R. Sandy Bruce

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a family law trial.

The applicant, Rona Elizabeth Scott, sought full recovery of her legal costs on the basis that the respondent, Thomas Ryan Scott, acted in bad faith by advancing a baseless claim that the applicant was secretly an internet porn star, which the court found to be "patently ridiculous." The court found that the applicant was successful on virtually every issue, and that the respondent's conduct met the definition of bad faith, warranting a full recovery of costs.

Costs were fixed at $57,800, payable by the respondent forthwith.

This decision resolves a high-conflict divorce proceeding between Rona Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Ryan Scott, addressing issues of parenting time, child and spousal support (both retroactive and ongoing), equalization of net family property, and related matters.

The court grants sole decision-making authority and primary residence to the applicant, orders child support based on imputed income due to the respondent's intentional unemployment, and calculates retroactive and ongoing support.

The court also addresses a complex promissory note and inheritance issue, and rejects the respondent's claims regarding alleged proceeds from a "pornographic lifestyle" as entirely lacking in merit.

This case involves a motion to change brought by the mother (C.M.R.) seeking to vary existing decision-making and parenting time orders for the parties' child, K.R. The mother initially sought sole decision-making and primary residence, while the father (R.S.C.) sought dismissal of the motion and child support.

By the end of the trial, the mother sought joint decision-making and shared parenting, and the father conceded a material change in circumstances.

The court found a material change due to the child's academic struggles and the mother's improved stability.

The court ordered joint decision-making with the father having the final say in disagreements, and maintained the child's primary residence with the father, with expanded parenting time for the mother.

Child support was ordered from the mother to the father, and section 7 expenses were to be shared equally.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the father sought to return to a joint custody and shared residential arrangement that had been in place since November 2017 pursuant to a separation agreement.

The mother suspended this arrangement in May 2020, citing concerns about the father's alcohol addiction, relationship instability with his partner, and the impact on the children.

The court found urgency was established and determined that a graduated return to the shared custody arrangement was in the children's best interests, with conditions requiring the father to continue working with addiction services and counselling, and prohibiting excessive alcohol consumption while caregiving or in the presence of the children.

The applicant (mother) and respondent (father) brought competing urgent motions regarding custody and access to their two young children during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The respondent sought interim custody and primary residence, while the applicant sought to maintain the interim custody order granted in her favour on January 6, 2020.

The court found that while the respondent had been the primary caregiver prior to December 23, 2019, his physically aggressive and threatening behaviour on that date—including threatening to cut the applicant's car tires with a kitchen knife—provided compelling grounds to maintain the children in the applicant's temporary care.

The court granted interim sole custody to the applicant with liberal and unsupervised access to the respondent, subject to specific terms governing parental conduct, alcohol consumption, and communication.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that COVID-19 concerns created urgency, finding that both parents had demonstrated appropriate safety precautions.

The respondent brought a motion to vary his spousal support obligations, arguing that his business revenue had declined and the applicant's health and earning capacity had improved.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought an increase in support.

The court found that the respondent's net income had only decreased by 25%, which was offset by his new spouse's contributions to household expenses.

The court also found that the applicant's improved health and new qualifications were contemplated at the time of the original order.

The motion to vary was dismissed, as no material change in circumstances was established.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a 2001 child support order, seeking retroactive reduction of child support and rescission of accumulated arrears on the basis that the original order imputed income of $40,000 which he never earned.

The court examined his historical income, finding that although he had periods of financial hardship following separation, he was intentionally under‑employed between 2002 and 2004 and income should be imputed for those years.

The court concluded there had nevertheless been a material change in circumstances because the $40,000 imputed income exceeded his realistic earning capacity.

Exercising its discretion under s. 37 of the Family Law Act and the Child Support Guidelines, the court recalculated historical support obligations and determined when each child ceased to be entitled to support.

The arrears were reduced from the amount recorded by enforcement authorities and fixed at $19,573.50, payable in monthly instalments.

The applicant sought to terminate his spousal support obligations under a separation agreement after involuntarily losing his job and securing new employment at minimum wage, reducing his income by half.

The respondent, who was disabled and unable to work, argued for a reduced but continued support amount, suggesting the applicant draw on his equalized assets if necessary.

The court found a material change in circumstances and applied the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, noting the applicant's income fell below the $20,000 floor.

The court held the applicant lacked the ability to pay from his income and declined to order him to liquidate his remaining retirement assets, which would constitute impermissible double dipping.

The application to terminate support was granted.