William J. Leslie

The plaintiff, Liebgard Scharfenberg, sought dependant's relief from the estate of her deceased husband, August Karl-Heinz Scharfenberg, under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Deceased had made no provision for her in his will, citing a cohabitation agreement that released all claims to one another's estate.

The court found that the plaintiff was a dependant at the time of the Deceased's death, but ultimately dismissed her application for support.

The court found the plaintiff's credibility to be low and concluded that she had been financially opportunistic throughout the relationship, having divested herself of a significant asset from a previous marriage without rational explanation, and that she had not suffered financial detriment from the relationship with the Deceased.

The court held that it would be unconscionable to provide support from the estate given her actions and self-sufficiency.

This medical negligence action involved cross-motions concerning the admissibility of expert evidence.

The plaintiff sought to admit five expert reports, arguing they fell within the scope of the Amended Statement of Claim, including claims for negligent post-operative care.

The defendants sought to declare portions of these reports inadmissible, arguing they concerned new causes of action (endoscopic exploration and orbital wall decompression) previously ruled statute-barred by a prior motion judge.

The court found that the Amended Claim did not plead general post-operative care and that the 'Other Procedures' were distinct surgical events, not post-operative care.

The court ruled that expert opinions on the statute-barred procedures were irrelevant and inadmissible, also applying the doctrine of res judicata as an exclusionary rule.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed, and the defendants' motion was granted.

The applicant, Parkland Corporation, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent Dealer from selling non-Parkland supplied motor fuel from a gas station, in breach of a long-term exclusive supply contract.

The court granted the injunction, finding that Parkland demonstrated a strong prima facie case of breach of a negative covenant, which gives rise to a presumption of irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience strongly favored Parkland, as the Dealer's actions appeared pre-meditated and in bad faith, and Parkland would suffer unquantifiable harm to its commercial control, intellectual property, and business model.

The Dealer's various defenses, including an alleged oral agreement, lack of independent legal advice, and corporate oppression, were dismissed as unlikely to succeed.

The defendants were previously granted leave to examine a non-party under Rule 31.10.

The court had initially expressed reluctance to award costs due to the poor quality of the defendants' motion materials, which made it difficult to determine the relevance of the proposed evidence.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $13,916.32.

The court awarded a reduced lump sum of $3,500, noting that while the defendants satisfied the rule's requirements on their second attempt, the costs award must reflect the inadequacy of their materials, which did not even include a factum.

The defendants moved under Rule 31.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to examine a non-party, a former employee of the plaintiff municipality, under oath.

The underlying action involved allegations that the defendants submitted fraudulent invoices to the municipality.

The court found that the non-party had relevant evidence regarding the invoices and that the defendants had made appropriate efforts to obtain the evidence before resorting to the motion.

The motion was granted, as it would be unfair to require the defendants to proceed to trial without knowing the non-party's evidence.

This costs endorsement followed an unsuccessful summary judgment motion brought by the defendants.

The plaintiff sought costs totaling $37,358.51, arguing for substantial indemnity from November 19, 2018, due to an Offer to Settle.

The court found the Offer to Settle lacked a true element of compromise and did not trigger substantial indemnity costs.

Applying principles of fairness, proportionality, and reasonableness under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court awarded the plaintiff $20,000 in partial indemnity costs, inclusive of costs thrown away and disbursements, noting the motion's importance but not its complexity.

The plaintiff, Darryl Friese, was successful at trial and sought costs on a partial-indemnity basis up to May 6, 2019, and substantial-indemnity thereafter, based on a Rule 49 offer made six days before trial.

The defendant, Roxana Arfa, argued for partial-indemnity costs and contested the quantum.

The court found that the plaintiff's Rule 49 offer did not attract substantial indemnity consequences as it was made less than seven days before trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial-indemnity costs throughout, adjusting the plaintiff's proposed partial-indemnity rate from 85% to the appropriate 66.66% of the actual rate.

Total costs, including fees, disbursements, and HST, were fixed at $16,800.

The plaintiff sold his property to the defendant, but the defendant failed to close the transaction.

