Thomas A. Heeney

The appellant was struck by an uninsured motorcycle and suffered serious injuries.

She applied for statutory accident benefits 14 months after the accident, well beyond the 7-day notice period.

The License Appeal Tribunal found she did not have a reasonable explanation for the delay and barred her claim.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellant argued the adjudicator erred in law by failing to address a prior LAT decision with similar facts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an administrative tribunal's failure to follow or expressly distinguish its own prior decisions does not constitute an error of law, and the adjudicator's weighing of the reasonable explanation factors was a question of mixed fact and law not subject to appeal.

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle accident case, the non-settling defendant was found 100% liable for the plaintiff's damages.

The non-settling defendant sought to deduct the $150,000 settlement paid by the settling defendant under a Pierringer agreement from the jury's damages award to prevent double recovery.

The court held that while the settlement amount must be deducted to prevent overcompensation, the plaintiff is entitled to first deduct her full indemnity costs of pursuing the settling defendant from the settlement funds, ensuring she is not undercompensated.

The offender was convicted after trial of one count of dangerous driving causing death and five counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

While driving at 134 kph in an 80 kph zone with prolonged inattention, the offender rear-ended another vehicle, pushing it into oncoming traffic and causing a fatal head-on collision.

The court weighed the offender's high moral blameworthiness, excessive speed, and prior speeding record against her genuine remorse, lack of criminal record, and the collateral consequence of losing her teaching career.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to 27 months' incarceration and imposed a 5-year driving prohibition.

The parties resolved all issues arising from their separation except the allocation of parenting time for their four-year-old child.

The respondent mother sought to maintain the status quo, where the child was returned to her at 8:15 p.m. during the applicant father's parenting time.

The applicant proposed that the child remain overnight, resulting in an equal shared parenting schedule.

The court accepted the applicant's proposal, supported by the Office of the Children's Lawyer, finding that the late-evening transitions unnecessarily disrupted the child's bedtime routine and that equal time with both capable parents was in the child's best interests.

The accused brought an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for the production of third-party records.

The accused argued that a Case Management judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the application, asserting that s. 278.3 requires the application to be heard by the trial judge.

The court held that s. 551.3 of the Criminal Code expressly grants a Case Management judge the powers of a trial judge at the pre-evidentiary stage, including the power to adjudicate disclosure and admissibility issues.

The court found no conflict between the provisions and concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the application.

The plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident in South Carolina caused by an underinsured motorist.

The plaintiff settled his claim for $143,500, funded by TD Insurance, subject to a determination of liability between TD and Allstate Insurance.

TD brought a motion for summary judgment arguing Allstate was solely liable under its OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement.

The court found the plaintiff met the definition of an 'insured person' under the Allstate corporate policy because he was an employee provided with a regular use vehicle, and the 44R endorsement provided differently than the OAP-1 exclusions.

Consequently, the plaintiff was excluded from coverage under the TD policy.

Allstate was ordered to reimburse TD for the settlement amount plus costs.

The applicant sought to set aside a Separation Agreement executed on October 19, 2023, along with two ancillary documents (Schedule B and an Addendum), on grounds of failure to disclose significant assets, lack of understanding of the nature and consequences of the agreement, duress, lack of consensus ad idem, and unconscionability.

The court found that the respondent failed to disclose the value of his Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan as a divisible asset.

The applicant signed the agreement under economic duress, having committed to an unconditional condo purchase and needing the buyout funds to close.

The agreement was found to be unconscionable, particularly regarding the waiver of spousal support and pension claims.

The court set aside all three documents and ordered that the matter proceed to a second phase to determine equalization of net family property, spousal support, and other outstanding issues.

The parties agreed that the buyout of the matrimonial home at $600,000 would not be disturbed.

The applicant, a tenured university professor, sought judicial review of a decision by the university's Board of Governors to remove him from his position for adequate cause.

The removal followed findings that he engaged in a sexual relationship with a vulnerable student, hired another student with whom he had a sexual relationship without disclosing the conflict of interest, and used a dating website to flirt with an undergraduate student.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the hearing was procedurally fair and the decision to remove the applicant was reasonable, intelligible, and justified given the serious breach of trust and abuse of power.

The applicant, a school board trustee, sought judicial review of a school board decision finding she breached the Trustee Code of Conduct and imposing sanctions.

The Divisional Court found the application was not moot despite the sanctions being reduced to time served, as the finding of misconduct remained on her record.

The court quashed the decision, finding the board breached procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant and the trustees with the investigator's report and by failing to commence the inquiry within the required six-month timeline.

The court also found the decision blatantly unreasonable, as the investigator's findings did not support the conclusion that the applicant disclosed confidential information.

The respondent and intervenor sought full indemnity costs of $43,706.71 following their success on an appeal brought by the appellant condominium corporation.

