NEWMARKET COURT FILE NO.: FC-13-42559-02

Date: 2025-06-23
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
C.Z. (Applicant)
– and –
J.Y. (Respondent)

Appearances:
Applicant: Self-Represented
Respondent: Self-Represented

Heard: May 14, 15, 20 and June 5, 2025

WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87.—(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order...

(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.

(8) Prohibition re identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged. The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142.—(3) Offences re publication. — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

REASONS FOR DECISION

A. Himel

I. OVERVIEW

Child support for adult children comes with strings attached. The recipient parent, often with the assistance of the dependant children, is obliged to provide disclosure to confirm that each child continues to qualify as a child of the marriage as defined by the Divorce Act.

Where disclosure is lacking, litigation brews, as is evident from this case. The parties have engaged in litigation since 2013. They have two adult children: DY and CZ. DY is the younger child. The respondent father is estranged from the children and has nominal information about them. He does not trust the applicant mother given her behaviour throughout the litigation.

On January 12, 2021, I issued an amended final Order (“the Final Order”) (2021 ONSC 256) dealing with property claims, child and spousal support. I released substantial reasons for my decision (the “Trial Reasons”).

Both parties subsequently sought to change certain terms of the Final Order, although neither sought to vary the imputed income of $313,523 (“father”) and $74,166 (“mother”) or their respective shares of section 7 expenses, being 68% and 32%.

On January 3, 2023, Jarvis J. decided a Motion to Change (the “First MTC”). He made an order (2023 ONSC 80), and explained his decision (the “First MTC Reasons”). Justice Jarvis reduced the father’s child support for CZ, to reflect that she was away at school and in receipt of financial assistance from the York Region Children’s Aid Society (“the Society”). He dismissed the mother’s request to change several terms dealing with section 7 expenses.

The father was ordered to pay the adjusted summer formula table amount for CZ of $432 and the table amount for DY of $2,095, per month.

The father commenced this Motion to Change (the “Second MTC”) in October 2023. He sought to terminate child support for DY effective July 1, 2023. By that date DY was over the age of eighteen years and was not attending school on a full-time basis.

In accordance with the draft order submitted at trial, the father now seeks to suspend child support for DY effective September 1, 2024. He also seeks a reimbursement for amounts paid after that date. He proposes that child support be re-started after DY successfully completes at least two high school credits and ten hours of community service. The father suggests that when this milestone is achieved he will make a retroactive payment to the start of that semester. He would like to continue to pay child support retroactively at the end of each semester. If DY fails to graduate by June 30, 2027, he requests that child support terminate.

The father also seeks an order that CZ provide proof of enrollment in at least four courses per term, with specific disclosure of her enrollment and funding sources. After meeting with CZ to review the documents, he intends to forward the sum of $5,000 from the RESP. The amount will be increased or reduced depending on how many courses she completes.

The mother filed a Response to a Motion to Change and requested that child support continue for both children. She requested changes including to:

a) Remove the paragraph that says both parties shall agree in writing, in advance to all section 7 expenses and such agreement shall not be unreasonably withheld. She requests that the named expenses be paid.

b) Replace the provision respecting laptops with a provision requiring that a new computer and accessories be provided every two years, and that the computer is updated if it is lost, stolen, damaged or requires data recovery.

c) Replace the provision respecting the cell phone and plan with a provision that includes accessories, a replacement and an upgrade of the cell phone if it is lost, stolen, damaged or requires data recovery.

d) Include a provision that the RESP be split in two, and that each party have control over one account (as requested in her 2023 affidavit but not properly plead).

Notably, the relief sought above by the mother was addressed by Jarvis J. in the First MTC Order. The mother’s appeal was dismissed by the Ontario Divisional Court (“Divisional Court”) on February 7, 2024 (2024 ONSC 821). Her motion to set aside the appeal decision was dismissed on May 8, 2024 (2024 ONSC 2571).

In accordance with the draft order submitted at trial, the mother now seeks lump sum payments on account of retroactive section 7 expenses, gifts to the children and new specified section 7 categories. She also seeks a provision that outlines the information that will be provided to the father in respect of their post-secondary education.

Most of the relief sought by the mother does not require a finding of a material change in circumstances. The calculation of expenses contemplated by earlier orders is just that; a determination as to what qualifies as a section 7 expense, and the quantum and/or a formula to follow.

