Hosein v. Mohamed, 2025 ONSC 898

Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: FS-22-21
Date: 2025-02-18
Between:
Esa Hosein, Applicant
and
Charmaine Mohamed, Respondent

Before: T. A. Heeney

Applicant Counsel: Craig J. Potter
Respondent Counsel: Self-represented
Heard: February 4 and 5, 2025 at Woodstock

Introduction

1In this application, the applicant seeks to vary an interim child support order that was made 20 years ago, so as to terminate his support obligations toward the three children of the relationship. He also seeks reimbursement for child support that he paid after the dates that he alleges the children became disentitled to support.

2The respondent resists the application, and claims an increase in child support, retroactive to November 1, 2019.

Overview

3The parties began living together in 1994. There were three children born of the relationship, Alyssa, born April 17, 1995, Celisha, born September 6, 1997, and Breanna, born December 19, 2001. The parties separated for the first time in 2005. In that year, the respondent commenced proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice in Orangeville. She was named as the applicant in that proceeding but, in order to avoid confusion, I will continue to refer to her as the respondent and to Esa Hosein as the applicant. An interim order was made by Kruzick J. dated December 12, 2005, which granted primary care of the children to the respondent, access to the applicant, and ordered him to pay child support of $698 per month for the three children, based on attributed income of $37,000 per year. He was also ordered to pay $110 per month, representing ½ of the daycare expense, for a total monthly amount of $808.

4The parties attempted reconciliation several times over the ensuing 5 years, but separated permanently in 2010. The application commenced by the respondent became dormant. The interim support order remained in place, and the applicant continued to pay $808 per month in the years thereafter. To his credit, he made his payments reliably. To his discredit, however, those payments were far below the amount he should have been paying, given the increases in his income over the years.

5As noted above, the interim support order was based on the applicant having attributed income of $37,000 per year. The income tax records filed at this trial, and in particular the comparative tax summaries, reveal that his total annual income, from 2014 to 2018, was as follows:

• 2014: $100,483
• 2015: $94,156
• 2016: $64,487
• 2017: $99,371
• 2018: $147,141

6His income for subsequent years will be discussed below.

7The respondent testified that she frequently requested updated income information from the applicant, but he never complied. His response, instead, was to complain that he was overpaying her as it was. She considered bringing variation proceedings from time to time, but she was not “money driven” and was “naïve” in these matters. She never made a written request for financial disclosure, which would have triggered the disclosure requirements in s. 25 of the Child Support Guidelines. However, the obligation to provide annual financial disclosure in s. 24.1 of the Guidelines is automatic, and does not depend upon the written request of the recipient. The applicant clearly failed to comply with those provisions.

8On March 12, 2012, Alyssa gave birth to a child, Faith, at the age of 16. According to the Request to Admit, filed by the applicant and deemed to have been admitted by the respondent, the applicant contacted the Family Responsibility Office (“FRO”) to terminate the child support payable for Alyssa. The respondent refused to agree that support should be terminated, because Alyssa was still under 18 despite having become a mother. The applicant did not bring a motion to change, nor did he otherwise press the matter.

9When Alyssa reached the age of 18 in 2013, she was no longer in full time attendance at school, to the knowledge of the applicant. She was, therefore, clearly disentitled to child support at that point in time. However, the applicant continued paying $808 per month, and took no action to vary child support until he commenced this application in September, 2022. His payments continued until June 1, 2023, when the payment of child support was terminated by the interim order of Grace J. dated June 8, 2023.

10I infer from all of this that he did not want to bring an application to vary support to delete the support payable for Alyssa, because he would need to file current income information in order to do so. The December 12, 2005 order did not order support on a per child basis, where Alyssa’s support could simply be deleted, but made one support order for all three children. Terminating support for Alyssa would require the court to calculate the support payable for the remaining two children. Based on the annual income figures shown above, if support were to be recalculated he would have found himself paying considerably more for two children than he had been paying for three under the interim order.

11This inference is confirmed by the position he has taken in his counsel’s closing submissions at this trial, where he abandoned any claim to retroactive variation prior to November 1, 2019, and agreed with the respondent that any variation would only be effective from that date forward. Mr. Potter vaguely stated that retroactively terminating Alyssa’s support back to 2013 would create “conceptual difficulties”. He did not expand on what those difficulties might be, but I infer that they related to the need to recalculate the support payable for the remaining children based on his annual income from year to year since then.

