Robert Bruce Macdonald

The moving party sought a panel review of an order requiring him to post security for costs and staying his appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no reviewable errors.

The Court noted the moving party's admission that he resides outside the province and lacks assets within it provided sufficient grounds for the order.

The moving party law firm sought an order requiring the self-represented appellant to post security for costs of his appeal regarding a settlement enforcement order.

The appellant had previously agreed to settle a fee dispute but later refused to sign the release, prompting a case conference judge to enforce the settlement.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal to be frivolous and vexatious, noting that a settlement is binding even if the form of release is disputed.

As the appellant resided in Nevada and failed to demonstrate any assets in Ontario, the court ordered him to post $26,375.32 as security for costs and stayed the appeal pending compliance.

The appellant made a complaint to Serbian Orthodox Church authorities about the respondent, a priest, regarding his involvement in her family law proceedings.

The respondent sued for defamation, and the appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the expression did not relate to a matter of public interest because it was a private grievance not widely disseminated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by focusing on the size of the audience rather than the content of the expression, which raised broader concerns about the propriety of priests participating in private litigation.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a full s. 137.1 analysis.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of a bill assessment proceeding against the respondent law firm.

The assessment had been adjourned sine die pending the outcome of a separate negligence action against the firm, which was ultimately dismissed.

The firm argued the assessment should not be restored because the negligence trial already determined the firm's conduct.

The court rejected this argument, noting that while the finding of no negligence is res judicata, an assessment officer must consider other factors under the Cohen test to determine the reasonableness of fees.

The court granted the motion to set aside the dismissal but denied costs to the applicant because his non-lawyer daughter submitted fake case law in his factum.

The plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion seeking return of their deposits and damages for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a condominium unit.

The defendant vendor brought a cross-motion for possession and damages.

The central issue was which party breached the APS by failing to close.

The vendor delivered a Statement of Adjustments containing approximately $60,000 in additional charges that were either unauthorized or unsupported by evidence.

The plaintiffs refused to close pending clarification or removal of these charges.

The court found the vendor's demand for additional payment constituted an anticipatory breach of contract, entitling the plaintiffs to terminate the agreement and recover their deposits.

The court also granted the vendor possession of the unit and damages for occupancy fees, property taxes, and condominium fees incurred during the plaintiffs' continued occupation.

The appellants brought a motion seeking directions on whether the Court of Appeal for Ontario has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a trial judgment dismissing a solicitor's negligence action.

The trial judge had dismissed the claim but assessed damages at $1,400, significantly less than the $4.8 million claimed.

The respondent contended that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction under section 19(1.2)(d) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants requested that if the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction, it should constitute itself as a panel of the Divisional Court to hear the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found it lacked jurisdiction and declined to constitute itself as a Divisional Court panel, quashing the appeal with costs.

The court considered three motions for summary judgment arising from a mortgage dispute.

The plaintiff, Indigoblue Mortgage Investment Corporation, sought summary judgment against the defendants, Muhammad Ahmad and Sajidah Kausar, for defaulting on a second mortgage.

The defendants alleged they did not understand the mortgage transaction and raised defences of non est factum and forgery, claiming their son Awais Ahmad fraudulently encumbered the property.

The court found the defences unsubstantiated, holding that the defendants understood the transaction and that the mortgage was not a fraudulent instrument under the Land Titles Act.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment against third-party lawyer Toloue Ghahraei was dismissed, as was their claim of solicitor negligence.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of both the plaintiff and Ghahraei, dismissing the third-party claim against her.

This costs endorsement addresses the allocation of costs following the defendants’ successful motion to dismiss or stay the action due to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with a prior costs order.

The court reviews the parties’ written submissions, finds the defendants’ costs reasonable, and orders the plaintiff to pay costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to her conduct during the motion.

The court also rejects the plaintiff’s request for costs against the defendants’ lawyer personally.

The court considered a motion by the defendants to dismiss or stay the plaintiff’s action due to her failure to pay a prior costs order.

The court reviewed the procedural history, including the plaintiff’s repeated abusive conduct, failure to comply with court orders, and unsuccessful motions in this and other proceedings.

The court stayed the action, giving the plaintiff a final opportunity to pay the outstanding costs, failing which her action would be dismissed without further notice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a medical office building in Toronto was held as an asset of a partnership or as a tenancy in common.

The appellants, majority owners, sought a declaration of partnership and related relief, while the respondents argued for a sale under the Partition Act.

The Court upheld the motion judge’s finding that no partnership existed, but found error in the order dispensing with the appellants’ consent to the sale of the property.

The Court directed a reference to an associate judge for the sale and denied leave to appeal the costs order.

The plaintiffs, Muhammad and Naseem Farid, sued their former solicitor, Gerald Byron Brunt, for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good faith, and breach of statutory duty after a failed real estate transaction.

