COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-1570 DATE: 2021-12-10
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
— and —
JOSEPH CHANG
Counsel: J. Goulin and T. Kim, for the Crown R. Barrs and C. Tarack, for the Accused
HEARD: November 19, 2021
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
J.M. Woollcombe J.
A. Overview
[1] On September 28, 2021, I found Mr. Chang guilty of the second degree murder of Alicia Lewandowski. He is to be sentenced. The sentence that must be imposed, in accordance with s. 235(1) of the Criminal Code, is one of life imprisonment. The issue to decide is the term of parole ineligibility.
B. Relevant Facts
The Nature and Circumstances of the Offence
[2] In Reasons for Judgment released on September 28, 2021 (now reported at 2021 ONSC 6309) I set out detailed factual findings. I will only summarize them briefly here.
[3] At 4:59 a.m. on March 5, 2018, from the parking area behind her mother’s townhouse, Ms. Lewandowski made a 911 call reporting that her boyfriend had shot her in the head. Over the ensuing minutes, as her head was bleeding and she feared for her life, she begged the 911 operator to send help. She told Mr. Chang to stop what he was doing. Just over three minutes into the call, she reported having been shot again, explaining, “Oh my God. Oh my God. No. Oh. Oh. Oh.” She said nothing further. The 911 call, which was played at trial, is chilling.
[4] Ms. Lewandowski was found by police minutes later, vital signs absent. She was lying face down on the ground, on shards of glass from Mr. Chang’s car window, which had shattered when the first bullet he fired at her exited from her head. Mr. Chang fled the scene and did nothing to provide any assistance to the dying Ms. Lewandowski.
[5] Ms. Lewandowski had been shot three times: the first shot was to the back of her neck and would have caused profuse bleeding and extreme pain, but would not have been immediately fatal. There were two other shots, which were fatal: one was to the right side of the middle of her back and a second to her abdomen. Ms. Lewandowski was pronounced dead at 5:25 a.m.
[6] Ms. Lewandowski and Mr. Chang had been in a relationship for several years. He was a relatively successful drug dealer. She had a long-standing history of drug use, including heroin. They had lived together. Her mother Mira worried about her daughter’s relationship with Mr. Chang and urged her to leave him and to seek help for her own addiction. Ms. Lewandowski, however, remained committed to the relationship with Mr. Chang, despite having been staying at her mother’s home for her final days. I did not accept the Crown’s submission that Mr. Chang had an ongoing animus towards Ms. Lewandowski, or that he wanted their relationship to end. Their relationship was fractious and at times he was acrimonious towards her, to be sure, but neither one seemed to want it over.
[7] At the time of the shooting, Mr. Chang was facing serious criminal charges relating to events of July 23, 2016. Following the execution of a search warrant at his home at the time, police located a significant amount of drugs and $385,515 cash. His preliminary inquiry on those charges was conducted on February 6 to 8, 2018. He was committed for trial. His first appearance in Superior Court was scheduled for March 2, 2018.
[8] At the time of the murder, Mr. Chang was anxious and stressed about his outstanding charges. While his counsel believed that Ms. Lewandowki’s evidence on a Charter motion at trial would lead to the exclusion of the critical evidence, it is clear from the communications between Mr. Chang and Ms. Lewandowski both that he was less confident about this, and that he did not think Ms. Lewandowski was as supportive of him as he felt she should be. Many of his messages to her reflected a high level of concern about his charges and his future, as well as anger and frustration towards her.
[9] In the days leading up to the shooting, Mr. Chang’s behaviour became erratic. Ms. Lewandowski, who he dropped off at her mother’s home five days before he killed her, was worried about his increased drug use. He refused to permit her to come into his condominium unit on his birthday a few days later, threatening to put a bullet in her head. She was so concerned about him as a result that she called police, not in fear for her own life, but worried about Mr. Chang’s well-being.
[10] On March 3rd, Mr. Chang said things to both his cousin, Ms. Chung, and his lawyer, Mr. Kayfetz, that revealed that he had become very paranoid and likely delusional. He thought he was being watched and wiretapped. On the evening of March 3rd, he caused a flood in his condominium unit that led to it being searched by police. The state of that unit also strongly suggests that Mr. Chang was in a heightened state of paranoia and that he had made what can fairly be described as bizarre alterations to it.
