant.

The court found Quinn's testimony not credible, particularly regarding the fake phone call and his efforts to engage with the complainant outside of police duties.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence that she did not consent and found her credible and reliable.

The court also determined that, even if there had been apparent consent, it would have been vitiated by Quinn's abuse of his position of trust, power, or authority as an on-duty police officer.

Constable Quinn was found guilty of sexual assault.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent, Jake Grant, on an assault charge.

The trial judge had stayed proceedings due to alleged abuse of process, citing the complainant's monetary motivation, police misconduct in not referring the investigation out, and Crown's disclosure issues (not disclosing *R. v. Tout* and not calling the complainant).

The appellate court found that the trial judge made reversible errors in law and fact, particularly in misapprehending the evidence (especially surveillance videos), misapplying the *Babos* test for abuse of process, and incorrectly stating the Crown's duty to call witnesses or the accused's right to confront an accuser.

The appellate court found the police investigation was comprehensive and the disclosure process was adequately managed through pre-trial conferences.

The court concluded that the case was not one of the "rarest of cases" warranting a stay and that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute if the charges did not go to trial, given the egregious conduct depicted in the surveillance videos.

The appeal was allowed, the stay quashed, and the matter remitted for trial before a different judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder on the grounds of Crown non-disclosure.

The Crown failed to disclose medical records relating to the appellant's mother's health until partway through the appellant's cross-examination.

These records were relevant to the appellant's defence that his mother, rather than the appellant, killed the victim.

The trial judge initially dismissed the mistrial application, expecting that expert evidence would neutralize any prejudice.

However, the expert changed his evidence at trial.

The Court of Appeal found a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the overall fairness of the trial process and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed a certiorari decision quashing a committal for trial on a charge of breach of trust contrary to section 122 of the Criminal Code.

The respondent, an on-duty police officer, refused to assist a member of the public who reported a potential suicide in progress in High Park, Toronto.

The victim subsequently died by suicide.

The application judge found no evidence capable of supporting the necessary mens rea for breach of trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that while the respondent's conduct was egregious, the Crown failed to establish an improper purpose materially different from the mere failure to perform his duty.

The court distinguished between misfeasance in public office (which requires an improper purpose) and neglect of official duty (which does not), and held that a desire to avoid an unpleasant duty does not constitute the requisite improper purpose.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing an application for judicial review of a Crown decision to stay a private prosecution.

The appellant alleged that the Crown's decision to stay the prosecution constituted an abuse of process, arguing that the decision was not evidence-based and that failing to prosecute what the appellant characterized as indisputable perjury harmed the integrity of the administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that abuse of process is not a tool for assessing the quality or reasonableness of prosecutorial decisions, but rather addresses egregious Crown conduct that seriously undermines the fairness of proceedings or the integrity of the administration of justice.

The court found no foundation for an abuse of process finding.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his wife, Adrienne Roberts, who was found murdered in the basement of their home.

He appealed on three grounds: (1) that the application judge erred in dismissing his O'Connor application for production of criminal investigation files relating to two other similar crimes; (2) that the trial judge erred in dismissing his alternate suspect defence application; and (3) that the first degree murder verdict was unreasonable and should be substituted with second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the application judge's O'Connor ruling, no air of reality to the alternate suspect defence, and that the jury's verdict of first degree murder was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The applicant, a police officer, was convicted of attempted murder after shooting a person on a streetcar.

He brought a constitutional challenge against the five-year mandatory minimum sentence for attempted murder with a restricted firearm under s. 239(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate given the high moral blameworthiness of the applicant's conduct, nor was it overbroad in its application to police officers.

This case concerns the sentencing of Police Constable James Forcillo for attempted murder.

The court first addressed a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum punishment of five years for attempted murder under s.239(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, finding it did not infringe ss.12 or 7 of the Charter.

The sentencing judge then determined the appropriate sentence, rejecting the defence's submission that Forcillo's moral blameworthiness was low due to a misperception.

The court found that Forcillo acted contrary to his training by shooting a potential threat and failing to use de-escalation, constituting a high level of moral blameworthiness and an egregious breach of trust.

