Lesley K. Parsons

Stahle Construction Inc. appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay general damages, out-of-pocket expenses, and costs to its former employee, Roberto Soave, for improper termination of long-term disability (LTD) coverage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that Mr. Soave was disabled and eligible for LTD benefits prior to a car accident, despite Stahle's arguments regarding evidentiary burden and pleading.

The court found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's mixed findings of fact and law regarding disability and upheld the decision to determine the remitted issue.

The matter was remitted by the Court of Appeal to determine if the plaintiff qualified for long-term disability benefits under his employer's benefits booklet as of January 27, 2014.

The plaintiff argued he was disabled due to a severe hernia condition that prevented him from performing his duties as a site superintendent.

The defendant argued there was insufficient medical evidence of disability.

The court found the plaintiff credible, noted his condition was corroborated by medical records, and concluded he met the definition of disability during the qualifying period.

The court ruled the plaintiff qualified for long-term disability benefits.

Stahle Construction Inc. appealed a judgment ordering it to pay damages to Roberto Soave for improperly terminating his long-term disability benefits.

The trial judge found Soave was still employed and entitled to benefits.

On appeal, Stahle challenged the trial judge's refusal to admit an insurance policy, the weight given to an insurer's denial letter, and the interpretation of the Mercon Booklet regarding benefit eligibility.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions on evidence admission and weight but found palpable and overriding errors in the interpretation of the Mercon Booklet's eligibility requirements for long-term disability benefits.

The court clarified that eligibility depended on disability at the time work ceased or becoming totally disabled during a leave if required by law, not merely continuation of coverage.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the matter remitted to the Superior Court for reconsideration of Soave's eligibility based on the correct interpretation.

The Applicant sought a determination that he sustained a catastrophic impairment due to a mental or behavioural disorder following a motor vehicle accident.

The Insurer argued his impairment was only moderate (Class 3).

The Arbitrator preferred the evidence of the Applicant's expert, who conducted a robust 14-hour assessment including collateral interviews and cognitive testing, over the Insurer's experts whose assessments were brief and lacked collateral information.

The Arbitrator found that the Applicant's chronic pain and psychological conditions significantly impeded his useful functioning, meeting the criteria for a Class 4 Marked Impairment.

The Applicant was deemed catastrophically impaired.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict finding it liable for injuries sustained by the respondent child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury's verdict was reasonable as the appellant's failure to train staff in child supervision provided a basis for finding a breach of the duty of care.

The court also found no ambiguity in the jury's answers regarding causation when given a full and liberal reading.

The appellant, a recipient of disability benefits, received a settlement for a personal injury action that included prejudgment interest.

The Director determined that the prejudgment interest was not exempt income under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, reducing the appellant's benefits.

The Social Benefits Tribunal affirmed this decision.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that prejudgment interest is paid 'for' pain and suffering as part of the overall compensation package.

The appeal was allowed, and the prejudgment interest was deemed exempt income.