John Joseph Christopher Cardill

The moving party brought a motion for directions in the context of competing applications for the passing of accounts, seeking extensive additional financial disclosure from the responding party regarding their late parents' real estate and financial assets.

The responding party opposed, arguing the requests were disproportionate and that the moving party was delaying court-ordered mediation.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering specific disclosure regarding a $300,000 line of credit and cooperation on the sale of a foreign property, but denied the broader requests as disproportionate and directed the parties to proceed to mediation and set a date for the passing of accounts.

A second Case Management Conference was held regarding appeals against conditions of a draft plan of subdivision.

The parties had previously attempted mediation without success.

The Tribunal directed the parties to attempt to resolve the outstanding matters within 60 days, after which the municipality is to report back on progress and suggest next steps, which may include a further Case Management Conference or a motion to dismiss.

The appellant appealed an order made by an application judge concerning guardianship and property disputes.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in law by failing to provide any reasons for his decision, which rendered it incapable of appellate review.

Furthermore, the application judge breached procedural fairness by making orders on matters that were not requested in the pleadings and that contradicted a prior consent order, thereby violating the principle of res judicata.

The matter was remitted to a different judge.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of McLean J. dated May 27, 2021.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the moving parties, payable at the discretion of the appeal panel.

Following a motion for interim financial relief, the applicant sought costs on a full recovery basis, relying on an offer to settle that was less favourable to the respondent than the final order.

The respondent argued the requested amount was excessive.

The court found the applicant was presumptively entitled to full recovery costs under Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules.

After a minor reduction in the applicant's counsel's billed hours for reasonableness, the court awarded the applicant costs of $8,654.15.

The applicant sought an order for the immediate sale of the matrimonial home due to financial inability to maintain it and accumulated debt.

The respondent opposed the sale and brought a cross-motion for an order requiring the applicant to pay for an expert report to assess his pre-marriage assets.

The court granted the order for the immediate sale of the matrimonial home, finding that the respondent's claim for exclusive possession did not raise a triable issue and that the sale was in the interest of both parties to satisfy debts and preserve equity.

The respondent's motion for interim disbursements for an expert report was dismissed, as the court was not convinced of a prima facie case of sufficient merit or necessity, especially since the applicant had already provided an expert report.

The defendant brought a motion to fix costs following a successful summary judgment motion that dismissed most of the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff, a professional corporation of a lawyer, had sued the defendant, an expert retained in an underlying matter, for $95,000 after a fee dispute over a $2,768.50 invoice.

The court found the plaintiff's claim to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Despite missed opportunities by both sides to settle the minor fee dispute early, the court awarded the defendant costs on a substantial indemnity scale, reduced by one-third to account for the plaintiff's modest success on the fee assessment and some duplication of effort by defence counsel.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $36,300 in costs.

The appellant dentist appealed an order dismissing his motion for summary judgment, which argued that the respondent patient's dental malpractice action was statute-barred.

The respondent commenced her action within two years of her last appointment, but the appellant argued the limitation period began earlier when she first complained and threatened legal action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the claim was not discovered until after the treatment and dentist-patient relationship ended, as the appellant had advised the respondent the issue was not his fault and he would try to repair it.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to amend her pleadings at the outset of trial, the defendants sought costs of the motion and costs thrown away for trial preparation.

The court awarded the defendants costs of the motion on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $7,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable in any event of the cause and offset against any award payable to the plaintiff after trial.

The issue of costs thrown away was left to the trial judge.

On the first day of trial, the plaintiff sought to amend her Statement of Claim to advance a $240,000 claim for damages.

The proceeding was originally commenced as an application under the Solicitors Act to assess a solicitor's bill, which was later ordered to be treated as an action.

The court held that an order under Rule 38.10 does not retroactively convert an application into an action for all purposes, and the proposed amendment constituted a new cause of action for damages.

Because the plaintiff knew of the potential claim years prior, the amendment was statute-barred under the Limitations Act and the motion was dismissed.

The defendant dentist brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a dental negligence action as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The defendant argued that the claim was discoverable when the plaintiff complained about failed bridgework and threatened legal action during treatment.

The court held that the limitation period did not begin at that time because the plaintiff reasonably relied on the dentist’s explanations and continued remedial treatment.