The issues that I will deal with in this Second MTC are as follows:

a) Whether DY is a child of the marriage as defined by the Divorce Act, although they are not attending school on a full-time basis.

b) Clarification in respect of the payment of each child’s post-secondary expenses as addressed in the Final Order and the First MTC Order.

c) Determining if the test for a material change in circumstances is met such that the children (who are now adults) need not seek the father’s consent when medical (and related) expenses are incurred.

I decline to permit the father to exert the level of power and control he wishes to hold, nor am I prepared to ignore DY’s serious mental health challenges or CZ’s struggles completing her university courses. While one hopes that children follow the path from high school through university and to financial independence without issue, that is often not the case (particularly where parents engage in high conflict warfare).

I also decline to order the father to make significant payments on account of the mother’s claim for retroactive section 7 expenses. The mother blatantly violated the Final Order and the First MTC Order, which set out the disclosure and consent requirements. This was a pattern that pre-dates the first trial. The mother and children refused to share relevant information. Consequently, the father was forced to waste considerable time and energy attempting to understand the children’s circumstances.

My decision is as follows:

a) DY is a child of the marriage.

b) Commencing September 1, 2023, the sum of $5,000 per term (Fall and Winter) shall be released from the RESP. The RESP funds shall be used to enable CZ to complete her first post-secondary degree. Additional RESP funds may be available.

c) Funds shall be released to DY for their post-secondary education as per the directions set out later in the reasons (“Reasons”).

d) The father’s consent to the payment of either child’s medical (and related) section 7 expenses is dispensed with. These expenses shall be paid once specific disclosure is provided.

II. THE FACTS

The facts as I find them are set out below and form the basis for my decision.

A detailed history of this matter is included in the Trial Reasons and Jarvis J.’s First MTC Order. I rely on the factual and credibility findings set out therein.

While neither of the earlier proceedings focused on DY’s mental health, it is now clear that they have experienced significant challenges that started at or about age twelve. At age sixteen DY expressed wanting to commit suicide. They have multiple diagnoses including Major Depressive Disorder, anxiety, Autism Spectrum Disorder (“autism”), and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”).

DY’s mental health challenges manifest by making them extremely tired and dysfunctional. At times they cannot get out of bed except to make it to medical appointments, and often have problems retaining information.

From late 2023 to early 2025, DY received three multi-week treatments at Sunnybrook Hospital (“Sunnybrook”), which provided short-term gains. DY’s medical records (which were only disclosed days before the trial) and the evidence provided by the psychiatrist, raise serious concerns about DY’s current functioning and their future.

DY has not attended school on a full-time basis since at least June 2023. The school board deemed that DY was no longer a student in August 2024. The mother kept this important fact hidden from the father, refused to disclose report cards and impeded access to attendance records.

DY returned to school on a part-time basis in March 2025. They have an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) and the school is trying to accommodate their needs. Three plans have been offered to DY, with the goal of enabling them to complete high school.

As of now, DY has few credits and none of the community service hours needed to graduate. The mother hopes that DY will complete high school within two years.

CZ attends the University B, having transferred from the University A after her first year. Her official transcript, which was only released to the father (and filed with the court) after the end of the trial, shows that she is struggling. CZ completed some courses, and some grades are poor.

It is unclear if CZ continues to receive financial support from the Society, since the monthly allowance had an end-date of March 2024. She no longer receives bursaries from the Society. The child qualified for OSAP grants and loans, except for 2023–2024, when she was deemed to no longer be a student. To date, CZ has declined most of the OSAP loans offered to her.

While the trial commenced in mid-May, the final day was delayed to enable the Sunnybrook psychiatrist to testify about DY’s history and treatment. During the hiatus the parties attended before Bennett J. with the goal of narrowing or settling some of the issues. At the mother’s request both children attended at court, and further disclosure and information was provided. This was the children’s first meeting with the father in years.

A second meeting took place between the parties and children after the trial ended. The father remained unsatisfied with the authenticity of the disclosure until it was downloaded from the applicable websites (Ontario Student Assistance Program (“OSAP”), University B and Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”)) in his presence. He does not trust the mother or children. The parties were unable to resolve any of the issues and exchanged new offers to settle after this meeting.

As was the pattern in the past litigation, the father only learned the details of the children’s struggles as a consequence of this litigation and only just before, during or after the trial was over. The mother (and children) refused to share information in a timely manner, believing that each child has a right to privacy.

