Brooke F. Smith

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The appellant, a 64-year-old woman involved in ongoing employment litigation, attempted to cycle to British Columbia in winter without adequate preparation or training.

She was apprehended under the Mental Health Act and subsequently found incapable of consenting to treatment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the CCB's decision on grounds of bias, procedural fairness, and misapprehension of evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the CCB's determination of incapacity was reasonable and supported by evidence of the appellant's impaired judgment and inability to appreciate the consequences of her decisions in the context of her mental illness.

The appellant, acting as substitute decision-maker for her incapable mother, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision ordering her to consent to a palliative plan of care.

The Board had found that the mother's condition would continue to deteriorate and that the palliative plan was necessary to allow her transfer to a chronic care facility.

On appeal, fresh evidence demonstrated that the mother had stabilized on continuous ventilation and had already been transferred to the chronic care facility without adopting the palliative plan.

The Superior Court of Justice admitted the fresh evidence, found that the evidentiary foundation of the Board's decision had fundamentally shifted, and quashed the Board's decision as unreasonable.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board, which upheld a psychiatrist's finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication for schizophrenia.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the legal test for capacity and made a palpable and overriding error in its factual findings.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and that its factual findings regarding the appellant's inability to appreciate the manifestations of his mental condition and the foreseeable consequences of treatment decisions were supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, commenced an action for damages against several physicians, the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB), and Providence Care Hospital.

The CCB and the defendant doctors requested an order under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the claim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Public Guardian and Trustee, appointed as the plaintiff's litigation guardian, did not oppose the dismissal on the condition that no costs be ordered against the plaintiff personally.

The court found the statement of claim to contain hallmarks of vexatious proceedings and that the substance of the claim fell within the CCB's jurisdiction, thus dismissing the action without costs.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a Community Treatment Order and upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the palpable and overriding error standard of review to the Board's factual findings.

The court found ample evidence supporting the Board's conclusions that the appellant lacked sufficient insight to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions and that he would suffer substantial deterioration without the CTO.

The appeals were dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against two physicians and a hospital, alleging she suffered permanent injuries following a vaginal myomectomy.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, relying on expert evidence that the physicians met the standard of care and that the surgery did not cause the alleged injuries.

The self-represented plaintiff failed to produce any expert evidence to support her claims despite multiple extensions.

The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed the action, finding that the absence of expert evidence in a medical malpractice claim is fatal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment and confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The appellant argued that the 28-day delay between the signing of the Community Treatment Plan and the issuance of the CTO breached the Mental Health Act.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's finding that the renewal was made in conformity with the Act, concluding there was no undue delay given the administrative processes involved.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his incapacity to consent to treatment with anti-psychotic medication and upholding a Community Treatment Order.

The appellant, who has a history of schizophrenia, wished to discontinue his medication.

The court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Board's conclusion—that the appellant failed the 'appreciation test' for capacity because he did not accept his mental illness—was fully supported by the clinical evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's medical negligence action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff had a kidney removed in 2000 due to a misdiagnosis of cancer, which she was informed of shortly after the surgery.

She commenced the action in 2015.

The court found that the plaintiff knew the material facts necessary to make a claim by the end of 2001, as she was aware of the misdiagnosis, the unnecessary surgery, and had been encouraged by family to sue.

The court held that the claim was discovered well outside the two-year limitation period and dismissed the action.

The applicant, an RCMP officer on long-term sick leave, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB).

The HPARB had upheld a decision by the College of Physicians and Surgeons' Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee to take no further action on her complaint against an RCMP Occupational Health Services Officer.

The applicant alleged the physician arbitrarily changed her medical profile from employable with restrictions to unemployable without examining her.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the HPARB's conclusion that the physician performed a reasonable review of the medical information and exercised appropriate clinical judgment was reasonable.