R. v. Carter, 2026 ONSC 2790
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
BRITTANY CARTER
Accused
COUNSEL:
Jonny Melo, for the Crown
Michael Lacy, for the Accused (Offender)
HEARD: February 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, April 15, and May 21, 2026, at Woodstock
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
1May 13, 2023 was a bright, clear and sunny day. Kevin Dovigi was driving his 2020 Toyota Sienna van northbound on Highway 19 at about 3 p.m. He, his wife Melissa, his daughter Celia, his son Andrew, and Andrew’s friend Luca Marra were heading home to London after having spent the day at a soccer tournament in Tillsonburg. Mr. Dovigi described the traffic as “moderate”, and said it “was just like any other day” commuting home after soccer. He has no idea that, “in the blink of an eye”, his van would be involved in a horrific head-on collision, which would cause serious injuries to himself and the other occupants of his van.
2Kyle Wright was also driving on Highway 19 at the same time that afternoon, but in the opposite direction. He was the sole occupant of his 2004 Acura vehicle. He was last in line in a small group of three cars that were also heading southbound toward Tillsonburg. He had no idea that he was about to lose his life.
3Brittany Carter (“the Offender”) was driving her 2014 Jeep Compass on that same afternoon, heading from London on route to her parent’s residence in Turkey Point, to celebrate Mother’s Day the next day. It was a route she had taken “hundreds of times”. After travelling eastbound on Highway 401, she exited onto the southbound ramp at Highway 19. The road was in good condition, straight with no visual obstructions. There were no other southbound vehicles between her Jeep and Mr. Wright’s Acura, although the Acura was a considerable distance ahead when she first entered Highway 19.
4Over the next 1.5 to 2 km, she accelerated until she attained a speed of 134 kph. The speed limit on this highway is 80 kph. Her speed caused her vehicle to rapidly close the gap between her car and the Acura in front of her. Neverthless, her foot remained on the accelerator pedal and she maintained a steady speed of 134 kph per hour for at least the final 5 seconds before impact, not noticing that she was on a collision course with the Acura directly in front of her. Less than one second before impact, she says she saw the Acura’s brake lights come on, and for the first time noticed how close she was to Mr. Wright’s car. She quickly took her foot off the accelerator and applied the brakes, while swerving to the right, but it was too late to avoid a collision. The front left corner of her Jeep struck the right rear corner of the Acura, sending it careening to the left across the northbound lane, directly into the path of the oncoming Sienna van.
5The ensuing crash was the stuff of nightmares. The Acura was torn completely in half, with each half coming to rest a considerable distance from the other. There was a long and wide debris field left on and beside the highway. Mr. Wright was partially ejected from his vehicle, with his head on the pavement. His seat belt was on. Although he was still alive when first responders reached him, he had sustained multiple grievous injuries, and died at the hospital about three hours later. The cause of death was “multiple blunt impact trauma”.
6All of the occupants of the Sienna van were injured to varying degrees, and required treatment at the hospital.
7The Offender’s vehicle came to rest in the ditch on the west side of the highway. She was not injured in the collision with the Acura.
8She was charged with one count of dangerous driving causing death, contrary to s. 320.13(3) of the Criminal Code, and five counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, contrary to s. 320.13(2). She pleaded not guilty and, after a trial, the jury found her guilty on all counts.
9She now stands before this court for sentencing.
The Facts:
10Where the court is determining a sentence, s. 724(2) of the Code provides as follows:
(2) Where the court is composed of a judge and jury, the court
(a) shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty; and
(b) may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven, or hear evidence presented by either party with respect to that fact.
11Any aggravating fact that the Crown seeks to rely on for purposes of sentencing must be proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt.
12The essential elements of dangerous driving causing death are that the Offender operated a conveyance; that she did so in a manner that was dangerous to the public; and that her operation of the conveyance caused Kyle Wright’s death. The elements of dangerous driving causing bodily harm are the same, except that the final element is that her operation of the conveyance caused bodily harm to the five named victims.
13The first element is admitted in the Admissions document, filed as Ex. 8. It was also admitted that the five occupants of the Dovigi van all suffered “bodily harm”.
14As to the second element, the jury was instructed that, in order to convict, they must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Offender’s driving was a marked departure from what a reasonable, prudent driver would do in the same circumstances. Since they rendered a conviction, such a finding is essential to their verdict, and I accept as proven that the Offender’s driving was dangerous to the public.
15As to the third element, in order to convict they must have found that her driving caused the collision between the Acura and the Sienna van, which caused the death of Kyle Wright and injured the driver and passengers in the van.
16In addition to those basic facts, I find the following facts to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
17First, it is beyond any doubt that the Offender was driving at a steady speed of 134 kph in the 5 seconds immediately preceding the impact with the Acura. The Airbag Control Module (“ACM”) that was seized from her Jeep and analyzed, showed that she was travelling at 134 kph at 5 seconds before impact. Her speed remained constant at that speed until 0.7 seconds before impact, when it dropped slightly to 133 kph. At 0.4 seconds before impact it dropped to 132 kph, and then it dropped again to 124 kph at 0.1 seconds before impact. At the precise instant of impact, her vehicle was travelling at 115 kph.
18The ACM also showed that the accelerator pedal was depressed at 40% at 5 seconds before impact, and remained depressed, fluctuating between 39% and 22%, until 1 second before impact, when it dropped to 18%. It dropped all the way to 0% by 0.7 seconds before impact and remained there.
19The ACM also showed that the brakes in the Jeep were off at 5 seconds before impact with the Acura, and remained off until 0.4 seconds before impact, when the brake pedal was depressed. It remained depressed until impact.
