Robert S. Richardson

The Indigenous offender pleaded guilty to sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching of his nine-year-old step-niece, who lived in his care.

The offences involved grooming, manipulation, and digital penetration, causing profound and ongoing psychological harm to the child.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors against significant Gladue factors, including intergenerational trauma, FASD, and a history of abuse, as well as the offender's lack of a criminal record and guilty plea.

The court imposed a sentence of two years' imprisonment in addition to time served, followed by two years' probation, along with mandatory ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition with an exception for sustenance hunting.

This decision concerns a Gardiner hearing following S.M.'s guilty plea to two counts of sexual assault against his biological daughters, V.M. and M.G. The court reviews the evidence to determine aggravating facts, including the number, nature, and circumstances of the assaults.

The decision addresses the credibility and reliability of the complainants, the timing and location of the assaults, and the extent of family knowledge and disclosure.

The court finds the core details of the assaults proven beyond a reasonable doubt, despite some inconsistencies in peripheral details, and concludes that the complainants did not collude or exaggerate their testimony.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual interference for engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old victim.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence or two years' incarceration, emphasizing the offender's lack of a criminal record, traumatic background, and harsh pretrial custody conditions.

The court emphasized the primary sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children.

The offender was sentenced to three years' incarceration, mitigated by enhanced credit for harsh pretrial custody conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 21 months, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA order and a 5-year section 161 prohibition.

Ahmad Hasan was charged with two counts of criminal harassment and three counts of breach of probation stemming from his public Facebook postings targeting a detective and a lawyer involved in his previous criminal cases, and for breaching a publication ban.

The court found that Hasan's conduct, including seeking personal information about the complainants and making derogatory remarks, constituted threatening and harassing behaviour.

The complainants' fears for their safety were deemed objectively reasonable given the context of Hasan's prior convictions and obsessive conduct.

The court found Hasan guilty on all five charges.

The applicant, Charles Mustard, charged with first-degree murder from a 1993 cold case, sought judicial interim release (bail) under s. 522(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed his release.

The court assessed the three grounds for detention under s. 515(10): primary (attendance in court), secondary (public protection), and tertiary (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice).

While the applicant satisfied the primary and secondary grounds, the tertiary ground was a significant consideration due to the gravity of the offence and the apparent strength of the Crown's DNA evidence.

However, the court also considered the applicant's age (65), health conditions (borderline diabetes, arthritis, hearing/eyesight loss), and the heightened risk of COVID-19 transmission in detention facilities.

Despite a "porous" release plan involving the Toronto Bail Program and a shelter, the court found that the public, properly informed of Charter values and the pandemic crisis, would not lose confidence in the administration of justice by granting bail.

The application for bail was granted with specific conditions.

During a murder trial, the accused sought to exclude an utterance made to a police officer at the scene and a videotaped statement made at the police station.

The court held that the utterance at the scene was voluntary and not the product of a detention, as the officer's question was a general inquiry.

However, the court excluded the videotaped statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police breached the accused's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights by deliberately failing to advise him that his jeopardy had increased to manslaughter following the victim's death.

The accused were charged with multiple offences arising from an armed robbery of a jewellery store.

One accused pled guilty to several charges but contested the charge of attempted murder, while the other accused contested all charges based on identity.

The court found the circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data and intercepted communications, insufficient to prove the identity of the second robber beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also acquitted the first accused of attempted murder, finding she lacked subjective awareness of any intent to kill by her co-perpetrator.

Both accused were acquitted of the contested charges.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to export cocaine.

The conspiracy involved an agreement to use a courier to export nearly 9 kilograms of cocaine to the UK, but the offender abandoned the plan within a week of its inception.

The court considered the short duration of the conspiracy and the offender's positive rehabilitation efforts as mitigating factors, but noted the serious nature of the offence and the large quantity of drugs involved.

The offender was sentenced to 5.5 years imprisonment, with credit for pre-trial custody and house arrest.

Sentencing for three historical sexual offences committed by an adult family member against a child under fourteen in circumstances of trust, involving repeated vaginal intercourse and oral sex.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as paramount and found numerous aggravating factors, including the complainant's age, abuse of trust, predatory conduct, and profound long-term psychological harm.

Relying on immigration-consequence principles, the court reduced what would otherwise have been a seven-year penitentiary sentence because the offender would be deported and was ineligible for early release.

A six-year penitentiary sentence was imposed together with DNA, lifetime sex offender registration, a ten-year weapons prohibition, and a custodial no-contact order.

The accused was tried before a judge alone on one count of sexual touching of a complainant under fourteen and three counts of sexual assault, including one count arising from adult sexual intercourse years later.

Applying the W. (D.) framework, the court accepted the complainant’s evidence about the historical assaults, found the accused’s denials unreliable, and held the Crown had proven the first three counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the complainant was under fourteen when the abuse began and further held that, in any event, the accused occupied and abused a position of trust, negating consent.

On the final count concerning the 2013 encounter, the court found the complainant credible but was left with a reasonable doubt about non-consent at the moment of intercourse and entered an acquittal.

Mandeep Punia was charged with second-degree murder and Skinder Punia with accessory after the fact to murder.

The jury found Mandeep guilty of manslaughter and Skinder guilty of accessory to manslaughter.