Evidence showed the dentist’s negligent treatment continued throughout the remaining course of care and lacked informed consent.

The court concluded that the claim was not discoverable until the dentist‑patient relationship ended and that commencing litigation earlier would not have been an appropriate means of remedy while treatment was ongoing.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that ordered her to pay an equalization payment and denied her request for lump sum child support.

The respondent had refused to disclose his net worth, failed to pay child support, and disappeared prior to trial.

The Court of Appeal set aside the equalization payment and, admitting fresh actuarial evidence, awarded lump sum child support.

To satisfy the respondent's support and other obligations, the Court ordered his equity in the jointly owned matrimonial home to be vested in the appellant.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding an estate dispute.

Both parties agreed the appeal should be allowed in part.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no bequest to the appellant of any interest in the cottage and the dismissal of her claim for damages.

However, the court found the motion judge erred by leaving the estate in limbo after the respondents were prepared to renounce being trustees.

The Court of Appeal modified the order to remove the respondents as trustees and appointed the appellant as trustee, with conditions on disposing of real property.

The respondents were ordered to pass accounts, and the appellant was ordered to return a bracelet and ring to the estate.

Costs of the motion below were fixed at $12,500 for the respondents, with no costs for the appeal.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a master's costs order that directed no costs be awarded to either party following a motion in which the plaintiff had been substantially successful.

The court considered the standard for granting leave to appeal a costs order under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, which requires strong grounds demonstrating that the lower court erred in principle or exercised discretion improperly.

The court emphasized that appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with discretionary costs decisions absent clear error.

The master had considered the conduct of the parties and explained why costs were not awarded despite the general rule that costs follow the event.

The court found no basis to conclude the master was plainly wrong or erred in principle and refused leave to appeal.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant, sought a third extension of time to perfect his appeal from a judgment upholding a contingency fee agreement.

The Court of Appeal applied the five-factor test for extending time to appeal.

Finding that the moving party had not satisfactorily explained the lengthy delay, had not shown merit in the proposed appeal, and that the responding parties were prejudiced by the lack of finality, the court dismissed the motion.

Following a prior motion decision, the court addressed written submissions on costs.

The applicant sought costs of both the motion and an earlier assessment before an Assessment Officer.

The court declined to determine the costs of the earlier assessment, holding that such submissions should have been made to the Assessment Officer who conducted the hearing.

Exercising discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the applicant entitled to costs of the motion.

Partial indemnity costs of $7,992 plus HST and disbursements were awarded as fair, reasonable, and proportionate.

The respondent to an earlier application brought a motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him as guarantor on a promissory note.

The moving party argued the judgment should be set aside due to defective notice of the application, alleged representations by opposing counsel, and an asserted defence relating to inadequate legal advice regarding the guarantee.

The court accepted that the notice of application contained procedural defects and created confusion about whether the matter had already been decided.

However, the court held that the moving party failed to bring the motion promptly and demonstrated no viable defence on the merits.

Applying Rule 38.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and emphasizing the principles in Rule 1.04 regarding just and efficient determination of proceedings, the court declined to set aside the judgment.

The insured was sued for damages arising from an alleged unprovoked physical attack.

The insurer denied its obligation to defend, relying on the policy's exclusion for intentional acts.

The insured successfully applied for a declaration that the insurer owed a duty to defend, arguing that his actions were in self-defence and therefore not intentional.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the true nature of the claim was for the intentional torts of assault and battery, which were explicitly excluded from coverage.

The court concluded that self-defence does not change the intentional nature of the act, and thus there was no possibility of indemnification to trigger the duty to defend.

The appeal was allowed and the application dismissed.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario proposed to suspend the respondent's liquor licence for permitting drunken patrons on the premises.

The parties presented an Agreed Statement of Facts in which the licensee admitted to violating subsection 45(1) of Ontario Regulation 719/90.

The Board accepted the joint submission on disposition and ordered a seven-day suspension of the liquor licence.

The Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario held a pre-hearing teleconference regarding a Notice of Proposal to suspend the liquor licence of Barefax.

The Board ordered the Licensee and the Registrar to exchange witness lists, evidence summaries, and other disclosure ten days prior to the scheduled hearing.

The Board also directed that a motion by the Licensee be scheduled prior to the hearing date.