Thomas A. Heeney

The appellant veterinarian appealed three separate decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Veterinarians of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct and imposing penalties including suspensions and costs.

The appellant argued that the proceedings should have been dismissed for abuse of process due to delay and procedural irregularities, that the College's expert evidence should not have been admitted, and that the penalties were clearly unfit.

The Divisional Court dismissed all three appeals, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the Committee's factual findings and no errors of law.

The Court held that the statutory referral process was properly followed, the delay was not inordinate and caused no prejudice, the expert evidence was properly admitted, and the penalties and costs were within the Committee's reasonable discretion.

The City of Toronto applied for judicial review of WSIAT decisions granting breast cancer benefits to three communications dispatchers under the firefighter occupational disease presumption.

The WSIAT had ruled that evidence of the dispatchers' lack of exposure to fire suppression hazards could not be considered to rebut the presumption.

The Divisional Court found this interpretation unreasonable, as it contradicted the plain meaning of the statute and the binding WSIB policy, which allowed the presumption to be rebutted by evidence that employment was not a significant contributing factor.

The WSIAT decisions were quashed and the original WSIB decisions denying benefits were restored.

The applicant sought to vary a 20-year-old interim child support order to terminate his support obligations for three children and to seek reimbursement for support paid after the children allegedly became disentitled.

The respondent opposed and sought an increase in child support retroactive to November 1, 2019.

The court found that the applicant had underpaid support for years due to not disclosing increased income, and that the respondent was entitled to retroactive support for the two remaining eligible children, calculated based on the applicant’s true available income, including retained corporate earnings.

The court fixed arrears and set out the process for determining costs and payment of arrears.

Ontario sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario finding that changes to the Ontario Autism Program (OAP) discriminated against a child with autism on the basis of disability.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding it unreasonable.

The Court held that the Tribunal failed to provide a rational chain of analysis to support its conclusion that the child experienced adverse treatment based on her disability, as the OAP's funding caps were designed to address inequities and ensure all eligible children received some beneficial services.

The Court declined to remit the issue of disability discrimination back to the Tribunal, concluding that no rational analysis could lead to a finding of discrimination on these facts.

The applicant, a child with Autism Spectrum Disorder, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing their claim that changes to the Ontario Autism Program discriminated on the basis of age and disability.

The tribunal had declined to decide whether the definition of 'age' in section 10 of the Human Rights Code, which limits age discrimination claims to persons 18 or older, violated section 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court held that the tribunal was required to decide the Charter issue as it was properly pleaded and necessary to resolve the applicant's claim.

The tribunal's decision was quashed and the matter remitted for resolution of the constitutional question.

The court considered whether a person intending to make a claim against an estate for unjust enrichment, based on services rendered to the deceased, has standing to file a Notice of Objection to the granting of a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee under Rule 75.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and to seek removal of the Estate Trustee named in the will.

The court held that such a potential creditor does not have standing to file a Notice of Objection, as the category of persons with standing is limited to those whose claims turn on the outcome of a challenge to the will or the issuance of a certificate of appointment.

The Notice of Objection was ordered removed.

The decision addresses motions by the plaintiff to amend his Statement of Claim to add explicit human rights claims previously advanced before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO), and to add two new defendants.

The court grants leave to amend to add the Code-related claims, finding that the amendments do not introduce new causes of action but rather new remedies arising from the same factual matrix.

The court denies leave to add new defendants, as claims against them are statute-barred.

The court also addresses costs thrown away on an abandoned injunction motion, awarding partial indemnity costs to the defendants.

The offenders, a mother and father, were convicted of multiple counts of severe physical and sexual abuse, including incest, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement, committed against four of their children over nearly two decades.

The court applied the principles from Friesen, emphasizing the profound harm caused by sexual violence against children and the egregious breach of trust.

After applying the totality principle to the numerous consecutive sentences, the mother was sentenced to a global term of 17 years and 8 months, and the father to a global term of 21 years.

The self-represented applicant, a massage therapist, sought judicial review of a decision by the College of Massage Therapists of Ontario.

The applicant mistakenly believed the College had made a finding of professional misconduct regarding testimonials on a Google Maps listing.

The Divisional Court clarified that the College had only disposed of the matter administratively by requiring corrective actions and training.

Finding the College's disposition reasonable and noting the applicant's ability to remove the offending listing, the court dismissed the application for judicial review.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order for the pre-trial sale of the jointly-owned matrimonial home.

The appellant occupied the home and paid no child or spousal support, arguing that his payment of carrying costs on investment properties was sufficient.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge properly exercised her discretion.