20Exhibit 1 is an extremely important item of evidence. It was admitted in the Admissions document that the video captured one perspective of the collision from a residential CCTV camera, which was situated on the west side of the highway, south of the scene of the collision. We were able to watch a cropped version of the video that zoomed in on the scene of the collision, showing the Acura entering the frame, followed shortly afterward by the Jeep. The Jeep steadily closed in on the Acura until it collided with the rear of the vehicle. The Acura immediately crossed the highway in an easterly direction and collided with the Sienna in the northbound lane. The Jeep went into the ditch on the west side of the highway in a cloud of dust. The resolution on the video, even in the zoomed-in version, is excellent.
21It shows, and I find as a fact, that Kyle Wright’s Acura was driving in a southerly direction as the last car in a line of three cars. He was two to three car lengths behind the vehicle in front of him, and there is no apparent change in that gap from the time the Acura entered the frame until impact. Had Mr. Wright applied his brakes, that would have caused his vehicle to slow, and the gap between the Acura and the car in front of him to consequently increase. It did not, and I find that he did not brake his vehicle.
22The video also shows the Jeep, driven by the Offender, moving at a steady speed throughout, one which was noticeably faster than the Acura. That speed differential caused the gap between the two vehicles to close rapidly, up to the point of impact. To be precise, the Acura enters the video frame at the 14 second mark. The Jeep then enters the frame at the 18 second mark. The Jeep closes in on the Acura at a steady pace over the following 8 seconds, until impact occurs at the 26 second mark.
23From the ACM evidence, I find as a fact that the Offender was driving at a steady pace of 134 kph, from at least 5 seconds before impact, until she pulled her foot off the accelerator pedal and applied the brakes, less than one second before impact. From the video evidence, which shows that her speed was steady from the time she entered the frame until the point of impact, I find that she had maintained that speed of approximately 134 kph since at least 8 seconds before impact.
24The Offender admitted that she did not notice the Acura, and how close she was to it, until less than one second before impact, when she tried to brake and swerved to the right in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid a collision. I conclude that she was completely inattentive to the traffic that was in front of her, and in particular to the presence of the Acura that was directly in front of her, for a period of at least 7 seconds, and then tried to take evasive action during the final second before impact.
25Highway 19 is a two-lane secondary highway, that runs in a north/south direction between Highway 401 and Tillsonburg. On that roughly 20 km route, it goes through the villages of Salford and Mount Elgin, as well as the hamlet of Ostrander. There are numerous farms, businesses and residential homes on either side of the highway, with driveways that front on the highway. Farm vehicles, such as tractors and combines, frequently use this road. As a result, there are innumerable opportunities for vehicles to suddenly enter onto the highway from a vast number of entry points.
26I am satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that driving at 134 kph on that highway, on an afternoon when traffic has been described as “moderate”, and taking into consideration not only the amount of other traffic that was there but also what might reasonably be expected to be there at the time, is grossly excessive and dangerous.
27I find, therefore, that the Offender’s driving constituted a marked departure from what a reasonable, prudent driver would do in the same circumstances in two respects: grossly excessive speeding, coupled with a prolonged period of inattention.
28As to the final element of causation, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the combination of the Offender’s speed and inattention caused the collision between the Jeep and the Acura to occur. This, in turn, caused the Acura to careen into the path of the Sienna, where the two vehicles collided. Thus, the dangerous driving of the Offender was a significant contributing cause of the collision between the Acura and the Sienna van that resulted in the death and personal injury at issue.
29Before leaving the fact-finding segment of my reasons, there are two matters to address.
30The first concerns what the Offender was doing and, most importantly, where she was looking in those final seconds before impact. The explanation that first jumps to mind is that she was using her cell phone in some fashion, which is a dangerous habit that has become all too common on our roadways. However, she expressly denied that she was doing so, and there is no evidence to contradict that. Indeed, there is no evidence at all regarding her cell phone, such as whether or not it was seized and analyzed. The Offender also denied that she was fiddling with the radio.
31During oral argument at the sentencing hearing, I posed the proposition that, while we may not know where she was looking or what she was doing, we do know where she wasn’t looking, which is straight ahead, at the traffic on the roadway in front of her. If she had been, she could not have failed to see the Acura, which was there to be seen, with no obstructions between her car and the Acura for the entire time since she had entered Highway 19 from the 401.
32In response to this proposition, Mr. Lacy, for the defence, relied on his client’s testimony that she was thinking about Mother’s Day and the fact that she and her sister have a difficult relationship. In the previous couple of years there had always been arguments between her and her sister which ruined the day for her mother. This was weighing heavily on her, and “to some degree” this was in the back of her mind. She offers this preoccupation as an explanation for why she didn’t realize how fast she was travelling, and why she didn’t notice that she was about to collide with the Acura until literally the last second. Mr. Lacy argued that it is a matter of human experience that people can “zone out”, and not see what is directly in front of them. He argued that the Crown had not disproven this proposition beyond a reasonable doubt.
33The Crown Mr. Melo agreed that it is a common experience for drivers to become zoned out on occasion. He noted that the video shows that the Jeep was not straying from its lane, so there had to have been at least some attention being paid to the roadway. He drew a distinction between making a finding that she was not paying attention to what was in front of her, as opposed to a finding that she was looking elsewhere and not at the road. He is seeking a finding as to the former, but not as to the latter.
34I agree that becoming zoned out, or daydreaming, is something that can and does happen to drivers from time to time. Speaking from personal experience, it is most likely to happen on a long drive, on a straight and boring highway with cruise control on, where the driver suddenly realizes that he or she doesn’t remember the past five minutes. However, that is not the scenario we are dealing with.
35Counsel agree that the collision happened at least 1.5 km but less than 2 km south of the 401. I will use the midpoint of 1.75 km (or 1,750 m) for discussion purposes. At 134 kph, a vehicle is travelling 37.22 meters per second. Thus, it takes only 47 seconds for a vehicle to travel 1,750 m at that speed, although it would take somewhat longer once one accounts for the period during which the car was accelerating to that speed. This is not a long period of time, where a driver might find themselves lulled into a daydream. The Offender was actively driving during this short period, in that she would have exited the 401 at somewhere around 60 to 70 kph, negotiated the off ramp, entered Highway 19 and then deliberately accelerated until she was travelling at 134 kph. She testified that her intention was to turn left at the next intersection south of the accident scene, to take a back way to Turkey Point. Those plans would have kept her cognizant of where she was and where she was about to go.
