Jeffery Thomas Arthur Booth

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a previous Tribunal decision that found they were statute-barred from claiming income replacement benefits and had not suffered a catastrophic impairment.

The applicant argued the Tribunal committed a material breach of procedural fairness and erred in law and fact by neglecting their health status and pre-accident trauma, and by improperly weighing evidence.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding no breach of procedural fairness and no error of law or fact, noting that the applicant failed to meet the high threshold required for reconsideration.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, claiming catastrophic impairment based on mental and behavioural impairments.

The adjudicator first determined that the applicant was statute-barred from claiming income replacement benefits because they failed to submit a Disability Certificate (OCF-3) within 104 weeks of the accident.

On the issue of catastrophic impairment, the adjudicator preferred the evidence of the respondent's psychiatric expert, finding that the applicant's functional impairments were related to a well-documented, long-standing psychiatric history rather than the subject accident.

The adjudicator also dismissed the applicant's claims for unapproved portions of psychological and chiropractic treatment plans, as well as a catastrophic assessment, finding them not reasonable and necessary.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following an automobile accident.

The respondent insurer raised a preliminary issue, arguing it was not required to pay income replacement benefits under s. 31(1) of the Schedule because the applicant intentionally failed to disclose a material change in risk.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had moved from Brantford to Toronto and intentionally failed to notify the insurer of this change of address, which would have significantly increased his insurance premiums.

Consequently, the Tribunal held that the respondent was not required to pay the applicant an income replacement benefit.

In a motor vehicle accident case, the appellant's insurer appointed defence counsel under a non-waiver agreement.

Following a trial on liability, the insurer sought to intervene in the appeal to challenge a finding regarding insurance coverage, while a co-defendant moved to remove the appellant's counsel for conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to remove counsel, finding an inescapable conflict between the interests of the appellant and the insurer who instructed counsel to appeal the coverage finding.

The motion to intervene was dismissed because the insurer failed to show it would be adversely affected by the judgment and bore responsibility for the confusion at trial.

The plaintiff sought damages for negligence arising from a motorcycle collision in which a rider lost control, crossed the centre line, and struck the plaintiff’s vehicle, causing death and serious injury.

The court considered whether two other motorcyclists riding with the deceased rider were negligent and contributed to the accident.

Evidence included their guilty pleas under the Highway Traffic Act and video footage showing excessive speeds, unsafe lane changes, and stunt riding during the group ride.

The court found that the three motorcyclists were engaged in a joint venture involving unlawful and dangerous driving that created a foreseeable risk of serious harm to other road users.

The two defendants were each found 25 per cent liable for the plaintiff’s damages, jointly and severally.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a trial judge's order of no costs, which was made after a 12-day jury trial where the plaintiff recovered no damages due to the statutory deductible and threshold motion.

The trial judge had relied on the plaintiff's impecuniosity to make the no costs order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no strong grounds to believe the trial judge made an error in principle in exercising his discretion.

Following a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff was found 10 percent liable while the defendants were found 90 percent liable, but the plaintiff failed to meet the statutory threshold for recovery of damages under the Insurance Act.

As a result, she recovered no damages and the defendants sought costs exceeding $100,000.

The court considered the discretionary framework under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including settlement offers, the importance and complexity of the case, and the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations.

Significant weight was placed on the plaintiff’s demonstrated impecuniosity and her self-represented status at trial.

The court held that awarding costs would have no practical utility and could deter access to justice for self-represented litigants.

Following a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff’s claim failed because she did not meet the statutory threshold for recovery under the Insurance Act.

The defendants sought substantial costs exceeding $100,000.

The court considered the general rule that costs follow the event under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, but also examined broader considerations including reasonableness, access to justice, settlement dynamics, and the plaintiff’s financial circumstances.

The evidence established that the self-represented plaintiff was impecunious and incapable of paying a significant costs award.

The court concluded that imposing costs would have no practical utility and could discourage unrepresented litigants from pursuing legitimate claims, and therefore declined to award any costs.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim for contribution and indemnity arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a pedestrian.

The plaintiffs alleged that an off-duty police officer who observed the pedestrian before the accident owed a duty to intervene or provide assistance and that the police services board was vicariously liable.

The court held that an off-duty officer in the circumstances owed no heightened duty beyond that of a reasonable citizen and that the pedestrian’s conduct did not trigger any obligation under common law policing duties or statutory provisions.

The court found no breach of duty of care and concluded that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.