Justin McCarthy

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The appellant, a 64-year-old woman involved in ongoing employment litigation, attempted to cycle to British Columbia in winter without adequate preparation or training.

She was apprehended under the Mental Health Act and subsequently found incapable of consenting to treatment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the CCB's decision on grounds of bias, procedural fairness, and misapprehension of evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the CCB's determination of incapacity was reasonable and supported by evidence of the appellant's impaired judgment and inability to appreciate the consequences of her decisions in the context of her mental illness.

The plaintiff, Cary Beazley, brought a motion to review a single motion judge's order of the Court of Appeal, which had dismissed his motion for an extension of time to appeal the dismissal of his medical malpractice action.

Beazley alleged negligence by physicians for failing to timely diagnose and treat Lyme disease.

The Court of Appeal panel reviewed the motion judge's decision, applying a deferential standard of review, and found no legal error or misapprehension of material evidence.

The panel upheld the motion judge's finding that the proposed appeal lacked arguable grounds, as the expert evidence did not support Beazley's claims regarding Lyme disease testing accuracy or the standard of care.

The review motion was dismissed without costs.

The self-represented moving party sought an extension of time to appeal a summary judgment dismissing his medical malpractice action against numerous doctors and a hospital for alleged failure to diagnose and treat Lyme disease.

The motion judge had previously dismissed the action due to the plaintiff's failure to provide admissible expert evidence on standard of care and causation, and for procedural non-compliance regarding document filing.

The Court of Appeal denied the extension, finding that despite the moving party's bona fide intention to appeal and the relatively short delay, the proposed appeal lacked arguable merit, primarily due to the absence of admissible expert evidence to support the medical negligence claims and the moving party's failure to adhere to procedural rules.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's medical malpractice action on summary judgment, the successful defendant physicians and hospital sought their costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, had alleged a delayed diagnosis of Lyme disease against 35 physicians and the hospital.

The court found that the plaintiff acted unreasonably by ignoring repeated guidance regarding the necessity of expert opinion evidence and by failing to familiarize himself with relevant legal practices.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, fixing the physicians' costs at $365,095.67 and the hospital's costs at $75,019.11.

The plaintiff, Cary Beazley, sued 27 physicians and Queensway Carleton Hospital for medical malpractice, alleging delayed diagnosis and treatment of Lyme disease.

Three motions for summary judgment were heard: one by the defendant physicians, one by the Hospital, and a cross-motion by the plaintiff seeking a finding of liability in his favour.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against all defendants, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide admissible expert evidence to support his claims in negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court also denied the plaintiff's request to file a second expert affidavit and to be qualified as an expert.

This is an interim ruling on the admissibility of documentary evidence for motions for summary judgment in a medical negligence action.

The self-represented plaintiff, Cary Beazley, alleged delayed diagnosis of Lyme disease against numerous physicians and a hospital.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment.

The court addressed the admissibility of 83 documents relied upon by the plaintiff, many of which were incomplete, unsworn, or linked via hyperlinks.

The court emphasized that while procedural fairness is extended to self-represented litigants, fundamental evidentiary rules, such as the requirement for hard copies, proper authentication, and logical probative value, must still be met.

Many of the plaintiff's documents were excluded for failing to meet these criteria, including a video recording of testimony due to lack of authentication and internet information for lack of reliability.

This interim ruling addresses the plaintiff's request to be qualified as an expert witness in the areas of Lyme disease diagnosis and treatment, in the context of summary judgment motions.

The plaintiff, who is self-represented and a party to the action, sought to rely on his self-prepared 'Beazley Reports' as expert evidence.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's request, finding that as a party with a direct financial interest and an advocate, he was unable or unwilling to provide fair, objective, and non-partisan opinion evidence, which is a threshold requirement for expert qualification.

The court also found that the 'Beazley Reports' themselves did not constitute expert reports.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board, which upheld a psychiatrist's finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication for schizophrenia.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the legal test for capacity and made a palpable and overriding error in its factual findings.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and that its factual findings regarding the appellant's inability to appreciate the manifestations of his mental condition and the foreseeable consequences of treatment decisions were supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff suffered a wrist fracture and attended the emergency room, where she was assessed by the defendant physician.

The physician discharged the plaintiff to follow up with her family health clinic but failed to provide adequate verbal instructions regarding the need to see an orthopedic surgeon within 7-10 days, nor did he document this timeframe in his chart.

The plaintiff experienced a delayed referral to an orthopedic surgeon, resulting in the fracture healing in a malposition that required surgery.

The court found that the defendant physician breached the standard of care by failing to provide and document adequate discharge instructions, and that this breach caused the plaintiff's poor outcome.

Judgment was issued in favour of the plaintiffs for an agreed-upon amount of damages.

Following a motion where the court struck a component of the plaintiff's tort claim and ordered parallel family and tort proceedings to be jointly case managed, the court determined costs.

Finding divided success and novelty in the issues, the court fixed costs at $8,500 on a partial indemnity scale.

Given the questionable utility of the second action, costs were ordered payable to the plaintiff in the cause.

The plaintiff commenced a divorce proceeding and a separate civil tort action against the defendant spouse, alleging assault and negligence.

The defendant moved to strike or stay the civil action as an abuse of process, arguing it improperly circumvented the family law regime.

The court declined to strike the entire civil action, finding it is not prima facie an abuse of process to commence a separate tort proceeding.

However, the court struck certain improperly pleaded claims, struck the jury notice, and ordered joint case management of both proceedings to avoid duplication and ensure judicial efficiency.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication for schizophrenia.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the test for capacity and failed to consider relevant evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Board applied the correct legal test under the Health Care Consent Act and reasonably concluded that the appellant's mental disorder prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.