The plaintiff subsequently resold the property for a lower price and sued for the difference in sale price and special damages.

The defendant counterclaimed for the return of her deposit, arguing that the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by not accepting her proposed amendment to the agreement.

The court found that the plaintiff was not obligated to accept the proposed amendment and had taken reasonable steps to mitigate his damages by relisting and selling the property.

The plaintiff was awarded damages and the defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

The applicants, adult children of Hilda Anne Willis, brought a motion seeking declarations of their mother's incapacity and their appointment as guardians for her property and personal care, as well as financial disclosure from her husband, David Joseph Burgie.

The court found Ms. Willis, an 86-year-old with dementia, incapable of managing her property and personal care.

However, it declined to appoint the applicants as guardians.

For property, the court noted a subsisting Power of Attorney in favour of Danny Willis, making a guardianship order unnecessary.

For personal care, the court ordered Ms. Willis to return to her home under Mr. Burgie's care, supplemented by at least three hours of daily homecare, finding that Mr. Burgie's care was not irresponsible, though needing supplementation.

The application was adjourned, and costs were to be addressed by written submissions if no agreement was reached.

This trial determined custody, parenting schedule, child support, and section 7 expenses for three children, one with significant special needs.

The father sought joint custody and a week-about schedule, while the mother sought sole custody and primary care.

The court granted joint custody and a week-about parenting schedule, finding that both parents were capable and that joint custody would balance parental power.

No table child support was ordered due to the shared residency and similar incomes, and section 7 expenses, including nanny costs, were to be shared equally.

The father was ordered to attend a parenting course, and one child was to receive counselling.

The applicant was successful on a motion and sought costs.

The respondent agreed that the applicant was entitled to costs and that the requested amount was reasonable, despite disagreeing with the applicant's cost submissions.

The court ordered the respondent to pay the agreed-upon costs of $45,020.56.

The applicant father brought a motion for interim joint and shared custody of the parties' three children, one of whom has special needs.

The respondent mother sought to maintain the status quo of primary residence with her.

The court found that the parties lacked the necessary communication for joint custody and that the father had not presented compelling circumstances to change the status quo on a temporary basis.

The court ordered that the children remain in the mother's primary care with expanded access for the father, and set interim child support and section 7 expenses.

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim arising from a share purchase agreement in which the plaintiff withheld escrow funds alleging breach of a non‑competition covenant.

The plaintiff asserted that the defendant assisted a competitor by facilitating access to a refrigerated trailer through related entities, thereby providing a competitive “springboard.” The court found the plaintiff’s escrow payment request failed to comply with the contractual notice requirements and, more importantly, that the evidentiary record did not establish that the defendant affirmatively assisted or induced any competitive business in breach of the covenant.

The trailer was owned and leased by a separate corporation and was not unique or provided without compensation.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and that summary judgment was appropriate.

Following dismissal of claims against several defendants in a civil action, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

Multiple defendants sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the plaintiff had advanced serious and unfounded allegations attacking their integrity.

The court reviewed the governing principles for costs under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, emphasizing reasonableness and the expectations of the parties.

Although the allegations were serious and unsupported, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the self‑represented plaintiff appeared misguided rather than malicious.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the successful defendants in varying amounts, payable within 30 days.

The self‑represented plaintiff commenced a new action against numerous parties, including her former employer, its insurers, opposing counsel, and her own former lawyers, arising from circumstances surrounding her termination and the settlement of an earlier wrongful dismissal action.

Multiple defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim or obtain summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by abuse of process, the prior settlement and release, limitation periods, and failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the plaintiff was attempting to re‑litigate issues resolved in the earlier action and that many claims were legally untenable, including claims against opposing counsel and insurers who owed no duty of care to an adverse party.

Claims alleging breach of privacy, breach of confidence, defamation, Charter violations, and Human Rights Code violations were also found to disclose no reasonable cause of action.

The statement of claim was struck against most defendants without leave to amend and summary judgment was granted dismissing the remaining claims of conspiracy and extortion against them.