Reasons for Sentence

Court File No.: CR-23-792 (Hamilton)
Date: 2025/03/12
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between:
His Majesty the King – and – Mouhamad Al Jalmoud

Crown Counsel: C. Gzik
Defence Counsel: S. Foda and O. Said
Heard: November 18, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, December 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 2024 and February 7 and 12, 2025
Justice: I.R. Smith

Introduction

[1] Following a trial with a jury, Mr. Al Jalmoud was convicted of two counts of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death (Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (the “Code”), s. 320.13(3)) and one count of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm (s. 320.13(2)). The jury found Mr. Al Jalmoud not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for three related counts of failing to stop after an accident (ss. 320.16(2) and (3)). It is now my obligation to impose a fit sentence for the offences of which the jury found Mr. Al Jalmoud guilty. The Ontario Review Board has the obligation to fix a disposition in connection with those offences for which Mr. Al Jalmoud was found not criminally responsible (s. 672.47(1)).

[2] The Code provides that the maximum punishment for dangerous operation causing bodily harm is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years (s. 320.2). The maximum sentence for dangerous operation causing death is life imprisonment (s. 320.21). In both cases, the minimum punishment for a first offence of dangerous operation is a fine of $1,000 (ss. 320.2(a)(i) and 320.21(a)). In addition, in cases of dangerous operation causing death, the court may make an order prohibiting an offender from operating a conveyance for any length of time and, in cases of dangerous operation causing bodily harm, for a period of not more than 10 years, which period may commence when any custodial sentence has been served (s. 320.24(5)).

[3] Crown counsel, Ms. Gzik, argues for a total sentence of 11 years in custody, comprised of concurrent 6-year sentences on the two counts of dangerous operation causing death and a consecutive 5-year sentence for the offence of dangerous operation causing bodily harm. In addition, the Crown proposes a 20-year driving prohibition to follow on the completion of the custodial sentence. The Crown also seeks a DNA order (s. 487.051 of the Code).

[4] Counsel for Mr. Al Jalmoud, Mr. Foda, takes a very different view. He submits that the appropriate sentence in this case is a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day (less credit for pre-trial custody and time spent on bail), to be followed by 3 years of probation. He proposes a 10-year driving prohibition and opposes the making of a DNA order.

The Evidence and Factual Conclusions

[5] Following a jury trial, it is the first duty of the sentencing judge to set out the facts which are express or implied by the jury’s verdict, and to make findings of fact where the implications of the verdict are ambiguous (Code, s. 724(2); R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, at paras. 15–19; R. v. Brown, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 518). Given the jury’s dichotomous verdict, whereby Mr. Al Jalmoud was found guilty of the dangerous operation counts, and not criminally responsible for the failing to stop counts, in this case the fact-finding task is not straightforward. I begin this exercise with an overview of the evidence, then follow with what is express or implied by the verdicts and with my own factual conclusions where such conclusions are necessary.

The Driving, the Collision, and Its Aftermath

[6] Mr. Al Jalmoud was operating a black Ford Escape, a small SUV, on the evening of September 25, 2022, shortly before 11:00 p.m. He was observed by two Hamilton police officers driving down the Jolley Cut, a winding road that connects that portion of Hamilton at the top of the Niagara escarpment, referred to locally as “the mountain,” with the downtown area of the city which sits at the foot of the escarpment. The police officers were in a white police minivan used by the Forensic Services Unit of the Hamilton Police Service. Although it bore some markings identifying it as a police vehicle, it did not have all the markings of a police cruiser and was not equipped with roof lights.

[7] The police officers, both of whom were in uniform, testified that as the Escape was travelling down the Jolley Cut it veered out of its lane. One of the officers, Detective Constable Kris David (“DC David”), who was driving, testified that the Escape was speeding. Detective Constable Gregory Kalmats (“DC Kalmats”) did not confirm that observation and said instead that at one point the Escape slowed down and travelled slowly around a corner while weaving out of its lane.

