Robert G. Matlack

The plaintiff sought leave to amend the statement of claim to correct the name of the plaintiff.

The defendant opposed, arguing prejudice and limitation period issues.

The court found that only two invoices were issued by the correct corporate entity, but those claims were out of time and duplicate.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice from the loss of a limitation defence.

The motion to amend was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The appellants brought a motion in writing to amend a previous decision of the Divisional Court, which had allowed their appeal but did not award costs of the underlying action due to a misunderstanding that they were not sought.

As no order had yet been issued or entered, the court remained seized under Rule 59.06(2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted the motion, finding that the appellants were entitled to costs of the action based on their successful appeal, and awarded $25,000 in costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $25,000 on an unpaid invoice for engineering services.

The trial judge had rejected the appellants' limitation defence, finding the limitation period was suspended during settlement discussions.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The court held that the limitation period expired before any settlement discussions took place, as the appellants had refused to pay the full invoice amount more than two years prior to the commencement of the action.

The judgment and costs order were set aside.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that found she was a partner in a law firm rather than an employee.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the control and dependency test established in McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, holding that McCormick does not establish control and dependency as an all-purpose test for determining partnership status.

Instead, courts must examine all surrounding circumstances, the substance of the relationship, the behaviour of the parties, and their intentions.

The trial judge's findings of fact, which supported a partnership relationship, were available on the evidence and no palpable and overriding error was demonstrated.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, sued her former law firm for wrongful dismissal, asserting she was an employee.

The defendant firm contended she was a partner.

The court applied the "substance over form" principle to determine the true nature of the relationship, examining factors such as participation in firm management, access to financial information, tax filings, and benefits.

The court concluded that the plaintiff was a partner, not an employee, and therefore dismissed her claim for wrongful dismissal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding an aborted real estate transaction where the purchaser was identified as a corporation 'In Trust'.

The appellants had pleaded that the corporation was acting as a trustee for a disclosed beneficiary, but later sought to amend their pleadings at the end of the trial to hold the trustee liable.

The trial judge denied the motion to amend and held only the corporate beneficiary liable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trustee status was not a live issue at trial due to the appellants' own pleadings, and awarded costs to the respondents.

The appellant sued her former lawyer for professional negligence, alleging he settled her motor vehicle accident claim too soon and for too little.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the lawyer met the standard of care and the appellant was motivated to settle early.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in qualifying a mediator as an expert and in permitting a defence expert to testify despite a breach of an order excluding witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or her conclusion that the lawyer met the standard of care.