12On October 16, 2019, tragedy struck. Alyssa was killed in a car accident. Celisha and Breanna were both at school at York University when they heard the news, as was the respondent, who was employed there. This was devasting for the family, as will be detailed below. The respondent took custody of Faith, and continues to act as mother to the child to this day. The applicant agreed that he would continue to pay child support, notwithstanding Alyssa’s death, and that the support that would have gone to Alyssa could be used to help raise Faith instead.

13Almost three years later, the applicant decided that he was no longer prepared to pay support, and commenced this application on September 12, 2022, seeking termination of all of his support obligations, and reimbursement of child support paid beyond their eligibility dates.

14In the respondent’s Answer dated November 25, 2022, she agreed that support for Alyssa should be terminated effective October 16, 2019, being the date of her death. However, she made a claim of her own for variation of the child support payable for Celisha and Breanna, “once the income of the Applicant Father has been determined”, effective November 1, 2019 until present.

15During her testimony, I asked her why she expressly limited the date of retroactivity to November 1, 2019. She was not sure why, but assumed it had come up in her discussions with her lawyer, who had been retained on a limited-scope retainer at that point in time, and was assisting her in preparing her pleadings. It is reasonable to assume that this arose out of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, which established a presumptive cap on retroactivity at three years prior to formal notice of the application to vary.

16At the Settlement Conference before Campbell J. on March 7, 2024, the applicant requested, and received, leave to amend his Application, and subsequently did so. The respondent admits that, as confirmed in the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form, she was given the opportunity to amend her pleadings in response, but did not do so. This was well after the fall of 2022 when, she testified, “my jaw dropped when I realized just how much income he had earned over the years without increasing his child support obligations”.

17She did not request leave to amend her pleadings prior to, or at any time during the course of, this trial. It was only in her closing submissions, when she referred to the concept of “blameworthy conduct”, that she asked the court to consider varying support back to a time earlier than November 1, 2019. I reminded her that her pleadings specifically limited the date of retroactivity to the November date, and even at that late point in time there was still no request for an amendment. Had there been such a request, though, such an amendment would have fundamentally altered the case before the court, and would have required an entire body of evidence to be put before the court that had not been tendered, given the state of the pleadings. Accordingly, I ruled that she was bound by the relief she had sought in her Answer.

The Law

18There are two issues before the court. The first is a determination of the period or periods during which Celisha and Breanna were entitled to support. The second is a determination of the quantum of support to be paid during those periods.

19Support entitlement is determined by s. 31(1) of the Family Law Act, which provides as follows:

31 (1) Every parent has an obligation to provide support, to the extent that the parent is capable of doing so, for his or her unmarried child who,

(a) is a minor;

(b) is enrolled in a full-time program of education; or

(c) is unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents.

20The quantum of support is determined by s. 33(11) of the Act, which provides as follows:

(11) A court making an order for the support of a child shall do so in accordance with the child support guidelines.

21I will make reference to specific sections of the Guidelines as they become relevant in the discussion below.

The Applicant’s Position

22The applicant concedes that both Celisha and Breanna were in full-time attendance at York University as of November 1, 2019, and were, therefore, entitled to child support at the table amount based on the applicant’s income.

23He concedes that Breanna continued to be eligible until May, 2020, but at that point in time she ceased being a full-time student. She was over the age of 18, and never returned to school thereafter, and thus it is argued that she was disentitled to child support after May, 2020.

24As to Celisha, the applicant concedes that she continued to be a full-time student at York throughout 2020, and finished her degree in August, 2021. He therefore submits that she was disentitled to support after August, 2021.

25His final submissions can be summed up by the following table, a version of which he filed with the court:

Period	Applicant’s Annual Income	Number of eligible children	Number of months	Monthly table amount	Child support payable
Nov. - Dec. 2019	$70,000	2	2	$1,067	$2,134
Jan. - May 2020	$58,000	2	5	$884	$4,420
June - Dec. 2020	$58,000	1	7	$536	$3,752
Jan. - Aug. 2021	$77,000	1	8	$718	$6,462
Total					$16,768

26According to the applicant’s calculations, the total amount of child support actually paid by the applicant from November 1, 2019 until his last payment in 2023 was $31,512. Accordingly, the applicant claims from the respondent the difference in those two amounts, representing reimbursement of the alleged overpayment in the amount of $14,744.