[8] The officers decided to check on the driver since it may be that he or she was distracted or impaired. At the bottom of the Jolley Cut, where the road straightens out, and turns into John Street, the Escape and the police vehicle stopped beside each other at a red light at the intersection with Charlton Avenue. While stopped, DC David made eye contact with the driver of the Escape, and then as the light turned green maneuvered the police minivan into the lane in which the Escape was travelling, hoping to exit the minivan and speak to the driver of the Escape.

[9] At that moment, so the officers described for the jury, and surveillance video confirms, the Escape accelerated very quickly, drove into the lane for oncoming traffic and around the minivan and sped off going straight, northbound on John Street, and passing through two red lights, at the second of which, at the intersection with Young Street, the Escape collided with a Hyundai Sonata being driven by an Uber driver named Hardik Patel. His passengers, both sitting in the back seat, were two friends, Ryan Valentim and John Wignall. I will return to the consequences of this collision later in these reasons, but note now that Mr. Patel was very seriously injured as a result of this collision, and that Mr. Valentim and Mr. Wignall both died due to non-survivable blunt force injuries, Mr. Wignall at the scene after he was ejected through the rear window of the Hyundai and Mr. Valentim at the hospital.

[10] Data retrieved from the Escape’s “black box” revealed that in the 5 seconds preceding the collision, the vehicle accelerated from 61 km per hour to 107 km per hour at the moment of impact with the Sonata and that the Escape was still accelerating at that moment, although the driver was reducing pressure on the gas pedal and turning slightly in the last second before impact. The speed limit on John Street is 50 km per hour.

[11] After the collision, the Escape travelled slowly into a nearby parking lot. Surveillance video shows Mr. Al Jalmoud exiting the vehicle and walking quickly, or running slowly, away. It seems that he jumped a fence and broke his wrist in doing so. He returned to the scene minutes later and can be seen on surveillance video speaking with a police officer. He appears to be distraught.

[12] Mr. Al Jalmoud was not the owner of the Escape and he was not the holder of a driver’s licence which would have permitted him to drive alone. Instead, he was the holder of an Ontario G1 licence, the terms of which prohibited him from driving without a passenger who was an experienced driver (Drivers’ Licences, O. Reg. 340/94, s. 5).

[13] The police suspected that Mr. Al Jalmoud may have been impaired by alcohol or drugs, but tests for alcohol or drugs in his system proved negative.

[14] Mr. Al Jalmoud was also transported to the hospital, where he was unconscious or incoherent for several hours.

The Evidence of Mr. Al Jalmoud

[15] Mr. Al Jalmoud was 20 years old on September 25, 2022. He testified that he has no recollection of the events after he was stopped at the stop light beside the police minivan and until he woke up in the hospital on the morning of September 26, 2022.

[16] He said that on September 25, 2022, he had been working at a shisha bar in downtown Hamilton. The owners of the bar, two brothers, asked him to go get coffee and said that he could use their vehicle, which was registered to their mother. He protested, saying that he was not properly licensed, but eventually agreed to run the errand as requested, even though he knew it was wrong. He took the opportunity to use the Escape to go up the mountain and attend at another shisha bar at which he had previously worked. He said that he wanted to retrieve some documents which he had left behind there.

[17] As he returned downtown, he travelled down the Jolley Cut and noticed the police minivan. He said that he could see that it was occupied by police officers, whose Hamilton Police Service crests were visible on the shoulders of the officers’ uniforms. He said that he had no memory of driving away from the police at the intersection of John Street and Charlton Avenue, but testified that when DC David pulled the minivan into his lane, he felt bad, experienced a flashback and felt himself going back to his childhood in Syria. He said that he was scared and that it felt like his brain wanted to explode. His heart started to beat hard and he had difficulty breathing. His ears started to ring, and he could see a yellow fogginess come over him in his eyes. He was in pain and felt the need to urinate. From that point on, as I have said, Mr. Al Jalmoud says that he had no memory of what happened.

