ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-525544
DATE: 20151214
BETWEEN:
ZABIH ATTAYEE
Plaintiff
– and –
CITY OF PICKERING
Defendant
Stanley Razenberg, for the Plaintiff
Meredith Jones and Lidiya Yermakova, for the Defendant
HEARD: December 3, 2015
REASONS FOR DECISION
diamond j.:
Overview
[1] On or about December 8, 2012, the plaintiff was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident which occurred while he was driving southbound on Valley Farm Road near its intersection with Greenmount Street in the City of Pickering, Ontario. The plaintiff suffered various fractures and other serious injuries, and was taken to Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre (“Sunnybrook”) by ambulance.
[2] The plaintiff was discharged from Sunnybrook on December 14, 2012. On December 21, 2012, the plaintiff retained the services of Slavko Ristich (“Ristich”) of Sokoloff Lawyers to represent his claims and interests arising from the accident.
[3] On December 5, 2014, three days shy of the two-year anniversary of the accident, the plaintiff commenced Action No. CV-14-517577 (“the first action”) against the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident, and the Regional Municipality of Durham (“Durham”). In the first action, the plaintiff alleged that Durham had jurisdiction and responsibility for the maintenance of Valley Farm Road, and Durham was negligent in its inspection and maintenance of the roadway where the accident occurred.
[4] For reasons set out in greater detail hereinafter, on April 8, 2015 the plaintiff commenced this proceeding against the City of Pickering (“Pickering”). In this proceeding, the plaintiff alleges that it is in fact Pickering which had jurisdiction and responsibility for the maintenance of Valley Farm Road and was negligent in its inspection and maintenance of the roadway where the accident occurred.
[5] Put simply, the plaintiff’s position is that he only discovered that the location of the accident was within the jurisdiction of Pickering, and not Durham, after the two year anniversary of the accident. Rather than bring a motion to add or substitute Durham in the first action, the plaintiff commenced this proceeding and will eventually seek to have both actions either consolidated or tried together.
[6] Pickering now moves for the following relief:
(a) an order granting summary judgment dismissing this proceeding on the grounds that it was not commenced within the two year limitation period set out in the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002 c.24 (“the Act”); and
(b) in the alternative, an order dismissing this proceeding as an abuse of process.
Summary Judgment
[7] Rule 20.04(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the Court shall grant summary judgment if the Court is satisfied that “there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence”. As a result of the amendments to Rule 20 introduced in 2010, the powers of the Court to grant summary judgment have been enhanced to include, inter alia, weighing the evidence, evaluating the credibility of a deponent and drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.
[8] In Hryniak v. Mauldin 2014 SCC 7, the Supreme Court of Canada established a road map in terms of how a motions judge should approach a motion for summary judgment. The Court must first determine whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial based only upon the evidence filed with the Court and without using the new fact finding powers set out in the 2010 amendments. Summary judgment will thus be available if there is sufficient evidence to justly and fairly adjudicate the dispute, with the motion being an affordable, timely and proportionate procedure.
[9] If the Court finds the presence of a genuine issue requiring a trial, the motions judge must then determine if the need for a trial can be avoided by using the new, enhanced powers under Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2).
[10] It is important to remember that the applicable evidentiary principles developed under the previous incarnation of Rule 20.04 continue to apply. The motions judge must still take a “hard look” at the evidence to determine whether it raises a genuine issue requiring a trial, and as a result each party must still put its “best foot forward” and submit cogent and compelling evidence to support or oppose the relief sought. A moving party has both a legal and evidentiary onus to satisfy the Court that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. It is the moving party’s obligation to present a record that can enable the Court to avail itself of the enhanced powers under Rule 20.04 if the record warrants the exercise of such discretion.
[11] In my view, summary judgment is a just and proportionate outcome for the parties. On the record before me, I am confident that I can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant law to the evidence, and that it is in the interests of expedient, affordable and proportionate justice to proceed as such.
Summary of Relevant Facts
[12] According to the plaintiff’s affidavit, he has “no independent recollection of how the accident happened”, as he fell unconscious at the scene of the accident and suffered (at the time) a suspected brain injury.
