Patrick K. Martin

This appeal concerned a dispute over a pre-construction home purchase agreement, specifically regarding the vendor's obligations in setting closing dates and obtaining an occupancy permit under the Tarion Addendum.

The appellant purchaser argued that the vendor's notices for delaying closing dates were defective due to imprecise nomenclature and failure to include revised critical dates, leading to a deemed firm closing date and the vendor's repudiation of the agreement.

The appellant also contended that the vendor was not ready to close because the occupancy permit was issued after the closing date.

The motion judge dismissed the purchaser's summary judgment motions, finding that the vendor's notices were valid despite minor nomenclature issues and that the purchaser was contractually obligated to obtain the occupancy permit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that minor nomenclature flaws in notices do not invalidate them if the intent is clear and timelines are met.

The court also confirmed that the purchaser was responsible for obtaining the occupancy permit as per the agreement of purchase and sale, which was not inconsistent with the Tarion Addendum.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the purchaser's deposit was forfeited due to their default.

The applicant sought an interim Mareva injunction against the respondents and several related entities, alleging breaches of a co-owners agreement, a distribution order, and misappropriation of funds in a real estate development project.

The respondents brought a cross-motion for the release of occupancy fees.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion for a Mareva injunction, finding that the applicant failed to establish a strong prima facie case, a real risk of asset dissipation, or irreparable harm, and that the undertaking as to damages was insufficient.

The court granted the respondents' motion for the release of occupancy fees.

The moving party sought partial summary judgment for $345,816 allegedly owed under an agreement concerning the sale of six townhouses.

The responding parties disputed the validity of the agreement, including whether the relevant version was signed and whether the parties had reached a meeting of the minds.

The court held that credibility issues and ambiguity in the competing agreements created genuine issues requiring a trial, making summary judgment inappropriate under the principles in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

However, based on the responding parties’ own evidence acknowledging net sale proceeds of $345,816 and a signed letter of direction to counsel, the court ordered that amount paid into court pending trial.

Directions were also made for discovery and case management steps.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking injunctive relief to prevent the distribution of funds from the sale of townhouses that were the subject of an agreement between the parties.

In the alternative, the plaintiff sought an order under Rule 45.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring the defendants to deposit $600,000 into court.

The court held that the evidence of irreparable harm was speculative and insufficient to satisfy the test for an injunction.

The court further found that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence showing a risk that the defendants would frustrate execution or render recovery impossible, which was necessary to satisfy the balance of convenience under Rule 45.02.

Both the request for injunctive relief and the request for a payment into court were dismissed.