Daniel Adam Rechtshaffen

The accused was charged with eight counts relating to possession and trafficking of controlled substances (cocaine, ketamine, MDMA, and LSD) and exporting controlled substances.

The accused admitted to purchasing a bulk quantity of drugs with 15 friends for consumption at electronic dance music festivals.

The accused stored the drugs at his residence, divided them into individual portions for his friends, and attempted to ship some to Miami.

The court found the accused guilty of four counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking and two counts of possession for the purpose of exporting, but acquitted on the two counts of exporting, finding the actus reus incomplete as the drugs never left Canada.

The decision addresses a section 11(b) Charter application by Jordan Masters-George to stay proceedings due to delay in a complex, multi-accused drug prosecution.

The court found that while the net delay exceeded the 30-month ceiling set by R. v. Jordan, the delay was reasonable given the complexity of the case, the Crown’s reasonable prosecution plan, and the absence of COVID-19-related delay.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Cameron McCaw, was sentenced for sexually assaulting K.B. while she was passed out from alcohol intoxication.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability, the age gap, and the unprotected vaginal intercourse, and mitigating factors such as the defendant's lack of criminal record, efforts at rehabilitation, and genuine remorse.

The Crown sought a four-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought one year.

The court imposed a sentence of 40 months' imprisonment, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition, a mandatory DNA order, and a 20-year Sex Offender Registry order.

The defendant brought a Charter application to exclude a loaded prohibited firearm and ammunition from trial, alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of a traffic stop, arrest, and vehicle search conducted by Constable Corona of the Peel Regional Police.

The court found that the initial detention was arbitrary, the arrest was unlawful, the search was unreasonable, and the defendant's right to counsel was violated.

The court excluded the firearm evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that all three Grant factors favored exclusion.

The defendant brought an application for disclosure of statements, witness accounts, and video evidence relating to a public complaint of unlawful detention and excessive use of force filed against the main prosecution witness, Constable Darrell Corona, arising from an unrelated incident occurring two months after the defendant's alleged offence.

The defendant sought this material to demonstrate a pattern of police misconduct, to cross-examine the officer, and to support a Charter application.

The Crown and police opposed the application, arguing the material constituted third-party records subject to privacy protections and that no proper third-party disclosure application had been filed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown had satisfied its first-party disclosure obligations by providing the charges, a summary, and the hearing date, and that the investigative materials sought fell outside the scope of mandatory first-party disclosure.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(a) of the Criminal Code, and with having consumed alcohol in such quantity that the concentration in her blood exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(b).

Following a serious single-vehicle collision, the accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial proceeded on a blended voir dire basis.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish the chain of continuity of the blood sample and that the toxicologist's opinion was undermined by discrepancies in the time the blood was drawn.

The court also found that while the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, as the observed signs of impairment could be attributed to trauma and injuries from the collision.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on charges of importing heroin, conspiracy to import heroin, possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking relating to approximately 10 kg of heroin hidden in carpets imported from Pakistan.

The court applied the Shephard test and the Arcuri framework for circumstantial evidence.

Olufeko and Onaola consented to committal on all counts.

Ajiri was discharged on importing and conspiracy to import counts but committed on possession counts.

Fanikayode contested committal on all three counts.

The court committed Fanikayode to trial, finding sufficient evidence that he conducted counter-surveillance at the cargo terminal and storage facility, from which a jury could infer his membership in the conspiracy and knowledge of the controlled drug shipment.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to multiple property offences and a breach of recognizance, arguing that the convictions created unforeseen adverse immigration consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Relying on the principles in R. v. Pham, the appellant sought to replace the convictions with a conditional discharge.

The court accepted fresh evidence concerning potential immigration consequences but held that granting a discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

The offences involved multiple fraudulent transactions over an extended period, a breach of recognizance, and significant retail losses.

The court concluded that substituting a discharge solely to mitigate immigration consequences would produce an unfit sentence and improperly skew the sentencing process.