36I am, therefore, highly skeptical of this explanation, and reject it. At the same time, there is no evidence that the Offender was intentionally looking somewhere other than at the road in front of her, such as at her cell phone, and the Crown is not seeking such a finding. What is clear is that there was a complete lack of attention being paid to the traffic in front of her, during the final seconds leading up to impact. Whatever she was doing, she was not paying attention to the road in front of her, which she had a duty to do. On the evidence, I can do no more than find that there was prolonged and unexplained inattention, and to that extent I modify my previous iteration of this finding, above.
37I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally accelerated to 134 kph, shortly after entering Highway 19. No-one was pushing her foot on the accelerator pedal. That is a shockingly high speed for a highway of this kind, and she could not have been unaware that she was travelling at a high rate of speed. The duty to be diligent and to keep a proper lookout increases as the speed of the vehicle increases, because excessive speed increases the risk that something unexpected and dangerous might happen. The Offender utterly failed to make sure that she exercised the diligence that her high speed demanded.
38Accordingly, I find that the Offender’s dangerous driving consisted of grossly excessive speeding, coupled with a prolonged period of unexplained inattention.
39The second issue that I wanted to deal with before moving on relates to a theory that Mr. Lacy wished to pursue at trial. His theory was that Mr. Wright might have been engaged in “brake checking”, which in some way caused or contributed to the collision. Brake checking is a phenomenon where a driver is being tailgated by the car behind him. The driver applies his brakes, as a warning to the following car to back off and stop tailgating. This could amount to just tapping the brake pedal so that the brake lights come on, or it could amount to actually applying the brakes, whether gently, aggressively, or somewhere in between. If the brakes were to be applied aggressively, it could create a situation of great danger.
40I ruled that there was no air of reality to this theory, and that counsel would not be allowed to, in effect, give evidence from the counsel table as to the nature of this phenomenon. This ruling was vindicated by the evidence at trial. First, the evidence makes it clear that the Offender was not tailgating the Acura, which is a central feature of brake checking. Instead, she simply drove at the Acura, starting from quite a distance away, until ultimately colliding with it.
41Second, as I have already found, the video clearly shows that there was no abrupt widening of the gap between the Acura and the car in front, from which I drew the inference that Mr. Wright did not brake his vehicle. He may well have looked in his rear-view mirror, seen that a car was bearing down on him such that a collision was imminent, and tapped his brake pedal to illuminate his brake lights in a desperate attempt to get the attention of the oncoming driver. However, there would have been absolutely no reason for him to press hard on the brake pedal and actually brake the Acura, since that would only serve to make the collision happen sooner and be more violent.
42Third, the Offender testified that she did not see the brake lights come on until the last second before impact, and the ACM data confirms that that is the point in time when she took her foot off the accelerator and applied the brakes. It is, therefore, clear that if Mr. Wright did cause his brake lights to become illuminated in that last second before impact, it did not cause or contribute to the happening of the collision in any way because, at that point, a collision was inevitable. I find that Mr. Wright was a completely innocent victim.
43It is not necessary for me to rule on whether or not the brake lights actually did come on one second before impact, since it is not an element that the Crown is obligated to prove, and the defence has no onus of proof at all. Furthermore, nothing ultimately turns on this point. However, for what it is worth, I am inclined to believe the Offender’s testimony on this issue.
The Victims:
44Kyle Wright was only 32 years of age when his life was taken from him. He leaves behind his 13-year-old son Marcus, his mother Melissa, his brother Bradley, and many aunts, uncles, cousins and friends. In the victim impact statement authored by his mother, he is described as thoughtful, kind and hardworking. Working on cars was his passion, and he had a rare and infectious hunger for knowledge.
45Kevin Dovigi was 42 years of age at the time of the collision. According to the hospital records that formed an attachment to the Admissions document, he suffered a left clavicle fracture, a small sternal fracture with associated hematoma, and a complex ankle fracture and dislocation of his right ankle. In his testimony he said that his recovery was long. He spent the first few months after the collision pretty much confined at home. He was in a wheelchair for months. He is still receiving counselling, three years after the collision, to help him deal with the trauma he experienced.
46Melissa Dovigi was 42 years of age at the time of the collision, and suffered a traumatic left abdominal wall hernia, with abdominal pain. Her husband stated in his evidence that she later required surgery. She authored a compelling victim impact statement where, as she sat down to write her statement, and after going through in her mind the emotional, physical and financial impacts that the collision had had on her and her family, she decided that she did not want to share those personal details in front of a courtroom. She did, however, say that the experience has made her stronger, more compassionate and forever grateful for her life and those of her family. In a comment directed to Brittany Carter, she said she is ready to move on, and concluded by saying “I do forgive you”.
47Celia Dovigi was 13 years of age at the time of the collision. She suffered a right groin laceration, a left lower lobe pulmonary contusion, and bruising on her chest and hips bilaterally as well as right shoulder abrasions, the latter of which were secondary to the seatbelt. In her father’s testimony at trial, he said that her physical recovery progressed well, but after a year “something cracked”. She couldn’t get in the car or go to bed at night, and was full of fear. She could barely make it from north London to certain points in the city, and had no thought of getting on the highway.
48Andrew Dovigi was 13 at the time of the collision, and suffered a right middle lobe pulmonary contusion and intestinal injuries. He underwent surgery and was intubated. According to his father’s testimony, he was taken away from sports for a couple of months, but started playing again in August, following the collision. His father was “blown away” by how resilient he has been and the recovery he has made.
