William Grantley Woodward

Eight consolidated actions arising from a motor vehicle accident on November 30, 2021, in London, Ontario, in which the defendant driver failed to stop at a red light and struck members of the London 120th Brownies, killing one child and injuring several others.

The court determined whether the defendants' personal liability umbrella policy constituted a motor vehicle liability policy under the Insurance Act and the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement.

The court held that the umbrella policy was not a motor vehicle liability policy and therefore the defendants were inadequately insured motorists.

The plaintiffs were entitled to access their own OPCF 44R coverage, with the aggregate available insurance limits of $2.3 million to be divided pro rata among all eligible claimants.

The defendant Bradley Gray moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss all claims and cross-claims against him arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs, Braden Moxam and Lisa Moxam, did not participate in the motion.

The co-defendants, John and Colleen Anderson, opposed the motion, having filed a cross-claim alleging Gray's negligence.

The court applied the enhanced powers under the Rules of Civil Procedure, as clarified by Hryniak v. Mauldin, to weigh evidence and evaluate credibility.

The court found that Gray, as the dominant driver, had acted reasonably and could not have avoided the collision caused by Anderson's failure to obey a stop sign.

Gray's motion for partial summary judgment was granted, dismissing all claims and cross-claims against him.

This motion in a negligence action addressed the defendant's request for orders compelling the plaintiff to attend medical assessments, complete questionnaires, and sign consent forms, as well as to adjourn pre-trial and trial dates.

The plaintiff had refused to comply, relying on prior case law.

The court vacated the pre-trial and trial dates due to non-compliance with Rule 53.03(2.2) regarding expert report schedules.

The court ordered the plaintiff to sign consent forms and complete questionnaires, finding that section 105(5) of the Courts of Justice Act mandates answering relevant questions and that the court has inherent jurisdiction to control the discovery process, distinguishing prior cases that suggested a complete code.

The motion for the assessments themselves was adjourned as premature.

The appellant insurance company appealed a summary judgment order that found the respondents (an adult son, his wife, and their daughter) were covered under the homeowner's policy of the named insured (their mother/mother-in-law) as relatives "living in the same household." The named insured owned a house that served as her primary residence until she entered a nursing home, after which the respondents used it as a cottage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that "household" in insurance law refers to a type of community requiring intimacy, unity, and permanence, not merely physical residence.

The respondents maintained separate lives in the city and did not share a common life with the named insured meeting these requirements.

The respondents were seriously injured in a motorcycle accident in Minnesota caused by a state-owned truck operated by a state employee.

Due to Minnesota's statutory damage cap under the Tort Claims Act, they recovered only US$500,000 (inclusive of legal fees), despite damages exceeding that amount.

They sought the shortfall from their Canadian insurer under an underinsured motorist endorsement (OPCF 44R).

The insurer refused, arguing Minnesota was not "inadequately insured" and that legal fees were not recoverable.

The motion judge found in favor of the respondents on both issues.

On appeal, the court held that Minnesota was an inadequately insured motorist despite being self-insured and having statutory immunity, but reversed the finding that legal fees could be claimed as special damages.

Following a jury verdict awarding damages for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident caused by the defendant’s negligence, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiff sought substantial partial indemnity costs, while the defendant argued that settlement offers should shift costs after a certain date under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the defendant’s offers did not comply with the formal requirements of Rule 49.10 and declined to give them the requested cost consequences.

Applying the general rule that costs follow the event and considering the factors in Rule 57.01, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs for the action.

In a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision where liability was admitted and damages remained in issue, the plaintiff moved to exclude evidence from experts who prepared accident benefits reports for the plaintiff’s insurer.

The plaintiff argued the reports were irrelevant, non-compliant with Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, prejudicial to trial fairness, and duplicative.

The court held that although the experts had not signed the Form 53 acknowledgement required under Rule 53.03(2.1), the rule applied even to experts retained by non-parties and the non‑compliance could be cured by granting leave subject to obtaining the acknowledgement.

The court found portions of the reports remained relevant to the plaintiff’s cognitive, emotional, and physical condition at an intermediate stage following the accident, though opinions on employability were excluded as no longer relevant.

The motion to exclude the expert evidence was dismissed, subject to conditions.

Following a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences where the plaintiffs obtained a judgment significantly less favourable than the defendant’s Rule 49 offer to settle.

The plaintiffs recovered limited damages after the statutory deductible reduced the award.

The court considered whether Rule 76 simplified procedure should have been used and concluded it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to proceed under the ordinary procedure due to the complexity of the case and expert evidence.

Applying Rule 49.10(2), the plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the defendant’s offer, and the defendant was awarded partial indemnity costs thereafter.

Substantial indemnity costs were refused because there was no reprehensible conduct.