10 total
Global 5.5-year sentence imposed for CSAM and extensive voyeurism offences.
The sentencing court addressed guilty pleas to possessing child pornography, making child pornography available, and three voyeurism counts arising from prolonged covert recordings in private domestic, workplace, and public settings.
Applying Criminal Code sentencing principles, the court gave primary weight to denunciation and deterrence, citing the scale of offending, serious and lasting victim harm, and significant aggravating features including sexualized degrading conduct and exploitation of highly private spaces.
The court also considered mitigation, including the guilty plea, remorse, expert evidence of rehabilitative potential and managed risk, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions including extensive lockdowns, triple-bunking, and an in-custody assault.
A global sentence of 5.5 years less 733 days of credit was imposed, with ancillary DNA, SOIRA, s. 161, forfeiture, and s. 743.21 non-communication orders.
Circumstantial evidence proved possession, not theft.
The accused was tried on a summary conviction charge of stealing a 2021 luxury sport utility vehicle.
The prosecution relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance footage, timing, and the accused's later possession of the complainant's key fobs at his workplace.
The trial judge found the evidence established to a near certainty that the accused had possession of the stolen vehicle shortly after the theft and that he was the person seen on the surveillance videos.
However, applying the strict circumstantial-evidence framework, the court held that other reasonable inferences remained, including innocent possession after the true thief loaned the vehicle and keys to the accused.
The Crown therefore failed to prove the theft allegation beyond a reasonable doubt, and an acquittal followed.
Pre-trial application to exclude cellphone video containing rap lyrics denied; evidence admissible as party admission.
The applicant, one of three co-accused charged with murder, brought a pre-trial application to exclude a video recovered from his cellphone.
The video depicted the applicant holding a firearm with a caption containing rap lyrics referencing a shot to the head, which mirrored the victim's cause of death.
The applicant argued the video was irrelevant and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
The court dismissed the application, finding the video was sufficiently proximate in time to the murder and admissible as a party admission, subject to limiting instructions to the jury regarding out-of-court statements and unconscious racial bias.
Accused sentenced to life imprisonment with 14 years parole ineligibility for second degree murder of girlfriend.
The accused was convicted of second degree murder for shooting his girlfriend three times, including while she was on the phone with a 911 operator.
The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 17 to 20 years, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.
The court found the domestic nature of the homicide, the abuse of trust, the use of a firearm, and the callousness of the killing to be significant aggravating factors.
Mitigating factors included the accused's expressions of regret and the harsh conditions of his pre-trial custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The court sentenced the accused to life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of 14 years.
Section 276 and the common law Seaboyer regime do not apply to human trafficking and sexual services offences.
This is an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of evidence regarding a complainant's prior sexual activity in a preliminary inquiry for human trafficking and related sexual services offences.
The court considered whether section 276 applied, given the charges were not explicitly listed sexual offences, and whether the common law Seaboyer regime should apply.
The court adopted the reasoning that section 276 only applies if a listed offence is directly implicated or connected, rejecting the "sexual milieu" test.
It also declined to extend the Seaboyer common law regime to sexual services offences, emphasizing judicial restraint and parliamentary intent.
Consequently, neither section 276 nor Seaboyer applied, and admissibility would be governed by general rules of evidence.
Accused found guilty of second-degree murder after drug-induced psychosis defence rejected.
The accused was charged with the first-degree murder of his intimate partner, whom he shot three times.
The defence argued that the accused was in a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the shooting and lacked the specific intent for murder, seeking a verdict of manslaughter.
The Crown argued the killing was planned and deliberate.
The court admitted various hearsay statements and preposterous utterances to assess the accused's state of mind.
The court rejected the defence's expert psychiatric evidence, finding the accused had the intent to kill.
However, the court found the Crown failed to prove the murder was planned and deliberate.
The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.
Crown permitted to cross-examine recanting complainant on prior police statement translated by bilingual officer.
During a domestic assault trial, the complainant recanted her allegations against her husband.
The Crown brought an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine her on a prior inconsistent statement given to police.
The statement had been taken in Punjabi and translated into English by a bilingual police officer who was not a certified interpreter.
The court found that the officer accurately and contemporaneously documented the statement verbatim, and ruled that the Crown had met its onus to prove the statement was reduced to writing.
The court excluded a loaded firearm from evidence due to multiple serious Charter violations stemming from a pretextual traffic stop.
The defendant brought a Charter application to exclude a loaded prohibited firearm and ammunition from trial, alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The defendant challenged the lawfulness of a traffic stop, arrest, and vehicle search conducted by Constable Corona of the Peel Regional Police.
The court found that the initial detention was arbitrary, the arrest was unlawful, the search was unreasonable, and the defendant's right to counsel was violated.
The court excluded the firearm evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that all three Grant factors favored exclusion.
Application for disclosure of police misconduct records dismissed as they constitute third-party records.
The defendant brought an application for disclosure of statements, witness accounts, and video evidence relating to a public complaint of unlawful detention and excessive use of force filed against the main prosecution witness, Constable Darrell Corona, arising from an unrelated incident occurring two months after the defendant's alleged offence.
The defendant sought this material to demonstrate a pattern of police misconduct, to cross-examine the officer, and to support a Charter application.
The Crown and police opposed the application, arguing the material constituted third-party records subject to privacy protections and that no proper third-party disclosure application had been filed.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown had satisfied its first-party disclosure obligations by providing the charges, a summary, and the hearing date, and that the investigative materials sought fell outside the scope of mandatory first-party disclosure.
Summary conviction appeal dismissed; trial judge's credibility findings and treatment of character evidence upheld.
The appellant, a high school math teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a 16-year-old student.
He argued the trial judge erred by treating a cross-examination question as evidence, failing to address improbabilities in the complainant's evidence, and attaching no weight to his good character evidence.
The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that any error regarding the cross-examination question was harmless, the trial judge's credibility assessments were reasonable and supported by the evidence, and the trial judge did not err in her treatment of the character evidence given the private nature of the offences.