The mother’s attitude and written communications with the father are, at best, dismissive and rude. At worst, they are obstructionist. The mother was ordered to produce disclosure and did not comply in a fulsome or timely manner. DY’s medical records were produced immediately before and during the trial. CZ’s official university transcript, tax information, confirmation of funding sources and OSAP records were produced during and after the trial. DY’s application for ODSP benefits, an updating letter from the Society and CZ’s OSAP application were never produced.

The mother failed in her court-ordered obligation to provide disclosure about the children and their expenses, and to obtain consent in advance of incurring section 7 expenses. Notwithstanding these facts, she seeks to recover these and other future expenses. She requests that the parties gift funds to the children in advance of these expenses being incurred.

The father believes that neither child is fulfilling their obligation to attend school on a full-time basis. Consequently, he disagrees with the mother’s position that he owes certain amounts for retroactive and ongoing child support and section 7 expenses. He wishes to tie access to child support and RESP funding to each child’s success at school.

III. IS DY A CHILD OF THE MARRIAGE?

The First MTC Reasons include an extensive review of the relevant legislation applicable in a motion to change child support, including ss. 17(1)(a), (4) and (6.1) of the Divorce Act and ss. 3(1), (2) and 14(1) of the Child Support Guidelines. Justice Jarvis also reviewed the relevant caselaw in this area, with a particular focus on matters involving adult children. I rely on the tests set out in that decision and need not repeat them here.

The primary issue in the Second MTC is whether DY falls within the definition of a child of the marriage, given that they are over the age of eighteen and not attending school on a full-time basis. That term is defined in s. 2(1) of the Divorce Act as follows:

child of the marriage means a child of two spouses or former spouses who, at the material time,

(a) is under the age of majority and who has not withdrawn from their charge, or

(b) is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability, or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life.

The two-stage test to determine qualification for child support requires the judge to answer the following questions:

1. Is the adult child able to withdraw from their parents' charge or obtain the necessities of life, i.e., the court must make a finding of whether the adult child can or cannot obtain an income to meet their reasonable needs; and
2. Is the “cause” of the inability to withdraw permitted under the Divorce Act, i.e., is the cause of that inability a social/economic factor (such as the cost of living and delayed adulthood, or a difficult transition in their life). (Brun v. Fernandez, 2023 ONSC 4787, para 10)

As the father has not had a meaningful relationship with DY since on or about 2020, he has no first-hand knowledge about DY and their functioning.

After explaining the mother’s obligation to call a medical practitioner in order to rely on notes and records, the mother summonsed Dr. Peter Giacobbe, the chair of intervention psychiatry at Sunnybrook. He testified as a participant expert. The psychiatrist is a member of the team that has treated DY from December 2023 to present. Dr. Giacobbe and the Sunnybrook records contain a detailed analysis of DY’s presentation and the child’s psychiatric history (which also includes information from the referring family doctor).

Using a multi-dimensional approach, being interviews and observations of DY, and a questionnaire assessment tool (Hamilton Scales), Dr. Giacobbe determined that the child was a suitable candidate for Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), which uses magnetic pulses to stimulate the brain. This is a treatment option where at least two rounds of antidepressant medication and counselling were unable to address a patient’s depression.

TMS is provided on a daily basis, five days per week (for four or six weeks), at Sunnybrook. A wand is attached to the patient’s head and stimulates the brain for several minutes. DY initially experienced significant improvement and felt more energetic. Over time, symptoms of depression returned and the second and third rounds of treatment (in mid and late 2024) did not provide sustainable improvement.

In January and February 2025, DY attended a one-month day treatment program at North York General Hospital and returned to high school on a part-time basis. As DY continues to struggle, they met with Dr. Giacobbe in late May to review other treatment options.

Both parties made submissions as to whether the child continues to be a child of the marriage based on the evidence provided by the mother, the child’s school records, the Sunnybrook records and Dr. Giacobbe’s testimony.