The Defence Advanced by Mr. Al Jalmoud

[18] The jury heard extensive evidence about Mr. Al Jalmoud’s childhood and that evidence, along with expert psychiatric evidence, was the basis for the position of the defence that Mr. Al Jalmoud was not criminally responsible for the offences alleged by the Crown. The evidence established that Mr. Al Jalmoud was born in Aleppo, Syria. There, as a child, he witnessed the horrors of the Syrian civil war, including bombings, airstrikes, killings in the street, mass and arbitrary arrests, and torture. He witnessed the effects of these horrors on his friends, neighbours and family. He was tortured himself. He developed a fear of police and military figures. The family fled to refugee camps in Lebanon, where they were mistreated. Eventually, Mr. Al Jalmoud and his family came to Canada as refugees in 2018. He was 16 years old.

[19] Two psychiatrists testified, Dr. Sebastien Prat and Dr. Julian Gojer. The content of their expert evidence was similar. They were both of the opinion that, as a result of Mr. Al Jalmoud’s childhood experiences, he developed the condition known as post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). It is a recognized mental disorder that is caused by exposure to significant trauma, including by being in significant danger, and is followed by an inability to forget that trauma, and the avoidance of the repetition of that trauma, all of which can result in cognitive and emotional disturbances.

[20] Drs. Prat and Gojer both testified that various symptoms in a person who suffers from PTSD might be triggered by exposure to circumstances that resemble the observed severe trauma which caused the PTSD in the first place. The symptoms in question can include dissociation, which is an altered state of consciousness where the person is not really conscious because the brain is shutting down in order to avoid reliving the previously experienced trauma.

[21] Both doctors testified that Mr. Al Jalmoud suffered from PTSD on the evening of September 25, 2022, that the PTSD led to a dissociative state triggered by Mr. Al Jalmoud’s encounter with the police officers in the white minivan, and that Mr. Al Jalmoud was in a dissociative state until he woke up in the hospital hours later. They both testified that Mr. Al Jalmoud was not in control of his actions. While he was capable of performing motor functions, he was not conscious or aware of what he was doing, either while driving away from the police or after the collision.

[22] For all these reasons, both experts were of the view that Mr. Al Jalmoud was not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for both the dangerous operation counts and the fail to stop counts.

[23] Importantly, though, Dr. Prat agreed in cross-examination with the Crown’s suggestion that it was possible, although he thought not likely, that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s PTSD was triggered by the collision itself, which was violent and loud, or that it was triggered when Mr. Al Jalmoud arrived back at the scene and saw all the first responders and that two people had died. Dr. Prat agreed that it was possible that Mr. Al Jalmoud was in a dissociative state from either of those points forward and not before. Dr. Gojer did not agree that either of those theories proposed by the Crown was possible.

Facts Which Are Express or Implied by the Jury’s Verdict

[24] I am satisfied that the following facts must be taken from the jury’s verdict in this case.

[25] First, and most obviously, the jury was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Al Jalmoud committed the offence of dangerous operation of a conveyance and thereby caused the deaths of Mr. Wignall and Mr. Valentim and bodily harm to Mr. Patel. By contrast, the jury was not satisfied that Mr. Al Jalmoud was not criminally responsible for those offences by reason of mental disorder. In other words, the jury did not conclude that Mr. Al Jalmoud was in a dissociative state from the point of his encounter with the police minivan at the intersection of John Street and Charlton Avenue. The presumption of criminality was not displaced. Mr. Al Jalmoud was therefore responsible for his criminal conduct because he was capable of appreciating the nature and quality of his conduct and of knowing that his conduct was wrong.

[26] Second, the jury was satisfied that the elements of the fail to stop offences had been made out, a point which had not been conceded by the defence (unlike the position of the defence on the dangerous operation counts). Otherwise, the jury would have acquitted Mr. Al Jalmoud on the failing to stop counts, not found him not criminally responsible. Only having found that all the elements of the offence had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt could that jury have then gone on to consider the not criminally responsible defence.

