R. v. Arrindell, 2025 ONCJ 724

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Arrindell, 2025 ONCJ 724

DATE: 2025 04 15

COURT FILE No.: Brampton 3111 998 22 31101767

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

RONALD ARRINDELL

Before Justice G.P. Renwick

Heard on 30-31 July 2024 and 15 April 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on 15 April 2025

T. Kim counsel for the prosecution

A. Vaughan counsel for the Defendant Ronald Arrindell

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FOLLOWING A TRIAL

RENWICK J.:

INTRODUCTION

1The Defendant is charged on a single-count Information with stealing a 2021 Land Rover sport utility vehicle. The prosecution proceeded summarily.

2Four witnesses (including the complainant) testified for the prosecution during the trial. There were several video recordings and still images that became exhibits.

3The case is entirely circumstantial. There is no direct evidence that the Defendant is the perpetrator of the theft.

4The main issue for determination is whether the circumstantial evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Defendant is the person who stole the complainant’s vehicle. This determination is essential to discover if the charge has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

5The Supreme Court of Canada has recently reiterated the legal principles that govern the fact-finding process engaged during a trial.¹

6The onus during a criminal trial begins and ends with the prosecution to prove the guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Everyone charged with a criminal offence is presumed innocent and that presumption remains throughout the whole of the trial, unless and until the court is satisfied that the charges have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution’s burden of proof never shifts during the trial. In this case, if at the end of my consideration of the evidence and submissions I am not satisfied that the prosecution has proven any element of an alleged offence beyond a reasonable doubt, and more specifically, if I have a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the theft, he will be acquitted of the charge.

7A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or frivolous doubt. It must be based upon reason and common sense and it logically derives from the evidence or the lack of evidence adduced during a trial. While likely or even probable guilt is not enough to meet the criminal standard, proof to an absolute certainty is inapplicable and unrealistic. The Supreme Court of Canada has cautioned that there is no mathematical precision to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but it lies much closer to absolute certainty than to proof on a balance of probabilities.² If after considering all of the admissible evidence, I am sure that a defendant committed an alleged offence and I am not left with any reasonable doubt, I must convict them since this demonstrates that I am satisfied of their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, if I am not sure, or some reasonable doubt remains, then the charge has not been proven to the required degree and an acquittal must follow.

8The evidence of identity in this case is circumstantial. To be satisfied that the identity of the suspect has been proven to be the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, I must be satisfied that it is the only reasonable inference available on the evidence.³ In assessing the case, I must consider the evidence cumulatively and as a whole, including gaps in the evidence. Given that each circumstantial piece of evidence may be insufficient on its own to support the required inference, I must consider all the individual pieces of evidence together to determine whether the prosecution’s burden is overcome. The test is a strict one, because triers of fact are susceptible to the danger inherent in the use of circumstantial evidence: jumping to unwarranted conclusions.⁴ When assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact must also consider other plausible theories and other reasonable possibilities which are inconsistent with guilt.

9Admissibility and the weight attached to evidence are two distinct considerations. In addition to the testimony received, there are video recordings and photographs to consider. The probative value of evidence is not presumed. In all cases, a trier of fact must determine the appropriate weight to give each piece of evidence and what, if anything, is established or proven and to what degree.

THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT

10In this part, I will outline some of the evidence and provide an assessment of the testimony, with references to specific portions of the evidence. Although I will not refer to all evidence, I listened to each witness carefully, I have taken detailed notes, and I have assessed all testimony for intrinsic and extrinsic consistency, plausibility, balance, motive, and the witness’ ability to recall and communicate.

11I will not recapitulate the entirety of the evidence received during this trial. Suffice it to note that I have used several opportunities during the trial and subsequent to the completion of the submissions to review my notes and the exhibits and to listen to parts of the digital audio recordings of the proceedings. I have thoroughly reviewed the evidence in this case, and I will only discuss parts of the evidence where it serves to underscore my findings. Lastly, despite any verbal exchanges during the evidentiary phase of the trial or submissions, I came to no conclusions about any of the evidence received until the closing submissions were made and my review of the evidence, submissions, and the law was complete.

The Police Testimony

12Constable Stefan Arroyo testified first. He explained his response to the call for service and video evidence he seized of the area where the stolen Range Rover was recovered approximately four hours after the fact.

13The officer identified security video from a business where the Range Rover had parked. Constable Arroyo noted that the vehicle had attempted to enter the parking lot for the Wayfair building, but a security gate arm did not lift and the vehicle parked in a neighbouring lot. With his phone, Constable Arroyo took a video of the monitor upon which he viewed the security footage from the neighbouring business (Congevec). The original video had gaps where the recording had stopped and started. A man is suddenly seen walking closely in the area of the stolen vehicle apparently away from where it had been parked. The male wore a white and gray sweater with a black horizontal stripe across the chest and back, black pants, and tan work boots with black toe-caps. The male had black skin and short dark hair. The officer testified that he noted the time on the video monitor for the security footage, 4:36 p.m. The video showed the male leave the parking lot and walk across a boulevard behind a parked trailer and out of sight. The video is grainy.

