Domenico Polla

The appellant appealed a confirmed provincial officer's order requiring the removal of demolition waste from a site.

Following a pre-hearing conference where the parties indicated that mediation would not be helpful and compliance had not been completed, the Environmental Review Tribunal issued an order setting the schedule for document exchange, witness statements, and the hearing dates.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice declaring her a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant sought an adjournment claiming she did not receive the respondent's materials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment request, noting the appellant's history of making similar claims and that materials were properly served.

The court found no merit in the appeal, holding that the vexatious litigant order was fully justified by the appellant's lengthy history of vexatious proceedings and that the order did not deny actual justice or fairness.

The Attorney General for Ontario applied under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to declare Althea Reyes a vexatious litigant and to prevent her from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave.

Reyes had a history of approximately 20 civil proceedings and several criminal proceedings between 1995 and 2017, including actions found to contravene a previous vexatious litigant order.

The court found ample evidence that Reyes persistently instituted vexatious proceedings, conducted litigation vexatiously, failed to pay costs, and abused court processes.

The application was granted, declaring Reyes a vexatious litigant and imposing a leave requirement for future proceedings.

This costs endorsement followed a successful motion to strike brought by the defendant.

The defendant, Meghan Scott, sought costs, which the plaintiff, Althea Reyes, failed to provide submissions for despite an extension.

The court, considering Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the serious allegations made against the defendant's professional integrity, awarded costs to the defendant on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant, a Crown Attorney, moved to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant was immune from personal suit under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act, as her actions were performed in the course of her duties.

Furthermore, the action against the Attorney General (who would be the proper defendant) was a nullity due to the plaintiff's failure to provide proper notice under s. 7 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and s. 8(5) of the MAG Act.

Leave to amend the statement of claim was denied as the defects were incurable.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a further and better list of documents from the Crown in an action alleging wrongful arrest, defamation, and Charter breaches arising from protests in Caledonia.

The court first ruled that a police complaint report was inadmissible on the motion under the Police Services Act.

Applying principles of proportionality and relevance based on the pleadings, the court ordered the Crown to produce documents related to specific prior demonstrations relied upon in its defence and documents concerning a specific court attendance where harassment was alleged.

The court dismissed requests for broad categories of documents, including all communications from senior OPP officers referencing the plaintiff, finding them overbroad, speculative, and not proportional to the issues in dispute.

The respondent brought a motion seeking various declarations and judicial notice of facts, raising constitutional arguments as a defence to pending vexatious litigant applications under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent argued his motion should be heard immediately, prior to the scheduled applications.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that previous scheduling orders intended for the constitutional issues to be heard by the Applications Judge alongside the main applications, and that hearing them separately would be against the interests of justice.

The appellant estate appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying reimbursement for out-of-country medical expenses incurred by the deceased in Texas for cancer treatment.

The Board found that the deceased did not seek prior approval and did not meet the requirement for post-approval because the services were not provided in 'emergency circumstances'.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's factual findings were supported by the evidence and its decision was reasonable.

The moving parties sought to review an order of a single judge dismissing their motion to expedite the hearing of two leave to appeal motions.

The underlying matters related to a Crown wardship order and a Habeas Corpus application.

The moving parties argued that as Aboriginal people, they had a right to have matters heard in a court of equity applying Aboriginal law, and that the children's aid society had no authority to apprehend their children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the single judge's procedural ruling that the matters were not properly before the court.

The appellant applied for an order requiring consumer reporting agencies to remove debts over two years old from his credit report, arguing that the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 should apply.

The application judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Limitations Act does not apply to the Consumer Reporting Act.

The passing of a limitation period precludes court enforcement but does not extinguish a debt, and the reporting of such debts is expressly contemplated by the Consumer Reporting Act.

The appellant, representing Ontario grain farmers, applied under Rule 14.05(3)(d) for a declaration interpreting a regulation that restricted the use of neonicotinoid-treated seeds.

The appellant argued the regulation was unworkable and sought an interpretation that would effectively delay its implementation.

The motion judge struck the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation was not ambiguous and the appellant was improperly seeking to rewrite the regulation rather than resolve a genuine interpretive dispute.

The defendants were entirely successful on their motion to set aside a noting in default and in opposing the plaintiffs' motion for an adjournment.

The court determined the costs payable to the defendants.

The self-represented plaintiffs sought costs for their cross-examinations, but the court denied this request as they failed to demonstrate an opportunity cost or that they performed work ordinarily done by a lawyer.

The court fixed the costs payable by the plaintiffs to the defendants at $7,000, considering the factors under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the unreasonableness of the plaintiffs' settlement offers.

An agricultural industry association sought a stay of a provincial regulation restricting the use of neonicotinoid‑treated seeds pending further compliance time, arguing farmers would suffer economic harm due to regulatory timing requirements.

The province opposed and brought a cross‑motion to strike the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that injunctive relief against the Crown is highly restricted and unavailable absent circumstances such as deliberate flouting of the law, which were not present.

Even if relief were available, the applicant failed to meet the RJR‑MacDonald test for an interlocutory stay because the alleged harm was speculative and compensable in damages and the balance of convenience favoured environmental protection.

The court also held the application improperly sought to rewrite or delay the operation of a regulation rather than determine legal rights and therefore disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

Multiple tobacco manufacturer defendants sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $300,000 after withdrawing previously scheduled motions to strike the Crown’s statement of claim in a health care cost recovery action under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act.

The defendants argued they were the successful parties because their motions prompted extensive amendments to the pleading and that the Crown delayed notifying them of its intention to amend.

The court held that the amendments addressed only some of the alleged deficiencies and that significant legal issues remained unresolved when the defendants chose to withdraw the motions.

As a result, success on the motions was considered divided.

Exercising discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court ordered that each side bear its own costs.