William Grantley Woodward

In supplemental reasons following an earlier decision, the court addressed the priority of payment and subrogation rights between OPCF 44R insurers and an umbrella policy (PULP) insurer, following the Court of Appeal's decision in Rodriguez-Vergara v. Lamoureux.

The court held that the at-fault drivers' automobile policy is primary, followed by the respective OPCF 44R endorsements, and finally the PULP.

The court also held that the OPCF 44R insurers have no right of subrogation against the umbrella insurer, and their subrogation rights against the at-fault drivers directly are limited to the amount by which their payment exceeds the combined automobile and excess policy limits.

The plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident in South Carolina caused by an underinsured motorist.

The plaintiff settled his claim for $143,500, funded by TD Insurance, subject to a determination of liability between TD and Allstate Insurance.

TD brought a motion for summary judgment arguing Allstate was solely liable under its OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement.

The court found the plaintiff met the definition of an 'insured person' under the Allstate corporate policy because he was an employee provided with a regular use vehicle, and the 44R endorsement provided differently than the OAP-1 exclusions.

Consequently, the plaintiff was excluded from coverage under the TD policy.

Allstate was ordered to reimburse TD for the settlement amount plus costs.

Eight consolidated actions arising from a motor vehicle accident on November 30, 2021, in London, Ontario, in which the defendant driver failed to stop at a red light and struck members of the London 120th Brownies, killing one child and injuring several others.

The court determined whether the defendants' personal liability umbrella policy constituted a motor vehicle liability policy under the Insurance Act and the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement.

The court held that the umbrella policy was not a motor vehicle liability policy and therefore the defendants were inadequately insured motorists.

The plaintiffs were entitled to access their own OPCF 44R coverage, with the aggregate available insurance limits of $2.3 million to be divided pro rata among all eligible claimants.

The appellant sought to set aside a settlement agreement for statutory accident benefits reached in 2016, arguing he lacked the capacity to enter into the contract.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application, finding the appellant failed to rebut the statutory presumption of capacity.

On appeal and judicial review, the Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding no errors of law in the capacity analysis and concluding the decision was reasonable.

The court also rejected arguments that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by excluding a retrospective expert capacity report.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that found he was barred from proceeding with his accident benefits dispute because a 2016 settlement agreement was valid and not vitiated by incapacity.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in law and breached procedural fairness by excluding a retrospective capacity assessment, improperly weighing evidence of his emotional dysregulation, and demonstrating a reasonable apprehension of bias against his counsel's law firm.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding no errors of law or procedural fairness, and concluding that the applicant was improperly attempting to re-litigate the weighing of evidence.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a 2014 motor vehicle accident.

The respondent argued the application was barred because the parties had executed a full-and-final settlement in November 2016.

The applicant contended he lacked the mental capacity to enter into the settlement agreement at that time.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's contemporaneous academic records and cognitive test scores demonstrated he had the capacity to understand the agreement and instruct counsel.

The Tribunal held the settlement was valid and dismissed the application pursuant to s. 9.1(8) of Regulation 664.

The applicant was injured in a motorcycle accident and sought a determination of catastrophic impairment.

The insurer initially denied the determination pending insurer examinations.

The applicant sought $14,238.00 for the cost of catastrophic examinations obtained to support his application.

The Tribunal found the applicant was not precluded from obtaining examinations before the insurer completed its own, and that the costs were reasonable and necessary.

The Tribunal ordered the insurer to pay the examination costs with interest, but denied the applicant's request for a special award, finding the insurer had not acted unreasonably.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to conditionally strike the defendant's jury notice in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, citing court backlogs and pandemic-related delays in London, Ontario.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that striking the jury notice would not improve the likelihood of the four-to-five-week trial being reached, as civil jury trials take precedence over non-jury trials of comparable length when a judge becomes available.

The court emphasized that the substantive right to a jury trial should not be interfered with without compelling reasons, which were not present.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend defence medical examinations with a neuropsychologist and a psychiatrist, in addition to an agreed-upon physiatry examination.

The plaintiff, who claimed damages for physical, cognitive, and emotional injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident, argued she should only have to attend one of the two disputed examinations.

The court granted the motion, finding that trial fairness required the defendant to have the opportunity to respond to the plaintiff's evidence regarding her physical, emotional, and cognitive impairments.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff husband to answer questions on discovery regarding the injuries sustained by his co-plaintiff wife in a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff had refused to answer, arguing they were 'witness questions' outside the scope of issues between him and the defendant.

The court allowed the motion, adopting the expansive approach to discovery that requires a party to answer any proper question relevant to any matter in issue in the action, not just issues between the examining party and the party being examined.

The defendant Bradley Gray moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss all claims and cross-claims against him arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs, Braden Moxam and Lisa Moxam, did not participate in the motion.

The co-defendants, John and Colleen Anderson, opposed the motion, having filed a cross-claim alleging Gray's negligence.

The court applied the enhanced powers under the Rules of Civil Procedure, as clarified by Hryniak v. Mauldin, to weigh evidence and evaluate credibility.