[27] Third, the jury was satisfied that Mr. Al Jalmoud was not criminally responsible for failing to stop by reason of mental disorder. Several findings necessarily flow from this conclusion, given that the only basis in the evidence for concluding that Mr. Al Jalmoud was not criminally responsible was that he experienced a PTSD triggering event which led to a dissociative state. These necessary findings include:

(a) that the jury accepted that Mr. Al Jalmoud suffered from PTSD as a result of his childhood experiences in Syria and Lebanon, the evidence of which the jury must also have accepted;

(b) that the jury accepted that PTSD is a mental disorder capable of leading to incidents of dissociation;

(c) that the jury accepted that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s PTSD had been triggered and that he was in a dissociative state at the time that he failed to stop; and,

(d) that the jury accepted that, while in that dissociative state, Mr. Al Jalmoud was either not capable of appreciating the nature and quality of his conduct or of knowing that the conduct was wrong.

[28] In my view, these are the factual conclusions which the verdicts require me to find. Otherwise, it is for me to make findings of fact based on my own view of the evidence and I turn to that exercise now.

Other Conclusions on the Facts

[29] Here, I address two broad issues, both relating to the evidence of Mr. Al Jalmoud’s driving, the collision, and its aftermath, in respect of which the jury’s verdict does not point definitively to any particular factual conclusion.

[30] First, I address the question of the nature of Mr. Al Jalmoud’s driving as he came down the Jolley Cut until he stopped at the red light at the intersection of John Street and Charlton Avenue. As noted above, DC Kalmats and DC David gave different evidence about what they observed. DC Kalmats said that he observed the Escape travelling slowly around one of the turns on the Jolley Cut but still veering out of its lane. He also testified that the Escape travelled out of its lane once or twice but was not speeding, and there was nothing else which was unusual about the way in which the vehicle was being driven. For his part, when he testified, Mr. Al Jalmoud denied that he was speeding at this time.

[31] DC David testified that after veering out of and then back into its lane, the Escape accelerated quickly up to a speed of approximately 90 km per hour, before stopping at the intersection of John Street and Charlton Avenue.

[32] DC David was very effectively cross-examined, in my view, and presented as defensive and as advocating for his position on the facts. On the issue of the nature of Mr. Al Jalmoud’s driving before he arrived at the intersection of John Street and Charlton Avenue, I prefer the evidence of DC Kalmats. However, even without that preference, given the contradictory nature of their evidence respecting whether Mr. Al Jalmoud was speeding, I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Al Jalmoud was in fact speeding as he approached the stop light at Charlton Avenue. The Crown has failed to prove this potentially aggravating factor.

[33] I do accept, however, that Mr. Al Jalmoud veered out of his lane, that he did so more than once, and that this attracted the attention of the officers who genuinely wondered whether the driver of the Escape was impaired or distracted or, as DC Kalmats allowed in cross-examination, just a bad driver.

[34] In this latter respect, I note that the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. Al Jalmoud was an inexperienced driver. Indeed, he testified that the driving he did on September 25, 2022, was the first driving he had done in Canada, where he had been living for roughly four years (although he said that he did have some limited prior experience driving before he came to Canada). The evidence establishes that Mr. Al Jalmoud was not impaired. Moreover, there is little or no evidence that he was distracted. In all these circumstances, I conclude that the driving Mr. Al Jalmoud exhibited as he came down the Jolley Cut was the driving of an inexperienced driver, driving a car he had not driven before, on a winding road on which he had not driven before, at a time when he knew he should not be driving. He was perhaps nervous as a result.