49Luca Marra was 12 at the time of the collision. He was airlifted to London Heath Sciences Centre due to the severity of his condition. He suffered a concussion, a laceration to his forehead, neck pain and some bruising to his arms and legs. His father, Gerrard Marra, read a victim impact statement into the record at the sentencing hearing, and disclosed additional information, which I accept pursuant to s. 722(1) of the Code. He said that before the collision Luca was a happy, outgoing and confident young man, who had direction, purpose and a strong sense of identity. Much of that was built through sport and structure. Soccer and martial arts were central to who he was. Since the collision he has not been the same.
50He sustained a brain injury, and now lives with chronic pain and persistent headaches. He requires ongoing physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and psychological support. In soccer, he could no longer keep up, and was cut from his competitive soccer academy. He now feels like an outsider. After dedicating seven years to martial arts, earning his black belt and training younger students, he can no longer participate.
51He is left feeling overwhelmed, believing he has no future and a sense that he cannot meet expectations. His suffering has deeply affected his family.
Circumstances of the Offender:
52Brittany Carter is 32 years of age, and is single with no dependents. She has no criminal record. She has the full support of two loving parents, who faithfully attended the trial throughout, along with many members of her extended family.
53She took an apprenticeship program in hairstyling in high school, and completed a college degree at Fanshawe College. She was then accepted into a program at the Faculty of Education at Queen’s University. There she completed a technological education program specializing in hair styling and aesthetics. She ultimately graduated with a Bachelor of Education degree, and became a full-time teacher in 2020.
54I am advised that once this court enters a conviction, which will happen today, she will be terminated from her employment, and will also face disciplinary action with the regulator.
55She has been diagnosed with Generalized Anxiety Disorder with panic attacks, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder and migraines. She is actively medicated under the care of her primary physician and is engaged in regular therapy.
56In his sentencing submissions, Mr. Lacy argued that the Offender’s mental health challenges played a role in the commission of the offences before the court, and is a mitigating factor. However, the Crown points out that there is no evidence before the court of a causal link between her disorders and her criminal conduct. He relies on R. v. Fabbro, 2021 ONCA 494 at para. 25, where Gillese J.A. said this:
For mental health to be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing, the offender must show a causal link between their illness and their criminal conduct. That is, the illness must be an underlying reason for the conduct. And, there must be evidence that a lengthy sentence would have a serious negative effect on the offender such that it should be reduced on compassionate grounds.
57Accordingly, I do not give this submission any weight, given that no causal link has been established between the Offender’s mental health issues and the commission of the offence. I do acknowledge the view of Ann Eaves, her Registered Psychotherapist, in her report of March 13, 2026, that the disruption of the therapeutic process and relationship if the Offender were to be incarcerated could negatively affect her ongoing development of coping skills and ego strength, and the trust and rapport within the therapeutic relationship. It is self-evident that incarceration would interfere with the weekly or bi-weekly sessions the Offender currently participates in. However, that does not rise to the level of seriousness whereby the sentence should be reduced on compassionate grounds.
58There were numerous letters of support filed on behalf of the Offender. She is consistently described as being compassionate, empathetic, kind-hearted, generous, thoughtful, resilient, hardworking, determined and family oriented. She is a very good teacher who creates a warm, inviting and supportive teaching environment.
59In considering the weight to be given to those letters of support, though, I am mindful of the comments of Stribopoulos J. in R. v. Yogeswaran, 2021 ONSC 5920 that it is often people of otherwise good character who inexplicably choose to drive recklessly on our roadways, and accordingly letters attesting to the good character of an offender might not receive the weight that they would receive in another criminal case. Those comments were adopted by Molloy J., the trial judge in R. v. Georgopolous, 2024 ONSC 5922 at para. 34, which were later supported by George J.A. on appeal, cited as 2026 ONCA 27 at para. 20.
60The letters of support confirmed that the Offender has expressed remorse virtually every single day since the collision. Her mother, Wendy, wrote that at every family gathering since, they acknowledge the losses that the other families continue to endure, and it is Brittany who initiates these conversations.
61The Offender herself wrote a lengthy letter to the court, which she read into the record at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, in which she accepted responsibility for her actions, accepted the verdict of the jury, and expressed her deep remorse. I find her remorse to be genuine.
Positions of the Crown and Defence:
62The Crown is seeking a penitentiary term of 5 years incarceration on the count of dangerous driving causing death. Mr. Melo did not suggest a specific sentence for the five counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, but presumably they would be less than 5 years and would be concurrent in any event. The defence is seeking a sentence of 2 years less a day on the dangerous driving causing death count, with concurrent 18-month sentences on the other four counts, to be served in the community under a conditional sentence order. They propose that this would be followed by probation for 3 years and a 5-year driving prohibition.
The Law:
63There are several sections of the Criminal Code that must be taken into account in passing sentence. The first is s. 718, which lists the purpose and principles of sentencing:
718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.
64The proportionality principle is embodied in s. 718.1:
718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
65This means that the sentence must fit the seriousness of the crime and its consequences, as well as the offender’s level of moral blameworthiness.
66Section 718.2 requires the court to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances in passing sentence, and to increase or decrease the sentence in accordance with those factors. I will engage in that exercise below.
67Subsection s. 718.2(b) also codifies the principle of parity, in the following terms:
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
68This requires the court to examine other cases involving similar circumstances with a view to establishing a range of sentences appropriate to those circumstances. Again, I will engage in that exercise below.
69Subsections 718.2(d) and (e) also establish the principle of restraint, such that an offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances. All available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community, should be considered. This principle applies not only in determining whether incarceration is appropriate, but also in determining the appropriate length of a jail sentence: See R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114 at paras. 32-35. The court must impose the minimum term of imprisonment that can achieve the objectives of sentencing and no longer: R. v. Rocchetta, 2016 ONCA 577 at para. 35; R. v. Francis, 2022 ONCA 729 at para. 80. The principle of restraint is particularly important when considering youthful offenders who are facing their first penitentiary sentence. The Offender now before the court, while a relatively young adult, does not fit the profile of a youthful offender, but she is potentially facing her first penitentiary sentence.