[13] The plaintiff gave evidence that Ristich was retained to “represent my interests in this matter”. No copy, redacted or unredacted, of the executed Retainer Agreement was produced on this motion. Presumably, the plaintiff’s “interests in this matter” would cover both potential tort and accident benefit claims arising from the accident.
[14] As stated, Ristich was retained by the plaintiff on December 21, 2012. The plaintiff gave evidence that his “immediate needs” to be serviced by Ristich were in relation to statutory accident benefits so that he could obtain the necessary medical and/or rehabilitation treatment. There is nothing in Ristich’s affidavit which confirms that upon being retained, his firm was focused upon the plaintiff’s accident benefits claims, or for how long.
[15] Ristich delivered a letter dated February 20, 2013 to Sunnybrook requesting copies of the contents of the plaintiff’s medical records. Ristich deposes that his office did not receive those medical records from Sunnybrook until April 18, 2013, and only upon his receipt and review of those medical records was he able to confirm that the accident did in fact take place “on or about December 8, 2012”.
[16] The plaintiff wishes to leave me with the impression that until the medical records arrived at Ristich’s office on April 18, 2013, Ristich was not aware that the date of the accident was December 8, 2012. I have difficulty in accepting this position for several reasons. To begin, Ristich has offered no specific explanation as to why it took his office two months to deliver a request to Sunnybrook. More importantly, his request letter itself specifies the plaintiff’s date of loss to be December 8, 2012. The record shows that as at February 20, 2013, Ristich did not have copies of any documentation relating to the accident. Thus the reasonable conclusion to draw is that the December 8, 2012 date must have been provided to him by the plaintiff.
[17] In fact, on January 31, 2013, Ristich’s office received a copy of an assessment report from Tru Path Occupational Therapy Services (“Tru Path”) relating to the plaintiff’s recommended therapy, and the date of loss listed on that report is December 8, 2012. That date could only have been provided to Tru Path by either the plaintiff, Ristich or someone from Ristich’s office.
[18] In the clinical notes and records of the plaintiff’s family doctor, there is a notation dated January 9, 2013 which states: “MVA. 08.12.2012”. Obviously, the plaintiff’s family doctor would only have learned of the date of the accident in conversations with the plaintiff.
[19] Accordingly, I find that the plaintiff was aware by late December 2012 that the accident occurred on December 8, 2012. In any event, Ristich gave evidence that once he confirmed the date of the accident, he diarized the two year anniversary date in his file to expire on December 8, 2014. This prudent step leads me to the conclusion that Ristich was aware of the potential expiry of the plaintiff’s right to commence legal proceedings under the Act, regardless of whether those legal proceedings related to the plaintiff’s accident benefits or tort claims.
[20] Ristich did not order a copy of the Motor Vehicle Accident Report (“Report”) until May 6, 2014. There no explanation offered as to why it took Ristich nearly 17 months from the date of his firm’s retainer to order the Report. All Ristich stated in his affidavit was that it was ordered “in anticipation of the two year anniversary of the accident being December 8, 2014”.
[21] Ristich received the Report within two days of requesting it (i.e. on May 8, 2014). Attached to the Report were the investigating officer’s notes. It is Ristich’s evidence that upon his review of the Report and the investigating officer’s notes, he became aware for the first time that liability for the plaintiff’s tort claims may rest not only with the driver of the other vehicle, but with the municipality responsible for the maintenance and repair of the roadway. Ristich relies upon the following passage in the investigating officer’s notes:
“Based on the damage, it appeared that the collision likely involved speed as a factor. In addition, it was noted that the roads were wet from a drizzle throughout the day. Also, it was noted that the collision location was slick with what appeared to be some type of spilled liquid. However, this substance did not appear to be present where the skid marks were located.”
[22] Ristich did not consider the maintenance and repair of the roadway to be a live issue until his receipt and review of the Report and the investigating officer’s notes.