[11] The bizarre alterations and presence of drugs and drug paraphernalia in Mr. Chang’s unit, together with the statements of Ms. Lewandowski and the strange utterances made by Mr. Chang in the days before the murder leave no doubt that that Mr. Chang was consuming an increased quantity of drugs, had become highly paranoid and was experiencing some delusions as of March 3rd.
[12] There is no evidence about what Mr. Chang did after leaving Mr. Kayfetz’ home on the night of March 3rd. There is no evidence that he consumed any drugs and no evidence respecting the extent of the effects of any drug consumption on him.
[13] On Sunday March 4th, the night before the murder, Mr. Chang went to his friend Wesley Kim’s home and obtained a 9 mm Luger firearm and ammunition. He then returned to his own condominium building, where he was unable to gain access to his unit and left. Having not spoken to Ms. Lewandowski since the Friday evening when he refused to permit her to enter his unit, Mr. Chang reached out to her on the phone. No doubt, she was very relieved to hear from him and would have welcomed any opportunity to see him. They had a number of calls between 2:14 a.m. and 3:10 a.m.. He picked her up at her mother’s home. They left, returning to the parking area at 4:59 a.m. Minutes later, she had been shot.
[14] It is likely that there was some kind of altercation between Ms. Lewandowski and Mr. Chang in the parking lot early that morning. Certainly it seemed like neighbours overheard a dispute. When he fired the first shot, Mr. Chang was either sitting in the passenger seat of his car, or was just outside the car pointing the gun in at Ms. Lewandowski, who was in the driver’s seat. The shot went in the back of Ms. Lewandowski’s head. Knowing he had shot her, that she was bleeding profusely and that she had made a 911 call, Mr. Chang shot Ms. Lewandowski twice more, again at close range. He intended to kill her.
Circumstances of the Offender
[15] There is little that is positive to say about Mr. Chang. At the time of the murder, he had just turned 39 years old. He is now 42. He has a Youth criminal record and an adult record for an assault conviction in April 1998 and for two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance in November 2000. These convictions were all more than 18 years prior to this offence and have no real relevance.
[16] There is no evidence of Mr. Chang ever having had legitimate employment. He chose to work as a drug dealer. He was arrested in July 2016 and still faces serious drug charges. Released on bail, he proceeded to breach many of the conditions that had been imposed on him, including by not living with his surety and resuming his work selling drugs. He faces further charges related to both drugs and the gun he tossed from his condominium unit on March 3, 2018. Mr. Chang is presumed innocent of all of the charges and will have trials respecting them. He must not be sentenced now for anything related to them.
[17] However, the outstanding charges illustrate that Mr. Chang comes before the court as someone who has not chosen, to date, to lead anything resembling a pro-social lifestyle. He sold drugs and lived in a criminal underworld. He had ready access to guns and chose to carry a gun on his person outside his home.
[18] I note that the evidence supports a finding that at the time of the offence, Mr. Chang was using drugs and that he was suffering mentally as a result of that use. His choices were, to some extent, influenced by his decision to consume drugs.
Victim Impact
[19] At the sentencing hearing, Alicia’s mother, Mira Lewandowski read her victim impact statement. The Crown also read victim impact statements from Ms. Lewandowski’s cousins, her grandmother, her father and two friends. I have carefully considered the magnitude of the loss suffered by Ms. Lewandowski’s family and friends.
[20] Alicia Lewandowski was only 25 years old when she was killed. While there is no question that she had her struggles in life, she was also a warm and loving person who cared for her close knit family and friends and was loved by them. They speak of Alicia’s loving, kind and trusting nature. She was beautiful, both outside and inside. Her family and friends have eloquently expressed the enormous pain that they still feel, profoundly and daily, from her death. They continue to question how such a tragedy could have happened and remain deeply distressed at what Mr. Chang did to their beloved Alicia. Her murder has torn apart the lives of those who loved her.
[21] No one speaks more powerfully about her loss than Ms. Lewandowski’s mother. The grief Mira Lewandowski feels is palpable in the words she expressed in court. She grieves Alicia, and thinks of the horrific death that she suffered through, on a daily basis. As a mother who lost her child, everything changed forever. Every aspect of her life, including her work, her health and her relationships with others, have been impacted by her loss. She feels an unspeakable sadness and has been irreparably scarred by Mr. Chang’s actions.