70Although s. 718, above, sets out six objectives of a just sentence, the law is clear that for the offence of dangerous driving causing death, denunciation and deterrence are normally the primary goals. In R. c. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, at para. 73, Wagner J. (as he then was), speaking for the majority, said the following:
While it is true that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation apply in most cases, they are particularly relevant to offences that might be committed by ordinarily law-abiding people. It is such people, more than chronic offenders, who will be sensitive to harsh sentences. Impaired driving offences are an obvious example of this type of offence, as this Court noted in Proulx:
...dangerous driving and impaired driving may be offences for which harsh sentences plausibly provide general deterrence. These crimes are often committed by otherwise law-abiding persons, with good employment records and families. Arguably, such persons are the ones most likely to be deterred by the threat of severe penalties: see R. v. McVeigh (1985), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 145 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 150; R. v. Biancofiore (1997), 119 C.C.C. (3d) 344 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 18-24; R. v. Blakeley (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 541 (C.A.), at pp. 542-43.
71In passing sentence, it is important to recognize that Parliament, in 2018, increased the maximum penalty for dangerous driving causing bodily harm from 10 years to 14 years incarceration. They also increased the maximum penalty for dangerous driving causing death from 14 years incarceration to life imprisonment. This brought the maximum sentences for dangerous driving causing death or bodily harm in line with those imposed for impaired driving causing death or bodily harm. This expresses Parliament’s clear signal to sentencing judges that more significant penalties should be imposed for such offences: see Lacasse, at para. 7; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424 at para. 108-9; and R. v. Georgopoulos, 2026 ONCA 27 at para. 26.
72However, it must also be recognized that Parliament, in 2022, reversed the previous Conservative government’s restrictions on the availability of conditional sentences, by making them available for offences where the maximum term of imprisonment was 14 years or more, subject to specific exceptions which are not applicable here. Minister of Justice David Lametti, in introducing the amendments, noted that they were intended to “give judges the option to order that a sentence be served within one’s community under strict conditions, if the individual does not pose a risk to public safety”.
73This means that a conditional sentence is an available option in the case at bar, for all counts on the indictment.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors:
74I will consider the aggravating factors first.
75The fact that the Offender’s driving resulted in the death of, and bodily injury to, more than one person is deemed to be an aggravating circumstance, pursuant to s. 320.32(a). The other factors deemed to be aggravating (i.e. street racing, having a passenger under the age of 16 years, being remunerated for operating the conveyance, having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 120 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood, operating a large motor vehicle, or driving while prohibited) do not apply here.
76The Crown relies on the fact of Kyle Wright’s death and the impact on his family, as well as the injuries suffered, both physical and emotional, by the Dovigi family and by Luca Marra and his family, as aggravating factors. However, the fact that the Offender caused the death of Mr. Wright and caused bodily harm to the occupants of the Sienna van, constitute essential elements in the offences before the court. As such, they cannot be said to be aggravating factors: see Lacasse (supra). However, these facts do serve to assist in evaluating the relative seriousness of the conduct in question. In a crime such as this, the consequences clearly matter. That was made clear in the Saskatchewan dangerous driving case involving Jaskirat Singh Sidhu, who was the driver of a transport truck and who, due to prolonged inattention, failed to stop for a stop sign, and thereby killed or grievously injured 29 members of the Humboldt Broncos junior hockey team. He received a sentence of 8 years in penitentiary.
77It is an aggravating factor that the Offender has a driving record. It consists of two offences for speeding, one in 2014 for driving at 115 kph in a 100 kph zone, and one in 2019 for 90 kph in an 80 kph zone. She also was convicted in 2014 of having numbers on her license plate that were not plainly visible, and in 2015 of following another motor vehicle too closely. While somewhat dated, the two speeding offences and the one offence of following too closely are highly relevant, since both are involved in the offences before the court.
78It is an aggravating factor that the Offender intentionally accelerated to 134 kph in an 80 kph zone. Such a speed would be high even on the 401, although it cannot be said to be a rare occurrence. But that is a divided highway, where access is controlled, and three lanes of traffic are all travelling in the same direction, separated from oncoming traffic by a protective barrier. Highway 19, on the other hand, is a two-lane highway, where two lanes of traffic are travelling in opposite directions only a few feet apart, with nothing separating them from each other in the event that a car crosses, or is pushed across, the centre line. Access to the highway is entirely uncontrolled, and is accessible from innumerable access points.
79It is also an aggravating factor that the Offender failed to keep a proper lookout as to the traffic in front of her for what was, given the extremely high speed she was travelling at, a relatively prolonged period of time.
80The following mitigating circumstances must also be considered.
81First, although the Offender does have a driving record, she does not have a criminal record, so she must be treated as a first offender.
82The Offender has also expressed genuine remorse for her actions, both here in court at the sentencing hearing, and repeatedly in her private life, and that is a mitigating factor. She has stated that she accepts the verdict of the jury, and thereby accepts responsibility for her actions, but that is not the same as accepting responsibility from the outset and pleading guilty prior to trial. She pled not guilty and was convicted after a trial. The fact that she did so is not, of course, an aggravating factor in sentencing, but it does represent the absence of the mitigating factor that a guilty plea, and a full acceptance of criminal responsibility for her actions, would have represented.
83It is not a mitigating factor that the Offender’s driving did not include street racing, or driving while under the influence of alcohol. It simply means that those aggravating factors are not present.
84It is a mitigating factor that the Offender is an otherwise law-abiding good citizen, who is highly regarded by her peers, excels at her profession of teaching, and is a kind-hearted, generous and thoughtful person, who has strong family support.