[23] Despite becoming aware of this live issue in or around mid-May 2014, the Statement of Claim was not issued in the first action until December 5, 2014, mere days before the expiry of the two year anniversary of the accident. As stated, the first action identified Durham as the municipality with jurisdiction over Valley Farm Road.
[24] The inclusion of Durham as a main defendant in the first action is puzzling. The Report itself lists the location of the accident as having taken place on Valley Farm Road, 150 meters south of Greenmount Street, in the Municipality of Pickering. The investigating officer’s notes confirmed that on December 8, 2012, he was on “general patrol in the City of Pickering/Town of Ajax”, and while travelling northbound on Valley Farm Road in the City of Pickering he came across a motor vehicle collision.
[25] There is no mention of Durham in the Report or the investigating officer’s notes. The Report does state that injured persons were taken to RVHS-Ajax Hospital by Durham Region EMS, and that the investigating officer was part of the Durham Region Police Service. However, it is clear that the accident occurred in Pickering.
[26] There is no evidence from Ristich explaining why he believed at the time of the issuance of the first action that the responsible municipality was Durham, and not Pickering. For reasons set out hereinafter, this evidence may still become relevant on another pending motion. However, there is no evidence in the record before me to explain why Ristich named Durham and not Pickering as a defendant in the first action.
[27] Not surprisingly, once Durham was served with the Statement of Claim and performed its initial investigation, it advised Ristich by letter dated December 15, 2014 (after the expiry of the two year anniversary of the accident but within days of service of the first action upon Durham) that Valley Farm Road was in fact under the jurisdiction of Pickering.
[28] Rather than bringing a motion to add or substitute Pickering as a defendant in the first action, Ristich caused this proceeding against Pickering to be issued on April 8, 2015. There is no evidence from Ristich or the plaintiff as to why it took an additional four months to take active steps in taking action against whom Ristich now believed to be the proper defendant.
[29] On or about July 20, 2015, Pickering delivered its Statement of Defence in this proceeding, and pleaded, inter alia, a limitation period defence under the Act.
Request for adjournment
[30] At the outset of the hearing of this motion, counsel for the plaintiff requested an adjournment. The basis for this request was that the plaintiff had scheduled a motion before a Master seeking leave under Rules 26.01 and 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend the first action and substitute Pickering for Durham as the proper defendant. It is the plaintiff’s position on that pending motion that the inclusion of Durham as a defendant in the first action was a “misnomer”, and leave ought to be granted to add Pickering to correct the name of a party incorrectly named pursuant to Rule 5.04(2).
[31] As noted above, there is no evidence from Ristich or anyone from his office explaining why or how Durham was named as a defendant in the first action. Counsel for the plaintiff sought to adjourn Pickering’s motion so that either (a) the plaintiff’s motion to amend proceed first, or (b) all three motions be heard together by a judge.
[32] In a handwritten endorsement dated December 3, 2015, I denied the plaintiff’s request for an adjournment as I believed there were no potential findings on this motion which would affect the merits of the plaintiff’s pending motion to amend before a Master. I am not being asked to make findings on the issue of whether the test under Rule 5.04(2) has been met. The issues to be determined by me on this motion (limitation period and abuse of process) do not factor into a Master’s disposition of the plaintiff’s pending motion to amend.
Limitations Act, 2002
[33] Pursuant to Section 5(1)(a) of the Limitations Act 2002, a claim is discovered on the earlier of the day upon which a person with the claim first knew, or a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of that person first ought to have known,
(i) that the injury, loss or damage had occurred,
(ii) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission,
(iii) that the act or omission was that of a person against whom the claim was made, and
(iv) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it.
[34] Section 5(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002 and the jurisprudence developed thereunder is clear that a person with a claim shall be presumed to have known of the matters referred to above on the day the act or omission upon which the claim is based took place unless the contrary is proved. This is a presumption that can be rebutted by a plaintiff with necessary evidence.
[35] As the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently held in Miaskowski v. Persaud 2015 ONSC 758 (C.A.), a plaintiff is presumed to have discovered the material facts upon which his/her claim against a defendant is based on the day the accident took place. There is an obligation upon a plaintiff to act with due diligence in determining if he/she has a claim. No limitation period will be tolled while a plaintiff sits idle and takes no steps to investigate any of the matters referred to in section 5(1)(a) of the Act.
