Michelle K. Fuerst

The appellant challenged his conviction on the basis that a saliva sample was obtained without informed consent and without permitting access to counsel after request.

The court held that the trial judge erred by placing the onus on the appellant to prove lack of consent under s. 8 of the Charter and failed to give reasons on the s. 10(b) issue.

Applying the framework for conscriptive evidence and discoverability under s. 24(2), the court was not satisfied that the saliva sample would be admissible.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was directed.

The appellant challenged his convictions on the basis that the trial judge improperly dismissed a Charter application seeking exclusion of a saliva sample.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by placing the burden on the appellant to prove lack of consent under s. 8, failed to make adequate credibility findings, and gave no reasons on the alleged s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the conscriptive evidence analysis from Stillman, the court concluded the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis was of little assistance and rejected the Crown's discoverability argument for lack of evidentiary foundation.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged his conviction on evidentiary and credibility-assessment grounds.

The court held that evidence relating to a stolen Nintendo and a note left by the appellant was admissible, provided it was not used as propensity evidence, and found no such misuse on the record.

However, the trial judge's reasons showed a failure to assess whether disbelief of the appellant's testimony nonetheless left the court with a reasonable doubt in a case turning on credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Criminal appeal arising from a conviction for criminal negligence causing death following a police shooting during a land claim protest.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge was required to hold a voir dire before permitting cross-examination on statements allegedly made by the accused to a superior officer, including whether that superior was a person in authority and whether the statements were voluntary.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, holding that the inquiry obligation was triggered and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The majority dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the absence of a voir dire caused no substantial wrong and did not affect the verdict; the mistrial appeal, fresh evidence motion, and Crown sentence appeal were also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for second degree murder arising from a spousal shooting in a case where intent was the sole issue and the Crown’s case was entirely circumstantial.

The majority held that the trial judge erred by providing the deliberating jury with only the Crown’s closing address after the jury requested it, without also providing the defence closing address.

The court found that closing addresses are persuasive advocacy, and fairness required balanced access where the case turned on competing inferences rather than direct evidence.

The majority concluded the imbalance created serious prejudice and that the curative proviso could not be applied.

A dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice.