Melissa Catherine Atkin

The defendant, charged with sexual assault, brought a pretrial motion seeking a ruling that Instagram messages between him and the complainant were not "records" under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code, thus not requiring the pre-screening procedure.

The Crown argued for a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court found no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in either the general platonic messages (Group #1) or the more sensitive cocaine trafficking messages (Group #2), concluding that the messages were not "records" under s. 278.1 and no further defence application was required.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 36 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court deducted 7.5 months of delay caused by the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and a subsequent technical issue at the preliminary inquiry.

The remaining delay of 28.5 months fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to establish that it was a clear case of unreasonable delay.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Jehangir Khan, was charged with sexual assault.

The case hinged on the credibility of the complainant and other witnesses versus the defendant's testimony.

The court applied the principles of R. v. W.(D.) and found the defendant's evidence credible and reliable, corroborated by a third-party witness (PW).

The complainant's testimony was deemed untrustworthy due to altered text messages, evasiveness, internal inconsistencies, and collaboration with other witnesses to craft a false narrative.

The Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The accused was charged with extortion and firearms offences.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, his jury trial was suspended, resulting in a delay beyond the 30-month ceiling.

The accused brought a s. 11(b) Charter application, arguing that the suspension of jury trials was an unconstitutional overreaction to the pandemic and seeking to call expert medical evidence to challenge the lockdown measures.

The Crown brought an application to summarily dismiss the accused's motion.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the Chief Justice's decision to suspend jury trials was an exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework, regardless of whether it was the correct public health response, and that the accused's motion had no reasonable prospect of success.

The self-represented applicant applied to vary his bail to remove a condition prohibiting him from recording court proceedings.

During previous appearances, the applicant had insisted on his right to record proceedings for note-taking purposes, leading a judge to issue a bench warrant for failing to 'properly attend' court.

The Superior Court found that the applicant was legally permitted to record the proceedings under the Courts of Justice Act and the Ontario Court of Justice Protocol.

The court held that the bench warrant was unlawfully issued and the bail condition was improperly imposed.

The application to vary bail was granted.

The applicant sought disclosure of a drug recognition expert's (DRE) rolling log, which documents all drug recognition evaluations conducted by the DRE.

The Crown opposed disclosure, arguing that rolling logs are clearly irrelevant and that disclosure is prohibited by section 320.36 of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the rolling log was clearly irrelevant because the DRE's opinion was corroborated by toxicological analysis.

The court also held that section 320.36 does not prohibit disclosure of rolling logs, but found disclosure unnecessary in this case due to the corroboration.

The accused brought a s. 7 Charter motion for a stay of proceedings due to lost evidence, later seeking a jury instruction.

The court found that most alleged police failings did not engage the Crown's duty to preserve evidence as it was never in their possession.

The only potentially lost evidence was nightclub surveillance footage, but its loss was not due to "unacceptable negligence" and its relevance was marginal and speculative.

Therefore, no s. 7 Charter violation was found.

However, the court ruled that a jury instruction on the general inadequacies of the police investigation and the concept of reasonable doubt arising from an "absence of evidence" was appropriate, based on pre-Charter common law principles.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown sought to prove lack of consent by arguing the complainant lacked capacity due to voluntary alcohol ingestion.

The court found that the complainant's lack of memory was not solely indicative of incapacity, and considering the totality of evidence, including the accused's detailed account and post-incident communications, a reasonable doubt existed regarding the complainant's capacity to consent and actual consent.

The accused was acquitted.

Following a trial, the accused was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon.

The assault with a weapon count was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation, while the defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with one year of probation, finding that while the assault was serious—involving the use of a glass in a public bar setting—the accused's youth, first-time offender status, and significant rehabilitative efforts warranted a discharge rather than a conviction.

The court declined to impose a section 110 weapons prohibition order.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon after striking the complainant on the back of the head with a drinking glass at a bar.

The accused claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while there was an air of reality to the self-defence claim based on the accused's evidence regarding her anxiety and prior abusive relationships, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the force used was not reasonable in the circumstances.

The accused's response was grossly disproportionate to the threat posed.

The accused was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm, with the assault with a weapon charge stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

Sentencing was adjourned.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her involuntary admission to a psychiatric facility and finding her incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

She argued the Board misapprehended the evidence, applied the wrong legal test, and reached an unreasonable decision.

The court held that the appropriate standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law was reasonableness and found the Board’s decision comprehensive and supported by the evidence, including medical records and witness testimony regarding deteriorating mental and physical condition.

The court concluded that the statutory requirements under the Health Care Consent Act and Mental Health Act were properly applied.

The appeal was dismissed.

Competing applications were brought concerning whether a contractual dispute arising from the termination of an agreement to design and build a diabetes registry should proceed by arbitration or litigation.

One party sought appointment of an arbitrator pursuant to the dispute resolution clause in the agreement, while the other sought to have the dispute determined through litigation in the Superior Court and consolidated with related defamation proceedings.

Before hearing the applications, the court proposed procedural options, and the parties agreed to proceed with litigation in the Superior Court under case management with an expedited trial schedule.

The applications were adjourned to a case conference to establish a litigation plan, and related defamation actions were transferred to the Commercial List for coordinated management.

Competing applications were brought concerning whether a contractual dispute arising from the termination of an agreement to design and build a diabetes registry should proceed by arbitration or litigation.

One party sought appointment of an arbitrator pursuant to the dispute resolution clause in the agreement, while the other sought to have the dispute determined through litigation in the Superior Court and consolidated with related defamation proceedings.

Before hearing the applications, the court proposed procedural options, and the parties agreed to proceed with litigation in the Superior Court under case management with an expedited trial schedule.

The applications were adjourned to a case conference to establish a litigation plan, and related defamation actions were transferred to the Commercial List for coordinated management.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Court of Appeal found that the Consent and Capacity Board's decision was unreasonable because there was no evidence that the proposed treatment would benefit the appellant, nor any evidence of the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was allowed and the finding of incapacity was set aside.