The father argued that DY is not presently a child of the marriage. Therefore, support for DY should be suspended from September 1, 2024, and on an ongoing basis until they return to school. He submitted as follows:

a) Child support should be suspended because it is unclear whether DY is currently enrolled in school and whether they will enroll for the Fall 2025 semester.

b) DY does not try hard enough to go to school.

c) A medical report from July 2024 concluded that DY can return to school regularly.

d) DY is not impaired, and Dr. Giacobbe testified that individuals with impairments may be capable of taking one or two courses.

e) DY has not made reasonable efforts to complete high school. They have received no credits in two years.

f) There is no medical evidence that DY is disabled, nor that they cannot work due to a disability.

g) DY’s symptoms are not correlated to their ability to function. He is not sure why they cannot go to school or work.

h) While DY was able to drive relatives to the airport (at least two hours round trip), no effort has been made to complete even a single hour of community service.

i) The school anticipates that DY will graduate next year, the mother testified that she anticipates that the child will graduate in two years. A monitoring mechanism should be implemented to ensure that DY completes high school. Without oversight, DY may never graduate.

j) Following the decision of M.C.G. v. M.H.G., 2019 ONCJ 40, the father adopts an approach that considers DY’s medical condition (which permits part-time study) and ties the child support with DY’s academic performance.

I disagree. The father is clearly unwilling or unable to accept that DY has serious mental health issues that impede their ability to function (in daily life and as a student or employee).

I find that DY continues to be a child of the marriage, whether or not they attend school (on a part-time or full-time basis).

My decision to decline to terminate child support stems, in part, from the testimony of Dr. Giacobbe and the Sunnybrook records. This evidence is both credible and reliable (Hosein v. Mohamed, 2025 ONSC 898, paras 34-36):

• The child was referred to Sunnybrook by their family doctor as other treatments had failed. In December 2023, when Dr. Giacobbe assessed DY for the suitability of the TMS treatment:

  • DY reported a history of depression (for which medication was prescribed starting at age thirteen or fourteen), with the most recent medication “helping to get them out of bed.” At the time of the assessment they took three prescribed medications.
  • DY experienced suicidal ideation at age sixteen and was concerned about self-harm.
  • They were future oriented and hopeful that with the right supports their mental health would improve.
  • DY was previously diagnosed with ADHD, anxiety and autism.
  • Dr. Giacobbe diagnosed DY with Persistent Depressive Disorder, early onset (which was later changed to Major Depressive Disorder).

• In the eighteen months since offering the TMS treatment, the psychiatric evidence is as follows:

  • DY has a disrupted sleep-wake cycle and chronic fatigue. This includes falling asleep at 7 or 8 am and waking up at 5 pm.
  • The child reported having very low energy, attending school infrequently, being on-track to get only 1 credit at school (June 2024), and having fatigue (physical and mental) that impeded their ability to attend school.
  • They present as having a flat affect.
  • DY expressed having no energy to do hobbies, schoolwork or anything they enjoy.
  • They also described feeling guilty about many things (not talking to friends, handing in assignments late, perceived moral failures), which interfere with their ability to function (including doing schoolwork). They worry about whether they will be able to hold onto a stable job in the future.
  • Symptoms of anxiety and depression returned after the completion of treatment (even through the third round of TMS).
  • Physical symptoms including severe hypermobility and joint pain, headaches, muscle pain and other issues, impact their energy level and motivation.
  • DY’s improved mental health (particularly after the first round of TMS) did not sustain, and a fourth round of treatment was not recommended.

• In response to questions from the parties (and the court), Dr. Giacobbe testified that:

  • DY has a persistent Major Depressive Disorder which, along with their comorbidity, can make it more difficult to go to school.
  • Many young people who attend for treatment at the clinic cannot function.
  • The majority of his patients are impaired and are not going to school, which is another marker of severity.
  • TMS is an intensive process that is reserved for individuals who are treatment resistant and whose functioning is impacted by depression.
  • It would not be unusual for a young person not to be able to go back to school after treatment.
  • DY expressed wanting to return to school, and when feeling better (after the course of the first TMS treatment) did return on a part-time basis. However, the fatigue would later get in the way. Attendance fell off when they felt unwell.
  • He does not believe that DY embellished or exaggerated their symptoms, which was confirmed by his observations and the assessment tool.
  • Over time DY’s scores on the Hamilton Scales returned to around what they were before the three rounds of TMS.
  • Other more intrusive treatments were recently discussed with DY, including Ketamine IV and Electroconvulsive Therapy.
  • Even if the depression can be managed, it will have enduring effects and there are no cures for autism, anxiety and ADHD.
  • The focus of the treatment is to improve DY’s mood, as this is a barrier to motivation and being able to attend school.