[22] There is nothing that can be said or done today, or ever, to bring Alicia Lewandowski back. No sentence imposed on Mr. Chang can ever change what has happened. To all of you who have suffered this tremendous loss, I hope today provides some closure. As difficult as it is, I hope you are able to move forward in your lives with this part of your history behind you and with your memories of Alicia held in your hearts.
[23] I would like to address the fears about possible retribution by Mr. Chang that were raised in a number of the victim impact statements. While I understand the worry of various family members that they do not know what Mr. Chang is capable of, in my view, the evidence does not support a finding that if and when he is released, Mr. Chang will pose any risk of harm or danger to anyone related to Ms. Lewandowski. The question of what risk he may pose at the point when he is eligible to seek parole will be carefully considered by the Parole Board at that time.
C. Positions of the Parties
[24] The Crown seeks a parole ineligibility period of 17 to 20 years. It is the Crown’s position that this is at the highest end of the domestic homicide cases, which is how the Crown says this case should be characterized.
[25] The defence submits that the parole ineligibility period ought to be 10 to 12 years. It is the defence position that because Mr. Chang will receive a life sentence with a minimum parole ineligibility period of 10 years, it makes the most sense to leave the determination as to when it is safe to release him into the community to the Parole Board, which will be better positioned to make that determination.
D. Analysis
Sentencing Principles
[26] Section 745(c) of the Criminal Code provides that a person convicted of second degree murder is to be sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole until the person has served at least 10 years of the sentence or such greater number of years as has been substituted under s. 745.4, to a maximum of 25 years.
[27] Section 745.4 directs that in determining the parole ineligibility, the court may substitute for 10 years a period of parole ineligibility as is deemed fit up to 25 years. The factors to consider are the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission (as well as the recommendations made by the jury, a factor obviously not present here).
[28] In addition, consideration must be given to the purposes of sentencing as contained in s. 718 and the principles contained in s. 718.2. Finally, codified in s. 718.1 is the fundamental principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para. 30.
[29] Determination of the period of parole ineligibility is a fact sensitive process: R. v. Shropshire, 1995 47 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227 at para. 18. The primary purpose of setting parole ineligibility is to give effect to the principles of denunciation and deterrence. Rehabilitation, while not a factor that is excluded from consideration, plays a lesser role than in other sentencing situations: R. v. McKnight, 1999 3717 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 1321 (C.A.) at para. 39.
Relevant Case Law
[30] Both the defence and Crown have provided me with a number of cases to guide my determination of a fit period of parole ineligibility.
[31] The defence position is that this is not a domestic homicide. While accepting that Mr. Chang and Ms. Lewandowski were in a relationship, the defence submits that this is not a domestic case that went “sour”. Nor, says the defence, is this a case that is really connected to Mr. Chang’s drug dealing. Rather, the defence characterizes it as a case in which Mr. Chang’s drug use caused his mental state to deteriorate to the point of him being paranoid and then killing Ms. Lewandowski for unknown reasons.
[32] Many of the cases provided by the defence bear few similarities to the facts in this case. As a result of the defence position that this is not a domestic homicide, none of them concern a person killing his intimate partner. In only one case was the accused affected by drugs at the time of the killing. While I accept that some of the cases reveal more heinous or prolonged attacks by an accused than occurred in this case, and the imposition of parole ineligibility in the range sought by the defence, many of these cases are of limited assistance, other than reinforcing that parole ineligibility periods are fact-specific and hard to compare. Those cases that assist to some extent are:
• R. v. Ahmadi, 2021 ONSC 478: The accused, in a drug induced state, brutally attacked a defenceless 75 year old woman, inflicting devastating head injuries and, ultimately, her death. The accused was a young man with no criminal record and good prospects for rehabilitation. The trial judge set parole ineligibility at 13 years.
• R. v. Kassa, 2013 ONCA 140: The accused strangled to death with a ligature, for four to five minutes, the victim, whom he knew. He had an extensive criminal record. At the same time, he had made efforts to rehabilitate himself, was relatively young (23 at the time of the offence), had cooperated with the authorities while in custody and had been a good father to his children. The Court of Appeal found no error in the 13 year parole ineligibility period set by the trial judge.