This decision provides the judge's reasons for several trial rulings: (a) the effect of a registrar's error during peremptory challenges in jury selection, which was deemed procedural and saved by s. 643(3) of the Criminal Code; (b) the refusal to issue a Vetrovec warning for a crucial Crown witness (Supinder Litt) due to her non-unsavoury character, though a strong caution was given; (c) the refusal to give a Bero instruction regarding incomplete police recordings, as no deliberate failure to preserve evidence was found, but the jury was instructed that reasonable doubt could arise from the absence of evidence; and (d) the decision to leave the defence of provocation with the jury for Mandeep, finding an "air of reality" to the subjective element based on the totality of evidence, despite the defence not actively advancing it.

In a murder trial, the Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a 911 call purportedly made by a central Crown witness.

The Crown argued the call was admissible as the best evidence of the event and to rebut recent fabrication.

The defence argued the recording lacked context and amounted to improper oath-helping.

The court ruled the 911 call-back was inadmissible at this stage, finding it devoid of material information and that its admission would serve solely to bolster the witness's credibility before it was attacked, thereby offending the rule against oath-helping.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit four out-of-court statements made by a witness, Kulwant Litt, for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule (a K.G.B. application).

The witness, who is the father of one accused and father-in-law of the other, had previously confessed to his son (acting as a police agent) and the police about the accused's involvement in a murder and the subsequent disposal of the body, but later recanted.

The court found that necessity was established by the recantation and that threshold reliability was met through a combination of procedural reliability (the witness was available for cross-examination and the statements were recorded) and substantive reliability (confirmatory physical evidence and lack of motive to lie at the time).

The statements were ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after stabbing a stranger to death in a cafe.

The court found the elements of second-degree murder were proven, as the attack was unprovoked and not planned.

However, based on psychiatric evidence, the court found the accused suffered from schizophrenia and was experiencing severe delusions and paranoia at the time.

The court concluded the accused was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong and found him not criminally responsible under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations that he sexually touched and propositioned a 15-year-old complainant on three occasions during the summer of 2013.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the complainant's testimony.

The defendant and his wife denied all allegations, and the defendant's niece provided corroborating evidence regarding one of the alleged incidents.

The court found material implausibilities in the complainant's account, particularly regarding her presence in the defendant's home on the evening of the Bellwoods Park incident and her return to the defendant's home on the Thanksgiving weekend despite prior negative experiences.

The court also found the defendant's niece to be a credible and persuasive witness whose evidence contradicted the complainant's account of the Canada Day weekend incident.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

During a jury trial for second-degree murder and accessory after the fact, the accused brought a motion seeking further disclosure relating to certified translations of Punjabi-language recordings and interviews relied upon by the Crown.

The defence identified material discrepancies between police, Crown-certified, and defence-certified translations of a key intercepted conversation and sought documentation relating to the commissioning, preparation, and certification of translations.

The court found that the requested materials had a sufficient nexus to the reliability of the translations relevant to a proposed s. 9 Canada Evidence Act application under R. v. K.G.B. The judge ordered limited disclosure of communications, requests, drafts, and information concerning the preparation and certification of specific transcripts prepared by a particular translator.

Broader disclosure requests were withdrawn without prejudice.

During a jury trial for second‑degree murder and accessory after the fact, the Crown sought a preliminary ruling regarding disputed Punjabi-to-English translations of intercepted communications.

The Crown requested that the court appoint a neutral third‑party translator to resolve discrepancies between the Crown and defence transcripts or, alternatively, determine that the Crown translation was accurate before addressing a defence disclosure application.

The court declined to order a court-appointed translator, emphasizing that calling its own witnesses should occur only rarely and with extreme caution.

Given material discrepancies between translations and incomplete argument on the defence disclosure application, the court directed that submissions continue on the defence request for further disclosure relating to the translations.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling house and committing assault therein, assault, and breach of recognizance.

The central issue was whether a causal nexus existed between the accused's chronic schizophrenia and his offending conduct.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that the accused's delusional beliefs regarding the victim were of delusional intensity and significantly drove his behaviour.

The court found the accused represented the lowest risk to community safety and imposed a suspended sentence with two years' probation, prioritizing rehabilitation over deterrence and denunciation.

The accused applied for directed verdicts at the close of the Crown’s case in a jury trial involving multiple firearm offences arising from the discovery of a loaded handgun and other weapons in an apartment.

The Crown’s case was entirely circumstantial and relied on evidence connecting both accused to the premises and the location of the firearm within a shared laundry hamper.

The court reviewed the directed verdict test and principles governing circumstantial evidence, constructive possession, and joint possession.

It held that the circumstantial evidence could support reasonable inferences of knowledge and control sufficient for a properly instructed jury to convict on the firearm-related counts.

However, there was no evidence supporting the mental element required for possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace regarding a stun gun.

The accused faced a single remaining count of obstructing justice after resolving other charges by plea.

The allegation was that he misled the court about his identity by allowing himself to be presented under an assumed name and by providing a false birth date during a bail appearance.

The court held that giving a knowingly false birth date that perpetuated the court’s misunderstanding of the accused’s identity constituted the actus reus of obstruction under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

Although the accused testified that he intended only to maintain the status quo until consulting counsel, the court found that his purpose at the time was to preserve concealment of his true identity.

The Crown proved both the actus reus and specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.