ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
R.V.
Defendant
COUNSEL:
Christina Tang, for the Crown
Robert Richardson, for the Defendant
HEARD: 22 May 2026, at Kingston
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
THE PUBLICATION, BROADCAST OR TRANSMISSION OF ANY INFORMATION THAT COULD IDENTIFY THE COMPLAINANTS OR A WITNESS IN THIS PROCEEDING IS RESTRICTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 486.4 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
1R.V., you pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference and one count of invitation to sexual touching.
2Between approximately May 2023 and January 2025, you repeatedly engaged in sexual conduct towards a child who was approximately nine years old at the outset. Your conduct included touching her breasts and genital area, asking her to touch your genitals, removing her clothing, and, on at least one occasion, digitally penetrating her vagina. You instructed her not to disclose your conduct and used language suggestive of emotional manipulation.
3The victim of your crimes is Z.P. She is now eleven years old. You were her step-uncle. At all times material to your crimes, Z. lived with you, your common law spouse (Z.’s aunt), and your sons (Z.’s cousins). You and your spouse were Z.’s legal guardians. During the relevant period you lived together at two addresses in Kingston, the first at D. Street, and latterly on M. Street.
4Both you and Z. identify as Indigenous.
5You have committed grave offences involving the exploitation of a highly vulnerable child.
Statutory Framework
6Sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching are indictable offences punishable by a maximum of fourteen years’ imprisonment.
7Mandatory ancillary orders are sought for these offences, including requiring you to provide a sample of your DNA and placing your name on the register of sex offenders. A prohibition order under section 161 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 is also typically engaged in cases such as this.
Positions of Counsel
8The Crown seeks a sentence of five years’ imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, together with the ancillary orders pursuant that I have just mentioned: providing a sample of DNA (sections 490.012 and 490.013 of the Criminal Code); compliance with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10; an order prohibiting you from having supervision of children under the age of sixteen, with an exception for your own children (section 161 of the Criminal Code); an order prohibiting you from communicating with Z.P. (s. 743.2(1) of the Criminal Code); and a weapons prohibition order for ten years (s. 109 of the Criminal Code).
9The defence submits that a global sentence of two years’ imprisonment, less credit for time served, would be appropriate, with a focus on rehabilitation and Gladue considerations. The defence does not oppose the ancillary orders sought, provided that there is a partial lifting of the weapons prohibition order for purposes of sustenance and related Indigenous factors.
10The defence also suggests that following the custodial sentence, you should be on probation for a further two years, with requirements to attend for counselling in accordance with the recommendations made in the Gladue report.
11As of today’s date, you have spent 442 days in pre-sentence custody. Applying the formula of 1.5 days of credit for each day of pre-sentence custody (R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575), would result in a credit of 663 days (55.25 months). Applied to the positions put forward on behalf of the Crown and the defence, the Crown position is that you should serve a further 40.75 months, whereas the submission made on your behalf by defence counsel would have you serve a further 4.75 months in prison.
Aggravating Factors
12There are a number of serious aggravating factors in this case.
13As I have already mentioned, Z. was nine years old when your offending started. She was among the most vulnerable members of society. She was entitled to your protection.
14Your offending was prolonged and repetitive (occurring over approximately a year and a half) and escalating in seriousness, culminating in digital penetration.
15The offences took place in a shared home environment, involving a profound breach of trust and safety.
16Your conduct involved clear evidence of grooming and manipulation, including secrecy, persistence in seeking sexual contact, and the use of emotionally suggestive language.
17The nature of the conduct itself, particularly the digital penetration, was intrusive and highly invasive of Z.’s bodily security.
Impact on the Victim
18A victim impact statement was provided by M.G., Z.’s legal guardian, caregiver and stepfather. His statement speaks to the deep and enduring harm caused by these offences.
19It is clear from the victim impact statement and the agreed facts that Z. endured a sustained atmosphere of fear and anxiety, having lived for an extended period of time in the very environment in which the abuse was occurring. The abuse has profoundly affected her sense of safety and trust, including impairing her ability to trust both herself and others.
20Z. suffers from nightmares and flashbacks which interfere with her daily functioning and well-being. Her academic performance at school has deteriorated, and she struggles to concentrate due to ongoing emotional distress.
