Rachel Sarah Morrow Migicovsky

The plaintiffs, having succeeded in the action, sought costs.

They argued that their February offer to settle entitled them to elevated costs under Rule 49.

The court found that the offer contained no real compromise on the principal amount and that the fixed costs offer could not be evaluated as a compromise.

Consequently, the court awarded the plaintiffs their costs on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $54,000 all-inclusive.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the respondent Receiver, representing Hillmount Capital Inc., was successful.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the appellants, Celine and Richard Pizale, to pay the Receiver partial indemnity costs, fixed at $3,000, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The plaintiffs, real estate brokers, sued the defendant for unpaid commission on a $17 million property purchase.

The parties disagreed on whether the defendant had orally accepted the plaintiffs' offer to reduce their commission from 1.5% to 0.75%.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court utilized its enhanced fact-finding powers, including hearing oral evidence, to assess credibility.

The court found the plaintiffs' evidence more reliable and consistent with the documentary record, concluding that the defendant had not accepted the reduced commission offer.

The plaintiffs were awarded judgment for the full commission amount of $288,150.

The appellants, Celine and Richard Pizale, sought to appeal orders approving the sale of their partially-renovated property by a receiver and an administration order.

They argued they had an automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) or, alternatively, should be granted leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal dismissed their panel review motion, affirming the chambers judge's decision that no automatic right of appeal existed as the sale approval order did not result in a loss beyond that already worked by the unappealed appointment order.

The court also found no basis to grant leave to appeal, concluding that the appeal did not raise an issue of general importance or prima facie merit, and would hinder the receivership process.

The applicant leased a scissor lift to a construction company, which agreed to name the applicant as an additional insured on its commercial general liability policy but failed to do so.

After an inspector was injured using the lift, the applicant sought a declaration that it was an 'Unnamed Insured' under the respondent insurer's policy and entitled to a defence and indemnity.

The court found that while the applicant met the definition of an 'Unnamed Insured', the policy contained an unambiguous restriction limiting coverage to liability arising out of operations performed in connection with a contract performed for the applicant.

Since the inspection was performed for the property owner and not the applicant, the application for coverage was dismissed.

The plaintiff's insurer brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement regarding its subrogated claim for property damage caused by the defendant's excavation.

The defendant had agreed to pay $400,000 to the insurer, but payment was deferred until a settlement with the named plaintiffs or the outcome of a liability trial.

The defendant subsequently settled with the named plaintiffs and obtained a release, effectively eliminating the liability trial.

The court held that the insurer had standing to enforce the agreement by motion in the main action and ordered the defendant to pay the $400,000 immediately, as the condition for payment had been met by the settlement with the named plaintiffs.

The defendant lawyer moved for summary judgment to dismiss a professional negligence claim against him.

The plaintiff alleged the lawyer negligently failed to ensure her ex-husband maintained an irrevocable life insurance beneficiary designation under an interim separation agreement.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the interim agreement was superseded by a final separation agreement negotiated by a different lawyer, which fundamentally changed the insurance obligations and did not require an irrevocable designation.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial as the defendant's actions did not cause the plaintiff's loss.