I am also persuaded that DY continues to be a child of the marriage, because of the mother’s evidence:

• The mother has worked with school social workers since at least 2019, to address DY’s depression, support her at school and develop academic plans. Yet the challenges continue.
• In 2020 and 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic the mother accessed the limited available resources to support DY (who was expressing suicidal ideation).
• In 2021, the child followed a supervised alternative learning plan.
• The mother sought the assistance of the Society, which facilitated the referral to a psychiatrist, and the autism diagnosis.
• The mother observes that the child had low energy, was exhausted and unable to get out of bed. In fall 2024, DY slept 12 to 14 hours per day. Their attention and focus were not sustained. They had difficulty keeping in contact with the Society worker.
• In 2023 to early 2025, the mother drove the child from York Region to Sunnybrook for treatment (every weekday for 4 to 6 weeks) and sometimes needed to drag them out of bed.
• In January and February 2025, the mother drove the child to North York General Hospital (day treatment) for the thirty-day program.
• The child did well at the day treatment program, yet recently met with the Dr. Giacobbe as they are struggling again.
• The mother enrolled the child in a private online school, with the goal of obtaining more credits.
• The mother, the child and the school developed three plans, with various options. The child is currently attempting Plan A. They returned to school in March 2025, aiming to complete two courses by the end of June.
• However, DY missed a lot of assignments in accounting (and may have dropped that course). They were often behind on assignments and needed to re-take tests.
• The goal is for DY to obtain more credits this summer, which may depend on DY having the required energy to attend summer school.
• They may need to move to a less challenging school plan, being B or C.
• The mother hopes that DY will complete the required 10 credits within the next two years.
• As DY has difficulty committing to any assigned task, the volunteer work schedule may be problematic. This impacts the child’s ability to do the required community service hours (and, more likely than not, to hold a part-time or full-time job).
• DY continues to struggle every day. They are not slacking off, nor are they playing games.
• The child cannot retain information including, for example, what they are having for dinner.
• While they applied for ODSP benefits in 2023 or 2024, the application was rejected. The mother did not include medical evidence in the application. She does not have a copy of the application, although that information was recently sought.
• DY wants to finish high school. They feel severe pressure that they are being left behind their peers.

The evidence summarized above provides clear links between DY’s diagnoses and condition, and their inability to provide for themselves (Hosein v. Mohamed, 2025 ONSC 898, para 36). It is not appropriate to withhold or provide child support on the basis of DY’s attendance at school on a full-time or part-time basis. DY has multiple mental health issues that, collectively, impede their ability to complete their education or be employed.

I agree with Justice Agarwal that “adult children who are incapable of economic self-sufficiency, because of illness or disability, fall within the definition of ‘child of the marriage’.” (Payne v. Payne, 2023 ONSC 1504, para 38)

I also agree with Chappel J.’s decision in Szitas v. Szita, 2012 ONSC 1548, para 39:

An adult child of the relationship may remain entitled to support under the Divorce Act on the basis of illness or disability which renders them unable to withdraw from parental charge or to obtain the necessities of life. However, a finding of ongoing entitlement in these circumstances requires cogent evidence from the spouse requesting ongoing support about the nature and extent of the child’s disability or illness, and the manner and extent to which this disability or illness is impacting on the child’s ability to obtain the necessities of life on their own.

It is concerning that the father, after hearing Dr. Giacobbe’s evidence, maintains that there is no evidence DY cannot work or go to school because of a disability. His lack of empathy and insight may form part of the reasons that DY continues to be estranged from the father.

I am satisfied that DY cannot withdraw from their parents’ charge or obtain the necessities of life. The cause of the inability is DY’s serious, pervasive and long-standing mental health issues.

The father’s claim to dismiss or suspend child support for DY is dismissed, as is his request for the return of any overpayment of child support.

IV. THE POST-SECONDARY EXPENSES

As stated earlier in the Reasons, the mother’s request to dispense with the father’s consent to contribute to the children’s section 7 expenses was dismissed in 2023. Jarvis J. was skeptical that the mother would consult with the father in good faith and relied upon my earlier conclusion that she “repeatedly crossed the line that ventures between full disclosure and careless, cavalier and/or conscious non-disclosure.”

The mother’s failure to disclose crucial information about each child is an ongoing issue. I am not re-visiting the First MTC Order.

Nor am I prepared to address the request to divide the RESP accounts, as set out in an affidavit that was served with the Response to the Motion to Change. This issue was dealt with by Jarvis J., as confirmed by the Divisional Court. Even if I had been open to consider the request, the mother once again failed to provide evidence from the institution that the RESP accounts can be divided.