21Z.’s ability to form healthy peer relationships has also been significantly impaired, resulting in isolation and social withdrawal.
22The victim impact statement describes a child whose emotional development has been disrupted, whose sense of self-worth has been undermined, and whose childhood has been fundamentally altered and blighted by the trauma that she has experienced.
23In summary, the evidence establishes that the harm that you have inflicted is profound, pervasive and ongoing, with long term consequences for Z.’s psychological and emotional well-being.
Mitigating Factors
24A significant mitigating factor is that you have no criminal record.
25Also of significance is that you entered a guilty plea, sparing the complainant from the burden of testifying. You have expressed remorse, and it is reported that you have insight, albeit that such insight remains incomplete, into the consequences of your actions.
26You have demonstrated prosocial tendencies in your life, including education, employment and involvement with your children, prior to your arrest.
Gladue Factors
27You are currently 37 years old. Your mother was Indigenous, your father French Canadian. You have five half-sisters and two half-brothers. Your life circumstances have been marked by profound hardship.
28You were removed from your parents at a very young age due to instability, substance abuse and violence. Your childhood was characterised by abuse, neglect and exposure to domestic violence.
29Your family bears the effects of intergenerational trauma, including your mother’s attendance at the St. Anne’s residential school. You were raised in a disadvantaged environment marked by poverty and limited access to services, in a number of different family and foster placements. It is clear from the comprehensive and helpful Gladue report prepared by Heather Loudon, that throughout your childhood you experienced significant cultural disconnection.
30The Gladue report also references a diagnosis of foetal alcohol syndrome disorder (FASD) with no follow up, which has affected impulse control, judgment and decision making.
Mental Health and Clinical Evidence
31A psychiatric report from Dr. Amina Ali at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) confirms that you have experienced significant mental health and substance use issues. The report finds that you likely suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, that you have experienced major depressive disorder, and that you have a history of suicidal ideation and attempts.
32You also have a longstanding history of polysubstance abuse.
33The CAMH report identifies ongoing risk factors, including impulsivity and sexualised thinking patterns, and recommends further sexual risk assessment.
34At the same time, the report indicates that you are considered capable of engaging in treatment and that you would benefit from structured interventions.
Sentencing Principles and Jurisprudence
35The general principles of sentencing are set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code. Judges passing sentence are required by law to impose just sanctions that have one or more of the following six objectives:
i. to denounce unlawful conduct and harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
ii. to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
iii. to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
iv. to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
v. to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
vi. to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.
36Sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. The sentence must also be similar to those imposed on similar offenders, for similar offences, committed in similar circumstances. Offenders should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances.
37Pursuant to section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.
38However, section 718.01 of the Criminal Code provides that when a court imposes a sentence for an offence involving the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen, it should give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.
39The leading authority on the subject of sentencing for sexual offences against children is R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that the prime interests that the legislative scheme of sexual offences against children protect are “the personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity, dignity, and equality of children” (at para. 51). This requires courts to focus their attention on emotional and psychological harm, not simply the physical harm caused by sexual violence. The Supreme Court continues, at para. 74:
It follows…that sentences must recognize and reflect both the harm that sexual offences against children cause and the wrongfulness of sexual violence. In particular, taking the harmfulness of these offences into account ensures that the sentence fully reflects the “life-altering consequences” that can and often do flow from the sexual violence. Courts should also weigh these harms in a manner that reflects society’s deepening and evolving understanding of their severity [references omitted].
40The Supreme Court reminds sentencing judges that it is not sufficient to simply state that sexual offences against children are serious. Rather, courts are required to give effect to (1) the inherent wrongfulness of these offences; (2) the potential harm to children that flows from these offences; and, (3) the actual harm that children suffer as a result of these offences (Friesen, para. 76).
41The court in Friesen stated that sexual offences against children should generally be punished more severely than sexual offences against adults; further, sexual interference with a child should not be treated as less serious than sexual assault of a child.
42In Friesen, a six-year sentence imposed by the trial judge following the accused’s guilty plea to sexual interference with a young child and attempted extortion of the child’s mother was restored by the Supreme Court of Canada, after it had been reduced to four and a half years by the Manitoba Court of Appeal.
