Milan Rupic

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after the elderly victims were stabbed in their sleep.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's motive, opportunity, blood on his track pants, and a confession to an undercover officer.

The trial judge admitted expert evidence from a police officer regarding crime scene reconstruction and criminal profiling.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of the expert evidence, demeanour evidence, and the conduct of Crown counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that while the criminal profiling evidence was inadmissible, the crime scene reconstruction evidence was properly admitted.

The court applied the curative proviso to the profiling evidence, finding the case against the appellant overwhelming, and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed an order awarding costs to the accused following a stay of proceedings.

The stay was granted because the Crown failed to disclose notes of an eyewitness interview until the second week of a manslaughter retrial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the failure to disclose was a marked and unacceptable departure from the reasonable standards expected of the prosecution, justifying the rare award of costs against the Crown.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice.

The Crown alleged in the information that the appellant directed witnesses to make a false statement, but at trial argued that knowledge of falsity was irrelevant if coercion was used.

The trial judge convicted based on coercion without finding the statements were false or the appellant knew they were false.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown was bound by the particulars in the information, which required proving the appellant knew the statements were false.

Since the Crown conceded it could not prove this knowledge, the conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his common-law wife.

At trial, the primary issue was whether the appellant had the requisite intent, given his intoxication and mental disorder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding his voir dire testimony, evidence of his violent disposition, and the issue of intention, and appealed his sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 14 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and upholding the sentence as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred by not leaving manslaughter or provocation with the jury, that the Crown improperly elicited prior out-of-court statements to rebut recent fabrication, and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

He also sought to adduce fresh evidence regarding a forged arrest warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support provocation, that the prior statements were admissible, that any prejudice from cross-examination was cured by instructions, and that the fresh evidence was collateral.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's findings of credibility were inconsistent, particularly given the complainant was a self-admitted manipulator and liar who had previously concocted a story of physical abuse.

The Court also found the trial judge's identification and analysis of corroborative evidence was flawed.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The young person appellant appealed his conviction for manslaughter arising from a deliberately set fire in a store during business hours.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine its own witness on a prior statement, failed to appreciate the mens rea test, and failed to adequately explain how inconsistencies in the evidence were reconciled.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the cross-examination, concluding the evidence amply supported the mens rea finding, and holding that the trial judge's reasons sufficiently identified the evidence relied upon to support the verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the credibility of a jailhouse informant and arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on intoxication, the common sense inference of intent, and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence would not have affected the verdict and that the jury instructions, read as a whole, did not contain reversible errors.

The appellant, a police officer convicted of criminal negligence causing death, appealed his conviction on the basis that his statement to a commanding officer was admitted into evidence without a voir dire.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even assuming a voir dire should have been held, it was a proper case to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and robbery, a dangerous offender designation, and an indeterminate sentence arising from a violent hotel-room attack.

He argued breaches of the right to counsel and search and seizure protections, challenged the reliability of identification and DNA evidence, and disputed the dangerous offender finding and sentencing analysis.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had been properly informed of his rights, had a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel, voluntarily provided the blood sample, and that the identification and DNA evidence were properly assessed.

The court further upheld the dangerous offender finding under s. 753 of the Criminal Code and confirmed that the trial judge properly considered the appellant's lack of responsibility and remorse in assessing dangerousness and treatment prospects.

The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellant challenged arson-related convictions arising from a house fire prosecuted entirely on circumstantial evidence, arguing among other things that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by using the Hodge's case formulation to test the defence explanation for the fire.

The court held that the trial judge improperly required the accused to provide a reasonable explanation based on proven facts, rather than asking whether the Crown had proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

That error required the convictions to be set aside and a new trial ordered.

Fresh evidence relating to the trial judge's earlier involvement in family proceedings was admitted but found insufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Criminal appeal arising from a conviction for criminal negligence causing death following a police shooting during a land claim protest.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge was required to hold a voir dire before permitting cross-examination on statements allegedly made by the accused to a superior officer, including whether that superior was a person in authority and whether the statements were voluntary.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, holding that the inquiry obligation was triggered and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The majority dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the absence of a voir dire caused no substantial wrong and did not affect the verdict; the mistrial appeal, fresh evidence motion, and Crown sentence appeal were also dismissed.

The appellant, a street flower vendor, was charged with exposing goods for sale without a licence contrary to a municipal by-law and with obstructing a peace officer after refusing to obey an order to move.

The by-law scheme permitted only owners or occupants of abutting property to apply for a sidewalk use licence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enabling provincial legislation did not authorize the municipality to discriminate between free-standing street vendors and owner/occupant vendors, rendering the by-law ultra vires.

Consequently, the conviction for obstructing a peace officer was also set aside, as the officer had no authority to arrest the appellant for failing to comply with an order enforcing an invalid by-law.

The accused was charged with murder.

At trial, the Crown relied on hearsay evidence of telephone calls made by the deceased to her mother on the night of her death, as well as character evidence suggesting the accused was a drug smuggler.

The accused was convicted, but the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the hearsay and character evidence inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Court held that while the first two telephone calls were admissible under the principled approach to hearsay based on necessity and reliability, the third call lacked a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.

Furthermore, the character evidence was highly prejudicial and irrelevant to the murder charge, warranting a new trial.