The Respondent’s Position and Analysis

27The respondent disputes both the entitlement termination dates that the applicant proposes, as well as the quantum of support that should have been paid.

28With respect to Breanna, her original intention had been to study at York and obtain a 4-year degree. However, she was severely impacted by the death of Alyssa. Given that she learned the news while at school, she came to associate being at school with her sister’s death, and said “it was hard to enter the hallways without thinking of what happened”. She finished her first year, but never returned to school thereafter. She spent most of her time in her bedroom at her mother’s house, alone, in a state of deep depression. She lost weight, and went down to around 80 pounds by 2022.

29Her mother encouraged her to seek professional help, but Breanna was stubborn and refused to get any, until sometime in 2022, when she began seeing her current psychiatrist. She is on medication which has helped stabilize her mental health, and has helped her to get and keep the job she now has, working in a daycare centre at the YMCA caring for infants from 4 months to 4 years old.

30The only medical report filed with respect to Breanna is from her psychiatrist, Dr. Staab, dated May 5, 2023. It is one paragraph long. It states that he saw Breanna in consultation on May 5, 2023. She was diagnosed with a “mood disorder”, and he had recommended some medications to help with mood stabilization. She will follow up with him under his care over the next 6 months, for follow-up and treatment. She is currently living at home and requires the support and guidance of her mother.

31There is no opinion offered as to the impact of her mood disorder on her ability to work and to withdraw from the charge of her mother. It is clear that she did not, in fact, withdraw from her mother’s charge. The respondent continued to provide a home, meals and other necessities of life for Breanna throughout, at considerable expense and financial hardship, while Breanna contributed no income herself. Indeed, money was so tight that the respondent had to file a Consumer Proposal on November 11, 2022. This requires her to make monthly payments of around $275 for five years, in the total amount of $16,500.

32Breanna did try to set up a home-based business as an eyelash technician. She obtained a certification in 2021 and started to practice then, but only had about 1 client per week, so it generated very little income. She obtained her current job in July, 2024, and has aspirations to return to university at some point and get her degree.

33The respondent asks for Breanna’s child support to continue until July, 2023.

34The onus is, of course, on the respondent to prove that Breanna was unable, by reason of her illness, to withdraw from parental charge: Licata v. Shure, 2022 ONCA 270, para 33. In Weber v. Weber, 2020 ONSC 4098, para 63, Chappel J. spoke to the quality of the proof required to satisfy that onus, stating that “the court will require credible and trustworthy evidence” showing, among other things, that the child is unable, due to their illness or disability, to obtain the necessaries of life, and therefore looks to the parent for financial assistance.

35In Druhan v. Druhan, 2010 ONSC 3430, Polowin J. relied on the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in setting the standard for the proof required. She said this, at para. 50:

There is case law with respect to this issue. Where courts have been asked to determine whether an adult child is unable to withdraw from parental care by reason of illness or disability, it has been held that there must be evidence clearly establishing such illness or disability (see Crawford v. Crawford, 45 R.F.L. (4th) 211 (N.B. C.A.) and Scott v. Scott, [2004] N.B.J. No. 468 (N.B. C.A.)). In Scott v. Scott, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal held that a trial judge had erred in finding that a 24 year old man who suffered from learning disabilities and had been “sickly” as a child but who had graduated from high school at the age of 18, continued to be a child of the marriage. The Court stated the following at paragraphs 46 and 48:

46. In my view, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that A. is unable to withdraw from his parents’ charge or to obtain the necessaries of life. While Ms. Scott may have been able to relate her observations of A., her description of his ailments constituted inadmissible hearsay and opinion. Cogent evidence of illness and disability and proof of an inability to withdraw from the charge of one’s parents or to obtain the necessaries of life was required before A. could be found to be a “child of the marriage”. (See Morris v. Morris, para 2 regarding the need for proper evidence in family law proceedings.)

48. Following Crawford, I am of the view that the evidence was insufficient to permit the motions judge to classify A. as a person who is unable, by reason of disability, to withdraw from his parents’ charge or to obtain the necessaries of life. It was simply not demonstrated at trial that A. could not engage in some form of gainful employment. (Underlining mine).