[35] Before turning to the next issue, I pause here to observe that Mr. Al Jalmoud was cross-examined extensively about a variety of topics including, but not limited to, why he was driving, why he went up the mountain, what route he took both going up and coming back down, where he planned to get coffee, why he was getting coffee when the shisha bar served its own coffee, whether he was properly licenced, how he had obtained his licence, and where he was living at that time. I think it is fair to say that Mr. Al Jalmoud would not have been perceived by the jury as a good witness. Although I am confident that the jury made allowances (as I did) for the fact that Mr. Al Jalmoud is not a sophisticated man, is either not literate or is barely literate in both English and Arabic, was nervous on the witness stand and was testifying with the assistance of a stand-by interpreter, his evidence on these questions was vague and difficult to follow.

[36] I conclude from this part of the cross-examination that Mr. Al Jalmoud did not have a good explanation for why he was using the Escape, although I hasten to add that there was no evidence at trial that the Escape was stolen or taken without consent. I also observe that it was not proven to any standard that Mr. Al Jalmoud did not obtain his G1 licence lawfully. I do, however, consider his evidence during cross-examination to tell against his credibility given his inability to provide straightforward answers to some relatively simple questions.

[37] Second, I turn to the question of why Mr. Al Jalmoud sped away from the police minivan after it turned into his lane. As I have said, the jury’s verdict makes it plain that they found that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s conduct in this regard was voluntary and not undertaken in a dissociative state. I observe that Mr. Al Jalmoud testified that he knew the van stopped beside him was carrying police officers. He said that he saw the police crest on the shoulders of the officers’ uniforms. He also testified that he was aware that he should not have been driving given the conditions which attached to his G1 driver’s licence.

[38] Having watched the dash cam video recording from the city bus which was a block behind the two vehicles when they were stopped at the traffic lights at Charlton Avenue, and which shows the maneuver of DC David when he pulled into Mr. Al Jalmoud’s lane, I accept that that maneuver would have been startling to anyone sitting in Mr. Al Jalmoud’s position, but it was unlikely to have generated a response as extreme as Mr. Al Jalmoud’s unless the driver was afraid of the police or had something to hide from them, or both.

[39] Having reviewed the evidence, and taking into account the jury’s verdict, I have concluded that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s intention was to flee from the police. It was late in the evening, and he was driving a strange car without a proper licence. Mr. Al Jalmoud was still at that time a relative newcomer to Canada. His driving to that point demonstrated that he was an inexperienced and possibly nervous driver. In addition, the evidence established that he had a fear of police. The speed at which he departed leaves no doubt that he intended to get away from the police.

[40] Before leaving this topic, I make two further points. Mr. Foda argues that I cannot come to the conclusion that Mr. Al Jalmoud was fleeing the police because the Crown did not pursue that argument at trial and because the Crown withdrew a charge of flight from the police. I do not agree that either of these facts prevents me from coming to the conclusion I have reached. I do not know why the Crown exercised its discretion to withdraw the charge of flight from the police (although I do note that that offence has elements which the Crown may not have been able to prove in this case [2]). Nor do I know why this line of inquiry was not pursued by the Crown at trial. I am left to my own assessment of the evidence and, as I have said, it leads me to the conclusion that Mr. Al Jalmoud intended to flee. Indeed, I am of the view that this conclusion is inescapable.

[41] In addition, though, given their conclusion on the fail to stop counts, Mr. Foda submits that the jury must have accepted that Mr. Al Jalmoud suffered from PTSD, a mental illness. As I have already said, I agree with this reasoning. From this, the defence goes further and submits that the evidence establishes that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s mental illness played a role in this event and his moral culpability for the offences is thereby diminished. In particular, it is submitted that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s PTSD, which was characterized by, among other things, a fear of police officers, played a direct role in this incident.

[42] Evidence of mental illness can be relevant in sentencing in at least two ways: R. v. Dillon, 2025 ONSC 958, para. 23. Where it has played a role in the commission of the offence, the offender’s mental illness can reduce his or her moral blameworthiness for that offence. Evidence of mental illness may also be relevant to the impact of the sentence on the offender and might thereby motivate the sentencing judge to reduce the length of a sentence or change the nature of the sentence imposed. I will return to the second of these issues later in my reasons and focus now on whether Mr. Al Jalmoud’s mental illness played a role in his dangerous operation of a conveyance – to disastrous effect.