14At the Wayfair building, the officer saw additional security video that appeared to show the same male with the distinctive white and gray sweater, dark pants, and tan work boots walk from behind a parked trailer across a large lot at the side of the Wayfair building, and eventually (from another camera angle), across the front of the building and into the front entrance.

15Constable Arroyo did not seize the first video he saw of the Range Rover attempting to enter the Wayfair parking lot before attending the Congevec parking next door.

16Constables Angela Annoni and Matt Davis also testified. Their testimony assisted with identifying the Wayfair videos and still photographs entered as exhibits.

17Uniquely, Constable Davis testified that he saw video of the male exit the stolen vehicle after it had parked, the male was at the trunk, he saw the vehicle lights flash (as if the vehicle was locked using the key fob), and the male left it in the Congevec parking lot. This officer was not cross-examined on this evidence.

18Aside from the testimony that Officer Davis saw the male leave the stolen the vehicle and lock it, the police testimony is not contentious. The Defendant was arrested at Wayfair, his place of employment, sometime after 8:00 p.m. The Defendant was searched incident to arrest and he was found in possession of the complainant’s car keys (for the stolen vehicle and the Defendant’s wife’s car), and other keys, which were returned to the complainant at 9:15 p.m.

The Testimony of the Complainant

19Mr. Dharminder Brar testified about the theft of his 2021 Range Rover. It was worth over $150,000. He left the vehicle with the keys inside for a couple of minutes and when he returned, it was gone. Mr. Brar tracked his vehicle (using an app) to the location where it was recovered. He believed that he arrived at the Wayfair building within one hour of losing the vehicle. Mr. Brar was uncertain whether the vehicle was stolen around 2:00-3:00 p.m. or 3:00-4:00 p.m. or so, but he was certain that he found the vehicle and waited there for many hours watching it, parked and undisturbed, until the police arrived.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE

Credibility and Reliability Generally

20Triers of fact must consider both credibility and reliability in determining whether the allegations are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility is shorthand for truthfulness and believability. Reliability is the lens through which we evaluate the accuracy of evidence. Trial judges must be careful not to conflate credibility with reliability otherwise the fact-finding net might entangle even the least reliable piece of evidence.

21It is important to remember that in some cases credibility takes a back-seat to reliability. For example, there are prosecutions where the suspect is unknown to the complainant and the latter may be honestly mistaken about the identity of the perpetrator. In such a case, reliability concerns govern the analysis because credibility does not guarantee accuracy.

22While credibility is not a proxy for reliability,⁵ where the evidence is highly credible, consistent, plausible, not inconsistent with other evidence, largely undisturbed upon a vigorous cross-examination, and not found to be otherwise unreliable, truth and accuracy are likely established.

23Assessments of credibility and reliability can be the most important and challenging judicial determinations in a criminal trial. Our highest court has reminded us:

Credibility and reliability assessments are also context-specific and multifactorial: they do not operate along fixed lines and are “more of an ‘art than a science’.” With respect to credibility in particular, while coherent reasons are crucial, it is often difficult for trial judges to precisely articulate the reasons why they believed or disbelieved a witness due to “the complex intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various versions of events.” The task is further complicated by the trial judge’s ability to accept some, all, or none of a witness’ testimony.⁶

24Judicial fact-finding is often based on inductive reasoning and evaluations of “probable interpretations of the evidence.”⁷ It necessarily depends on common-sense inference-drawing.⁸ To again quote the Supreme Court:

Reasoning about how people generally tend to behave, and how things tend to happen, is not only permissible, it is often a necessary component of a complete testimonial assessment.⁹

Self-Instruction Respecting Credibility and Witness Certainty

25In this analysis, I have specifically cautioned myself to be careful when assessing the credibility of witnesses. Witness certainty is not an indicator of accuracy. In this case, the police officers and the civilian were confident that the stolen vehicle was recovered in a timely way and that the Defendant was the culprit based on circumstances of timing, clothing descriptions, and recognition of the Defendant as the male in the security video seen near the stolen vehicle shortly after it was parked.

26This is a circumstantial case. Many similar cases have led to wrongful convictions because alternative explanations for the evidence were not known or presented at trial.

27In the end, the trier of fact must be satisfied of the value of the various pieces of evidence, the significance of gaps in the evidence, and whether the inferences sought by the parties are reasonable when all evidence is considered as a whole.

The Circumstantial Evidence Proves The Defendant Drove the Stolen Vehicle

28To be satisfied that the circumstantial evidence proves that the Defendant is the vehicle thief, I must conclude that the only reasonable inference available in respect of all of the evidence is that the Defendant is guilty. All alternative possible inferences must be considered and rejected by the court before the prosecution’s theory can be considered.