36The respondent is required to prove two things on this issue: first, that Breanna was suffering from an illness or disability at the relevant time, and second, that because of that illness or disability she was unable to support herself and obtain the necessities of life, and was therefore unable to withdraw from the care and support of her mother. While Dr. Staab’s letter does offer a diagnosis that she was suffering from a “mood disorder” when he saw her in May of 2023, we have no medical opinion regarding her condition from May of 2020 up until that date. Furthermore, there is no expert opinion offered that links her mood disorder to an inability to provide for herself.

37Accordingly, I agree with the applicant that the respondent has failed to discharge her onus of proof. I conclude that Breanna’s entitlement to child support ceased after May, 2020.

38As to Celisha, she graduated from York in August, 2021. Unlike Breanna, she has produced clinical records confirming that she was seen by Dr. Freedman on a relatively continuous basis from 2015 up to and including 2023. Because of her issues, York provided her with accommodation, such that she was permitted to obtain her degree over 6 years instead of 4. In August, 2019, Dr. Freedman referred her to a psychiatrist with a diagnosis of “anxiety, neurosis, suicide, attempted”. However, unlike Breanna, there is not even a brief medical opinion to verify her diagnosis, nor is there any evidence to link it to an inability to provide for her own needs.

39Furthermore, in her own evidence she demonstrated that she was, in fact, able to work and earn an income. She was employed on a full-time basis from the time of her graduation in August, 2021 for almost two years, well into 2023. She obtained another full-time job shortly thereafter. She was not working at the time she testified at trial, because her last employment was seasonal, and she was laid off in January, 2025.

40She has recently returned to school, at George Brown College, to study fashion design and techniques. She started in January, 2024, and is expected to graduate in May or June, 2025. She believes that her studies at George Brown will be a good supplement to her fine arts degree in facilitating a career in the fashion field.

41The respondent argues that Celisha’s recent return to full-time studies at George Brown re-establishes her entitlement to child support. However, she is now 27 years of age. This will be her second degree, and while the courts in some cases have ordered child support to continue during a second degree, many others have limited a child’s entitlement to support to the first degree only. While she continues to live at home, and does represent something of a financial burden to the respondent, she has been able to work full-time prior to starting her new program, and has held a part-time job while she has been attending school. Coupled with OSAP assistance, I consider her to be largely self-supporting, and cannot be considered as being unable to withdraw from her mother’s charge.

42Accordingly, I agree with the applicant that Celisha’s entitlement to support ends after August, 2021.

43What remains is the determination of the quantum of support to be paid by the applicant for Breanna and Celisha during the periods of eligibility established above. This will flow from a determination of applicant’s income from 2019 to 2021. The respondent took no position on this point, and left it to the court to determine the applicant’s true income for support purposes.

Determination of Applicant’s Income

44The applicant operates a business under the name of HIT Services Inc. He did so for a number of years as a sole proprietor, but incorporated the business in 2019. He is the sole owner, director and shareholder. As soon as I saw the financial records of the corporation, I put Mr. Potter on notice that attribution was going to be a significant factor in a determination of the applicant’s income. The income figures in the applicant’s table, above, show only his income from the salary he paid himself from his company, and do not reflect any retained earnings that he chose to leave in the company.

45As shown in the applicant’s table, his T-4 income from the corporation in 2019 was $70,000. However, the company had net income for the year, after the payment of his salary and all expenses and corporate taxes, of $8,479. The applicant admitted in his testimony that this money was available to him, but he chose not to take it out of the corporation. The corporation’s pre-tax net income for that year was $9,690.

46In 2020, his salary was $58,000. However, the company earned net profit that year, after payment of that salary and all other expenses and corporate taxes, of $221,260. This money was left in the company, as an accretion to retained earnings. Once again, he admitted that this money was available to him, but he left it in the business. The pre-tax net income of the company for that year was $252,249.

47In 2021, his employment income is stated to be $77,000, as shown in the table above. However, in the company’s Statement of Income and Retained Earnings, it shows “salaries and wages” paid of $133,000. He testified that the only persons receiving a salary from the company were himself and his wife. Everyone else who worked for the company was a subcontractor. His wife worked part time, 3 days per week, taking care of invoices. He said her income was between $30,000 and $42,000 per year. This does not accord with what the company’s financial statement says, since the combined salaries fall well short of $133,000.