43In R. v. Audet, 2020 ONSC 5039, at para. 34, this court interpreted the suggestion in Friesen that even a first offender convicted of a single incident of sexual assault against a child should receive a mid to upper single-digit sentence as meaning the midpoint between one year and nine years, namely five years.
44In R. v. J.H., 2025 ONCJ 78, the defendant was found guilty of two incidents of sexually abusing his eight-year-old daughter. He was Indigenous and the sentencing materials filed provided what the sentencing judge described as “insight into the unique systemic and background factors that played a part in the offender committing the offences”. Applying R. v. R.S., 2023 ONCA 608, at para. 54, the sentencing judge acknowledged that the defendant’s degree of responsibility was diminished to the extent that dislocation, marginalization and racism could reasonably have contributed to his offending and, hence, that the defendant’s reduced moral responsibility must be reflected in the sentence imposed. Justice Garg of the Ontario Court of Justice recognised that sentencing judges must consider a defendant’s Indigenous heritage and experiences as an Indigenous person when assessing what sentencing procedures and sanctions might be appropriate, including opportunities for restorative sanctioning. However, he continued, at paras. 19-20:
There is no rule that a court sentencing an Indigenous offender must give the most weight to the principle of restorative justice, as compared to other legitimate principles of sentencing. The relative weight to be assigned to restorative justice as against denunciation or deterrence will be connected to the severity of the offence. The principles of denunciation and deterrence may predominate where the offence is sufficiently serious [references omitted].
It cannot be overlooked that the victim in this case is also Indigenous. The Court in Friesen explained that the sentencing court may consider the sexual victimization of Indigenous children when imposing sentence: para. 70. Section 718.04 holds that a court must give primary consideration to denunciation and deterrence when sentencing for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances, including because the person is Indigenous and female. “There is no denying that Indigenous people…have endured serious injustices, including high rates of sexual violence against women”: R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33 at para. 198; see also R. v. Trudeau, 2024 ONCJ 119 at paras. 17-20.
45In J.H., notwithstanding Gladue factors, the victim’s young age, the inherent breach of trust arising from the commission by a father of sexual offences against his own daughter, and the exploitation of that position of trust to discourage the victim from disclosing the abuse (the defendant having told the victim on one occasion to “shush. Don’t tell Mommy”) justified a global six year prison sentence.
46A contrasting approach was taken by this court in R. v. Mazinakouskang, 2026 ONSC 1099. In that case, the defendant was a 43-year-old Indigenous man who was convicted of sexual interference for the touching of a six-year-old child. The incident occurred while the defendant was intoxicated at a friend’s house. The touching involved the child’s thighs, neck, cheek, lower back, abdomen and chest, but did not involve contact under the clothing. The defendant claimed no memory of the incident due to his intoxication. He was sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation. With pre-sentence custody credit, the accused was deemed to have served his custodial sentence and was released. The ancillary orders made included a weapons prohibition, with exceptions for sustenance hunting. While prioritising denunciation and deterrence, Nieckarz J. balanced these objectives with the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation and the principle of restraint in sentencing. This was particularly having regard to the defendant’s significant Gladue factors and his rehabilitative efforts, which included sobriety and engagement with support systems.
47In R. v. T.J., 2021 ONCA 392, a sentence of 24 months was imposed on a defendant for touching that involved directing a child to the bathroom when she was visiting his home, placing her hands on his penis and using them to rub him until he became erect. He told the victim to put her mouth on his penis, but she pulled away and left. The defendant had no criminal record, but did have a history of substance abuse, for which he had attended counselling. He was found to be in a position of trust with respect to the child. The Court of Appeal described the defendant’s conduct as “highly morally blameworthy” and his conduct as “violent, exploitative and harmful to [the complainant] and her family”.
48In R. v. R.H., 2024 ONSC 2790, the defendant pleaded guilty to a single charge of sexual interference. The victim was his daughter. She was between seven and eleven years old when the incidents occurred (more than once, although it was not certain exactly how many times). The defendant touched and digitally penetrated his daughter when alone with his children in the evenings. He restrained her when she resisted. While Conlan J. held that denunciation and deterrence should receive primary consideration, he considered that rehabilitation remained relevant, given the absence of a proven criminal record, and post-offence rehabilitative efforts which the defendant had made.