29The Defendant is alleged to have stolen Mr. Brar’s Range Rover and within an hour he drove to his place of employment, where he was found several hours later in possession of the complainant’s vehicle key fobs and other keys. Though there is no evidence that puts the Defendant inside the stolen Range Rover, a finding of guilt would entail rejecting the possibility that someone else stole the vehicle and gave the Defendant the keys that were later found on him.

30I have difficulty accepting the testimony of Constable Davis that he saw video footage of the suspect leaving the stolen vehicle and locking it. While the witness was fairly confident during this testimony, it is unclear what video he was referring to, and why that video was not apparently recovered. That testimony is contradicted by the video evidence in exhibit 2A. In that video, it is clear that the recording skips (a moving transport trailer in the background is suddenly several lengths ahead at one point; at a later point, the male suspect is suddenly outside the Range Rover). For whatever reason, this officer’s memory is incorrect. I am satisfied that there is no video that recorded the suspect leaving the stolen vehicle or apparently locking it.

31Nonetheless, the photographic evidence satisfies me that the Defendant is proximate to the Range Rover just after it is parked. I have carefully reviewed all video and still images. I have taken into account the build of the male (slender), his clothing (colour, style, and fit), his long gait, his footwear, and the timing of his movements from Congevec to the Wayfair parking and around the building and I find that all of the videos depict the same male walking from the stolen vehicle and into Wayfair. Based on the clothing, the gait, the body type (apparently tall and slender), and even his right hand position (the male at the side of the building appears to be holding an object up to his head, which appears to be a phone on the third Wayfair video – exhibit 6D), I am satisfied that the male that appeared near the stolen Range Rover is the same male that entered the Wayfair building and signed in as an employee.

32I am further satisfied that the male suspect is the Defendant for the following reasons:

i. The suspect in the video footage generally looks like the Defendant as he appeared hours later at the police station in terms of gender, build, age, and skin colour;

ii. The suspect has the same hair colour, hair length, and hair style as the Defendant;

iii. The suspect has the same distinctive hairline as the Defendant (see exhibit 6D, Wayfair 3 video at 3:44 and exhibit 5B);

iv. The outline shape of the suspect’s head (the cut of his hair) as captured in the still image of the third Wayfair video (see exhibit 6F) is identical to the still photograph of the Defendant in the police interview room video (exhibit 5B);

v. The suspect puts on what appears to be a white mask when he enters the Wayfair building (exhibit 6G). This is similar to the white mask worn by the Defendant at the police station (exhibits 5A and 5B);

vi. The suspect and the Defendant are both employees at Wayfair who happened to be working on the same day; and

vii. The Defendant appears to be wearing very dark coloured pants upon arrest, similar to the suspect in the Wayfair videos.

33I acknowledge that the Defendant is never seen wearing the distinctive sweater with the black horizontal stripe. I also acknowledge that the police interview photographs do not depict the Defendant’s footwear. However, the police testified that the Defendant was wearing the distinctive footwear of the suspect and this evidence was not challenged.

34The issue remains whether all of the evidence establishes only that the Defendant is the vehicle thief. I am left with a reasonable doubt that the Defendant stole the complainant’s Range Rover or had any knowledge of the theft for the following reasons:

i. The Range Rover has no obvious signs of theft; it would not be apparent to someone borrowing the vehicle that it was stolen;

ii. The stolen vehicle is tracked to its ultimate parking spot within one hour of the theft; this does not preclude the thief from having loaned the vehicle and the keys to the Defendant, shortly after the theft;

iii. Mr. Brar did not testify that the vehicle drove directly from his office on Derry Road to the location where the vehicle was found; the evidence does not preclude the opportunity for the Defendant to have become in innocent possession of the vehicle before driving to his work;

iv. The Defendant did not seem to hide his possession of the vehicle; but for the lack of a parking pass, he may well have parked the vehicle at his place of employment;

v. The vehicle was not forensically examined for unknown finger-prints; and

vi. The Defendant did not confess to having stolen the vehicle or any knowledge that it was stolen.

35I am satisfied that the evidence established to a near certainty that the Defendant was in possession of a stolen 2021 Range Rover on 07 June 2022. I have a reasonable doubt that he knew the vehicle was stolen or that he had anything to do with the theft.

CONCLUSION

36The theft allegation against the Defendant has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I find Ronald Arrindell not guilty as charged.

Footnotes

1. 1R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7 at paras. 59-62.
2. 2R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] S.C.J. No. 40 at para. 242.
3. 3R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] S.C.J. No. 33 at paras. 17, 18, 22, 26-32, 34, 35, 36, 41, 42, 55, and 56.
4. 4Villaroman, supra, at paras. 27, 29, and 30.
5. 5R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56 at para. 41.
6. 6Kruk, supra, at para. 81.
7. 7Kruk, supra, at paras. 71 and 75.
8. 8Ibid.
9. 9Kruk, supra, at para. 72.