[36] A plaintiff is not required to possess a comprehensive understanding of his/her potential claim in order for the limitation period to commence. As held by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Lawless v. Anderson 2011 ONSC 102 (C.A.), “the question to be posed is whether the prospective plaintiff knows enough facts on which to base an allegation of negligence against the defendant”.
[37] Discoverability is thus a fact-based analysis. The discovery of a claim does not depend upon a plaintiff’s knowledge that his/her claim is likely to succeed, or awareness of the totality of a defendant’s wrongdoing. Knowledge of the material facts, and not the elements of a cause of action, will inform the Court’s assessment of the commencement of a limitation period. A plaintiff must show that he/she was both not subjectively aware of the factors set out in section 5(1)(a) of the Act, and that a reasonable person “with the abilities and in the circumstances of the person with the claim” would also not have been aware of these factors. In other words, the plaintiff bears the onus of leading evidence to displace both the objective and subjective components of the tests set out in section 5(1)(a) of the Act.
[38] As held in Miaskowski, a plaintiff has an obligation to establish why, with the exercise of a reasonable diligence, he/she could not have discovered the identity of a defendant prior to the expiry of the applicable limitation period.
[39] The plaintiff’s position appears to be two-fold:
(a) his claim against Pickering was not discoverable until Ristich obtained the Report on May 8, 2014 which was the first time the responsibility for the roadway became a live issue,
(b) in the alternative, his claim against Pickering was not discoverable until sometime in or around April 2013, being a point at which the plaintiff could have discovered the existence of the live issue through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
[40] I have already found that by late December 2012, the plaintiff was in possession of the material facts to know that the accident occurred on December 8, 2012. Pickering does not challenge Ristich’s evidence that he (and by imputation, the plaintiff) did not become subjectively aware of the claim against Pickering until after he received the Report. The issue for me to determine is whether Ristich could have reasonably become aware of the plaintiff’s claim against Pickering at an earlier date through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
[41] There is no evidence explaining why Ristich waited until February 20, 2013 to request production of the medical records. There is no evidence explaining why, once Ristich received the medical record, he waited over a year to request a copy of the Report.
[42] Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that Ristich was not able to make the request for the Report until such time as he learned the location of the accident from his review of the medical records. Not only is there no evidence to support this submission, but it also does not make common sense. By late December 2012, Ristich was already in possession of key factors to assist him in requesting the Report: the plaintiff’s name, his personal information, and the date of the accident.
[43] I reject the plaintiff’s first position. There is no evidence upon which I can conclude that there were any subjective or objective reasons to support Ristich waiting nearly 17 months after his firm was retained to request the Report.
[44] Ironically, the plaintiff’s second position assumes that the first position is incorrect, but that it was reasonable for Ristich to wait approximately four months (i.e. sometime in or around April 2013) before requesting the Report. This four month period appears to have been chosen unilaterally and arbitrarily, and likely for the purpose of “marrying up” the limitation period to not expire until after the commencement of this proceeding.
[45] I reject the plaintiff’s second position. To begin, as held by Master MacLeod in Chesnie v. Snider 2004 34949 (ON SC), [2004] O.J. No. 4462 (Master):
“Obviously it is not sufficient to simply invoke the magic word, ‘discoverability’. The pleading must set out the material facts by which it can be concluded the limitation period has not expired.”
[46] In seeking to discharge his obligation to plead the material facts supporting the plaintiff’s second position on discoverability, paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim in this proceeding states as follows:
“On or about December 5, 2014, the Plaintiff commenced an action against the Defendant Sharon Sullivan and the Regional Municipality of Durham. On or about December 15, 2014, Defendant the Regional Municipality of Durham informed the Plaintiff that Valley Farm Road is not under the jurisdiction of the Regional Municipality of Durham, and is in fact under the jurisdiction of the City of Pickering.”