48Be that as it may, the company earned net profit that year, after expenses and corporate taxes, of $329,388. Once again, he admitted that this money was available to him, but was left in the company as an accretion to retained earnings, which by that point in time stood at $559,126. The pre-tax net income of the company for that year was $347,023.

49Section 18 of the Child Support Guidelines provides as follows:

18. (1) Where a parent or spouse is a shareholder, director or officer of a corporation and the court is of the opinion that the amount of the parent’s or spouse’s annual income as determined under section 16 does not fairly reflect all the money available to the parent or spouse for the payment of child support, the court may consider the situations described in section 17 and determine the parent’s or spouse’s annual income to include,

(a) all or part of the pre-tax income of the corporation, and of any corporation that is related to that corporation, for the most recent taxation year; or

(b) an amount commensurate with the services that the parent or spouse provides to the corporation, provided that the amount does not exceed the corporation’s pre-tax income.

(2) In determining the pre-tax income of a corporation for the purposes of subsection (1), all amounts paid by the corporation as salaries, wages or management fees, or other payments or benefits, to or on behalf of persons with whom the corporation does not deal at arm’s length must be added to the pre-tax income, unless the parent or spouse establishes that the payments were reasonable in the circumstances.

50Given the applicant’s admission that he is the sole owner, director and shareholder of the company, it was entirely within his power to determine how much salary he would pay himself, and how much income he would leave in the corporation. This allowed him to engineer the income actually paid out to him to an artificially low level. I am satisfied that the employment income figures used by the applicant in the table, above, do not fairly reflect all of the money available to him to pay child support. Given his admission that these retained earnings were “available” to him, and were left in the company by choice, I am of the view that it is appropriate to add the pre-tax corporate income to the salary paid to the applicant, in order to determine an amount that fairly reflects all of the money available to him from which to pay child support. I do not find it necessary or appropriate to add back the salary paid to his wife, since I find it reasonable in the circumstances.

51Mr. Potter argued that it was reasonable for the applicant to leave this money in the corporation, in order to provide working capital. That argument is often made in opposition to an attribution order. However, the applicant did not, in fact, do so. In 2022, he paid himself a dividend from the corporation of $322,000. In 2023 he paid himself another dividend of $102,034. Both of these dividends came out of, and correspondingly reduced, retained earnings. He testified in his reply evidence that he used the first dividend to purchase one house, and used the second to purchase another house. Clearly, if those retained earnings were available for him to enrich himself by purchasing real estate, they were equally available for him to pay child support, for the short duration that is at issue in these proceedings.

52Taking the applicant’s salary from the table, above, and adjusting that income by adding the pre-tax net income of the corporation in each year, and then calculating the table amount of child support payable based upon that income, leads to the following result. Note that I have accepted his employment income for 2021 at $77,000, despite the discrepancy discussed above:

Period	Applicant’s Annual Income	Number of eligible children	Number of months	Monthly table amount	Child support payable
Nov. - Dec. 2019	$79,690	2	2	$1,206	$2,412
Jan. - May 2020	$310,249	2	5	$4,000	$20,000
June - Dec. 2020	$310,249	1	7	$2,453	$17,171
Jan. - Aug. 2021	$424,023	1	8	$3,272	$26,176
Total					$65,759

53As noted above, the total amount of child support actually paid by the applicant, from November 1, 2019 until his last payment in 2023, was $31,512. Crediting him with this amount as against retroactive child support of $65,759 would leave him in arrears in the amount of $34,247.

Application of the Guidelines for High-Income Payors

54There is another relevant section of the Guidelines that must be considered before arriving at a final decision. Section 4 provides as follows:

4. Where the income of the parent or spouse against whom an order for the support of a child is sought is over $150,000, the amount of an order for the support of a child is,

(a) the amount determined under section 3; or

(b) if the court considers that amount to be inappropriate,

(i) in respect of the first $150,000 of the parent’s or spouse’s income, the amount set out in the table for the number of children under the age of majority to whom the order relates,

(ii) in respect of the balance of the parent’s or spouse’s income, the amount that the court considers appropriate, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the children who are entitled to support and the financial ability of each parent or spouse to contribute to the support of the children, and

(iii) the amount, if any, determined under section 7.

55In this case, with attributed income we are dealing with income in excess of $150,000 for both 2020 and 2021. Section 4 directs the court to calculate support based on the table amount, unless the court considers that amount to be inappropriate, in which case it should follow the approach set out in ss. (b).

