C. Josic

This decision addresses the validity of search warrants issued under s. 8 of the Charter and the lawfulness of an arrest under s. 9 of the Charter.

The court conducted a Garofoli hearing to assess whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds based on information from a confidential source (CS) to believe that the accused, Mr. Scott, possessed a firearm.

The court applied the "three Cs" test (compelling, credible, corroborated) for informant reliability and found that despite limited corroboration, the CS’s information was sufficiently credible and compelling to justify the warrants and the subsequent arrest.

The offender was convicted of multiple offences arising from two incidents targeting the same victim: discharging a firearm at her and intentionally ramming her vehicle during a high-speed chase while brandishing an imitation firearm.

The court considered the offender's background, including the impact of systemic racism, and the harsh conditions of his pre-sentence custody.

The Crown sought a 22-year sentence and delayed parole eligibility, while the defence proposed 10 years.

The court imposed a net global sentence of 17 years and 1 month, which was reduced to 10 years, 3 months, and 21 days after applying credit for pre-sentence custody, and declined to order delayed parole eligibility.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash the discharge of the respondents on various criminal organization and conspiracy charges following a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors by failing to consider the evidence as a whole, failing to test the evidence against the essential elements of the offences, and improperly weighing competing inferences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge properly assessed the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence and that any alleged errors in assessing sufficiency were within his jurisdiction and not subject to prerogative review.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit two defendants to trial on nine drug-related offences arising from the seizure of cocaine, marijuana, and proceeds of crime from a house at 54 Sharpe Street in Toronto on November 25, 2015.

Bromfield conceded committal only for cocaine and proceeds found on his person.

Smithson conceded committal only for cocaine found in the basement where she resided.

The court applied the test for sufficiency of evidence at committal, focusing on the doctrines of constructive and joint possession.

The court found insufficient evidence to support committal on contested counts, discharging both defendants on most charges while committing Bromfield on two counts and Smithson on one count.

The accused was charged with trafficking in heroin, possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, and 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all applications.

The section 11(b) delay application was dismissed on the basis that while the total delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months, exceptional circumstances justified a deduction of approximately 4 months, bringing the net delay to 17 months.

The court also found that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied.

The sections 8 and 7 applications challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and search were dismissed based on findings that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest based on information provided by a witness, and that the search incident to arrest was therefore lawful.

The court rejected the accused's abuse of process application.

The accused brought an application in the nature of certiorari seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for trial on charges of trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

The accused argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction because the only identification evidence consisted of in‑dock identification by police witnesses.

The court held that while in‑dock identification evidence is inherently dangerous, it is not presumptively inadmissible and may constitute direct evidence for the purposes of the committal test.

Applying the test from United States of America v. Sheppard and R. v. Arcuri, the court found there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could convict.

The preliminary inquiry judge therefore acted within jurisdiction in committing the accused for trial.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered drugs hidden in his car seat during a roadside stop.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing that the police lacked reasonable grounds for his detention and arrest, thereby violating his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights.

The court found that the police had both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to detain and subsequently arrest the accused based on a confidential informant's tip and their own observations.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding the arrest and searches were lawful, and held that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.