49Conlan J. also noted that the defendant had, himself, been the victim of childhood sexual abuse. His rehabilitative attempts included psychotherapy and a willingness to obtain professional help to work on depression and past trauma. The sentencing judge concluded that there were sufficient exceptional circumstances to take the case some distance away from what might otherwise have been the norm, as directed by Friesen. A sentence of two years was imposed.
Discussion
50The offences in this case are unquestionably serious. The complainant was young and vulnerable, the conduct was repeated and escalating, and the harm is profound and ongoing.
51Absent significant mitigation, the appropriate sentence would fall well within the mid-range penitentiary category identified in the authorities presented by the Crown.
52This is not, however, an ordinary case.
53Your background includes severe and chronic childhood trauma and intergenerational harm. There is evidence of cognitive impairment associated with FASD. You have experienced serious mental health challenges. There is also a history of longstanding substance dependence. Furthermore, this is a case in which the Gladue factors are not peripheral. They are central to the understanding of the offender and the offence. They have a significant impact on your degree of moral blameworthiness.
54Furthermore, you have no criminal record. You entered an early guilty plea. You have expressed remorse, both through your interactions with the Gladue writer, but also in the remarks which you made to the court during the sentencing hearing. Significantly, you are assessed as likely to be receptive to treatment.
55In my view, these factors justify a sentence which is closer to the lower end of the penitentiary range, while still recognising the gravity of your offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence.
Disposition
56Mr. V., please stand.
57Having regard to all of the circumstances, I impose a sentence of a further two years’ imprisonment, in addition to the time that you have already served.
58I make the ancillary orders requested by the Crown, namely,
i. that you provide a sample of your DNA;
ii. that your name is placed is on the sex offenders register for a period of 20 years;
iii. that a prohibition order should be made under section 161(1) of the Criminal Code and, specifically, paragraph (a.1) prohibiting you from being within two kilometres of any dwelling-house where Z.P. ordinarily resides, and subparagraph (c) prohibiting you from having any contact – including communicating by any means – with a person who is under the age of sixteen unless you do so under the supervision of a person who the court considers appropriate, with an exception for your own children;
iv. there will be a weapons prohibition order for ten years under section 109 of the Criminal Code, subject to a limited exemption, granted pursuant to section 113 of the Criminal Code, to permit hunting in accordance with Indigenous practices. In providing for this exception, the precise wording of which will be settled with the assistance of counsel, I take into account the Gladue factors and authorities such as R. v. M.K.M., 2024 BCSC 575, paras. 121-123, R. v. M.K., 2018 ONSC 6055, R. v. P.L., 2022 ONSC 452, and R. v. Hawryluk, 2022 ONCA 36, recognising the importance of hunting for sustenance in Indigenous life and culture.
59Upon completion of the custodial portion of your sentence, you will then be on probation for a further two years. In addition to the statutory conditions, you are to:
i. report in person to a probation officer within two working days of your release from custody, and after that, at all times and places as directed by the probation officer or any person authorised by a probation officer to assist in your supervision;
ii. co-operate with your probation officer and sign any releases necessary to permit the probation officer to monitor your compliance, and you must provide proof of compliance with any condition of this order to your probation officer on request;
iii. live at a place approved of by the probation officer, and not change that address without obtaining the consent of the probation officer in advance;
iv. attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs consistent with the restorative justice recommendations made on pages 45 – 47 of the Gladue report of Heather Loudon dated 20 May 2026 which should include, but are not limited to, mental health supports, alcohol and substance misuse programming, and community wellness.
60Because the term of imprisonment that I have set will result in you entering federal custody, I also recommend to Correctional Services Canada that one or more of the options set out on pages 47 and 48 of Ms. Loudon’s Gladue report should be considered, namely:
i. The IICPM sex offender programme;
ii. The Indigenous Continuum-of-Care Model and the Pathways Initiatives Program; and/or
iii. Waseskun Healing Centre.
Mew J.
Handed down: 3 June 2026
CITATION: R. v. R.V., 2026 ONSC 3242
COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-277 (Kingston)
DATE: 20260603
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
R. V.
Defendant
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Mew J.
Handed down: 3 June 2026