85I also must take account of the fact that she will be terminated from her employment following the entry of a conviction on these counts. That is a tragedy, given the challenging and unconventional route she took to become a teacher, and how well she has done in her career. This is not, strictly speaking, a mitigating factor, since it does not relate to the gravity of the offence or the level of responsibility of the offender. However, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, has determined that the collateral consequences of a finding of guilt or the imposition of a sentence are properly considered in assessing the circumstances of the offender. As Moldaver J., speaking for the majority, said at para. 48:
The question is not whether collateral consequences diminish the offender’s moral blameworthiness or render the offence itself less serious, but whether the effect of those consequences means that a particular sentence would have a more significant impact on the offender because of his or her circumstances. Like offenders should be treated alike, and collateral consequences may mean that an offender is no longer “like” the others, rendering a given sentence unfit.
86I will now move to a consideration of other similar cases. I use the word “similar” loosely, in that they almost all deal with the offence of dangerous driving causing death, but the fact situations in each case vary widely.
The Range of Sentences:
87I have been provided with numerous decided cases by both the Crown and defence, and those cases themselves cite numerous other decisions, all of which serve to establish minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve as guidelines for the sentencing court. I will summarize some, but not all, of them below. All authorities relate to counts of dangerous driving causing death, unless otherwise noted, and all reflect a verdict after trial, except where a guilty plea is noted.
88The cases relied upon by the Crown include the following:
R. v. Kotula, 2025 ONSC 2388: offender drove 124 kph in a 50 kph residential area, crashing into the back of another car causing a chain reaction that killed two victims and injured two others. His license was suspended at the time. 6.5 years jail on the fatalities, 4 years concurrent on the bodily harm counts;
R. v. Obermok, [2023] O.J. No. 4127 (O.C.J.): guilty plea to one count of dangerous driving causing death. He drove at 105 kph through a stop sign, without even slowing down, killing a 2 year-old passenger and seriously injuring the child’s mother. He had alcohol in his blood, calculated to have been between 30 and 90 mg in 100 ml of blood at the time of the collision. 5 years incarceration;
R. v. Kuzio, 2025 ONSC 2654: 23 year-old offender driving at a speeds estimated to be over 100 kph on a residential street, appearing to be following another vehicle as they made quick lane changes through the flow of traffic during rush hour. Offender lost control of his vehicle, striking an oncoming vehicle and killing the driver. 3.5 years incarceration;
R. v. Al Jalmoud, 2025 ONSC 1607: the offender evaded an attempted police traffic stop, driving into oncoming traffic and through two red lights at 107 kph in a 50 kph zone, striking another vehicle, injuring the driver and killing two passengers: 3.5 years incarceration;
R. v. Kerr, 2024 ONSC 1514: the offender drove at double the speed limit in downtown Toronto on Boxing Day, lost control and flew onto the sidewalk, killing a pedestrian and injuring five others. 4 years incarceration;
R. v. He, 2022 ONSC 2100: the offender was not exceeding the speed limit, but drove through a red light that had been red for at least 11 seconds, killing a pedestrian. She was found guilty due to prolonged inattention. Conditional sentence of 18 months;
R. v. Georgopoulos, 2024 ONSC 5922, aff’d 2026 ONCA 27: offender took his administrative assistant for a spin in his brand new Lamborghini, reaching speeds of 112 kph in a 40 kph zone. As he attempted to pass a streetcar on the right, at 112 kph, he crashed into a parked car, then into the streetcar, causing permanent brain damage to his passenger. 2.5 years incarceration for dangerous driving causing bodily harm;
89Defence counsel relies on the following cases in support of his position that a conditional sentence is appropriate:
R. v. Naveed, 2025 ONCJ 268: guilty plea, where the offender crashed into another car at 140 kph in a 50 kph zone, killing the driver and injuring himself and the two passengers in his car. Conditional sentence of two years less a day;
R. v. Beedawia, 2024 ONSC 3247: driver of tractor trailer failed to stop at a stop sign, colliding with another vehicle, killing a 4 year-old child and severely injuring the child’s mother. He failed to adjust his manner of driving to dimly lit and foggy conditions. Conditional sentence of two years less a day following a contested trial;
R. v. Khan, [2023] O.J. No 5300 (S.C.J.): guilty plea, by 20 year-old youthful offender racing another vehicle at a high rate of speed, striking another vehicle while attempting to pass it, killing one of the passengers and injuring another. Conditional sentence of two years less a day;
R. v. Boutrous, 2023 ONCJ 266: guilty plea (contested on sentencing facts) by 18 year-old driver speeding at 150 kph in a 60 kph zone, striking another vehicle that was in the midst of a U-turn, killing the occupant. Conditional sentence of two years less a day;
R. v. Hutchinson, 2022 ONCJ 276: guilty plea where the offender was driving 50 kph over the speed limit, weaving in and out of traffic. While attempting to pass other vehicles at 112 kph, she struck the victim riding an e-bike, causing head injuries that ultimately resulted in his death. She had four prior convictions for speeding between 2015 and 2017, including one of driving 109 kph in a 60 kph zone. Conditional sentence of two years less a day;
R. v. Linton, 2022 ONCJ 197: the offender attempted to pass a line of cars by crossing over a double solid line, which reflected a lack of visibility of oncoming traffic, and accelerating to 100 kph in a 70 kph zone. The vehicle struck an oncoming car, killing the driver and causing crippling and permanent injuries to the two young passengers. The offender also received a significant injury. Found guilty after uncontested trial. Conditional sentence of two years less a day;
R. v. Ryazonov, 2008 ONCA 667: guilty plea where the offender was driving at extremely high rates of speed in a 60 kph zone for 1.5 km prior to crashing into a taxicab, killing the driver. Conditional sentence of two years less a day upheld on appeal;
R. v. Kirkpatrick, 2018 ONCJ 208: guilty plea where the offender was stopped beside another car at a traffic light, and accelerated to well over the speed limit when the light turned green, pulled in front of the other car, lost control and struck a parked vehicle. Passenger in his vehicle sustained head injuries that ultimately caused her death. 14 months incarceration;
R. v. Paul, 2022 ONCJ 102: guilty plea by youthful driver who was travelling at 120 kph in a 60 kph zone when he lost control of his car and struck and killed a biker. He had been travelling at speeds of up to 140 kph, while being followed by a police officer who was pursuing him, but who disengaged due to the dangerously high speed. 18 months imprisonment;
