Myrna L. Lack

The applicants, the Township of Clearview and the County of Simcoe, sought a declaration that a deviation road crossing the respondent's property was a public highway and requested rectification of title.

The respondent argued that the road was never a public highway, that a 1966 tax sale transferred the land to private ownership, and that the claim was statute-barred.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the road was dedicated and accepted as a public highway in the 1800s.

The court held that the 1966 tax deed could not validly transfer a public highway, and that the municipality's claim was not barred by the Limitations Act or the doctrine of laches.

The application was granted, the road was declared a public highway, and rectification of the register was ordered.

The plaintiff suffered a fractured femur and a pulseless leg following a motorcycle accident.

He was treated in the emergency room by the defendant physician, who failed to urgently transfer him to a trauma centre or communicate the pulseless nature of the limb to the trauma team leader.

Due to the delay in transfer, the plaintiff's leg became unsalvageable and was amputated.

The court found the defendant physician breached the standard of care and that this breach caused the amputation.

The court awarded the agreed-upon damages without deduction for statutory accident benefits or OHIP subrogated claims.

The plaintiffs, auto dealers, purchased three vehicles from the defendants and subsequently sold them to third parties in the United States.

The defendant bank held prior registered security interests under the Personal Property Security Act against the vehicles.

The plaintiffs sued the bank seeking a declaration of ownership free of liens, alleging fraud by the sellers.

The bank moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim and for judgment on its counterclaim for conversion.

The court granted the bank's motion, finding the plaintiffs had actual or constructive notice of the registered liens and intentionally committed acts inconsistent with the bank's possessory rights.

The plaintiffs' claim was dismissed, and the bank was awarded damages for conversion totaling $132,250.

This endorsement addresses two motions: a charging order sought by Sutherland Law (former counsel for the defendant) for unpaid legal fees, and a motion for directions by the plaintiff regarding the calculation of proceeds from a property sale as per a prior judgment.

The court dismissed the charging order motion, finding no existing fund in the defendant's favour after applying the judgment's formula.

The court accepted the plaintiff's calculations, which determined the defendant's share to be nil, and ordered costs against Sutherland Law and the defendant.

The defendant municipality sought summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for misfeasance in public office, punitive damages, and other relief.

The plaintiff alleged a pattern of bad faith conduct by Township officials from 2005 to 2017, relating to construction, development, zoning, property standards, severance, and demolition permits.

The court applied the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldlin and the elements of misfeasance from Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse.

The court found that the plaintiff's claims were either statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, lacked factual support for unlawful conduct or targeted malice, or that the plaintiff lacked standing.

The court concluded that no genuine issue requiring a trial existed for any of the plaintiff's alleged causes of action.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence and breach of contract, arguing that it was barred by the principles of res judicata, collateral attack, and/or abuse of process.

This argument was based on a prior Small Claims Court default judgment obtained by one of the defendants against the plaintiff for unpaid invoices.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that section 107 of the Courts of Justice Act prevented the application of res judicata in these coincident actions.

Furthermore, the court determined that the parties were not identical in both proceedings, and the issues in the Superior Court action (negligence and breach of contract) were distinct from the Small Claims Court action (unpaid invoices) and not fundamental to the default judgment.

The court also concluded that the action was neither a collateral attack on the Small Claims Court judgment nor an abuse of process, as the Ontario Racing Commission investigation was not a prior legal proceeding.

The plaintiff sued her physician for medical malpractice, alleging he negligently managed her right forearm pain by failing to properly assess and investigate a bump that was eventually diagnosed as a rare synovial sarcoma.

The defendant physician had diagnosed repetitive strain injury and reflex sympathetic dystrophy, treating the plaintiff with psychotherapy and medication for nine years before ordering an MRI.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the defendant breached the standard of care of a primary care physician by failing to include a tumour in his differential diagnosis, failing to properly monitor the lump, and failing to order an MRI earlier.

The court also found that this breach caused the plaintiff's damages, as an earlier MRI would have led to earlier surgical removal of the tumour and eliminated years of pain.

