Mary-Anne C. Strong

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a lower court decision dated October 21, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the total amount of $10,000.

The defendants in a motor vehicle accident claim moved for leave to amend their statement of defence to plead the inevitable accident defence, citing a blown tire.

The motion was brought nearly four years after the action commenced and shortly before the scheduled trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants' lengthy and unexplained delay in seeking the amendment resulted in presumed, non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff that could not be remedied by costs or an adjournment.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a motor vehicle accident action from Guelph to London, seeking to consolidate it with a separate London action against the plaintiff's long-term disability insurer.

The plaintiff opposed the transfer.

The court, applying Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) factors holistically, found that the cause of action, damages, and subject matter were Guelph-centric.

It determined that the convenience of parties and witnesses did not favor London, and transferring would significantly delay the Guelph trial, which was already on the trial list.

The motion was dismissed, upholding the plaintiff's prima facie right to choose venue and emphasizing the negative financial impact of delay on the plaintiff.

This motion concerned the amendment of a statement of claim for statutory accident benefits (SABs) to include claims for medical and rehabilitation benefits denied post-issuance and a declaration of catastrophic impairment.

The action was commenced prior to 2016 amendments to the Insurance Act which removed the right to bring actions for SABs disputes, redirecting them to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT).

The court granted the amendment, finding that the proposed changes constituted a particularization of claims already broadly pleaded in the original statement of claim, rather than new disputes arising after the statutory amendments.

The court emphasized the policy against multiplicity of proceedings and the potential for inconsistent findings if claims were bifurcated between the Superior Court and the LAT.

The appellants were injured in a motor vehicle accident and held an insurance policy with a $1 million family protection coverage limit (OPCF 44R).

The tortfeasor also had a $1 million insurance limit.

Because the tortfeasor's limit might be apportioned among four injured parties, the appellants sought to access their underinsurance coverage to make up any shortfall.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the claim against the insurer, confirming that underinsurance coverage is not triggered when the tortfeasor's policy limit equals the family protection coverage limit, regardless of the number of claimants.

The appellant sued her former lawyer for professional negligence, alleging he settled her motor vehicle accident claim too soon and for too little.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the lawyer met the standard of care and the appellant was motivated to settle early.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in qualifying a mediator as an expert and in permitting a defence expert to testify despite a breach of an order excluding witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or her conclusion that the lawyer met the standard of care.