They argued that section 134(3) of the Condominium Act and the condominium declaration entitled them to full indemnity costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the request, finding that section 134(3) applies to applications, not statutory appeals, and the declaration's indemnification provisions did not apply to an appeal of a tribunal decision.

Costs were fixed at the previously agreed partial indemnity amount of $17,500.

The decision addresses a motion to amend the Statement of Claim in a civil action brought by Gurupdesh Pandher against the University of Windsor and several individuals.

The court considers whether the plaintiff may add Human Rights Code claims from prior HRTO applications, the addition of new defendants, the sufficiency of defamation pleadings, the scope of misfeasance in public office, the introduction of new human rights grounds, the effect of the collective agreement and labour arbitration, the use of documents subject to the deemed or implied undertaking rule, and the pleading of matters subject to settlement privilege.

The court grants some amendments, strikes others, and provides detailed directions for further pleadings.

The court addresses the issue of "costs thrown away" following the plaintiff's successful motion to amend his Statement of Claim to add Human Rights Code claims.

The court reviews the appropriate scale for such costs, the timing of the assessment, and the quantum to be awarded.

Ultimately, the court fixes the amount of costs thrown away at $52,549, payable by the plaintiff to the defendants, and provides detailed reasons for the calculation and allocation of these costs.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a Condominium Authority Tribunal (CAT) decision dismissing its application to remove a second dog from the respondent's unit.

The CAT found that the respondent's partner required the service dog as an accommodation for a disability under the Human Rights Code, and awarded $15,000 in damages for discriminatory treatment.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the CAT did not err in law in its accommodation framework and did not breach procedural fairness in awarding damages or a common expense credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a family law trial.

The applicant, Rona Elizabeth Scott, sought full recovery of her legal costs on the basis that the respondent, Thomas Ryan Scott, acted in bad faith by advancing a baseless claim that the applicant was secretly an internet porn star, which the court found to be "patently ridiculous." The court found that the applicant was successful on virtually every issue, and that the respondent's conduct met the definition of bad faith, warranting a full recovery of costs.

Costs were fixed at $57,800, payable by the respondent forthwith.

The applicant sought judicial review and appeal of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying his claim for attendant care benefits.

The LAT found that the applicant failed to prove his family members sustained an economic loss in providing care, as required by s. 3(7)(e) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant conceded the LAT correctly interpreted the provision but argued the requirement conflicted with the consumer protection mandate of the legislation and produced an absurd result.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that there was no ambiguity in the legislation and that rewriting the statute to achieve a perceived equitable result was not a justiciable issue.

The court considered costs following a full settlement in a family law case involving decision-making, parenting time, and child support.

The applicant sought full recovery costs, arguing the final order was nearly identical to her earlier offer to settle and that the respondent acted unreasonably by not responding.

The court found the respondent had, in fact, responded with a detailed offer and that both parties had reasonable positions, with success divided on various issues.

The court determined that full indemnity costs were not warranted, and awarded the applicant $18,000 in costs, finding this amount fair and proportionate given the circumstances and the divided success.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs and the manner of payment of child support arrears following a family law trial.

The court found that the respondent, Charmaine Mohamed, was the successful party, as the applicant, Esa Hosein, was ordered to pay significant arrears of retroactive child support rather than receiving reimbursement.

The court considered the parties' conduct, including failures to make reasonable offers to settle and to provide timely financial disclosure, and ultimately ordered the applicant to pay $10,000 in costs to the respondent, subject to a deduction for a prior costs award.

The court also ordered that the arrears of child support be paid in full within 60 days, rejecting the applicant’s proposal for a payment plan.

The court considered a motion by Royal Protective Services Inc. to compel Daniella and Shawn Leis to attend examinations for discovery before other parties in a complex, multi-party action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The court found that Daniella and her father were the only parties with direct knowledge of the essential facts and ordered that they be examined first, rejecting the Leis defendants' reliance on the technical order of examinations under Rule 31.04(3).

Costs were awarded to the moving party on a partial indemnity basis.

This decision resolves a high-conflict divorce proceeding between Rona Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Ryan Scott, addressing issues of parenting time, child and spousal support (both retroactive and ongoing), equalization of net family property, and related matters.

The court grants sole decision-making authority and primary residence to the applicant, orders child support based on imputed income due to the respondent's intentional unemployment, and calculates retroactive and ongoing support.

The court also addresses a complex promissory note and inheritance issue, and rejects the respondent's claims regarding alleged proceeds from a "pornographic lifestyle" as entirely lacking in merit.

The self-represented applicant failed to appear for the hearing of his appeal, having previously been denied an adjournment.

The Divisional Court panel noted that the order appealed from was interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal, which the applicant had not obtained.

The court directed the Registrar to issue a Notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, advising the applicant that the appeal appeared frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The applicant was given twenty days to provide written submissions in response.