The plaintiff, a registered practical nurse and office manager with 22 years of service, sued her employer, a plastic surgeon, for wrongful dismissal.

Following a dispute over the implementation of electronic medical records, the employer yelled at the plaintiff, used profanity, and told her to get out, stating he was sick of looking at her 'ugly face'.

The court found that the plaintiff was expressly fired, or alternatively constructively dismissed, as the employer's conduct made continued employment intolerable.

The court awarded a 24-month notice period, less mitigation earnings, but dismissed claims for aggravated and punitive damages.

The plaintiff sought damages for negligence arising from a motorcycle collision in which a rider lost control, crossed the centre line, and struck the plaintiff’s vehicle, causing death and serious injury.

The court considered whether two other motorcyclists riding with the deceased rider were negligent and contributed to the accident.

Evidence included their guilty pleas under the Highway Traffic Act and video footage showing excessive speeds, unsafe lane changes, and stunt riding during the group ride.

The court found that the three motorcyclists were engaged in a joint venture involving unlawful and dangerous driving that created a foreseeable risk of serious harm to other road users.

The two defendants were each found 25 per cent liable for the plaintiff’s damages, jointly and severally.

Following dismissal of an application brought under the Arbitration Act, 1991 seeking to set aside an arbitrator’s jurisdiction in a spousal support mediation-arbitration process, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs while the applicant argued for partial indemnity.

The court applied the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing proportionality and the result achieved.

The court found the application unreasonable, particularly given the applicant’s contractual commitment to the mediation-arbitration process and a rejected settlement offer.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded, though the amount claimed was reduced as some time billed was excessive.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He argued that the trial judge erred in concluding that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable”, in admitting a certificate of a qualified breath technician without providing adequate reasons, and in declining to exclude breathalyzer evidence after finding a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the total time between arrest and testing and reasonably concluded the police acted within a prompt and reasonable timeframe.

The court also found no reversible error in admitting the certificate and determined that the trial judge appropriately applied the s. 24(2) Charter analysis in admitting the breath test evidence despite the breach.

The conviction was upheld.

The applicant father brought a motion to change prior custody and access orders seeking substantially increased parenting time, including expanded mid‑week and summer access.

The court applied the threshold test for variation of custody and access orders, requiring proof of a material change in circumstances since the prior order.

The evidence showed the child was thriving under the existing arrangement and that both parents exercised access appropriately.

The court found no material change justifying the requested increase in access but identified an unforeseen consequence affecting the child’s ability to take uninterrupted summer vacation with the custodial parent.

The motion to increase access was dismissed, but the order was varied to allow the custodial parent a two‑week summer vacation period with access suspended, and retroactive adjustments to child support and section 7 expenses were ordered.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the plaintiffs' personal action for fraudulent misrepresentation and oppression, arguing it was barred by res judicata and issue estoppel due to a prior ruling denying leave to commence a derivative action.

The court dismissed the motion to stay under the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the prior ruling did not determine personal rights or make binding findings of fact.

However, the court granted a stay under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act pending the plaintiffs' appeal of the derivative action ruling, to prevent duplication of resources and inconsistent results.

The Director of the Ministry of the Environment appealed a decision of the Environmental Review Tribunal that revoked remedial orders against a former corporate officer (Lee) and an innocent current property owner (Montague) regarding historical contamination.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal regarding Lee, finding the Tribunal erred in law by applying too narrow a test for 'management or control' and failing to consider his liability for waste removal.

The appeal regarding Montague was dismissed, as the Tribunal correctly found she did not cause or permit the discharge and properly exercised its discretion on fairness grounds to relieve her of financial responsibility for the cleanup.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Fire Safety Commission upholding an Inspection Order that imposed conditions on burning brush on his farm.

The appellant argued the Inspector lacked jurisdiction and that the Commission's decision was procedurally unfair because it failed to provide reasons for upholding the conditions.

The Divisional Court found the Inspector had jurisdiction but agreed that the Commission's failure to provide reasons regarding the reasonableness of the conditions breached the duty of procedural fairness.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Commission for reconsideration.