William J. Leslie

The plaintiff, Liebgard Scharfenberg, sought dependant's relief from the estate of her deceased husband, August Karl-Heinz Scharfenberg, under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Deceased had made no provision for her in his will, citing a cohabitation agreement that released all claims to one another's estate.

The court found that the plaintiff was a dependant at the time of the Deceased's death, but ultimately dismissed her application for support.

The court found the plaintiff's credibility to be low and concluded that she had been financially opportunistic throughout the relationship, having divested herself of a significant asset from a previous marriage without rational explanation, and that she had not suffered financial detriment from the relationship with the Deceased.

The court held that it would be unconscionable to provide support from the estate given her actions and self-sufficiency.

This medical negligence action involved cross-motions concerning the admissibility of expert evidence.

The plaintiff sought to admit five expert reports, arguing they fell within the scope of the Amended Statement of Claim, including claims for negligent post-operative care.

The defendants sought to declare portions of these reports inadmissible, arguing they concerned new causes of action (endoscopic exploration and orbital wall decompression) previously ruled statute-barred by a prior motion judge.

The court found that the Amended Claim did not plead general post-operative care and that the 'Other Procedures' were distinct surgical events, not post-operative care.

The court ruled that expert opinions on the statute-barred procedures were irrelevant and inadmissible, also applying the doctrine of res judicata as an exclusionary rule.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed, and the defendants' motion was granted.

The applicant, Parkland Corporation, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent Dealer from selling non-Parkland supplied motor fuel from a gas station, in breach of a long-term exclusive supply contract.

The court granted the injunction, finding that Parkland demonstrated a strong prima facie case of breach of a negative covenant, which gives rise to a presumption of irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience strongly favored Parkland, as the Dealer's actions appeared pre-meditated and in bad faith, and Parkland would suffer unquantifiable harm to its commercial control, intellectual property, and business model.

The Dealer's various defenses, including an alleged oral agreement, lack of independent legal advice, and corporate oppression, were dismissed as unlikely to succeed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated October 12, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The claimants sought compensation for a historic de facto expropriation that occurred when the respondent municipality mistakenly constructed a road extension over their property.

At a case management conference, the tribunal was advised that the municipality was finalizing the formal expropriation and that the parties were engaged in mediation.

The tribunal directed the parties to attend a further status hearing and to prepare a draft procedural order if the matter did not settle.

The claimants sought compensation for an historic expropriation that occurred when the Township of Tay mistakenly constructed a road extension over their property.

The matter was scheduled for a three-day hearing on the merits.

However, due to the absence of a hearing plan, agreed statement of facts, and procedural order, the Tribunal determined the matter was not ready for a hearing.

With the consent of the parties, the hearing was converted to a Case Management Conference.

The parties agreed to attend a Tribunal-led mediation assessment and a subsequent status hearing.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to approve a $2.37 million settlement for a minor who was catastrophically injured when struck by a motor vehicle.

While the court found the overall settlement amount reasonable and in the minor's best interests, it scrutinized the proposed 25% contingency fee of $565,000.

Applying the Solicitors Act, the court found the fee agreement was neither fair nor reasonable, noting it was signed years after the retainer began, the case lacked significant complexity or risk on liability, and the docketed time was vastly lower than the proposed fee.

The court reduced the approved legal fees to 15% of the total award ($355,500) and ordered a newly structured settlement reflecting this reduction.

The plaintiffs brought an action against the municipality seeking damages and the removal of a municipal road built on their property in 1986.

The municipality brought a motion to dismiss the action, arguing it was statute-barred, res judicata, and that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction.

The court found that under section 65(1) of the Municipal Act, 2001, the mistaken construction of the road constituted a deemed expropriation.

Consequently, the plaintiffs are prohibited from bringing an action for possession or damages in the Superior Court, and their sole remedy is to seek compensation before the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The action was dismissed.

The defendants were previously granted leave to examine a non-party under Rule 31.10.

The court had initially expressed reluctance to award costs due to the poor quality of the defendants' motion materials, which made it difficult to determine the relevance of the proposed evidence.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $13,916.32.

The court awarded a reduced lump sum of $3,500, noting that while the defendants satisfied the rule's requirements on their second attempt, the costs award must reflect the inadequacy of their materials, which did not even include a factum.

The defendants moved under Rule 31.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to examine a non-party, a former employee of the plaintiff municipality, under oath.

The underlying action involved allegations that the defendants submitted fraudulent invoices to the municipality.

The court found that the non-party had relevant evidence regarding the invoices and that the defendants had made appropriate efforts to obtain the evidence before resorting to the motion.