However, the issue of the release of funds from the RESP must be addressed, as the father refuses to release funds unless his conditions are met. There are $130,000 of available RESP funds. Only $5,000 or $10,000 was released to date (and, seemingly, only after Justice Jarvis ordered him to do so).

The mother and CZ’s requests to have funds released have been refused. For example, the father refused to release funds to pay CZ’s tuition at University B. The father did not and does not believe the mother or child when they say that CZ is enrolled there and did not trust the documentation.

As stated above, the parties, CZ and DY met twice to deal with the father’s request for disclosure directly from the CRA, University B and OSAP.

Given the distrust between the parties, the mother’s failure to provide fulsome and timely disclosure is entirely unacceptable.

The official transcript is telling. CZ enrolled at the University A in September 2021. She has now completed four years of post-secondary education and will need one additional year (or perhaps one-and-a-half years to two years) to graduate.

The father’s assumption, being that CZ is not attending university on a full-time basis, is correct. CZ never enrolled in five courses per semester, which is the norm. She withdrew from several courses and failed some, resulting in a low number of credits received. The transition from the University A to University B added to the problem as she was unable to take summer courses that year. Consequently, CZ was denied OSAP for one year and was required to make loan payments during that time.

The father noted that CZ only qualified as a full-time student during the year she (successfully) attempted to regain access to OSAP bursaries. At times CZ was deemed to be a part-time student, and at other times she was labelled “marginal”.

However, the father’s proposal that RESP funds be used as a motivational tool, with funds being released contingent on her academic progress, is not tenable for the following reasons:

a) The Trial Reasons direct that RESP funds be used first, with any amounts that are not covered by the RESPs to be shared by the parties (68% and 32%) unless either child obtains loans or bursaries to defray the costs.

b) The First MTC Reasons changed the approach, and required that the Society’s contributions, and all bursaries and grants be used first towards CZ’s expenses.

c) Since the issuance of the First MTC Order, CZ was denied OSAP funds for one year and, more recently, the Society grants and bursaries ended. It is unclear if the monthly support of $1,000 or $1,200 continues, given Jarvis J.’s findings that their support would end in March 2024 (the child’s twenty-first birthday).

d) Notwithstanding the reduced sources of funds, the child continued to incur expenses to reside away from home. The expenses do not change because she is struggling to succeed at school. The mother had to pay these expenses.

e) The RESP funds are a family asset that was accumulated during the marriage. The Trial Order was not intended to be used as a means to exert power and control by the father.

I am also unwilling to effectively penalize CZ for her lack of success at university. I do not have the proper record to determine if the child’s struggles relate to her lack of motivation (as expressed by the father), to her mental health struggles (as noted by Jarvis J. and the Sunnybrook records), or for some other reason. (See, e.g., Peloquin v. Myette, 2017 ONSC 7473, paras 10-17)

For example, CZ’s challenges may relate to the fallout of being a child caught in the middle of years-long family law warfare, and her problematic relationship with both parents from at least June 2020 to January 2021.

The father once again lacks empathy and insight. The father’s attitude and his unwillingness to voluntarily provide any RESP (or other) funding to CZ, may form part of the reasons that CZ continues to be estranged from the father.

I recognize that the mother incurred post-secondary expenses from January 2023 to present. To address the deficit, the sum of $5,000 per Fall and Winter term be released by the father to the mother from the RESP. The total amount of $25,000 shall be released within seven days. (See, e.g., Runolfson v. Runolfson, 2025 ONSC 2434, paras 46-47)

Prospectively, within seven days of receiving the tuition fee statement from the post-secondary institution in August/September and January/February, and the official transcript from the prior semester, the father shall release the sum of $5,000 to the child from the RESP.

If either child seeks additional contributions to post-secondary expenses as there is a deficit, the mother and/or child will provide the following added disclosure in August/September and January/February annually:

a) The child’s student account for the term.

b) Any funding provided by the Society, or related entity.

c) The child’s OSAP funding (grants and bursaries) and the available loans.

d) The child’s most recent tax slips (filed by April 30).

e) Residence and meal plan, or lease and food budget.

f) The child’s anticipated graduation date.

