Thomas A. Heeney

The appellants appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal regarding the interpretation of s. 28(1) of Regulation 470 to the Funeral Directors and Establishments Act, which requires a funeral establishment's corporate name to be 'clearly disclosed to the public' on business signs.

The Tribunal had found that a large discrepancy in font size between the business name and the corporate name meant the corporate name was not clearly disclosed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal erred in law by focusing on relative font size rather than whether the corporate name was readable from the vantage point from which the sign was intended to be read.

The matter was remitted to the Complaints Committee for reconsideration.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that an Agreement to Lease was a valid and binding contract and that he was in breach for failing to commence tenant improvements.

The appellant argued that the respondent repudiated the agreement by insisting on a draft lease with terms significantly different from the Agreement to Lease.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish that the disputed terms in the draft lease were incompatible with the financial principles of the Agreement to Lease, and therefore the agreement remained enforceable when the respondent terminated it due to the appellant's default.

The appellant tenants appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court found that the Board member erred in law by concluding he lacked jurisdiction to award a rent abatement for a cockroach infestation, despite the tenants not specifically requesting it in their original materials.

The court also found the member erred by basing the $1,000 fumigation compensation award on a finding unsupported by evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board to determine the appropriate rent abatement and reasonable fumigation compensation.

The appellant, a recipient of disability benefits, received a settlement for a personal injury action that included prejudgment interest.

The Director determined that the prejudgment interest was not exempt income under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, reducing the appellant's benefits.

The Social Benefits Tribunal affirmed this decision.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that prejudgment interest is paid 'for' pain and suffering as part of the overall compensation package.

The appeal was allowed, and the prejudgment interest was deemed exempt income.

The appellants appealed a Master's order granting summary judgment and dismissing their medical malpractice action.

The action arose from the death of the appellant's wife following delayed surgical intervention for a ruptured aortic valve.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding that while the appellants presented some expert evidence of a lost chance of survival, they failed to provide evidence establishing on a balance of probabilities that the death would have been avoided with prompt surgery.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) dismissing their appeal of a Committee of Adjustment's decision to grant consents for a 40-year lease to construct a gas-fired power plant.

The applicants opposed the project due to anticipated job losses resulting from the closure of a nearby coal-fired plant.

The OMB dismissed the appeal without a hearing, finding that the job loss concerns related to the permitted use of the property as a power plant, not to the planning merits of the consents themselves.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, holding that the OMB correctly determined the applicants' concerns were not relevant planning grounds for the consent application.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Labour Relations Board, which declined to use its reconsideration powers under s. 114 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 to consolidate 11 bargaining units into two.

The Divisional Court applied the functional and pragmatic approach, determining the standard of review to be patent unreasonableness due to the presence of a strong privative clause and the Board's specialized expertise.

The Court found that the Board's decision to leave the restructuring of bargaining units to the parties once a collective agreement is in place was rational and consistent with long-standing jurisprudence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the License Appeal Tribunal confirming the Registrar's proposal to revoke his registration as a motor vehicle dealer.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal erred in law by applying a test of whether the Registrar was in error, rather than conducting a de novo hearing and making an independent determination as required by section 7(4) of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act.

Applying a correctness standard of review, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the decision, and remitted the matter for a rehearing before a differently constituted panel.

The parents, who are Jehovah's Witnesses, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order granting temporary care and custody of their premature child to the children's aid society.

The order was made to facilitate an emergency blood transfusion which the parents had refused on religious grounds.

The parents argued they were denied procedural fairness and their Charter rights were violated due to short notice and lack of counsel at the emergency teleconference hearing.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding that the parents received a fair hearing attenuated to the urgent medical circumstances, and that the issues were highly fact-specific rather than of general public importance.

The applicants sought costs against the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario following successful applications for judicial review.

The Divisional Court awarded costs of $20,000 on a partial indemnity scale against the Tribunal.

The court noted that while costs against a statutory tribunal are rare, the Tribunal's fully adversarial stance and unsuccessful arguments on all issues justified the award.

The Director of the Ministry of the Environment appealed a decision of the Environmental Review Tribunal that revoked remedial orders against a former corporate officer (Lee) and an innocent current property owner (Montague) regarding historical contamination.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal regarding Lee, finding the Tribunal erred in law by applying too narrow a test for 'management or control' and failing to consider his liability for waste removal.

The appeal regarding Montague was dismissed, as the Tribunal correctly found she did not cause or permit the discharge and properly exercised its discretion on fairness grounds to relieve her of financial responsibility for the cleanup.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision that interpreted a collective agreement's scope clause to include owner-operators in Cambridge, expanding the bargaining unit beyond the geographic parameters of the original Canada Labour Relations Board certificate.

The Divisional Court applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determining that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was subject to a standard of patent unreasonableness, while her interpretation of the Canada Labour Code was subject to a standard of reasonableness.

The court held that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to recognize a bargaining unit expanded by mutual agreement and that her interpretation was not patently unreasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Fire Safety Commission upholding an Inspection Order that imposed conditions on burning brush on his farm.

The appellant argued the Inspector lacked jurisdiction and that the Commission's decision was procedurally unfair because it failed to provide reasons for upholding the conditions.

The Divisional Court found the Inspector had jurisdiction but agreed that the Commission's failure to provide reasons regarding the reasonableness of the conditions breached the duty of procedural fairness.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Commission for reconsideration.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $10,000 on a quantum meruit basis for unpaid boiler repair work.

The appellant argued the Small Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to grant equitable relief under section 96(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that quantum meruit is a common law remedy, not an equitable one.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if it were an equitable remedy, section 23(1) of the Act grants the Small Claims Court jurisdiction to award equitable relief in the form of monetary payments up to its jurisdictional limit.

The plaintiffs, comprising Canadian citizens and Yugoslavian residents, sued the Government of Canada for damages in tort and under the Charter relating to Canada's participation in the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

The Crown brought a motion to strike the statement of claim, which was initially dismissed.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the court allowed the appeal and struck the statement of claim in its entirety.

The court held that the executive decision to participate in the bombing was a matter of high policy and Crown prerogative, making the tort claims non-justiciable.

Furthermore, the Crown is immune from tort liability for military actions and pure policy decisions.

While the Charter claims were justiciable, the court found that state-to-state military action does not engage section 7 or section 15 of the Charter.

The appellant architects were retained to design a building and obtained site plan approval, but the project was abandoned and their retainer terminated.

The architects registered a claim for lien for unpaid invoices, which the owner successfully moved to vacate under s. 47(1) of the Construction Lien Act on the basis that the services did not enhance the value of the land.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge misapprehended the evidence and improperly resolved genuine issues of fact that should have been left for trial.

The Court also clarified that where a planned improvement does not proceed, only the preparation of designs, plans, drawings, or specifications that in themselves enhance the value of the land are lienable, and this enhancement must be assessed at the precise time the services are rendered.