56In Simon v. Simon, para 22, MacPherson J.A., speaking for the court, cited Francis v. Baker as standing for the proposition that, in considering s. 4 of the Guidelines, “the burden is on the paying spouse to demonstrate that the Table amount is inappropriate”. See also Tauber v. Tauber, which listed a number of applicable principles at para. 40, including that “there must be clear and compelling evidence for departing from the Guidelines figure”. The test for reasonable expenses will be a demonstration by the paying parent that the budgeted expense is so high "as to exceed the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible": Bellenden v. Satterthwaire, [1948] 1 All E.R. 343 (Eng. C.A.) at 345.

57The applicant has marshalled no evidence that would persuade me that the table amount is inappropriate. The children were clearly in great need during the period in question, and the respondent was struggling financially to the point where she became overwhelmed with debt and had to make a Consumer Proposal. The applicant, meanwhile, had ample income with which to pay the table amount. Large though the monthly payments may be, they still represent a relatively small fraction of his total available income.

58I also cannot ignore the fact that the applicant has benefitted from underpaying child support, for at least the five years immediately preceding 2019. While I have denied the respondent’s request to vary child support prior to November 1, 2019 because she had never asked for such relief in her pleadings, the underpayment remains an obvious fact. In 2018 alone, when he earned $147,141, and assuming that Alyssa was disentitled at that point, support for the remaining two children should have been $2,044 per month, which is a far cry from $808.

59Furthermore, no order is being made over and above table support for a contribution to the children’s s. 7 expenses. Given that both girls were attending York University, a s. 7 order would have amounted to many thousands of dollars on its own.

60There is no question as to the respondent’s entitlement to child support for the period in question, since I have accepted all of the applicant’s submissions in that regard. The only issue where I did not accept his submissions related to the applicant’s income, and the amount of support that was payable as a result. Given the factors discussed above, I do not consider it to be “inappropriate” to make the applicant pay the full table amount that is presumptively applicable for that very short period.

Disposition

61For all of these reasons, a final order will go as follows:

1. The child support order of Kruzik J. dated December 12, 2005 is varied as follows:
   • (a) The applicant’s support obligation with respect to the child Alyssa is terminated, effective October 16, 2019;
   • (b) The applicant shall pay retroactive child support for the children Celisha and Breanna for November and December, 2019 in the amount of $1,206 per month, which is the table amount of support for two children based on the applicant’s attributed annual income of $79,690;
   • (c) The applicant shall pay retroactive child support for the children Celisha and Breanna for January to May, 2020 in the amount of $4,000 per month, which is the table amount of support for two children based on the applicant’s attributed annual income of $310,249;
   • (d) The applicant’s support obligation with respect to the child Breanna is terminated effective May 31, 2020;
   • (e) The applicant shall pay retroactive child support for the child Celisha for June to December, 2020 in the amount of $2,453 per month, which is the table amount of support for one child based on the applicant’s attributed annual income of $310,249;
   • (f) The applicant shall pay retroactive child support for the child Celisha for January to August, 2021 in the amount of $3,272 per month, which is the table amount of support for one child based on the applicant’s attributed annual income of $424,023;
   • (g) The applicant’s support obligation with respect to the child Celisha is terminated effective August 31, 2021;
   • (h) Arrears of child support are fixed at $34,247, and are payable by the applicant to the respondent. The manner of payment of those arrears shall be determined following receipt of the written submissions of both parties.

Costs

62The final issue is costs. While the respondent was self-represented at trial, she did incur legal expenses during the course of this litigation, as well as incurring expenses and, perhaps, lost income in the course of conducting this trial. I encourage the parties to agree on the issue of costs. If they cannot agree, and since the respondent is obviously the successful party in this litigation, I will accept written submissions on costs from the respondent within 20 days, with the applicant’s response due within 10 days thereafter, and any reply from the respondent due within 5 days thereafter. Submissions should be served on the opposing party, or their counsel as the case may be, and filed with the court.

63The parties shall include in their written submissions on costs their additional submissions as to the manner in which the arrears shall be paid. My preliminary view is that a clean break is appropriate in this case, such that the applicant should arrange financing and pay these arrears in a lump sum, within a reasonable time. However, I will consider the submissions of the parties before making a final decision.

T. A. Heeney