[47] No other material facts relating to the discoverability of the plaintiff’s claim against Pickering are pleaded in the Statement of Claim in this proceeding. As such, the plaintiff’s only theory of discoverability upon which he could rebut the statutory presumption is that he did not discover his cause of action against Pickering until December 15, 2014. This is inconsistent with, and does not support, his second submission.
[48] In addition, as Ristich was retained to protect and represent the plaintiff’s “interests in this matter”, I find that the plaintiff had an obligation to take positive steps to investigate the presence and identity of potential defendants. While I appreciate that Ristich did not subjectively know that the maintenance of the roadway was a live issue until May 8, 2014, as stated there is no evidence explaining why the plaintiff and/or Ristich sat back and failed to request the Report for 17 months. In the absence of any evidence explaining why positive steps were not taken to ascertain the existence of all proper defendants, I find that the plaintiff has failed to rebut the statutory presumption.
[49] Accordingly, I grant Pickering’s motion for summary judgment, and this action is dismissed.
Abuse of process
[50] In the alternative, Pickering also seeks an order dismissing this proceeding under Rule 23.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process. In Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E. Local 79, [2003] S.C.R. 77 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada held that the doctrine of abuse of process in civil proceedings engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The court has an inherent and residual discretion to prevent an abuse of its process.
[51] As stated, the plaintiff chose to commence this proceeding against Pickering rather than bring a motion to add or substitute Pickering as a proper defendant in the first action (although that motion is now scheduled to proceed before a Master). Section 138 of the Courts of Justice Act R.S.O. 1990 c. C.43 mandates that multiplicity of legal proceedings shall be avoided as far as possible. This same conclusion is supported by the provisions of Rule 5.02(2) which favours joinder of multiple defendants in the same proceeding when the claims made against them arise from the same transaction or occurrence.
[52] Pickering relies upon the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Maynes v. Allen-Vanguard Technologies Inc. (Med-Eng Systems Inc.) 2011 ONSC 125 (C.A.). In Maynes, the plaintiffs issued a Statement of Claim against a group of defendants. After the close of pleadings in that proceeding, due to subsequent events, the plaintiffs wished to add another group of defendants. The plaintiffs properly sought the consent of the original defendants to amend the Statement of Claim and add the new defendants in accordance with Rule 26.02(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Unfortunately, the original defendants declined to provide their consent.
[53] Instead of proceeding with a motion to amend the existing Statement of Claim, the plaintiffs commenced a second action naming both the original and new defendants, and then sought an order consolidating both actions.
[54] The plaintiffs attempted to justify their approach on the basis that the expiry of a limitation period was quickly approaching. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ position, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held as follows (emphasis in bold):
“In addition to avoiding a multiplicity of actions, the doctrine of abuse of process seeks to uphold the integrity of the administration of justice: see Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E. at paras. 35-37. In the present case, the plaintiffs’ assertions in Claim Six are intricately linked to Claims One through Five, which are already being pursued in the Ongoing Actions. The plaintiffs should have sought leave of the court to name the Added Defendants in the Ongoing Actions and to amend their pleadings to plead any relief they had not already claimed, either pursuant to rule 26.02(c) or rule 26.01. As mentioned, rule 26.01 obliges the court to amend a pleading ‘on such terms as are just unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.
Instead, the plaintiffs commenced the New Action for the purpose of naming the Added Defendants as parties to the related litigation and sought declaratory relief against them in Claim Six. By doing so, the plaintiffs effectively circumvented the express procedural requirement in rule 26.02(c) that leave of the court be obtained to add a non-consenting party to the proceeding after pleadings have closed. This was an abuse of process. By starting the New Action instead of moving to amend their pleadings in their existing actions to claim “enhanced relief” against the Added Defendants, the plaintiffs circumvented the court’s jurisdiction to: (1) assess whether the defendants would be prejudiced by an amendment and to determine whether that prejudice can be compensated for by costs; (2) to impose costs in favour of the defendants for granting the amendment; and (3) to impose other terms that are just.
The filing of the statement of claim in the New Action also placed an inappropriate burden on the defendants who had to bring a motion to strike the New Action, when the onus should have properly been on the plaintiffs to convince the court that leave should be granted to amend their pleadings in the Ongoing Actions.”