The court found that the plaintiffs did not have the funds to close the transaction and that the defendant was not responsible for the failure.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' evidence as inconsistent and unsupported by documentary evidence, and found the expert evidence provided by the plaintiffs to be partial and unreliable.

The action was dismissed, and even if liability had been found, damages would have been limited to $1,400.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from a summary judgment order arising from a mortgage default.

The appellant borrower argued that the respondent lender breached its duty of good faith by failing to cancel building permits to obtain a partial refund before enforcing its security through a power of sale.

The Court of Appeal held that the lender was not contractually obligated to realize on its security in any particular order, and cancelling the permits would have reduced the property's value.

Consequently, the motion judge did not err in finding that the lender acted reasonably and in good faith to maximize its recovery.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 all inclusive to the responding party.

The lender, Alleghe Mortgage Fund Ltd., brought a motion for summary judgment against the borrower, Winona Park Towns Ltd., and its principal, Pedram Talebzadeh, seeking repayment of a $2 million loan secured by a second mortgage and guarantees, and leave to issue a writ of possession.

The borrower and guarantor opposed the motion and brought a counterclaim, alleging the lender acted in bad faith, that the notice of sale was invalid, and seeking to redeem the mortgage based on an earlier debt amount.

The court found no genuine issues requiring a trial, dismissing all arguments raised by the borrower and guarantor, and granted summary judgment in favour of the lender, including the dismissal of the counterclaim and leave to issue a writ of possession.

This was a motion for a stay of an order issued by Akazaki J. following a summary judgment motion.

The appellants, who own 75% of a commercial property, sought to buy out the respondents, who own 25%, under the Partnerships Act.

The respondents counter-claimed for a sale under the Partition Act, which the motion judge granted, allowing them a unilateral 90-day period to sell the property.

The appellants sought a stay of this remedy pending their appeal.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found the appeal had sufficient merit, particularly regarding the motion judge's imposition of an unrequested remedy.

Irreparable harm was established due to the risk of the appeal becoming moot if the property sale proceeded.

The balance of convenience also favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted, and costs were awarded to the appellants.

The plaintiffs, including a corporate entity and Dr. Earl Schwartz, brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that a medical office building they co-owned with the defendants (Dr. Martin Schwartz and Susan Schwartz) was a partnership asset, and to compel the defendants to sell their share to the corporate plaintiff at an appraised value.

The defendants denied the existence of a partnership and sought a sale of the property under the Partition Act.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' partnership claim, finding that the co-owners did not operate the building as a business with a view to profit, but rather primarily for their own professional use at cost.

The court ordered the sale of the property by the defendants on the open market and determined a financial reconciliation for ownership expenses, to be paid from the sale proceeds.

The plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages was also dismissed.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion brought by the applicant to appoint an investigative receiver-monitor and for interim disbursements in a complex corporate/family dispute.

Although most issues were settled just before the scheduled hearing, the court found compelling reasons to award costs to the applicant due to the respondents' litigation conduct, including failure to provide proper financial disclosure and late capitulation on key issues.

The applicant was deemed the successful party, having secured the appointment of their proposed receiver and interim disbursements of $1 million.

The court awarded $125,000 in costs to the applicant, balancing the applicant's success against the proportionality of the fees incurred, and declined to order joint and several liability as requested, preserving the issue for trial.

This is a costs endorsement following a decision to dismiss an application for delay.

The respondents, Robert Saltsman and the "Director Respondents" (Krishnasamy Parthiban, Andrew Lindzon, and Issa Nakhleh), sought costs on a partial indemnity scale for both the dismissal motion and the underlying application.

The applicants argued the costs were excessive.

The court found Mr. Saltsman's claimed costs of $38,696.62 reasonable and fixed them as claimed.

For the Director Respondents, the court allowed their motion costs of $27,177.12 but substantially reduced their application costs from $56,493.15 to $46,846.39 due to insufficient detail justifying the hours claimed for "preparation for the application." The total costs awarded to the Director Respondents were $74,023.51.

The applicants were ordered to pay costs jointly and severally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal summarily as an abuse of process.

The appellant, Donald Hughes, had appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary a default judgment granted in a mortgage action.

The Court of Appeal found that while the order dismissing the motion to vary was a final judgment, making it appealable to the Court of Appeal, the appeal itself constituted an abuse of process due to lengthy and unexplained delay, prejudice to the respondent, and a lack of judicial economy, especially given that the proper venue for disputing the debt was the bankruptcy court.

The applicant, a minority shareholder in a family-owned commercial real estate corporation, brought an oppression application against the majority shareholder and the corporation.

The applicant alleged oppression regarding the provision of financial information, the triggering of a shotgun buy-sell clause while the application was pending, and improper disbursements made to the majority shareholder.

The court found no oppression regarding the information provision or the shotgun clause, concluding the applicant was not entitled to an additional sum for her shares beyond the designated price.

However, the court found the majority shareholder's receipt of improper disbursements was oppressive and ordered an equalization payment of $154,717 to the applicant.