• R. v. Williams, 2013 ONCA 477: The accused was convicted of a drug-related second degree murder. After a “brutal beating and shooting of the deceased, the appellant returned to the deceased’s apartment to steal drugs”. He and the co-accused carried pliers, a gun, flex cuffs and pepper spray to assist with the robbery, clearly anticipating the need to overcome the deceased’s resistance. The deceased was shot in the head and beaten in the head with the gun and pliers in a brazen attack that endangered the lives of others in the apartment building. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s imposition of a parole ineligibility period of 14 years.
[33] The Crown characterizes this case as one of domestic homicide, a statutorily aggravating feature under s. 718.2(a)(ii). I agree. I observe that this characterization is appropriate even though Ms. Lewandowski and Mr. Chang were not spouses and she was his girlfriend: R. v. McLeod, (2003), 2003 4393 (ON CA), 177 O.A.C. 385 (C.A.) at para. 17; R. v. Hindessa, [2009] O.J. No. 6412 (S.C.J.) at para. 29; affirmed 2011 ONCA 477.
[34] Like many of the unexpected and unpredictable domestic homicides seen in the cases, there is little to explain why Mr. Chang chose to kill Ms. Lewandowski. In my view, however, that does not mean that this case falls outside the category of intimate partner or domestic homicides described in the case law. I find it helpful to consider these cases in determining Mr. Chang’s parole ineligibility.
[35] While no two cases are the same, the cases provided by the Crown suggest a usual range of parole ineligibility for a brutal second degree murder of an unarmed domestic partner of 12 to 15 years: R. v. McKnight, 1999 3717 (ON CA), [1999], O.J. No. 1321 (C.A.). Since that decision, the Court of Appeal has emphasized that this range is not “set in stone” and that ranges are guidelines, rather than rules. Cases of second degree murder of spouses may warrant parole ineligibility up to 17 years, especially where there are no mitigating factors or remorse: R. v. Tayongtong, 2021 ONCA 281 at para. 47; R. v. French, 2017 ONCA 460 at para. 31; R. v. Czibulka, 2011 ONCA 82; R. v. Wristen 1999 3824 (ON CA), [1999], O.J. No. 4589 (C.A.); application for leave dismissed, [2000] S.C.C.A 419; R. v. Soederhuysen, 2020 ONSC 6666 at paras. 31-34.
[36] In this particular case, the most helpful Crown’s cases are:
• R. v. McKnight, 1999 3717 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 1321 (C.A.): Charged with first degree murder for stabbing his wife with a bread knife in their bedroom for 10 to 15 minutes while she pleaded for her life, the accused was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. In reducing the parole ineligibility period from 17 years to 14 years, Laskin J.A., for the majority of the Court, highlighted the mitigating factors, including that the accused had no criminal record, had contributed to society through his medical practice, had been severely depressed at the time of the offence, without which he would likely not have killed his wife, had expressed deep and genuine remorse for what he had done and had positive potential for rehabilitation.
• R. v. Soederhuysen, 2020 ONSC 6666: The accused pleaded guilty to the second degree murder of his domestic partner after shooting her in the backyard of their home. Aggravating factors included the domestic nature of the crime, the fact that it involved a breach of trust, the use of a firearm, the number of shots, the fact that the accused did nothing to assist the victim as she lay on the ground dying and the fact that this was not a spur of the moment killing. At the same time, in imposing a period of parole ineligibility of 14 years, the trial judge noted the significant mitigating features, which included: the accused’s guilty plea, the absence of any criminal record, the cooperation of the accused with the authorities and the general prior good character of the accused.
• R. v. Praljak, 2019 ONCA 394: Convicted of the second degree murder of his wife, the trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility period of 15 years, which was affirmed on appeal. While the accused had no criminal record and no history of violence, there were a number of aggravating features present warranting an increase over 10 years of parole ineligibility. These included: the brutality of the killing (the victim had 9 knife wounds to her body as well as defensive wounds), the gratuitous violence and the fact that the deceased lived for several hours after the attack and endured tremendous pain.
