Lidiya Yermakova

The applicant, Derek Van Doorn, brought a motion under section 10 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, seeking the court's appointment of an arbitrator to resolve an underlying law firm partnership dispute with the respondent, Loopstra Nixon LLP.

The partnership agreement mandated arbitration but lacked a procedure for arbitrator appointment.

The court considered three candidates proposed by the parties and ultimately appointed The Honourable Frank J.C. Newbould, K.C., finding him to be the best candidate given his extensive adjudicative and arbitral experience, particularly in law firm partnership disputes.

The College of Psychologists of Ontario appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board ordering the College to register the respondent as a psychological associate.

The respondent had completed an online master's degree, which the College's Registration Committee found did not meet the resident study requirement and was not substantially similar.

The Board found the Committee acted improperly by not following the Board's prior recommendation that the program was substantially similar.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal, holding that the Committee was not bound by the Board's recommendation and that the Board erred in finding an improper exercise of power.

The matter was remitted to a newly constituted panel of the Registration Committee.

The applicant's driving instructor licence was revoked by the Ministry of Transportation after he was criminally charged with sexual assault involving a student.

Despite his subsequent acquittal, the Ministry maintained the revocation and required him to apply for a new licence, which it then denied.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the initial revocation decision was profoundly procedurally unfair as it failed to comply with the notice and response requirements of O. Reg 473/07.

The court further held that the subsequent re-application decision did not cure these defects, as it was irreparably compromised by the flawed revocation and improperly reversed the onus of proof.

The decisions were set aside and the licence was ordered reinstated.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Ontario College of Pharmacists Discipline Committee Panel, which had dismissed her motion to stay disciplinary proceedings for abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review on the basis of prematurity.

The court held that absent exceptional circumstances, administrative proceedings should run their full course before judicial intervention, and the applicant would have the opportunity to raise her abuse of process arguments before the Discipline Committee and on any subsequent appeal.

In a professional discipline hearing, the panel accepted the member’s admissions to multiple allegations arising from complex implant treatment, consent failures, disclosure of patient information, deficient records, and breach of a remediation and mentorship program.

The admitted facts included lengthy surgery on an elderly patient, treatment-planning inconsistencies, undocumented changes in implant number and prosthetic materials, inadequate informed consent, unauthorized distribution of patient photographs, and failure to follow a mentor’s recommendations in two implant cases.

The panel found all misconduct allegations proven and accepted a joint submission on penalty.

The sanction imposed a six-month suspension, reprimand, extensive remedial terms and monitoring, and costs of $10,000.

This endorsement addresses the costs of an unsuccessful motion brought by the plaintiffs to strike the defendants' jury notices.

The defendants were entirely successful in defending the motion and were presumptively entitled to costs under Rule 57.01.

The court considered the amount in dispute ($1,500,000), the importance of the issue (right to jury trial), and the moderate complexity of the motion.

The plaintiffs had rejected an offer to withdraw the motion without costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to both sets of defendants, discounting the amounts to align with the costs outlines served prior to the motion and disallowing senior counsel's attendance for the doctor defendants as unnecessary.

The plaintiffs moved to strike jury notices filed by the defendants after the plaintiffs amended their Statement of Claim to double the damages sought from $750,000 to $1.5 million, prompted by new expert reports on future care costs.

The court applied the principles from Dow v. Ottawa Hospital-Civic Campus to determine if the amendment reopened pleadings for all purposes, including the timely filing of jury notices.

The court found that the amendments were necessary, implicitly contained new allegations regarding the plaintiff's limitations and future care needs, significantly changed the nature of the action, and necessitated further discoveries.

As the defendants filed the jury notices promptly and were not the party seeking the amendment, the court concluded that pleadings were reopened for all purposes, granting the defendants a statutory right to a jury trial.

The plaintiffs' motion to strike the jury notices was dismissed, as were their alternative requests for costs and further discoveries of the defendants.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s negligence action arising from a motor vehicle accident, arguing the claim was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued the claim against the municipality was not discoverable until receipt of a police accident report revealing potential roadway maintenance issues and identifying the proper municipal authority.

The court held the plaintiff failed to rebut the statutory presumption of discoverability and did not exercise reasonable diligence in identifying potential defendants, noting a 17‑month delay in obtaining the accident report.

The action was therefore statute‑barred.

The court also found that commencing a second action rather than seeking to amend the existing action to substitute the proper municipality constituted an abuse of process.