Vanessa V. Christie

The offender was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance (fentanyl and heroin) after acting as a courier for a half-kilogram package.

Prior to sentencing, the offender applied to reopen the trial based on fresh psychiatric and psychological evidence suggesting intellectual limitations and depression affected her testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding the expert evidence inadmissible as oath-helping and not sufficiently cogent to affect the verdict.

On sentencing, the Crown sought 8 years while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized the gravity of commercial fentanyl trafficking but considered the offender's unique mitigating circumstances, including her lack of criminal record, restrictive bail conditions, and mental health issues.

The court imposed a sentence of 5 years in custody.

The plaintiff, 784773 Ontario Limited O/A Lowton Co-Tenancy, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, Michael Larkin and Larkin + Land Use Planners Inc., for misappropriated funds while acting as trustees.

The defendants admitted to misappropriating funds and owing a total of $1,728,304, of which $1,038,616 had already been paid via a partial judgment.

The remaining contentious issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled to the entirety of the remaining $739,926, as the defendants argued it might belong to other group members.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, emphasizing the admitted breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation, and ruled that the wrongdoer should not benefit from a lack of exacting proof.

The motion was granted, awarding the plaintiff the remaining $739,926, reimbursement for forensic accounting costs, and a declaration that the debt arose from fraud/misappropriation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The applicant sought to remove her two sisters as estate trustees and compel them to pass accounts, alleging inaction in distributing estate funds from a 2017 house sale.

One respondent agreed to step aside, while the other refused to distribute funds, holding them as security for a perceived claim regarding GIC accounts that had not been litigated.

The court found the refusing trustee's position unreasonable and detrimental to the estate's proper administration.

The court ordered the removal of both estate trustees, the appointment of a neutral professional trustee, and the passing of accounts.

The defendants' custom-built home and garage encroached significantly onto the plaintiffs' neighbouring property.

The plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction for the removal of the encroachment.

The defendants admitted trespass but sought an equitable remedy allowing them to retain the land, and brought a third-party claim against the builder, surveyor, and municipality for negligence and breach of contract.

The court declined to order an injunction, finding it would be oppressive to the defendants and that the injury to the plaintiffs was small and compensable by money.

The court ordered the severance and transfer of the encroached land to the defendants for compensation.

The court also found all three third parties liable for the encroachment, apportioning fault 70% to the builder, 15% to the surveyor, and 15% to the municipality, and ordered them to fully indemnify the defendants.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation, appealed his conviction.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of credibility, particularly regarding the absence of motive to fabricate.

The court found that the trial judge erred by treating the absence of evidence of motive to fabricate as a proven lack of motive, which improperly enhanced the complainants' credibility, especially since the defence did not raise the issue.

This was deemed a significant and fatal error, leading to the quashing of convictions and ordering a new trial.

The plaintiff purchaser brought a motion for summary judgment seeking the return of a $300,000 deposit and delayed closing compensation following a failed pre-construction real estate transaction.

The purchaser argued the vendor breached the Tarion Addendum by improperly setting closing dates and failing to obtain an occupancy permit.

The court found that the vendor's notices complied with the Tarion Addendum and that the agreement placed the obligation to obtain the occupancy permit on the purchaser.

The court concluded that the purchaser failed to close the transaction and ordered the $300,000 deposit forfeited to the vendor.

The applicant sought to rescind or set aside a longstanding vexatious litigant order arising from extensive litigation connected to real estate discipline proceedings and related disputes.

The court held that an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act is not a vehicle to review the correctness of the original order or re-litigate the underlying merits.

Applying the established rescission framework, the court found no evidence that the applicant had changed litigation conduct, accepted responsibility for past misconduct, advanced a potentially meritorious new claim, or moved on from the original controversies.

The application was dismissed, with costs to be addressed only if not agreed.

On a Crown pre-trial application in a first-degree murder prosecution arising from an alleged intimate-partner homicide, the court considered the admissibility of numerous ante mortem hearsay statements and prior discreditable conduct evidence.

Applying the state of mind and principled hearsay exceptions, together with the probative-prejudice balancing governing prior misconduct evidence, the court admitted specific incidents and background relationship evidence that were sufficiently reliable and materially probative of the nature of the relationship, animus, identity, and the deceased's circumstances shortly before death.

The court excluded generalized, vague, or duplicative allegations of prior violence lacking sufficient context or posing undue moral and reasoning prejudice.

It also held that issue estoppel did not bar evidence of an earlier police-attended incident that ended in a withdrawn charge and peace bond.

The 9-1-1 call concerning the peanut butter jar incident was admitted.

The applicant challenged the validity of her late mother's 2019 will, which left the estate to a defunct charity and appointed a neighbour's daughter as estate trustee.

The application was uncontested.

The court found the will invalid due to suspicious circumstances, including the deceased's documented brain injury and lack of capacity since 2012.

The court declared an intestacy, appointed the applicant as estate trustee, and allowed the estate to be processed as a small estate despite being marginally over the financial threshold.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to approve a $2.37 million settlement for a minor who was catastrophically injured when struck by a motor vehicle.

While the court found the overall settlement amount reasonable and in the minor's best interests, it scrutinized the proposed 25% contingency fee of $565,000.