Payment of the annual post-secondary expenses, including any deficit, shall be calculated and addressed as follows:

For CZ and DY (if they enroll in a three- or four-year undergraduate degree):

a) The first $10,000 per year shall be paid from the RESP, as directed above.

b) The next amount shall be paid from any grants, scholarships, and bursaries.

c) The deficit shall be paid by: i. the child being responsible for 1/3 of the deficit which they will fund from OSAP loans and/or part-time or summer employment; and, ii. the balance being paid by the RESP.

For DY (if they enroll in a one- or two-year community college degree):

d) The first $10,000 per year shall be paid from the RESP, as directed above.

e) The next amount shall be paid from any grants, scholarships and bursaries.

f) The deficit shall be paid by the RESP.

This approach differs from that employed by Jarvis J. who found that there was no deficit to be paid. This new approach recognizes that either child may take loans from OSAP, and that she/they will be solely liable for these loans. CZ (and DY, if they opt for a university degree) must take some responsibility for the cost of a three- or four-year university degree, and the impact of extending that education to five or six years. This will hopefully address the concern raised by the father, being that each child needs motivation to complete their education.

This approach also recognizes that, at present, it seems unlikely that DY will be well enough to reside away from home and complete a three- or four-year university degree. If they reside with the mother and attend university or community college, it is doubtful that there will be a deficit. If DY resides away from home to attend a one- or two-year community college degree, the available RESP funds are more than sufficient to pay for the degree even if it takes longer than anticipated.

In the unlikely event that there are insufficient funds in the RESPs, the post-secondary expenses shall be shared proportionately (Respondent (68%) and Applicant (32%)), subject to the provisions in the Reasons.

The required contributions set out above shall end when a child completes their first post-secondary degree. Any further contributions (towards a community college and/or post-graduate degree) can be negotiated by the parties or addressed at mediation.

V. SECTION 7 MEDICAL (AND RELATED) EXPENSES

The mother did not follow the Trial Order which set out the required section 7 process. I imposed that process because of the mother’s propensity to falsify documents and create fake receipts. Consequently, the father has paid no section 7 expenses. As stated previously this issue was already addressed by Jarvis J. at the First MTC.

The mother’s request that the child’s attendance at conferences, travel and related expenses qualify as section 7 expenses is dismissed. This was not an identified expense in the Final Order. If CZ wishes to attend such events, she can use her savings or employment earnings.

Not every dollar expended by a child or parent qualifies as a section 7 expense that must be shared.

The father is not required to contribute to the children’s retroactive section 7 expenses. A court order is a court order. The mother opted to ignore the Final Order and must reap the consequences of that decision. Nor is the father required to make a gift in the amount of $3,400 to each child within ten days, as there is no basis for that in law. If either parent wishes to gift funds (not from the RESP) as a motivation or reward for positive achievements in school, or in life, that is his/her decision.

However, the father’s unreasonable behaviour in his refusal, as recently as two weeks ago, to pay his share of the children’s prescription medication must stop.

It is illogical that the mother be required to seek, in advance, consent for the children to obtain medication or medical treatments. They are adults.

I find that the children attaining the age of eighteen (and thus having control over attending to their medical needs) is a material change in circumstances. At the time of the Final Order it was not foreseen or reasonably contemplated by me that the father would refuse to contribute to the children’s medical expenses. The father is exerting unreasonable power and control.

Commencing May 15, 2025, the father shall contribute to each child’s medical (and related) expenses, by making the following payment directly to the mother or child within seven days. He shall make these payments as long as each child continues to be a child of the marriage as defined by the Divorce Act:

a) His 68% share of each child’s medical expenses, including:

• Prescription medication.
• Dental care.
• Therapy, treatment and assistive/adaptive devices as recommended by each child’s treating physician.
• Parking for DY’s medical and treatment appointments.
• Mileage where DY’s medical and treatment appointments are situated within York Region or the Greater Toronto Area and are more than 15km from where the child resides. Any request for mileage shall be included in a chart that sets out the date of the appointment, the issue being addressed, the type of appointment, and a copy of the parking receipt. Mileage shall be paid in accordance with the CRA rate, which is currently $0.72 per km.

b) The mother and/or child shall provide invoices and/or receipts as well as the mileage chart, by email, no more than once per month.

NEXT STEPS

The parties have had more than their fair share of judicial resources over the past five years. The children need the litigation to stop. The parties are well able to afford mediation and/or mediation-arbitration if they have difficulty implementing the terms of this Order. The parties continue to hold considerable personal wealth, with the father’s net worth at approximately $2,800,000 and the mother’s at approximately $2,000,000.

