Joan Mouland

The appellants, pig farmers, purchased gilts and boars from the respondent.

The animals arrived sick and infected the appellants' herd.

The trial judge found the respondent breached the implied warranty of fitness under the Sale of Goods Act but dismissed the appellants' counterclaim for damages, finding they failed to prove their loss.

The trial judge relied on CAIS records rather than the PigCHAMP records used by all experts.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in his assessment of damages by relying on records without explanatory evidence and failing to resolve differences in the experts' assumptions.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by failing to determine the number of free replacement animals promised.

A new trial was ordered on the issues of damages and the balance owing.

Following a trial concerning the validity of a conveyance that severed a joint tenancy in residential property, the successful defendants sought costs.

The plaintiffs had attempted to set aside the conveyance on the basis of incapacity and undue influence and also sought rent and occupation rent, while the defendants advanced a counterclaim asserting a trust interest.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims and the defendants’ counterclaim, leaving the conveyance intact and determining ownership through the deceased’s will.

In the costs endorsement, the court held that the defendants were the successful parties and entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court declined to apply the defendants’ Rule 49 offer to settle because it did not correspond precisely with the judgment.

A family dispute arose regarding ownership of a Toronto home held in joint tenancy by two parents and their son.

Shortly before his death, the father executed a transfer severing the joint tenancy so that his interest would pass under his will to his daughter.

The plaintiffs challenged the transfer, alleging the father lacked capacity or was subject to undue influence, and sought occupation rent from the daughter who continued living in the property.

The court preferred the evidence of the drafting lawyer and defence expert and found the father understood the nature and consequences of severing the joint tenancy and was not unduly influenced.

The court also rejected claims that the son held his interest in trust for the parents and declined to award occupation rent.

The plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed and the severance of the joint tenancy upheld.

Following the dismissal of a motion for summary judgment concerning the validity of a transfer of property from joint tenants to tenants in common, the court addressed costs.

The motion had been dismissed after the court determined that significant factual disputes required viva voce evidence and the parties did not consent to the judge continuing to hear the matter after a settlement conference.

The court found that the plaintiffs’ request for recusal contributed to the motion being dismissed prior to final adjudication, but also noted that both parties had initially urged the court to determine the motion without oral evidence.

In the unusual circumstances, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs, while reserving certain preparatory costs related to trial for determination by the trial judge.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment.

After hearing submissions, the court determined that significant factual disputes required resolution through viva voce evidence tested by cross‑examination.

The judge indicated that oral evidence would be required under Rule 20.04(2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to properly determine whether a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

The plaintiffs raised concerns about the judge hearing viva voce evidence after previously conducting a settlement conference in the matter.

As the parties did not mutually agree that the same judge should hear the oral evidence, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought costs following the withdrawal of a defendant’s counterclaim and cross‑claim asserting entitlement to property through a constructive trust.

The counterclaim had expanded the scope and financial stakes of the litigation concerning ownership of residential property and required additional legal work by the plaintiffs’ counsel.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the plaintiffs were entirely successful in having the counterclaim withdrawn and that the claim lacked merit.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, finding that approximately 25 hours of counsel time reasonably related to responding to the counterclaim.

Costs of $7,585 plus HST and disbursements were fixed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a transfer of real property that severed a joint tenancy, which would otherwise determine whether the deceased’s interest passed through survivorship or through his estate.

The parties urged the court to treat the matter as suitable for summary judgment based solely on the written record.

The court held that the motion record revealed significant factual disputes, including conflicting evidence from witnesses and potential credibility issues.

Relying on appellate guidance regarding the limits of summary judgment where a full appreciation of evidence is required, the court concluded that viva voce evidence was necessary.

The court ordered that specified witnesses provide oral evidence with limited cross-examination to facilitate a fair determination.

The appellants were entirely successful on their appeal and sought costs.

The court awarded the appellants costs fixed at $1,000 for the motion for leave to appeal and $4,500 for the appeal, noting that the outcome was more favourable than an offer to settle made to them by the respondents.

The court found it was unreasonable for the respondents to oppose the appeal given the lack of reasonable prospect of success.

The court issued an amendment to its original judgment released on July 28, 2011, to correct an error regarding the place where the appeal was heard.

The original judgment incorrectly stated the appeal was heard in London, and was amended to reflect that it was heard in Hamilton.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order granting the respondents unfettered access to a residential property to retrieve personal belongings.

The motions judge had noted the appellants in default and refused to allow their counsel to make submissions on a motion to set aside the default or on the merits of the respondents' motion.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that the motions judge erred in law and denied procedural fairness by refusing to hear counsel, misinterpreting Rule 19.02, granting relief that far exceeded the notice of motion, and failing to provide reasons.