• R. v. Khairi, 2015 ONCA 279: The accused was convicted of the second degree murder of his wife, whom he stabbed in their home where they lived with their six children. While he admitted the killing, his position was that he lacked the intent to kill because of his mental health issues (the accused had been diagnosed as suffering from post traumatic stress and recurrent major depression). In upholding the trial judge’s decision to increase the period of parole ineligibility to 15 years, the Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge had identified the aggravating factors as including: the fact that the victim was the accused’s spouse, the vulnerability of the victim, the fact that the accused used two knives, the attempts of the accused to demean the character of the deceased, the impact of the killing on the children and the accused’s lack of appreciation of the enormity of what he had done. At the same time, there were mitigating features including the absence of any criminal record, the accused’s age (65 years old), the absence of prior violence, although the relationship had been turbulent and, to a limited degree, the accused’s psychological and psychiatric difficulties.
• R. v. Hindessa, 2011 ONCA 477: Charged with the first degree murder of his 20 year old girlfriend, the 33 year old accused was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder. He had stabbed her 9 times in the chest and once in the back as she lay in her bed. He then inflicted savage gratuitous violence on her body, slicing her throat and slashing her face. While there was no solid diagnosis, the trial judge accepted that the accused had a major mental illness, likely some form of psychosis, perhaps elements of paranoia and possible drug induced psychosis, though she could not say whether his mental health issues had anything to do with the murder. While there were mitigating factors including the accused’s personal history in Ethiopia, his mental health issues and the presence of some community support, there were many aggravating features present including the nature and brutality of the crime, the accused’s history of violence and his complete disregard for court orders intended to modify and restrain his behaviour. The Court of Appeal affirmed the 18 year period of parole ineligibility.
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
[37] I find that the following factors are aggravating here:
• Mr. Chang killed his intimate partner, a statutorily aggravating factor under s. 718.2(a)(ii);
• Mr. Chang abused the trust that Ms. Lewandowski had in him. On the early morning in which she was killed, she undoubtedly felt safe getting into Mr. Chang’s car with him. In using his gun to shoot her while she sat in his car, he abused her trust of him, a statutorily aggravating factor under s. 718.2(a)(iii);
• Mr. Chang obtained a firearm from a friend and carried it with him for several hours before using it to shoot Ms. Lewandowski;
• Mr. Chang’s killing of Ms. Lewandowski has elements of real callousness. He shot her the first time at close range in the back of her neck. Aware that she was bleeding, in significant pain and had called 911, he chose not to seek help for her. Instead, she was left in anguish for more than three minutes, no doubt horrified by what he had done and terrified for her life. He then shot her twice more, again at close range, while she sat in his car;
• After the fatal shots, Mr. Chang again chose not to render any assistance to Ms. Lewandowski. Instead, he removed her body from his car, coldly leaving her in the parking area, dying on a pile of glass, as he fled the scene;
• Mr. Chang was on bail at the time he committed the murder. He faced the serious drug charges that are still outstanding from July 2016. His lifestyle at the time reveals an absence of any intention on his part to comply with social norms or court orders. Instead, he chose to live a life of crime and to flagrantly breach conditions that he live with Grace Chung and abstain from the possession of drugs or firearms.
[38] There is also, in my view, an absence of some of the mitigating features sometimes present in other cases:
• Mr. Chang is not a person who can claim to have been a good citizen prior to this offence. He has no record of legitimate employment. He has not supported a family. This distinguishes him from such cases as McKnight and Soederhuysen.
• There is an absence of evidence that Mr. Chang shows strong prospects for rehabilitation. I reach that view because, first, there is an absence of evidence that he has any insight into what led him to commit the murder and, second because there is an absence of evidence of him having taken any steps to address issues about why he consumed drugs and what led to his life of criminality.
[39] I do accept that there is some mitigation in the fact that Mr. Chang has expressed regret for what he did and expressed that he is sorry for what he has put Ms. Lewandowski’s family through. This is a first, but very preliminary step in addressing whatever it is that led him to commit this offence and towards his rehabilitation.
[40] The defence submits that whatever else was going on with Mr. Chang at the time he killed Ms. Lewandowski, his mind was not functioning properly and his mental state had deteriorated. He had broken the cardinal rule of drug dealing: not to get high on his own supply. The evidence supports a finding that Mr. Chang was, around the time he killed Ms. Lewandowski, using drugs including crack cocaine. He was also experiencing some paranoia and delusional thinking, including visual and auditory hallucinations. It is the defence position that healthy and free of drugs, Mr. Chang would both pose a reduced risk to the public and has a significant potential for rehabilitation.