Applying the Solicitors Act, the court found the fee agreement was neither fair nor reasonable, noting it was signed years after the retainer began, the case lacked significant complexity or risk on liability, and the docketed time was vastly lower than the proposed fee.

The court reduced the approved legal fees to 15% of the total award ($355,500) and ordered a newly structured settlement reflecting this reduction.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action against various doctors, nurses, and a hospital following a surgery to treat severe nerve damage sustained in a snowmobile accident.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The plaintiffs failed to provide any admissible expert evidence to establish a breach of the standard of care or causation, whereas the defendants provided uncontradicted expert evidence supporting the care provided.

The court granted the summary judgment motions and dismissed the action against the moving defendants, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The accused was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance (fentanyl and heroin) after delivering a package containing 494 grams of the drugs to an undercover officer's co-conspirator.

The accused admitted to transferring the package but claimed she did not know it contained drugs, asserting that an acquaintance had left it in her car and asked her to deliver it.

The court rejected her evidence as unbelievable, finding that she either knew the package contained illegal drugs or was wilfully blind to that fact, given the suspicious circumstances and the high value of the drugs ($39,500).

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons on a s. 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to counsel.

The appellant claimed the trial judge failed to explain why he preferred the police officers' evidence over his own.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not make a negative credibility finding, but rather relied on the uncontroverted evidence that the arresting officer read the right to counsel from a card while the appellant was in the police cruiser.

The reasons were deemed sufficient for appellate review.

These consolidated applications concerned a 100-acre farm property transferred under a distressed sale arrangement containing a rental agreement and an eight-year buyback provision.

The court found that the responding party, acting through his attorney/mandatary, obstructed and frustrated the moving party’s repeated efforts to exercise the contractual buyback right, and thereby breached the agreement.

The court held that the breach supported both contractual enforcement and a constructive trust, and granted a mandatory injunction requiring the transfer to proceed on terms equivalent to those due on May 31, 2021.

Although the court accepted that the occupancy arrangement was commercial in nature and that some lease breaches had been shown, it refused termination and related relief under the Commercial Tenancies Act as inequitable in the circumstances.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to transfer the action to the Simplified Procedure under Rule 76, amend the Statement of Claim to reduce damages to $200,000, and strike the defendant's jury notice.

The motion was brought after the action had been set down for trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances to justify granting leave under Rule 48.04(1).

Furthermore, the court held that transferring the action would prejudice the defendant's substantive right to a jury trial, and the matter could not be fairly tried within the five-day limit of the Simplified Procedure.

The defendant insurer, Unifund, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against it.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff daughter resided with her mother at the time of a motor vehicle accident, which would entitle her to coverage under the mother's OPCF 44R Family Protection Endorsement.

The court reviewed evidence from examinations under oath and concluded that the daughter maintained her own separate residence and did not reside with her mother, despite frequently staying over to provide care.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding residency and granted summary judgment dismissing the action against Unifund.

The applicants, as first mortgagees of a commercial property, attempted to take possession following the respondent's default by changing the locks early in the morning.

The respondent's principal subsequently cut the locks and re-entered the property, leading to police involvement.

The applicants brought an urgent application for an injunction and a declaration that they were mortgagees in possession.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants did not take peaceable possession as they anticipated resistance, and held that the applicants should have pursued a standard power of sale process rather than resorting to self-help measures that breach the peace.

The Plaintiff brought a motion seeking various forms of relief, primarily to determine if Mareva injunctions ordered against him could continue post-judgment in aid of execution, or to have them set aside or varied.

The Plaintiff argued that the injunctions were causing severe financial and mental stress and that there was no longer a justifiable reason for their continuation after the trial judgment.

The Defendants opposed, asserting a continued risk of asset dissipation.

The court found that the injunctions remained in effect post-judgment and that the Defendants had met the burden of demonstrating a real risk of asset dissipation due to the Plaintiff's past conduct and non-compliance with disclosure orders.

The court dismissed the Plaintiff's motion to set aside or vary the injunctions, including requests for funds for living expenses and legal fees, finding insufficient evidence of lack of other assets.

The court also clarified that Mareva injunctions can persist despite an appeal and automatic stays of execution, as they serve a protective function.

The applicants, members of the Geneva Park community and Friends of Geneva Park, brought an urgent application seeking declarations of trust (implied, constructive, resulting, or charitable purpose trust) over the Geneva Park property, an order for directions or investigation under the Charities Accounting Act, production of the sale agreement, a Certificate of Pending Litigation, and an interim injunction to prevent the sale of the property by YMCA of Simcoe/Muskoka (YSM) to a private purchaser.

The applicants argued that their historical donations and contributions created a beneficial interest or trust.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence to support the creation of any trust, no misuse of charitable funds by YSM, and that granting an injunction or CPL would be unjust and inequitable, as the sale was a reasonable solution for the financially struggling charity.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for lack of jurisdiction.

The parties were co-workers and unionized teachers subject to a collective agreement.

The plaintiff had sued the defendant for defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and intentional infliction of mental distress arising from workplace harassment complaints.

The court applied the exclusive jurisdiction model from Weber, finding that the essential character of the dispute was workplace-related and arose from the interpretation, application, administration, or violation of the collective agreement.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as the dispute must be resolved through the grievance arbitration process.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.