Despite mitigating factors such as positive personal characteristics and the impact of protective custody, the aggravating factors, including the abuse of authority and the serious actual harm caused, substantially outweighed them.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence.

A sentence of six years in the penitentiary was imposed.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for certiorari and mandamus to set aside a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondent, an Emergency Task Force officer, on a charge of manslaughter.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by weighing the evidence regarding the careless use of a firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error.

The preliminary inquiry judge properly engaged in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence, and there was no evidence of a marked departure from the standard of care required of an ETF officer.

The applicant, convicted of second-degree murder following a fatal altercation at a bar, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The central issue on appeal was causation, with the applicant seeking to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting the deceased died from alcohol concussion syndrome triggered by a co-accused's subsequent punch, rather than the applicant's initial assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the proposed fresh evidence raised an arguable ground of appeal, satisfying the requirement that the appeal not be frivolous.

Concluding that the applicant's detention was not necessary in the public interest, the court granted release pending appeal on strict conditions.

The Crown applied for certiorari seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry judge’s decision discharging a police officer from charges of second-degree murder and manslaughter arising from the fatal shooting of a suspect during the execution of a search warrant.

The Crown conceded the murder charge but argued the officer should have been committed to trial for manslaughter based on careless use of a firearm, advancing two theories: that the officer released the firearm onto a sling while grappling with the deceased, or that he had his finger on the trigger and unintentionally fired.

The Superior Court held the preliminary inquiry judge applied the correct committal test and did not commit jurisdictional error.

The evidence showed the officer’s conduct complied with training and police policy, and the proposed inferences of careless firearm use were unsupported and speculative.

Certiorari was therefore unavailable.

Five police officers were convicted of attempting to obstruct justice, and three of them were also convicted of perjury, arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent false memo book entries and testimony to conceal the timing of the search.

The Crown sought penitentiary sentences of three to four years, while the defence sought non-custodial sentences.

The court considered the serious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence, but also weighed significant mitigating factors, including the catastrophic impact of the prolonged 14-year investigation and proceedings on the officers' lives, careers, and health.

The court concluded that a penitentiary term was not warranted and imposed a 45-day conditional sentence (house arrest) for each offender.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a police officer charged with assault, attempt to obstruct justice, and perjury arising from his arrest of a demonstrator.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in permitting the defence to challenge potential jurors for cause based on their affiliation with the protest group, and that the challenge procedure was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in allowing the challenge for cause and that any procedural irregularities in the jury selection process caused no prejudice to the Crown.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentences imposed on four court officers convicted of assaulting a handcuffed and shackled prisoner in a holding cell.

The trial judge had imposed conditional sentences ranging from 45 to 90 days.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences demonstrably unfit, emphasizing that the respondents committed a collective, premeditated, and vicious assault on a defenceless prisoner and attempted to cover it up.

The Court held that such a breach of trust by officers in the justice system requires a sentence emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation, normally calling for a custodial term.

The appeal was allowed and additional custodial terms ranging from 30 to 60 days were imposed.

The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $29,856.97 payable by the Attorney General of Canada, and costs of the motion fixed at $5,991.03 payable by the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario, following an appeal regarding a sealing order and access to search warrant information.

The Crown appealed from a summary conviction appeal judge's order setting aside the accused's conviction and ordering a new trial.

The trial judge had based the conviction on both the complainant's evidence and a videotape, but the Crown conceded the conviction could only be supported by the video alone, which the trial judge was not prepared to do.

The Court of Appeal agreed there was a miscarriage of justice but rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable and warranted an acquittal.

The Court upheld the order for a new trial and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder of his wife.

At trial, the Crown introduced hearsay evidence consisting of a letter written by the deceased to her cousin and statements made by the deceased to her family physician, both alleging prior assaults by the appellant.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under the principled approach to hearsay.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay statements, as he improperly relied on the truth of the contents to establish threshold reliability and erroneously concluded there was no motive to fabricate.

The Court also found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code by using the word 'danger' instead of 'likelihood' of death.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.