The court noted that the appellant's failure to pay support left him with unclean hands, and his claim of high carrying costs undermined his argument that the parties could afford to retain the home pending further litigation.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondents damages for their arrest at a border crossing.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that because the total damages awarded in each action exceeded $50,000 inclusive of prejudgment interest, the appeal exceeded the Divisional Court's monetary jurisdiction.

The appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicants sought an order for the removal of a gate obstructing a shared right-of-way and an injunction against further interference.

The respondents argued the gate was for security and brought a motion to strike parts of the applicants' affidavits.

The court granted the applicants' motion to strike scandalous allegations from the respondents' affidavits, finding them irrelevant.

The court then determined that the gate constituted a substantial interference with the applicants' right-of-way, particularly for vehicular access, and rejected the respondents' security justification as insufficient.

The court ordered the gate's removal and restrained the respondents from further obstruction.

The parties, married in 2015 and separated in 2019 with two children, resolved many issues through partial minutes of settlement.

The trial addressed remaining disputes including Easter parenting time, travel notice requirements, child support and arrears (specifically imputation of income for rent-free accommodation), Section 7 expenses, Facetime/phone contact with children, children's birthdays, parent birthdays, and counselling for the children.

The court made specific orders on each of these issues, notably imputing income to the applicant for rent-free housing and ordering a psychological assessment for one child due to concerning behavioral incidents.

Following a settlement of the plaintiffs' claims arising from a motor vehicle accident, the insurer sought costs against the uninsured at-fault driver.

The insurer claimed costs for defending the action as well as costs incurred in an unsuccessful motion for contribution against another insurer.

The court awarded the insurer its costs for defending the action but denied recovery for the costs associated with the unsuccessful motion, finding it was a dispute between insurers and not a necessary step in defending the claims against the uninsured driver.

Following a decision determining that a foster child was not entitled to share in an intestate estate, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant estate trustee was awarded full indemnity costs payable from the estate, as the application was necessary for the proper administration of the estate.

The successful respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs payable by the unsuccessful respondent, with the balance of his full indemnity costs payable by the estate, as the litigation between the respondents was adversarial and did not engage public policy considerations.

This motion concerned a dispute between two defendant insurers, Pafco Insurance Company and Kent and Essex Mutual Insurance Company, regarding Kent's obligation to contribute to a $950,000 settlement paid by Pafco.

The settlement satisfied claims made by the plaintiffs under the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement, following the death of Ashley Kerr in a car accident caused by an uninsured motorist.

The central issue was whether Ashley Kerr qualified as an "insured person" under Joe Hesch's (her common-law spouse) 44R policy with Kent, which would trigger Kent's contribution.

The court found that Ashley did not meet the definition of an "insured person" under Joe's policy because she owned the "other automobile" she was occupying at the time of the accident, an exclusion explicitly stated in the 44R endorsement and reinforced by the OAP 1 policy.

Consequently, Kent was not obligated to contribute to the settlement.

The court also granted Pafco a subrogated judgment against the at-fault uninsured motorist.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful application for interim guardianship of property for an incapable adult.

The applicant, Brenda Myers, sought full indemnity costs, while the responding party, Tereasa Muscedere (the incapable adult's mother), opposed the costs award, claiming impecuniosity and excessive costs.

The court found Tereasa's opposition to the guardianship application unreasonable and ordered her to pay partial indemnity costs to Brenda Myers and s. 3 counsel for the incapable adult.

The balance of Brenda Myers' and s. 3 counsel's costs, and the Public Guardian and Trustee's full indemnity costs, were ordered to be paid from the incapable adult's property, with a portion of the PGT's costs adjourned to the passing of accounts.

The applicant trustee sought directions on the distribution of an intestate estate.

The deceased died without a spouse, issue, or parents, leaving his estate to be distributed among his siblings.

The respondent, a former foster child of the deceased's adoptive parents, claimed entitlement to share in the estate as a 'sister'.

The court held that under the Children's Law Reform Act and the Succession Law Reform Act, a foster child who was never legally adopted does not meet the definition of a 'child' or 'sister' for the purposes of intestate succession.

The foster child was therefore excluded from sharing in the estate.

The three accused were charged with multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences after police executed a search warrant at an apartment and found large quantities of drugs and two handguns.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance showing the accused coming and going from the building, and the presence of two of the accused in the apartment during the raid.

The court found that while the evidence established the apartment was a stash house, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and control of the contraband, as there was a reasonable alternative inference that the drugs and guns belonged exclusively to the tenant of the apartment.

During an ongoing trial for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of surveillance video clips from an apartment building.

The defence challenged the authenticity of the video due to time stamp discrepancies and jumps in the recording.

The court applied section 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act and the test from R. v. Bulldog, finding that the Crown only needed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the video was a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purported to show.

The court held that the time jumps were attributable to the camera being motion-activated and the time stamp was inaccurate to a provable degree, ruling the video admissible.