The motion was granted, as it would be unfair to require the defendants to proceed to trial without knowing the non-party's evidence.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend her statement of claim in a medical malpractice action against an otolaryngologist.

The defendants opposed several amendments, arguing they sought to add statute-barred causes of action and withdraw an admission.

The court found that the proposed amendments regarding two additional surgeries performed on the same day added new causes of action outside the limitation period.

The court also refused leave to withdraw an admission regarding when a risk discussion occurred, as the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the change in position.

The contested amendments were dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the defendant's representative to answer a refused question from an examination for discovery.

The underlying action involved allegations of negligent repair of an ATV.

The refused question asked the representative to agree that if the threads on the axle were intact, the only way the tire could come off was if the cotter pin was missing.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the question improperly sought an expert opinion on a hypothetical matter from a layperson.

This costs endorsement followed an unsuccessful summary judgment motion brought by the defendants.

The plaintiff sought costs totaling $37,358.51, arguing for substantial indemnity from November 19, 2018, due to an Offer to Settle.

The court found the Offer to Settle lacked a true element of compromise and did not trigger substantial indemnity costs.

Applying principles of fairness, proportionality, and reasonableness under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court awarded the plaintiff $20,000 in partial indemnity costs, inclusive of costs thrown away and disbursements, noting the motion's importance but not its complexity.

The plaintiff, Darryl Friese, was successful at trial and sought costs on a partial-indemnity basis up to May 6, 2019, and substantial-indemnity thereafter, based on a Rule 49 offer made six days before trial.

The defendant, Roxana Arfa, argued for partial-indemnity costs and contested the quantum.

The court found that the plaintiff's Rule 49 offer did not attract substantial indemnity consequences as it was made less than seven days before trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial-indemnity costs throughout, adjusting the plaintiff's proposed partial-indemnity rate from 85% to the appropriate 66.66% of the actual rate.

Total costs, including fees, disbursements, and HST, were fixed at $16,800.

The plaintiff sold his property to the defendant, but the defendant failed to close the transaction.

The plaintiff subsequently resold the property for a lower price and sued for the difference in sale price and special damages.

The defendant counterclaimed for the return of her deposit, arguing that the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by not accepting her proposed amendment to the agreement.

The court found that the plaintiff was not obligated to accept the proposed amendment and had taken reasonable steps to mitigate his damages by relisting and selling the property.

The plaintiff was awarded damages and the defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action, which sought to set aside a Declaration and Deed of Gift and declare an oral agreement for property sale.

The plaintiff alleged an oral agreement to sell property for $700,000, with annual interest payments, despite a written deed of gift stating "no consideration other than natural love and affection" and an adjusted cost base payment.

The court found genuine issues for trial, particularly concerning the existence of the oral agreement, the nature of a $35,000 payment, and the timing of an invoice, all of which raised credibility issues.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, as the court was not confident it could fairly decide the dispute without a full trial and oral evidence.

The applicants, adult children of Hilda Anne Willis, brought a motion seeking declarations of their mother's incapacity and their appointment as guardians for her property and personal care, as well as financial disclosure from her husband, David Joseph Burgie.

The court found Ms. Willis, an 86-year-old with dementia, incapable of managing her property and personal care.

However, it declined to appoint the applicants as guardians.

For property, the court noted a subsisting Power of Attorney in favour of Danny Willis, making a guardianship order unnecessary.

For personal care, the court ordered Ms. Willis to return to her home under Mr. Burgie's care, supplemented by at least three hours of daily homecare, finding that Mr. Burgie's care was not irresponsible, though needing supplementation.

The application was adjourned, and costs were to be addressed by written submissions if no agreement was reached.

The municipality appealed a motion judge's decision to stay its civil action against the defendants pending the completion of related criminal fraud charges against one of the defendants.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by holding that section 7 of the Charter eclipsed the established test requiring extraordinary or exceptional circumstances for a stay.

The court reaffirmed that the burden remains on the moving party to prove exceptional circumstances, and set aside the stay.

This trial determined custody, parenting schedule, child support, and section 7 expenses for three children, one with significant special needs.

The father sought joint custody and a week-about schedule, while the mother sought sole custody and primary care.

The court granted joint custody and a week-about parenting schedule, finding that both parents were capable and that joint custody would balance parental power.

No table child support was ordered due to the shared residency and similar incomes, and section 7 expenses, including nanny costs, were to be shared equally.

The father was ordered to attend a parenting course, and one child was to receive counselling.

The applicant was successful on a motion and sought costs.

The respondent agreed that the applicant was entitled to costs and that the requested amount was reasonable, despite disagreeing with the applicant's cost submissions.

The court ordered the respondent to pay the agreed-upon costs of $45,020.56.