It is reasonable for the table amount of child support to stop for CZ once she completes her first university degree (within one to two years). Any further contribution should be as agreed to by CZ and each parent and can be addressed at mediation. Child support for healthy able-bodied adult children does not continue indefinitely, particularly where they are struggling to complete their first degree.

It is premature to determine whether DY will continue to be a child of the marriage throughout their life or whether, in-time, they will be able to secure employment and support themselves. What is clear, however, is that the litigation is causing added stress (as noted in the Sunnybrook records).

For these reasons, neither party may commence any further motion to change until at least July 1, 2029, or bring any motion or 14B motion, without leave of the court.

No motion to change may be commenced until the parties have completed the intake process with a mediator (privately funded or through Peel Family Mediation Services, and potentially involving the children). A failure to engage in mediation may be indicative of unreasonable behavior in any future litigation.

CZ and/or DY shall be responding parties (in addition to the responding parent) to any future motion to change child support and section expenses.

From now until July 1, 2029, I anticipate that: (a) either (i) DY will have success at school and will be enrolled in a post-secondary education program; or, (ii) DY will continue to struggle and may qualify for indefinite child support; and, (b) CZ will complete her undergraduate degree.

To ensure that the father has a reasonable amount of information about DY’s progress and challenges, the mother shall provide semi-annual reports by January 15th and July 15th. Each written report shall include: (a) the child’s end-of-term school report card and attendance records for that term; and, (b) a report from a treating physician that sets out the child’s diagnosis, prognosis, treatment plan, compliance with treatment and the impact on the child’s ability to function in daily-life, and attend school/work (on a full-time or part-time basis).

If the mother believes that DY continues to be a child of the marriage, I expect DY to apply for ODSP (with the assistance of the mother and a treating physician), by no later than September 1, 2028 (and potentially sooner). As soon as any application is submitted, the mother shall provide a complete application package to the father.

If DY qualifies for ODSP at any time, I expect the parties to adjust the table amount as provided for in the caselaw. They are directed to Justice Jarvis’ helpful discussion in the First MTC Reasons. The parties shall complete intake forms to engage in mediation if they are unable to negotiate a resolution.

Subject to the conditions set out above, any over-payment or under-payment of child support and section 7 expenses, and the distribution of any remaining RESP funds can be dealt with at a further the motion to change, if the parties are unable to resolve these issues. Any future motion to change shall be directed to me to ensure proper case management.

VI. COSTS

Neither party came close to meeting or beating their offers to settle. Both parties acted unreasonably throughout this litigation. While the mother was the more successful party, and only seeks the amount of $4,800 in costs, she is not entitled to any costs.

Since the commencement of the Second MTC the mother continued concealing the children’s status and engage in bad faith behaviour. Jarvis J. previously referred to her actions as “historical disclosure challenges”. I previously referred to the mother’s strategy as a “catch-me-if-you-can approach.” The Divisional Court described her approach as a “pattern of misadventure and delay.”

The mother repeatedly breached orders for disclosure, including the Final Order and Justice Shaw Orders dated September 19, 2024 and January 2, 2025. It was, and is, the mother’s legal obligation to provide disclosure about each child’s attendance and achievements at school, available funding and any medical or other impediments to success.

While I am not prepared to withhold child support and reasonable access to the RESP funds as this will effectively punish the children, I am not prepared to condone the mother’s litigation strategy by making an order for costs.

There shall be no order as to costs.

VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

CZ and DY, like all children, are a product of “nature and nurture.” The parents have no control over the children’s innately biological factors (genetics) and plenty of control over their upbringing and experiences. Children learn what they live.

Both parents want the children to complete their educations and succeed. Both parents should reflect on their role in this conflict, the impact on their children, and what they can do on a go-forward basis to provide the support that the children need and deserve.

It is unclear if either party works outside the home. It appears that the father supports himself by dissipating capital and the mother supports herself from spousal support that ends in December 2028.

While DY requires more time and attention than other young adults their age, both parties are capable of earning reasonable incomes and working a reasonable number of hours each week. If the parents opt not to work they will, presumably, dissipate their capital to support themselves (and perhaps DY).

VIII. DISPOSITION

Order to go as signed by me this day.

Date: June 23, 2025

A. Himel

End of reasons.