The court found that Gray, as the dominant driver, had acted reasonably and could not have avoided the collision caused by Anderson's failure to obey a stop sign.

Gray's motion for partial summary judgment was granted, dismissing all claims and cross-claims against him.

This motion in a negligence action addressed the defendant's request for orders compelling the plaintiff to attend medical assessments, complete questionnaires, and sign consent forms, as well as to adjourn pre-trial and trial dates.

The plaintiff had refused to comply, relying on prior case law.

The court vacated the pre-trial and trial dates due to non-compliance with Rule 53.03(2.2) regarding expert report schedules.

The court ordered the plaintiff to sign consent forms and complete questionnaires, finding that section 105(5) of the Courts of Justice Act mandates answering relevant questions and that the court has inherent jurisdiction to control the discovery process, distinguishing prior cases that suggested a complete code.

The motion for the assessments themselves was adjourned as premature.

The appellant insurance company appealed a summary judgment order that found the respondents (an adult son, his wife, and their daughter) were covered under the homeowner's policy of the named insured (their mother/mother-in-law) as relatives "living in the same household." The named insured owned a house that served as her primary residence until she entered a nursing home, after which the respondents used it as a cottage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that "household" in insurance law refers to a type of community requiring intimacy, unity, and permanence, not merely physical residence.

The respondents maintained separate lives in the city and did not share a common life with the named insured meeting these requirements.

The applicant was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and subsequently developed complete hearing loss in his left ear and partial hearing loss in his right ear due to a labyrinthine concussion.

He applied for non-earner benefits, housekeeping benefits, and a determination of catastrophic impairment.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's hearing loss and resulting psychological impairments continuously prevented him from engaging in substantially all of his pre-accident activities, entitling him to non-earner benefits.

The arbitrator also concluded that the applicant sustained a catastrophic impairment under criterion (g) of the Schedule, as his psychological impairments resulted in a Class 4 marked impairment in the sphere of social functioning.

The claim for housekeeping benefits was dismissed.

The insurer was ordered to pay the applicant's arbitration expenses.

The respondents were seriously injured in a motorcycle accident in Minnesota caused by a state-owned truck operated by a state employee.

Due to Minnesota's statutory damage cap under the Tort Claims Act, they recovered only US$500,000 (inclusive of legal fees), despite damages exceeding that amount.

They sought the shortfall from their Canadian insurer under an underinsured motorist endorsement (OPCF 44R).

The insurer refused, arguing Minnesota was not "inadequately insured" and that legal fees were not recoverable.

The motion judge found in favor of the respondents on both issues.

On appeal, the court held that Minnesota was an inadequately insured motorist despite being self-insured and having statutory immunity, but reversed the finding that legal fees could be claimed as special damages.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident in Minnesota and settled their claims there for $600,000.

They subsequently sued their Ontario insurer under the OPCF-44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement for under-insurance.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their pleadings and to determine questions of law under Rule 21 regarding whether the Minnesota defendants were underinsured and whether legal fees from the Minnesota action could be claimed as special damages.

The court held that the Minnesota defendants were underinsured with respect to one plaintiff whose settlement reached the foreign statutory limit, but not for the other plaintiff who settled below the limit.

The court further held that the legal fees incurred in the foreign action could be claimed as special damages by the eligible plaintiff.

In an addendum to a trial judgment, the court corrected a calculation error in the damages award based on the jury's decision.

With the agreement of counsel, the court recalculated the award by applying a 20 percent reduction for contributory negligence to the pecuniary damages, and applying the statutory deductible followed by the contributory negligence reduction to the non-pecuniary damages.

The total judgment was amended to $136,483.20.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff was awarded $160,480 after a 20% deduction for contributory negligence, the court determined the costs of the action.

One of the plaintiffs abandoned her claim on the eve of trial.

The court declined to award costs directly against the abandoning plaintiff but reduced the successful plaintiff's costs to reflect the shared representation.

The successful plaintiff was awarded $72,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, with a deduction for an insurance premium disbursement.

Two appeals were heard together regarding whether the equitable doctrine of laches can defeat a first party insurer's loss-transfer claim under s. 275 of the Insurance Act.

In both cases, the first party insurers delayed several years before requesting indemnification from the second party insurers.

The Court of Appeal held that the defence of laches cannot be invoked against a statutory loss-transfer claim, as it is a claim for legal relief subject to the Limitations Act, 2002, which no longer contains a laches-saving provision.

Furthermore, even if laches were available, the second party insurers failed to demonstrate acquiescence or actual prejudice.

Lombard's appeal was dismissed and TD's appeal was allowed.

Following a jury verdict awarding damages for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident caused by the defendant’s negligence, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiff sought substantial partial indemnity costs, while the defendant argued that settlement offers should shift costs after a certain date under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the defendant’s offers did not comply with the formal requirements of Rule 49.10 and declined to give them the requested cost consequences.

Applying the general rule that costs follow the event and considering the factors in Rule 57.01, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs for the action.