[43] As I stated earlier, the jury’s verdict demands the conclusion that Mr. Al Jalmoud was not sent into a PTSD-induced dissociative state when DC David pulled into his lane. As I have already concluded, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Al Jalmoud fled from the police for a constellation of reasons which I have already described (see para. 39, above). One of those reasons was Mr. Al Jalmoud’s fear of police. I accept that that fear was developed during Mr. Al Jalmoud’s very unfortunate upbringing in Syria and Lebanon and that it is related to – either as a symptom or cause of – his PTSD.

[44] However, while I accept that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s generalized fear of police may have played some role in this event, I am of the view that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s PTSD was not the most important factor in his decision to flee from the police. In my view, more important is the evidence which establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Al Jalmoud was driving without a proper licence, and that he knew that doing so was wrong. From that I infer that he knew that he was at risk of some kind of penalty if the police discovered that fact. In other words, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Al Jalmoud was trying to evade detection. That his reaction to the maneuver of the police was excessive, is at least as attributable to his inexperience as a driver as it is to his fear of the police.

[45] In short, while I accept that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s PTSD played a small part in this incident, and that this fact should result in some mitigation of sentence, my conclusion is that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s primary motivation was to evade detection by fleeing from the police. Put another way, this is not a case where the offender’s mental illness played a “central role” in the offence: R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114, para. 38; R. v. Ellis, 2013 ONCA 739, paras. 116–121, leave to appeal refused [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 35649.

[46] In my view, these conclusions are not inconsistent with the jury’s conclusion that Mr. Al Jalmoud was not criminally responsible for the fail to stop offences, which occurred mere moments later. As I have said, Dr. Prat gave evidence that it was possible that Mr. Al Jalmoud’s dissociative state was triggered either by the collision itself or by Mr. Al Jalmoud’s exposure to the scene after he returned to it. In other words, either of these triggers could have operated independently of the events which preceded the collision, and Mr. Al Jalmoud’s motivation for speeding away from the police minivan. In other words, Dr. Prat’s evidence left open the possibility for the jury that Mr. Al Jalmoud was acting voluntarily until the collision or shortly after it, and that he was in a dissociative state thereafter. The jury obviously accepted this evidence.

[47] Although I do not think it is strictly necessary for me to do so, I close this portion of my consideration of the facts by observing, for the sake of completeness, that it seems to me that as between the two options left for the jury by Dr. Prat’s evidence, it is much more likely that the jury accepted that the collision had caused the onset of Mr. Al Jalmoud’s PTSD and dissociative state, and much less likely that it was caused by Mr. Al Jalmoud’s return to the scene. I come to this conclusion based largely on the fact that the video surveillance recordings show Mr. Al Jalmoud exiting the Escape and leaving the scene having failed to stop and give his name and address as required by s. 320.16 of the Code. [3] It was open to the jury to conclude that all the elements of the offence of failing to stop had been made out at that time and that Mr. Al Jalmoud was already in a dissociative state as a result of the collision. By contrast, the only way in which a dissociative state commencing upon Mr. Al Jalmoud’s return to the scene could have resulted in the verdict of no criminal responsibility, is if the jury found that Mr. Al Jalmoud failed to give his name and address upon returning. In my view, the evidence at trial was not capable of establishing that element of the offence at that time beyond a reasonable doubt largely because no police witness said positively that Mr. Al Jalmoud failed to give his name and address at that time.

[48] Having considered the facts of the offences, I turn to the principles which must govern my sentencing decision.

Sentencing Principles

[49] The Code directs that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society by the imposition of sentences which, among other things, denounce unlawful conduct and the harms done to victims; deter the offender and others from engaging in similar conduct; and assist in the rehabilitation of the offender (s. 718).