R. v. Gawronski, 2023 ONCJ 67: guilty plea where the driver was speeding at 20 kph over the limit, cut in front of another vehicle and struck a pedestrian, killing her. He fled the scene, and had a recent history of speeding infractions including one for speeding at 149 kph in a 100 kph zone. 15 months imprisonment;
R. v. Laverdure, 2017 ONSC 2424: the offender was driving a vehicle outside an arena when he inexplicably drove into a crowd of pedestrians at approximately 60 kph, killing one and injuring several others. 22 months imprisonment;
R. v. Christink, 2012 ONCA 141: the offender drove a sports care late at night at more than twice the legal limit and failed to slow down in the face of warning signs. He lost control and crashed into a guardrail, killing two of his passengers. He had a prior record of impaired driving and five speeding infractions. He received a conditional sentence of two years less a day at trial. On appeal the court set aside the conditional sentence and substituted a sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of his sentence;
R. v. Laine, 2015 ONCA 519: the 21 year-old offender was found guilty of two counts of criminal negligence causing death, after driving at 140 kph in an 80 kph zone on a winding road. He lost control on a curve and flipped over, killing two of his passengers and injuring a third. He was sentenced to 4 years incarceration, which was reduced on appeal to 2 years less a day;
R. v. Trepanier, 2026 ONSC 1671: the 23 year-old offender was racing a friend at 190 kph in a 90 kph zone, passing cars in the oncoming lane, causing a multiple car collision which resulted in the death of one passenger and injuries to several others. 3 years incarceration;
R. v. McNorgan, 2024 ONSC 4592: The 79 year-old offender was convicted of one count of criminal negligence causing death and seven counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm. She had approached a red light at a high rate of speed, crashing into one vehicle and continuing through the intersection. As she continued, her vehicle left the roadway and struck a light standard, sheering it off at its base. She then struck a tree and continued onto the sidewalk, where she collided with a group of Girl Guides, killing one child and seriously injuring seven others. She insisted throughout that she had been applying the brakes but they did not work. However, the brakes were found to be in good working order. The ACM showed that the brakes had not been applied at all, and the offender had mistakenly had her foot on the accelerator the entire time. Conditional sentence of two years less a day.
90There is another case, R. v. Tabanao, 2020 ONSC 3501, varied 2024 ONCA 85, that counsel did not refer me to, but which was discussed in the McNorgan decision. It is relevant because it deals with prolonged inattention. It was a criminal negligence causing death case, where the offender, a commercial truck driver, was driving a loaded tractor trailer at about 100 kph on the 401. Traffic in front of him had slowed to a full stop for three kilometers ahead. This stop and go traffic was visible from about 2,300 meters away, with no visual obstructions. Without slowing down, the tractor-trailer slammed into one of the stopped vehicles, killing its four occupants, and struck another vehicle, injuring all three of its passengers. The offender gave evidence that he had been looking away from the road for a period of time prior to the collision. The evidence showed that he did not brake in the 7 seconds leading up to the collision.
91He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. This was reduced on appeal to 5 years.
92The final case I will refer to is R. v. Chan, 2026 ONSC 581. I will do a more expansive review of this very recent case because, like the case at bar, it involves excessive speed (although nowhere near the degree as in the case at bar) coupled with prolonged inattention. The 61 year-old offender was driving in a residential area in Markham. Her dash cam recorded the aggressive driving she engaged in during the three minutes prior to the collision. She was passing other vehicles, both on the left and on the right, so close that her proximity warning beeper repeatedly sounded. During the five seconds prior to the collision, she was travelling between 79 and 82 kph, in a 60 kph zone which, while that speed was not unusual for that particular location, was faster than the general flow of traffic. She maintained that speed as she approached and entered the busy intersection. There was no vehicle in front of her vehicle, and she had a clear view of the intersection. The traffic light showed amber or red for at least 14 seconds before she entered the intersection, and collided with the victim’s car, who was lawfully driving through the intersection on a green light, killing the passenger. The offender had no alcohol in her system.
93She was a first offender but had a driving record consisting of four charges of speeding, from 1995 to 2020. She was described as kind, compassionate, caring, reliable, trustworthy, helpful and committed to her community and her church.
94The trial judge, Speyer J., reviewed a number of authorities that had been provided by counsel, which indicated a very broad range of sentences, from conditional sentences or mid-range reformatory sentences, up to double-digit penitentiary sentences at the high end. Where any particular case lands on that continuum depends upon the degree of moral blameworthiness of the offender. Speyer J. determined that, given the prolonged period of inattention, the rushed and aggressive driving that preceded the collision, and the fact that the offender was speeding, albeit not excessively, a penitentiary term was warranted. However, in view of her prosocial life, strong community support and remorse, the appropriate sentence was the lowest possible penitentiary term of two years incarceration. The trial judge opined that, had she determined that a sentence of less than two years was proper, she would not have found a conditional sentence to be appropriate. In her view, an actual custody sentence was necessary because of the nature and circumstances of the offence, the harm that was done and the need to adequately denounce and deter dangerous driving.
Analysis:
95Having considered the authorities, I immediately observe that the 5-year sentence sought by the Crown is well in excess of the appropriate range of sentence imposed in comparable circumstances. For example, it exceeds the 3.5 and 4 year sentences imposed in Al Jalmoud and Kerr, above. Although I find that the Offender’s moral blameworthiness in the case at bar is high, due to the egregiously high speed and her prolonged inattention, it is, in my view, less than that of the offenders in those two cases.
96As to the cases cited by the defence, the majority of them are guilty pleas by youthful offenders taken in the Ontario Court of Justice, which authorities are not binding upon me. A guilty plea is a powerful mitigating factor that is not present in the case at bar, nor is the Offender a youthful offender.