[55] In addition, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ approach circumvented Rule 26.02(c), a rule which provides an effective means to obtain the necessary remedy. Commencing duplicative actions amounted to an abuse of process that undermined the integrity of the administration of justice.
[56] The plaintiff relies upon the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s subsequent decision in Abarca v. Vargas 2015 ONSC 4 (C.A.). In Abarca, as a result of a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs sued the driver of the car in which they were passengers along with the driver’s insurer. It was subsequently discovered that the driver was potentially under insured and the plaintiffs then commenced a new proceeding naming both the driver’s insurer and the plaintiffs’ own insurer (for the purpose of under insured automobile coverage).
[57] The plaintiffs’ insurer brought a successful motion striking out the second action as an abuse of process. On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the motion judge’s decision and held that the issuance of the second action was not an abuse of process. In finding that Maynes was not the ruling precedent, the Court held as follows (emphasis in bold):
“There are a number of distinguishing features that, in my view, render Maynes an inapt decision to apply to this case. First, the Leivas seek relief from Economical Mutual that is distinct from the relief claimed against the other defendants. They assert a claim against Economical Mutual for underinsured automobile coverage, which they cannot assert against any of the original defendants. This was not the case in Maynes, where five of the six claims asserted in the plaintiffs’ new action were ‘virtually identical’ to the original claims, and the sixth claim was for declaratory relief alone. With respect to the new claim in Maynes for declaratory relief, this court relied on the principle that a court should refuse to grant a declaration when other remedies are available. This court also concluded that the sixth claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Here, the claim against Economical Mutual is not for declaratory relief alone, and there is no suggestion that the claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action.
Second, the Toronto action involved a claim against Economical Mutual, which was not named as a defendant in the original Newmarket action. The Leivas point out that the claim against Economical Mutual had not even been discovered at the time the Newmarket action was commenced. By contrast, at para. 28 in Maynes, this court noted the motion judge’s finding that ‘key representatives’ of the new defendants were already involved in the original actions. Further, Med-Eng’s successor corporation remained a defendant in the original action. In Maynes the ‘new’ defendants were not so new at all – a fact that is not present in the appeal before the court.
Third, there is a real possibility that the claim against Economical Mutual would be out of time if it were necessary to add it to the Newmarket action, a factor that I have found to be relevant to the motion judge’s selection of a proportional remedy for the abuse of process in failing to follow the direction of Quinlan J. A limitations argument was also made in Maynes – the plaintiffs justified commencing a new action on the basis that a ‘potential limitation period was approaching’ (para. 30). But in Maynes, the significance of this fact would have been minimal given the court’s conclusion that the sole new claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Moreover, there was no apparent risk that the plaintiffs in Maynes would not be able to recover from the original defendants if the new claim was struck. In contrast, the risk that the Leivas will experience a shortfall in insurance coverage – the precise risk that they paid premiums to Economical Mutual to avoid – is very real.”
[58] In my view, Maynes is the ruling precedent to the case before me. I do not find the presence of distinguishing features as set in Abarca. The relief being sought against Pickering in this proceeding is absolutely identical to the relief being sought against Durham in the first action. I have already found that the plaintiff has not rebutted the statutory presumption that his claim against Pickering was discovered on or about December 8, 2012 for the reasons set out herein. As such, the limitation period had expired several months before this proceeding was commenced.
[59] Accordingly, in addition to granting summary judgment sought by Pickering, I also find this proceeding to amount to an abuse of the court’s process and dismiss it on that ground as well.
Costs
[60] At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel agreed that if Pickering was successful on this motion, it would be awarded its costs of the motion and the action on a partial indemnity basis in the all-inclusive amount of $7,500.00. I therefore make that Order.
Diamond J.
Released: December 14, 2015
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-525544
DATE: 20151214
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ZABIH ATTAYEE
Plaintiff
– and –
CITY OF PICKERING
Defendant
REASONS FOR DECISION
Diamond J.
Released: December 14, 2015