[50] The Code also requires me to take into account any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender (s. 718.2(a)). Among the factors I must consider is significant impact on the victims (s. 718.2(a)(iii.1)), the need for the sentence to be similar to other sentences imposed in similar circumstances (s. 718.2(b)); that the imposition of consecutive sentences should not result in a total sentence which is too long or harsh (s. 718.2(c)); and that the least restrictive punishment that is appropriate should be imposed (ss. 718.2(d) and (e)).

[51] In addition to the maximum and minimum penalties I described at the beginning of these reasons (see, para. 2 above), Parliament gives further guidance in specific provisions of the Code that apply to cases involving the operation of vehicles. First in this respect, in a preamble section to Part VIII.1 of the Code, among other things, Parliament directs that “the protection of society is well served by deterring persons from operating conveyances dangerously … because that conduct poses a threat to the life, health and safety of Canadians” (s. 320.12(b)). Second, on sentencing, the Code requires me to consider as aggravating features the following circumstances: that bodily harm or death was caused to more than one person, and that the offender was not permitted under provincial law to operate the conveyance (ss. 320.22(a) and (g)).

[52] These legislative pronouncements are consistent with the common law. The courts have consistently held that deterrence and denunciation are the most important factors in sentencing for criminal driving offences: In R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, para. 73, Wagner J. (as he then was) wrote as follows for a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada:

While it is true that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation apply in most cases, they are particularly relevant to offences that might be committed by ordinarily law‑abiding people. It is such people, more than chronic offenders, who will be sensitive to harsh sentences. Impaired driving offences are an obvious example of this type of offence, as this Court noted in Proulx:

… dangerous driving and impaired driving may be offences for which harsh sentences plausibly provide general deterrence. These crimes are often committed by otherwise law‑abiding persons, with good employment records and families. Arguably, such persons are the ones most likely to be deterred by the threat of severe penalties. [Citations omitted.]

[53] In R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487, the Court of Appeal addressed the same issue in the context of a case involving dangerous driving causing bodily harm. There, at paras. 33 and 45, Gillese J.A. wrote as follows:

General deterrence and denunciation are the most important factors in the determination of a sentence in a case such as this one. Other, like-minded people need to know that irresponsible use of a motor vehicle on our highways will not be countenanced. A sentence can only denounce conduct and deter others to the extent that it is punitive. The essence of general deterrence, is, therefore, punishment.

It is worth repeating – dangerous driving causing bodily harm is a serious offence. An appropriate sentence must give primacy to the objectives of general deterrence and denunciation. To meet the requirements of these principles, the sentence must clearly reflect the seriousness of the conduct and its consequences, both actual and potential. To meet the requirements of denunciation, it is necessary that there be absolutely no ambiguity in the message that such conduct is completely unacceptable. [Citations omitted.]

[54] Of course, other principles of sentencing must also be borne in mind. A sentence should not be crushing, should properly recognize the offender’s level of culpability or blameworthiness, and should be imposed by a court alert for the prospects of rehabilitation. Last, the court’s assessment of the extent to which the sentence imposed must reflect the need for specific deterrence will also always be an important consideration.

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Endnotes

[1] These reasons were delivered orally on March 7, 2025.

[2] At s. 320.17, the Code creates the offence of flight “while being pursued by a police officer.” While DC David did follow Mr. Al Jalmoud after Mr. Al Jalmoud sped away, he did so at a much slower speed, and it is at least arguable that the Crown would have difficulty proving pursuit and/or that Mr. Al Jalmoud was aware of same.

[3] In this respect, I note that at trial, the Crown did not rely on the alternate route to liability under this section, the failure to offer assistance.

[4] Strictly speaking, then, since Downes credit is not a mathematical deduction but a mitigating factor, the sentence in this case is one of 3 years and 5 months less credit for 2 months of pre-trial custody, leaving 3 years and 3 months to be served.

Released: March 12, 2025