Morgan Bronwyn Reid Rowe

Ontario sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario finding that changes to the Ontario Autism Program (OAP) discriminated against a child with autism on the basis of disability.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding it unreasonable.

The Court held that the Tribunal failed to provide a rational chain of analysis to support its conclusion that the child experienced adverse treatment based on her disability, as the OAP's funding caps were designed to address inequities and ensure all eligible children received some beneficial services.

The Court declined to remit the issue of disability discrimination back to the Tribunal, concluding that no rational analysis could lead to a finding of discrimination on these facts.

The applicant, a child with Autism Spectrum Disorder, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing their claim that changes to the Ontario Autism Program discriminated on the basis of age and disability.

The tribunal had declined to decide whether the definition of 'age' in section 10 of the Human Rights Code, which limits age discrimination claims to persons 18 or older, violated section 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court held that the tribunal was required to decide the Charter issue as it was properly pleaded and necessary to resolve the applicant's claim.

The tribunal's decision was quashed and the matter remitted for resolution of the constitutional question.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to partially stay an action initiated by two former civilian RCMP members, Francisco Chaves and Dayna Young.

The plaintiffs alleged abuse of authority, bullying, and harassment during their employment, particularly under Cameron Ortis, and unfair treatment after his arrest.

The Crown sought a stay, arguing that Mr. Chaves might be covered by a Quebec class proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no significant judicial economy, uncertainty regarding Mr. Chaves's inclusion in the Quebec class, and no real prejudice to the Crown if the action continued.

The court also noted that some aspects of the Ontario case might not be covered by the Quebec class action.

This is an appeal of a summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The motion judge had awarded the appellant damages equivalent to six months' reasonable notice, reduced by two months for failure to mitigate.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in reducing the appellant's damages for failure to mitigate.

Specifically, the motion judge erred in principle by suggesting the appellant should have sought lesser-paying jobs and made a palpable and overriding error by concluding the appellant "aimed too high" based solely on job titles without considering comparable duties.

The Court emphasized that the employer bears a heavy burden to prove both that the employee failed to take reasonable steps and that comparable employment would have been found.

The appeal was allowed, and the damages were based on an eight-month notice period without the two-month reduction.

The applicant, a non-status Indigenous child living off-reserve, sought judicial review of a decision by the Jordan's Principle Appeals Committee denying his request for funding for medical and educational services.

The Committee had denied the request because the applicant did not meet the eligibility criteria under the Standard Operating Procedures, as he was not a registered Indian, not eligible to be registered, and not ordinarily resident on reserve.

The Federal Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Committee did not breach procedural fairness and its decision was reasonable.

The Court also held that the Eligibility Policy itself, which was developed in consultation with stakeholders, was a reasonable exercise of executive policy discretion.

The applicant, a public service employee, sought judicial review of a decision by the Deputy Head of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to maintain her position's classification at the AS-05 level, rejecting the Classification Grievance Committee's recommendation to upgrade it to AS-06.

The Federal Court allowed the application, finding that the Deputy Head failed to reasonably apply the principles of classification to the knowledge and contacts factors and failed to justify departing from the Committee's recommendations.

The Court set aside the decision and remitted the matter for redetermination.

The plaintiff, a former Canada Post employee terminated in 1988, brought an action against his former union and its retained lawyer for civil conspiracy and other torts, alleging they deliberately provided inadequate representation during his grievance.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motions, finding that the essential character of the claim was a Duty of Fair Representation complaint within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canada Industrial Relations Board.

The court also found the claim was statute-barred and, as against the lawyer, an abuse of process attempting to re-litigate previously decided issues.

This endorsement addresses the costs of motions where the defendants successfully dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to amend their statement of claim and granted the defendants' motion to strike numerous paragraphs from the statement of claim and reply.

The defendants sought $16,641.06 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs argued the amount was unreasonable and disproportionate, proposing $5,000.00.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and principles from Boucher, found the defendants' claimed time excessive due to inferred overlap between counsel.

The court fixed costs at $12,000.00, inclusive of tax and disbursements, payable by the plaintiffs to the defendants.

The plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim following a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) decision that largely barred their claims against the defendants under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to strike out paragraphs of the original statement of claim and reply that were inconsistent with the WSIAT decision, as well as allegations related to surveillance and Human Rights Code breaches.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to amend, finding the proposed amendments were statute-barred or otherwise untenable.

The court granted the defendants' motion to strike, ruling that the WSIAT decision was final and binding, that the intentional infliction of mental suffering claim related to surveillance was inadequately pleaded, and that the Human Rights Code claims were either barred by WSIAT or could not stand alone.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for unpaid bonus installments under the respondents' Variable Incentive Plan (VIP).

The appellant resigned before the pay-out dates for the final installment of his 2009 bonus and two installments of his 2010 bonus, totaling $114,916.79.

The VIP contained an "active employment" requirement stipulating that employees must be actively employed on the payment date to receive installments.

The appellant contended that sections 11(5) and 13(1) of the Employment Standards Act, 2000 required the respondents to pay the future installments upon his resignation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the active employment requirement did not contravene the ESA because the future installments did not constitute wages to which the employee was entitled at the time of resignation.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking unpaid bonus payments after resigning from his employment.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff forfeited his entitlement to the bonus because the incentive plan required active employment at the time of payout.

The court found that the plan documents and employment letter clearly set out the active employment requirement, that the plaintiff had notice of it, and that the requirement did not contravene the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed, and summary judgment was granted in favour of the defendants.

The applicant, an RCMP officer on long-term sick leave, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB).

The HPARB had upheld a decision by the College of Physicians and Surgeons' Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee to take no further action on her complaint against an RCMP Occupational Health Services Officer.

The applicant alleged the physician arbitrarily changed her medical profile from employable with restrictions to unemployable without examining her.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the HPARB's conclusion that the physician performed a reasonable review of the medical information and exercised appropriate clinical judgment was reasonable.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of disability after being terminated following absences related to a slip and fall injury and a miscarriage.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the application, arguing that these conditions were temporary and did not constitute a disability under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal denied the motion, finding that both the slip and fall injury, which took weeks to heal, and the miscarriage were not common or transitory ailments and constituted disabilities under the Code, regardless of whether they had resolved by the time of termination.

The respondent requested that the human rights application be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that the substance of the application had been dealt with by the College of Early Childhood Educators in prior professional misconduct complaints.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that section 51(6) of the Early Childhood Educators Act, 2007 creates an absolute statutory privilege that renders the College's decisions inadmissible in civil proceedings, including Tribunal applications.

Consequently, there was no admissible evidence upon which the respondent could rely to support its section 45.1 request.

The union moved to strike the plaintiff's claim against it on the basis that the pleading alleged a breach of the duty of fair representation.

The court held that such complaints fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board under s. 74 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, and may be dismissed under Rule 21.01(3)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Relying on appellate and Supreme Court authority, the court found it had no jurisdiction over the claim against the union.

The motion was granted and the claim against the union was struck, with costs fixed at $1,500.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The Tribunal sought submissions on whether it had jurisdiction over the corporate respondent, a federally-incorporated not-for-profit that collects and analyzes data about First Nations peoples.

The respondents argued the organization fell under federal jurisdiction pursuant to s. 91(6) (Census and Statistics) or s. 91(24) (Indians) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Applying the functional test from NIL/TU,O, the Tribunal found that the organization's data analysis activities did not constitute First Nations governance, nor did they fall exclusively under the federal statistics power.

The Tribunal concluded it had jurisdiction to process the application.