97From a review of all of the authorities, I am satisfied that the appropriate range of sentence in this case runs from, at the low end, a conditional sentence of two years less a day or an upper-level reformatory jail sentence, up to 3 years in penitentiary at the high end.
98There are a number of similarities between the case at bar and the Chan case reviewed above. Both cases involve an adult offender of otherwise good character and strong family and community support. Both offenders have prior records for speeding. Both cases involved prolonged inattention, where the offender, for whatever reason, failed to see what was clearly in front of her for many seconds prior to the collision. Both cases involved speeding, but the magnitude of that speeding is not comparable at all. Chan involved speeding of 19 to 22 kph over the speed limit. Sigificantly, such a speed was not unusual for that particular location, which means that, on its own, it might be difficult to characterize as a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable, prudent driver in the same circumstances. By contrast, the case at bar involved speeding of 54 kph over the speed limit. On that highway at that time, such speeding could constitute dangerous driving on its own, the moral blameworthiness of which is only enhanced by prolonged inattention.
99Chan does include the additional element of aggressively passing cars in the moments before the collision, which is not present here, although it does not appear to be causally connected to the collision. Considering all factors I find the moral blameworthiness of Ms. Carter to be significantly higher than that of Ms. Chan. This suggests that if 2 years was appropriate for Ms. Chan, then something in the range of 2 ½ to 3 years would be appropriate for Ms. Carter.
100Excessive speed was also an important factor in another recent case, Kuzio, cited above. Tranquilli J. rejected the defence request for a conditional sentence of two years less a day and imposed a penitentiary sentence of 3 ½ years. At paras. 51-53 she emphasized the dangers posed by speeding, and the need for a sentence of imprisonment to meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence:
Speeding has long been recognized as a serious form of dangerous driving that engages the sentencing principles of specific and general deterrence. Speeding poses a potential threat to the safety and lives of motorists and their passengers. Such drivers must be made to realize that their driving must stop. The penalty must be such as to specifically deter both them and other drivers with the message that such dangerous conduct will be punished: R. v. Bimm, (1989), 17 MVR (2s) 157 (Ont.C.A.); R. v. Kerr, 2024 ONSC 1514 at para. 64.
The appellate courts have also advised sentencing courts that there must be no ambiguity in the court’s message that such driving misconduct is completely unacceptable. A motor vehicle can, in a moment of recklessness, be transformed into an object capable of destroying lives: R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487 at paras. 45-48. Driving in this fashion on a major throughfare, endangering the lives of others and taking the life of one of them warrants a severe custodial sanction: R. v. Nusrat, 2009 ONCA 31 at para. 55.
Accordingly, I find that these circumstances require a period of imprisonment to meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence: Proulx , at paras. 6, 107.
101I agree with those comments.
102In considering what sentence should be imposed, I give great weight to the collateral consequences of the Offender’s conviction, in that her career as a teacher will come to an abrupt halt. I also give weight to the mitigating factor of the Offender’s deep and genuine remorse, although its mitigating impact would have been enhanced had it been coupled with a guilty plea. At the same time, the principle of proportionality requires that the sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Here, the grossly excessive speeding engaged in by the Offender, coupled with prolonged inattention, turned her vehicle into an out-of-control missile, resulting in catastrophic consequences. Her offence is most grave, and her degree of moral blameworthiness is high.
103Taking those factors into account, as well as all of the other aggravating and mitigating factors, I am satisfied that a sentence somewhat higher than that imposed in Chan, but not a great deal higher, is appropriate.
104Ms. Carter, would you please stand.
105On count 1, dangerous driving causing death, you are sentenced to twenty-seven months incarceration.
106On counts 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, you are sentenced to 18 months incarceration on each count, to run concurrent with each other and concurrent to the sentence imposed on count 1.
107Ms. Carter, I take no joy in sentencing you to penitentiary. It is easy to feel sympathetic to your situation, and I do, but I cannot allow emotional considerations to stand in the way of fulfilling my role as a judge, which is to decide this case based upon the facts and upon the law. The crime you have committed is a very serious one, and its consequences have been catastrophic. The sentence I impose must reflect that degree of gravity. It is not an easy thing to do, but it is the right thing to do.
108The sheer number of recent cases involving dangerous driving causing death that I was referred to by counsel is shocking, and gives an indication as to just how frequently this crime is being committed in our province. Innocent people are dying because certain individuals choose to drive at dangerous speeds and take unnecessary risks. It has to stop. The message must be clear that if a person chooses to put the public at risk of death or bodily harm, they will find themselves standing where you are standing now, and facing the consequences you are now facing.
109You may be seated.
110On consent, an order will go in the usual form that you will provide a sample of your DNA forthwith.
111Since the effective sentence is not less than two years, it is not necessary to consider the request for a conditional sentence. I will say that, had I imposed a sentence of two years less a day, I would have been of the same mind as Speyer J. in Chan, that a sentence of actual custody is necessary because of the nature and circumstances of this particular offence and the harm that was done, and to adequately address the need to denounce and deter dangerous driving.
112The final issue is the driving prohibition. Crown counsel and defence counsel are aligned at a proposed prohibition for 5 years. I agree that that is appropriate. Accordingly, the Offender is prohibited from operating a motorized conveyance for a total period of 5 years from today’s date.
113To conclude, this has been a tragedy for everyone involved. For Kyle Wright, who lost his life at such a young age, and for his family and friends; for the Dovigi family, and for Luca Marra and his family, who continue, three years later, to deal with the consequences of that awful collision. It has also been a tragedy for Brittany Carter, an otherwise good person who did something horribly wrong that day. She will now have to serve her sentence, and will live with the guilt for the harm she has caused for the rest of her days. It is hoped that everyone involved can find in this nightmare what Melissa Dovigi has found: that it can make you stronger, more compassionate, and forever grateful for your life and the lives of your families.
T. A. Heeney J.
Released: May 21, 2026