[41] I agree that Mr. Chang has some prospects of putting his drug-using days behind him and that if he does so, the risk that he poses to the public may be lessened. No doubt his time in custody will assist with this. But the complete change in lifestyle that is required for his rehabilitation will, in my view, necessitate more than him merely being drug-free. He will need to also make the decision and commitment to change his lifestyle from being a gun carrying drug-dealer. I have no evidence that he has made such a decision or commitment.
[42] Thus, while I accept that Mr. Chang has potential for rehabilitation, I cannot conclude on the evidence before me that his potential is strong.
[43] The defence submits that the lockdown records that have been filed demonstrate that Mr. Chang has spent a significant period of time in custody under difficult conditions. I agree. Counsel says that he will also face more onerous custody going forward because of fear of infection from COVID-19.
[44] The records filed show the following:
• Mr. Chang spent most of his pre-trial incarceration at Maplehurst (March 6, 2018 to February 13, 2020 and July 7, 2020 to the present), for a total of 1198 days as of November 19, 2021. In this period, Mr. Chang was on full lock-down (meaning that he was confined to his cell for the 6.5 hours he would normally be in the dayroom) 321 times. He was on partial lockdown (confined to his cell for part of the 6.5 hours he would normally be in the dayroom) 63 times. Mr. Chang was also triple bunked 153 days. While a variety of programming was available to Mr. Chang in Maplehurst, there is no evidence before me as to what, if any programming, he engaged in.
• Mr. Chang was incarcerated at the Toronto East Detention Centre between February 13 and July 7, 2020. In this period, there were 24 lockdowns for periods between two and three hours.
[45] The defence submits that the extremely harsh conditions of incarceration that were faced by Mr. Chang over the pandemic are a further mitigating factor that should be considered in determining a fit period of parole ineligibility. The Crown submits that while the effects of harsh conditions in custody can and should be considered in crafting a fit sentence for Mr. Chang for the two outstanding sets of charges, in the event that he is found guilty, they should not be considered a mitigating circumstance on a murder case where the sentence imposed is life and the period of parole ineligibility is being determined.
[46] Doherty J.A., writing for the Court in R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344 recently explained at paras. 50-53, that “Duncan” credit can address exceptionally punitive conditions in jail which go well beyond the normal restrictions with pretrial custody. The restrictive conditions in jails and health risks caused by COVID-19 are an example of the sorts of conditions that may give rise to a “Duncan” credit. This sort of credit is not a deduction from an otherwise appropriate sentence, but is a mitigating factor to be considered in determining the appropriate sentence.
[47] Enhanced credit for lockdown days is not an entitlement or routinely granted, particularly when there is an absence of evidence of the adverse effects of the conditions on an accused: R. v. Omoragbon, 2020 ONCA 336 at para.52; R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754. Mr. Chang has chosen to not provide evidence of the adverse effects of the lockdowns or COVID-19 or triple bunking on him.
[48] It is clear to me that Mr. Chang spent almost a third of his time in Maplehurst under some lockdown, many of which were full lockdowns, and 13 percent of his time triple-bunked. He had some additional partial lockdowns at Toronto East. In addition, he has spent the entire pandemic (since March 2020 until now) in custody, where he faced increased risks to his health caused by a diminished ability to physically distance in jail.
[49] I see no principled reason why these factors should not be considered as a mitigating circumstance when determining the appropriate period of parole ineligibility. There can be little question that Mr. Chang’s pre-trial custody has, because of the pandemic, been harsh, likely very harsh. While I will not quantify the credit in months, I do consider the circumstances of Mr. Chang’s incarceration a mitigating factor in assessing a fair and appropriate period of parole ineligibility.
Sentence to be Imposed
[50] Mr. Chang, you have made many terrible decisions in your life. You chose to take the life of a young woman who you claimed to have loved, and who, for reasons I cannot begin to comprehend, loved you. You have devastated Alicia’s family and friends. As I am required to by law, I impose on you a sentence of life imprisonment. Having considered all of the factors I have discussed, I increase the parole ineligibility period to 14 years from the date of March 5, 2018.
[51] In addition, the following ancillary orders are made:
(i) A weapons prohibition order for life pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code;
(ii) A DNA order pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code.
J.M. Woollcombe J.
Released: December 10, 2021
COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-1570 DATE: 2021-12-10
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
— and —
JOSEPH CHANG
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
J.M. Woollcombe J.
Released: December 10, 2021